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This project examines the nature of UK relations with the Omani Sultans, Sultan Said bin 
Taimur (1932-1970) and his son, Sultan Qaboos (1970-present), in the context of the Dhofar War 
(1965-1975). The internal and external circumstances of this conflict give valuable insights into 
Omani independence and sovereignty, thereby addressing the paucity of Omani writing on this 
conflict (e.g. Al Hamdani, 2010, Al Amri, 2012, Ja’boub, 2010; Muqaibl, 2002).  
This study utilises a qualitative descriptive analytical methodology to study documents from 
British, American, Egyptian, and Omani sources, including archival texts from government officials 
and the revolutionaries. Interviews were also conducted with key military and civilian figures in the 
Sultanate of Oman and Britain. 
Examination of the actions undertaken by Sultan Said and Sultan Qaboos in the war 
highlights a dichotomy between the need to ensure compatibility with British politics at that time 
and the desire of the Omani leaders to maintain independence in the face of British imperialism. 
Despite the fact the profound differences between the policies of both Sultans, this study shows that 
both governments had a developing and negotiable autonomy, rather than existing as a direct colony 
or an informal colony (see Abdalsatar, 1989, p. 46; Fadel, 1995, p. 212; Halliday, 2008, p. 331; 
Miles, 1920, pp. 222-230; Omar, 2008, pp. 6-7; Owtram, 2004, p. 16; Samah, 2016, p. 273; Sultan 
& Naqeeb, 2008, p. 26; Wilson, 2012, pp. 331-332).Importantly, the relationship with the British is 
shown to have been a less important factor in the events and should therefore not be over-stated as 
informal imperialism. The main political values in the conflict were: (1) the support of tribal 
leaders; (2) the role of Islam and communism; (3) the unity of the leadership; and (4) the relations 
between the Sultans and other Gulf leaders. Overall, the relationship between the Omani rulers and 
the British was one of friendship, cooperation, and exchange of interests, which the Sultans used to 
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Bin  The son of... 
Front  Dhofar revolution 
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descendant of the Prophet, as is the case in some Arab countries, such as 
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 The Importance of the Study 
This study provides a discussion of one of the most important political and military events in 
Oman during the twentieth century. The Dhofar War is named after the southern region of the 
Sultanate of Oman in which it took place. It lasted for ten years (1965-1975) and is significant for a 
number of reasons, including the fact that it constitutes an important example of British diplomatic 
policy with regard to Oman and the nature of UK relations with the Omani Sultans: Sultan Said bin 
Taimur and his son, Sultan Qaboos. The reign of Sultan Said ended in 1970, during the Dhofar War, 
and he was succeeded by Qaboos. In many ways, the Dhofar War precipitated this important event. 
In fact, the war united Oman as never before, with profound ramifications for the internal and 
external policies of the nation, as will be explored in this thesis. 
Although there were good reasons for ending the Dhofar conflict, quickly,regional and 
international intervention resulted in it becoming the Arab world’s longest lasting war, with the 
fighting continuing for more than a decade. The rebels in Dhofar began their opposition to the 
policies of Sultan Said from 1965, but due to the official policy of not investigating the past, there is 
a paucity of Omani writing on this conflict, except for general studies by a handful of scholars (e.g. 
Al Hamdani, 2010; Al Amri, 2012; Ja’boub, 2010; Muqaibl, 2002). Al Hamdani (2010) focus on 
the policy that Sultan Qaboos used to win the hearts and minds of the revolutionaries, while Al 
Amri (2012) exclusively narrated the events of the war. In contrast, Ja’boub (2010) compared the 
interests of the revolutionaries and the sultans from an educational perspective, with particular 
forcus on the development of the educational process in the government and rebel areas of Dhofar, 
especially after the adoption of the communist ideology by the rebels, as this was accompanied by a 
major development in the curriculum and methods of education. Muqaibl (2002)  covered the 
Dhofar War in one chapter of his book, with his discussion concentrating on the role played by 
Sultan Qaboos in uniting Oman. 
The consequence of this is that many people, including most Omanis, are unaware of the 
events, despite many of those who witnessed the rebellion still being alive. The majority of the 
books about the conflict were either written by Britons (e.g. Buttenshaw 2010; Dunsire, 2011; 
Fiennes, 1974; Gardner, 2007; Halliday, 2008; Jeapes, 1996; Jessop, 1985; Wilkinson, 2006) or by 
non-Omani scholars (e.g. Al Rayes, 2002; Fadel, 1995; Haglawi, 2003; Kechichian, 2013; Medhi, 
1995; Takriti, 2013; Trabulsy, 2004). As a consequence of these studies being written by non-







Omani scholars with regards to the Dhofar War is typically that Britain acted as if Oman was under 
its protection. However, the reality is otherwise, at least from a legal perspective, with Omani rulers 
refusing British control in different ways and proportions, according to the circumstances. Overall, 
however the Dhofar War is given little attention in Oman for several reasons. At the time, it was a 
largely secret war (Fiennes, 1974, p. 15; Halliday, 2008; Jeapes, 1996, p. 11; Ordeman, 2016, p. 2,). 
As noted above, there is also a government policy of avoiding discussion of tumultuous past events 
(Sultan Qaboos’ Speech, 1990, p. 16). As a consequence of this, there is a serious shortage of local 
writing about this important period of time, despite the profound impact that it has had on the 
history and policy of the Sultanate of Oman.  
This research will constitute an important addition to the literature on a significant period in 
Middle Eastern history, enriching understanding of not only the Sultanate of Oman, but also the 
surrounding area. It is hoped that studying Britain’s diplomatic policy towards the Dhofar conflict, 
the pursuit of its own national interests during the Cold War period, and the nature of the 
relationship between the Omani Sultans and the British government, will provide valuable insights 
into this significant decade in the history of the region, into British attitudes towards the Dhofar 
War, and especially into the philosophy that underpins the current internal and international policies 
of the Sultanate. Therefore, this thesis will study the Dhofar War from a local perspective within the 
context of British diplomacy in an attempt to address the gap in historical understanding of the 
relations between Britain and Oman.  
The analysis in this chapter is organised into the following sections. First the chapter 
delineates the objectives of the research and defines its viewpoint in terms of the relationship 
between British diplomacy and Oman, as well as the corresponding Omani interaction with this 
diplomacy. As part of this overview, the main sources and methods utilised in this study are 
outlined. Secondly, this is followed by a background chronology within which to locate and 
understand the Dhofar War in internal Omani terms. Thirdly, in order to locate the arguments and 
interpretation of the present study, an investigation is then provided into the secondary literature, 
with particular reference to the various ways in which Omani history has been classified by both 
Arab and western historians. Finally, this chapter discusses the background and historiographical 
relationship between Britain and Oman during the Dhofar War, with the aim of understanding why 
British diplomacy sought a compromise with the Sultans in pursuit of its own national interests. 







to unite and secure the stability of Oman from internal and external threats in an attempt to provide 
developing and negotiable autonomy for the country. 
 
1.1: Objectives of the Study 
On the one hand, this study examines the Dhofar War in relation to British diplomatic 
policy. Particular attention is given to its political interactions with the Sultanate during that period. 
The involvement of Britain in the internal affairs of Oman will be studied in conjunction with the 
reasons for British diplomacy following a policy of war and the outcomes of that approach. An 
exploration will also be provided of the role played by British diplomacy in the overthrow of Sultan 
Said during the war, which allowed for a new era in the Omani-British relations upon the 
succession of his son, Sultan Qaboos. On the other hand, an investigation will be conducted into the 
strategies utilised by Oman in this area to make decisions independently of Britain. The study will 
highlight the role of Sultan Said and Sultan Qaboos in the war, with particular focus on how that 
role was compatible with British politics and the desire of the Omani leaders to maintain 
independence in the face of threatened British imperialism. The plan of Sultan Qaboos to defeat the 
rebellion will be discussed in conjunction with the internal instability of Oman, his success in 
engaging support from Britain and the effect that this had on the course of the war, as well as on his 
plan to reunite the country after the war. The study will prove that the Omani government had a 
developing and negotiable autonomy, rather than existing as a direct colony or an informal colony 
(See Owtram, 2004, p. 122). 
In contrast to much of the current literature, this thesis will highlight the Omanis perspective 
on British diplomacy in the Dhofar War, namely that Britain was principally or exclusively focused 
on its own interests, especially its economic concerns. In other words, Britain sought to obtain 
strategic and economic benefits from its relationship with Oman. Before the exploitation of oil, 
Oman was important to Britain because of its geographical location, which enabled the sea route to 
India to be secured. With the discovery of oil and the important role played by British companies in 
capitalising upon it, Oman became economically more important for Britain. This raises the 
question of why Oman collaborated with British control, suggesting that the Sultanate managed to 
preserve Oman’s unity through the use of British support. Indeed, British military aid played an 







preventing the fall of the country into the hands of the communist rebels. The Omani perspective is 
that while British diplomacy in Oman was based on perpetuating its own national interests, this also 
interest was for the benefit of Oman because of required the protection of the country against both 
external and internal threats. Hence, Omani rulers traditionally benefited from good relations with 
Britain, as it preserved its unity and stability, ultimately keeping them in power. Although Britain 
gained more from the relationship, at least in economic terms, Oman retained its independence and 
was not a colony. It is also crucial to understand that Oman used Britain to create positive 
conditions for the nation and that the Sultans were able to use their relationship with Britain to their 
advantage. In this sense, this study will be conducted on the premise that neither side benefited 
exclusively from the relationship. The decade of the Dhofar War (1965-1975) has a special 
importance and thus respect in the contemporary history of Oman. Particular focus will be given to 
the year 1970, during which Sultan Said was overthrown by his son, Sultan Qaboos. Sultan Qaboos 
radically changed the course of war, which had important ramifications for British diplomacy 
during this period. During these years, Oman also witnessed notable economic, social and political 
developments, the most important of which was the transition to an oil-based economy, which 
profoundly affected the construction of the modern nation of Oman. The unity that prevails in 
modern Oman can arguably be attributed to the conflicts and separation movements witnessed 
during those years. 
The thesis is principally therefore concerned with the overall argument that the Omani 
government had more autonomy from the British government than is normally conceded by the 
literature in this field. In effect, this thesis argues that Oman did not operate under direct 
colonialism or informal colonialism, instead functioning with developing and negotiable autonomy. 
There were five distinguishing ‘local’ values of political relations in Oman during the Dhofar War, 
in addition to which the relationship with the British was not the most important. These main 
political values were: (1) the relationships with tribal leaders and the importance of gaining their 
support in the conflict; (2) the role of Islam and communism; (3) the unity of the leadership on the 
side of the state and rebels; (4) the relations between the Sultans, the rebels and the other countries 
in the region; and regional countries; as well as (5) the diplomatic and military relations between 
Oman and Britain. It is argued that these ‘local’ values were as and at times more important in 
determining Oman’s autonomy than the predominant focus in the secondary literature on British-








This study utilises a descriptive analytical methodology (qualitative research) to study documents 
from the British National Archives, a selection of relevant American documents, and important 
Omani documents of the policies led by the revolutionaries, especially those related to the decisions 
of their conferences and meetings. The analysis also includes the most important speeches of Sultan 
Said and Sultan Qaboos, which have been selected based on their relevance to the policy of the new 
government led by Sultan Qaboos. This documentary analysis will be supplemented with interviews 
with key military and civilian figures in the Sultanate of Oman and Britain. Relevent Articles, 
magazines and newspaper have also been accessed in Egyptian libraries and archives. Photographs 
and maps have been taken from the following archives in Oman: the archives of the HE Minister 
responsible for Defence Affairs, the Chief of the Sultan Armed Force, the Royal Army of Oman 
archives, the Royal Air Force archives, the National Survey Authority (NSA), Ministry of Media 
archives, Oman, Oman oil company library, and the National Records and Archives Authority. 
Documents Selection: A plan of action was formulated to enable selection of the most appropriate 
documents. The sources focused on the nature of the relationship between the sultans of Oman and 
the British government, looking at how the sultans received the wishes and aspirations of the British 
side regarding Oman, and how British diplomats viewed the Omani sultans. It was also important to 
consider how the sultans of Oman viewed the British diplomats and the nature of British diplomacy 
towards Oman in terms of its priorities and areas of focus. In addition, special attention was given 
to the documents which focused on any value, whether local, regional or international, that affected 
the course of the war. 
Interviews: the researcher focused on a very important topic, namely the tribal loyalties of the local 
inhabitants of Dhofar. As explained in section 1.2,the geography of the Dhofar region is divided 
into three main categories: the plains, the mountains and the desert, which separates the region from 
the rest of Oman. Each of these regions is inhabited by competing tribes. A resident of the desert 
will tend to highlight what was done or said by the elders of the desert tribe. This is also the case 
with the other tribes. By interviewing a mixture of the tribes of the three regions, it was possible to 
ensure that accurate data was extracted through interviews, thus overcoming the subject of tribal 








Fig. 1: Map showing Oman and Dhofar 
(Source: National Survey, NSA OM 154) 
 
 1.3: The Internal Background to the Dhofar War 
The Arabs constitute the overwhelming majority of the population of Oman, although there 
are several other important racial groups: the Baluchi, the Persians, the Africans, the Hindus and the 
Persians (Philips, 2012, p. 11). These numbers are believed to have risen in response to Oman's 
openness to the outside world, which is reflected in the government's complacency towards the 
naturalisation of non-Omanis, as well as non-Ibadi. Most of the Arabs in northern Oman reject the 
Ibadi doctrine, except those who migrated after the establishment of the first, second and third 
Saudi state. Some Sunni Arabs migrated to northern Oman from Saudi Arabia as a result of the 
persecution from Wahhabism and were thus able to retain their faith, although the Wahhabi invaded 
some parts of Oman in response. Most of the Dhofar population forms part of a Sunni sect. They 
were adherents of the Ibadi doctrine until they changed their beliefs in the eleventh century 
(Interview, Al Shaibani, 24thJanuary 2017).  
Geographical factors, such as location, environment, 
terrain, and climate, have long played a significant role in the 
shaping of historical events. The important location of Oman, 
the diversity of terrain, its long coast, and the abundance of its 
natural resources are all factors that have ensured its strategic 
importance across the millennia. Administratively, the country 
comprises eight governorates, one of which is the governorate 
of Dhofar, which borders Yemen in the west and Saudi Arabia 
to the north and northwest. The administrative capital of the 
region is Salalah, which is the largest of the governorate’s 
nine cities and is situated 1000 kilometres away from the 
capital Muscat (see figure1). 
There are three types of climates in Oman: the prevailing desert climate of the centre; the 
Mediterranean region climate of the northern mountains. This climate occurs because of the rise of 
the green mountains up to 10,000 feet above sea level, resulting in weather and native flora that 
resembles the countries of the Mediterranean region. The climate can become quite cool throughout 
the year, with temperatures falling below 5 ° C below zero in winter and during the seasonal rain 
climate of the Dhofar region. From June to September, the Jabal receives moisture-laden monsoon 







rebels took advantage of this season and the heavy forests in their guerrilla operations against the 
Sultan’s forces. The nature of the terrain and the changing climate of Dhofar region, especially its 
fog and rain, made the task facing the Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF) and their allies considerably 
more difficult and were key factors in prolonging the war. 
A comprehensive understanding of the Dhofar War also requires knowledge of the local 
geography. Dhofar is also bordered by Yemen on the west and extends eastward for about 300 
kilometres. South Yemen expelled the British in 1967 and became the most important supporter of 
the rebels, who were inspired to believe that nationalist revolutions were able to overthrow colonial 
rulers. The province of Dhofar also borders Saudi Arabia in the northwest. These shared borders 
enabled Saudi support for the rebels at the beginning of the conflict. Importantly, because Dhofar 
also overlooks the Indian Ocean, the conflict attracted international and regional powers. The result 
was that although the conflict started as a rebellion against poverty and illness, default and abuse of 
power, and evolved into a proxy war between the ideologies of capitalism and communism in the 
wider Cold War conflict. 
The terrain of Dhofar can be divided into three different regions. The desert area in the north 
and constitutes two-thirds of Dhofar, where oil and natural gas fields are found. It is called the 
Najed area, which means ‘high place’. The second is the Dhofar Mountain Chain in the south of the 
governorate. These mountains were the most important war zones. The third region is a plain called 
the Jarbeeb, which is situated to the south of this mountainous range. The capital of Salalah is 
located on the Jarbeeb and was the residence of Sultan Said during the war. During the majority of 
the conflict, this plain was controlled by the Sultan of Oman Armed Forces (SAF), while the 
mountains were held by the rebels. 
Oman has historically been ruled by an Imamate. The relationship between the Imamate and 
the Sultans’ government, supported by the British, is an important factor in the complexity of the 
Dhofar War. The Imamate is a very old notion in Oman and has been applied for several centurie. 
The Imamate is an old political system in Oman, dating back to the hostility of the Sahaba in 657. 
After the Islamic state turned from democracy to dictatorship at the end of the rule of the Khlifas, 
which only lasted for 29 years, the Umayyads assumed the rule of the Islamic state and made it 
hereditary (Philips, pp. 25-26).In response, a group of Muslims at that time decided to follow the 
approach of the Khlifas, who were later known as the Ibadis, and migrated to Oman in response to 







for centuries in Oman, some powers appeared and assumed power, calling themselves the sultans. 
One of these groups was the Al Busaid dynasty, who rule Oman until today. Although the leaders of 
the Imamate and the Sultans of Al Busaid owe the Ibadi doctrine, there is an ancient disagreement 
between the groups due to the Ibadi imams insisting on the election of the ruler,  whether he be 
from the family of Bousaid or any other family. In contrast, the regime of the Ba'thid sultans is 
hereditary and therefore views the imamate system as a threat to their rule. It is therefore important 
to note that the difference between these powerful groups is political in terms of the system of 
government, not religious. Al Busaid family, which has ruled Oman for 270 years, making it the 
oldest ruling family in the Arab World. However, several rebellions have threatened the position of 
the Al Busaid family. British support of the Sultans has been an important factor in the continuation 
of their rule despite the threat of local tribes, which can be largely attributed to the imposition of 
high taxation and, under British pressure, an embargo on tribal trading in arms. Usually, the tribes 
of Oman used an intellectual traditional style deeply rooted in the Ibadism, which is a democratic 
form for electing an Imam. This created a conflict between the democratic selection approach of the 
Imamate and the inherited rule of the sultans, leading to repeated attempts to overthrow the rule of 
the rulers and end associated foreign interference. For example, the removal of Sultan Salim bin 
Thuwaini (1865-68)by Imam Azzan bin Qais Al Busaidi (1868-71) in 1865.The Dhofar War and 
the rebellion of the Imamate, later known as the Al Jabal Al Akhdhar War, are however the most 
important conflicts since 1900. The Imamate rebellion began in 1913 in the areas surrounding the 
Al Jabal Al Akhdhar, after the election of an Imam. In 1920, the Treaty of Seeb was signed between 
the Imam of Oman (1913-1919) and Sultan Timor (1913-1932), the father of Sultan Said (1932-
1970). In effect, this agreement was considered as consent to the independence of the Imamate of 
Oman from the Sultan of Muscat. However, after 1939, British oil companies received concessions 
from Sultan Said for oil exploration. When they failed to discover commercial quantities of oil in 
the lands of the Sultan, they moved towards the areas under the influence of the Imamate. The 
Imam refused to allow these companies exploration rights, which resulted in the Sultan declaring 
war in 1957, with the support of the British and the oil companies (Al Rayes, 2000, p. 28; Halliday, 
2008, p. 344; Kechichian, 2013, p. 251). After the death of Imam Muhammad Al Khalili (1920-
1954), Imam Ghaleb bin Ali Al Hinai (1954-1957) was elected in 1954. Sultan Saidhad been 
waiting for the death of Imam Muhammad, who had exercised a strong influence over the imamate 
areas, to begin an oil exploration campaign into the areas under these areas, supported by a military 







the Imamate. After several armed clashes between the parties and the arrest of many collaborators, 
Sultan Said entered Nizwa, the capital of the Imam. In response, Saudi Arabia and Egypt provided 
support to the Imam in the form of weapons that were smuggled through the mountains, resulting in 
Imam announcing the revolution. The Sultan's forces regained influence from the imamate in 1957, 
when Sultan Said managed to persuade the Royal Air Force to bomb the Imam's sites in Jabal Al 
Akhdar for two years, until the leaders of the Imamate fled into exile in Saudi Arabia in 1959 
(Philips, 2012,pp. 440-464). 
After a two year guerrilla-style war in the Al Jabal Al Akhdhar, fought with the participation 
of the British Army and Royal Air Force, the Imam fled Oman and led the rebellion from Saudi 
Arabia, with the financial and political support of the Saudi Kingdom. The Imam remained 
politically active in the international arena until the rise of Sultan Qaboos in 1970. Saudi Arabia 
tried to take advantage of the presence of the Imam in its territory, coordinating with the Imam and 
the leaders of the Dhofar rebellion to obtain political gains by opposing their common enemy, 
Sultan Said with the support of British troops. As this thesis will demonstrate, the success of the 
British against the forces of the Imam was not only good for Britain, as it resulted in the country 
being opened up for oil exploration by British companies, but was also good for Sultan Said, 
because it united Oman and ensured great wealth from oil revenues.  
 When Yemen was strong, Dhofar came under its sway, but when the rulers in Oman were 
strong, the area was incorporated into Oman. At other times, when the Dhofar region was governed 
by powerful rulers, it was independent. For example, Dhofar became part of Oman after 1879, 
during the reign of Sultan Turki (1871-1888), the great-grandfather of Sultan Said, who took the 
region after a civil war between the mountain tribes and plains tribes. The latter group, who were 
the weaker party at the time, sought the intervention of the Sultan of Muscat. In 1895, during the 
rule of Sultan Faisal (1888-1913) (the grandfather of Sultan Said), the local tribes revolted and 
imposed their control over the region. However, the Sultan’s forces eventually re-established 
control with the help of the British military (Al Taei, 2008, pp. 274-275). Since taking power in 
1932, Sultan Said bin Taimur was more strongly associated with Dhofar than his ancestors. He 
turned the city of Salalah into a summer capital and strengthened his association with the region by 
marrying into one of the powerful Dhofari tribes. This wife is the mother of Sultan Qaboos, the 








The rebellions of 1879 and 1895 were limited tribal conflicts that resulted from accidental 
events. As a consequence they lacked material and organisational capabilities, as well as external 
support. On some occasions, the sultans applied the policy of divide and rule to the tribes of the 
plain and the mountain, whereas at other times they attempted to balance power among those tribes 
(Muqaibl, 2002, p. 235). British support enabled Sultans Turki and Faisal to end these conflicts, 
thus further indebting them to Britain. In contrast, the rebellion that led to the Dhofar War (1965-
1975), the subject of this study, united the majority of the people of Dhofar against the rule of the 
Sultan Said, making it a different kind of phenomenon. 
The roots of the rebellion that sought to free Dhofar from the rule of the Sultans in Muscat 
can be traced to 1962, when Musalim bin Nafal founded what was later to become the Dhofar 
Liberation Front (DLF), with Saudi and Iraqi support. Initially, because of the harsh policies of the 
Sultan towards them, the movement focused on armed struggle to secure independence from Oman 
for the people of the Dhofar Region, encapsulated in the slogan, “Dhofar for Dhofari people”. This 
objective was to be achieved through the provision of money, weapons, and training for the fighters 
(Haglawi, 2003, pp. 308-309). However, after their military and political successes during the 
subsequent years, the leaders of the rebellion committed to wider aims of expelling British troops, 
toppling ruling families in the Gulf, and transforming Oman into a socialist democratic society. 
This Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF) began as the 
Dhofar Charity Association, which was organised to 
engender financial support from Omani students 
studying in the other Gulf countries and eventually to 
encourage them to fight for the revolution. This group 
developed into the Dhofar Soldiers Organisation, and 
finally, through the local organisations of the Arab 
National Movement, into the Dhofar Liberation Front. 
The activities of the DLF escalated between 1965 and 
1968 due to continued aid from Saudi Arabia, Iraq and 
Egypt. Egyptian political, military and moral support was particularly valuable to the rebellion, with 
President Jamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, still strong after his Suez crisis victory, encouraging Arab 
nationalist movements to eradicate British influence throughout the region (Haglawi, 2003, pp. 307-
309). Support also began from the People’s Republic of China as it sought to gain a foothold in the 
Fig. 2: Mid-1960s, Sultan Said meeting a 
 visiting RAF officer at Salalah in Dhofar 
(Source: Royal Armey of Oman Archives, 








Fig. 3: July 1970, Sultan Qaboos 
meetsthe Sultan Armed Forces 
officers at Muscat after the coup 
(Source: Royal Army of Oman 
Archives, RAO, Sultan Qaboos 5470) 
 
region, which had been largely monopolised by the west and was witnessing an economic boom 
associated with its oil revenues. China promoted an anti-western and anti-capitalist policy by 
backing the rebels and spreading its own brand of communist ideology into the region (Al Amri, 
2012, p. 105). 
Another important ally for the rebels came from South Yemen, which had gained 
independence from the British in 1967, following generous aid provided by the United Arab 
Republic (Egypt and Syria). Once the Communists came to power, the state declared itself to be the 
People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), providing moral, military and economic support 
to the rebels in Dhofar (Dunsire, 2011, p. 1). It can be argued that the success of the nationalists in 
ousting the British from Aden and the Protectorate of South Yemen encouraged the leaders of the 
Dhofar Liberation Front to increase their efforts to drive the 
Omanis out of Dhofar. However, communist ideology gained 
prominence, with the rebel leaders subscribing closely to a 
Maoist interpretation of Marxist theory (Jessop, 1985, pp. 
50,271). They assumed that this ideology clarified the issues of 
the national and social struggle in the colonised world. However, 
in the struggle to liberate Dhofar, the nationalists discovered that 
they had unleashed a much larger force than they had intended. 
By 1970, in response to fears that his policies would result in the 
loss of Dhofar and then the whole country, a coup was executed 
against Sultan Said by Omanis with the full coordination, support 
and planning of the British who were working in the Sultan’s 
forces (see figure 3) (Al Busaidi, 1965, pp. 3-5). The harsh policies of the Sultan were even 
exercised against members of his own family, particularly after an unsuccessful assassination 
attempt by soldiers sympathetic to the rebel cause in Dhofar in 1966. This eventually resulted in the 
Sultan retiring to his palace in Salalah (Fadel, 1995, p. 380). Some Arab historians consider the 
coup to be part of Britain’s arrangement to ensure their “strategic, economic and security” interests 
before leaving the regions east of Suez in 1971 (Dhiab, 1984, p. 109). Al Takriti claims that Britain 
supported the coup because they felt threatened by a dictatorial ruler(2013, p. 140), while Agwani 
(1978, p. 71) adds that Britain intended to support attempts to replace the ruling system in response 







the desires of an elite group of Omanis, rather than the British, led by Sultan Qaboos with the 
support of his uncle Tariq (Al Amri, 2012, pp. 153-152; Bahbahani, 1984, p. 155; Jeapes, 1996, p. 
27; Muqaibl, 2002, p.285). Moreover, the prevailing Arab national situation in the region at that 
time would not allow the continuation of any traditional government, such as the government of 
Sultan Said who had been opposing scio-economic change (Wilkinson, 2006, p. 462). The palace 
coup of 1970 was clearly the most prominent internal political fallout of the Dhofar War. It has 
been argued that this was a watershed event that radically altered Oman and was instrumental in the 
country moving from tradition to modernity (Rabi, 2011, p. 76).  
Until the mid-1970s, the rebels enjoyed military superiority. However, following the British 
strategy supporting the removal of removing recalcitrant leaders, the new Sultan Qaboos quickly 
introduced reformist policies that split the ranks of the rebels. As a result, he received extensive 
support from a large number of countries, especially those who perceived that a successful rebellion 
might spread to other Gulf Arab states, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the balance of 
power in the form of military, political and economic factors was altered in favour of the new 
Sultan. Following the failures suffered by the rebellion in combat and politics in the 1970s, rebel 
leaders reduced their aspirations from “the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf” to only “the 
Liberation of Oman”, renaming the movement to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman 
(PFLO) in 1974.  
It is also important to understand that anti-western countries, such as Egypt, played a major 
role in supporting the rebels because their policy was to support those working to remove western 
intervention, especially that of Britain. This approach increased following the failure of the tripartite 
aggression (Britain, Israel, and France) against Egypt after President Nasser announced the 
nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956. Its failure gave Arab people more confidence that 
colonialism could be defeated. Sultan Said was hostile to Egypt under the leadership of Abdel 
Nasser because of their Arab nationalist approach against  hereditary rulers, which he considered to 
be an Egyptian intervention in the affairs of other independent states, most importantly his own 
regime. Nevertheless, he did not have a certain official position because of its isolation from 
international affairs (interview, Sheikh Ahmed Al Falahi, 31stMarch 2018). Taking a historical 
overview of Oman, it is clear that British policy in Oman was based on supporting the Sultans of 
Muscat against internal revolution. Several revolutions broke out in northern Oman, but these were 







Sultans by the British in return for their commitment to treaties that served and protected the 
interests of Britain. In the rule of the relatively stable Al Busaidi sultans, the British government 
secured a guarantee not to stand against their interests in the region, while the Omani rulers found a 
strong ally that provided a means with which to improve the unity and stability of their country.  
 
 1.4:  The concept of informal and formal imperialism 
This idea was first advanced by Robinson and Gallagher in their article ‘The Imperialism of 
Free Trade’ (1953) (Economic History Review, 1953, pp. 1–15), which looks at formal and informal 
empires. The key features of an ‘informal empire’ as a classification or ideal type can be understood 
as follows (Osterhammel, 1986):  
in a situation of power differentials, a strong country (S) possesses an effective veto 
over a weaker country (W) whilst avoiding direct rule. The stronger a country has 
the high capacity to impose basic guidelines on the foreign policy of the weaker 
country. S maintains a substantial military presence in W and brings influence to 
bear through aid and advisers. In the economic and financial realm W is entrenched 
in those sectors of the economy of S which shows above average rates of growth. 
W is a net recipient of capital and investment. The hold of S over W is aided by the 
collaboration of indigenous rulers and ‘comprador' groups (Outram, pp. 11-20). 
The general argument is that Britain enjoyed informal political influence over those countries that 
were economically dependent upon the United Kingdom. Its formal empire was British territory, 
over which it exercised full sovereignty, namely its colonies. In contrast, Britain’s informal empire 
consisted of foreign territories over which the UK had partial sovereignty through treaties: namely, 
“protectorates, condominia, mandates, and protected states” (Jenks, 1919, pp. 87–92). According to 
this definition, Britain’s formal empire in the Middle East included the colonies of Malta, Cyprus, 
and Aden, while its informal empire was much larger, consisting of the Aden Protectorate, some 
Arab Gulf states, British-protected Egypt (1914–36), the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, British 
Somaliland, and the mandates of Iraq, Trans-Jordan, and Palestine as well as certain parts of Persia 
(Malta, Cyprus, and Aden, while its informal empire was much larger, consisting of the Aden 
Protectorate, some Arab Gulf states, British-protected Egypt (1914–36), the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 
British Somaliland, and the mandates of Iraq, Trans-Jordan, and Palestine as well as certain parts of 
Onley, 2005, p. 36-37). Aside from their constitutional status, these states were as integrated into 
the British imperial system as protected states, with most aspects of their state infrastructures—from 







along British lines (Elliot, 1996, PP. 176-180).Whether or not regions were regarded as informal 
parts of the Empire and or within the sphere of imperial influence depended only on the presence of 
rival imperial influence (Onley, 2005, pp. 36-37). The primary aim of the informal British Empire 
in the Gulf was to protect British India and its trade and communication routes. Britain obtained the 
collaboration of local rulers in the pacification of the Gulf was in return for treaties of maritime 
protection. Later, these parties would exclude foreign influences that threatened British India. 
Britain entered into treaties with the rulers and tribal leaders of the Aden Protectorate, in order to 
protect its important base at Aden and thereby ensure the protection of British India (ibid, p.42). 
The concept of informal imperialism in different forms has therefore been an important model in 
the secondary literature for describing the relationship between Britain and Oman as the following 
section 1.5 reveals. 
 
1.5: Secondary literature review: Providing an Omani Perspective 
The overwhelming majority of the literature on the Dhofar War is based on the wartime 
diaries of soldiers. Therefore, texts are primarily focused on the military angle, such as the 
efficiency of the weapons or the quantity of soldiers. Although such personal testimonies are 
important, there has been neglect of civilians and other groups, such as the opinions of locals, as 
well as a lack of focus upon political and security issues. Furthermore, the most of the original 
writings on the Dhofar War were from British authors (e.g. Buttenshaw 2010; Dunsire, 2011; 
Fiennes, 1974; Gardner, 2007; Halliday, 2008; Jeapes, 1996; Jessop, 1985; Wilkinson, 2006), 
meaning that the Omani voice in particular and Arab view in general is downplayed. This relates to 
what was, in many ways, a secret war, which today would be impossible to conduct. Jeapes (1996, 
p.11) and Medhi (1995, p. 54) look at the war from this military approach and explain the military 
tactics and weapons used, as well as the operational names of the attacks launched by the Sultan’s 
Forces against the rebels. Other texts have extensively highlighted the tactical aspects of the 
conflict, in addition to other military operations, ambushes, loss of lives, destruction of property, 
and war equipment (Buttenshaw, 2010; Dunsire, 2011; Fiennes, 1974; Gardner, 2007; Ladwig, 
2008; Peterson, 2007). 
In addition to the aforementioned military perspectives, there is a rich literature of a regional 
and international dimension. Al Amri (2012) discusses the Dhofar war in its broader international 







support for the rebels. Trabulsy (2004) also takes a broader regional perspective, arguing that the 
participating world powers supported opposing sides for their own national interests. Haglawi 
(2003) focuses on the impact of the involvement of aid from Arab countries, especially Saudi 
Arabia, Iraq and Egypt. He is most interested in the motivations of these states and their agendas for 
encouraging nationalist movements, such as South Yemen and Algeria. The military and diplomatic 
support that Egypt sent to the revolutionaries during the early years of the revolution also had a 
significant impact on the growing military and tactical superiority of the rebels. 
Some texts focus on local aspects which led to the Dhofar War. Ghobash (1997) emphasises 
the role of Ibadism as an example of original democracy, discussing this in the context of Sultan 
Said’s heavy handed approach with his people which led to the outbreak of the Dhofar 
War.Landen(1983, pp. 480-481) has also focused on the influence of Ibadism in the formation of 
Imamate rule in Oman and the harsh approach of Sultan Said in dealing with his people, which 
likely exacerbated the situation. This local approach offers valuable insights into the cultural aspect 
of events and relations in the region. Looking at the causes of the war, Kechichian (2013, pp. 255-
256) argues that the isolation of Oman from the surrounding Arab region brought about by Sultan 
Said was a primary cause of the war and eventually led to Arab League recognition of the rebellion. 
Rabi(2011, p. 24)argues that the war broke out because of the migration of Dhofaris to work in 
other Arab Gulf States, which gave them a better idea of how oil money had improved other 
countries in the region compared with Oman, which sparked waves of anger that eventually led to 
the insurgency. People were also profoundly affected by the rhetoric of Jamal Abdel Nasser, the 
ruler of Egypt at that time, who called for the expulsion of the British and their associates in the 
region. Ja’boub (2010, p. 248) adds to this understanding through a discussion of the strategy of the 
rebellion and Sultan’s education system, while Al Hamdani (2010, pp. 106-107) focuses on a pro-
sultan interpretation, looking at the strategy to alleviate poverty and gain the confidence of the 
people alongside military operations, comparing this to contemporary events in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
Some books have also taken an ideological approach to the discussion of the war, with 
scholars like Randolph(1974) and Karam (1974)focusing on the disadvantages of communism in 
Dhofar and the suffering brought about by the war, given that communism was alien to the religion, 
customs and traditions of the natives. Other literature follows colonisation and imperialism models. 







Fig. 4: Map showing Indian Ocean (Source: Oman 
National Survey Authority, NSA IO 14) 
 
of the Arabian Gulf counties, describing it as being colonial in nature, with Sultan Said doing what 
he was asked by British authorities. Similarly, Halliday (2008, p. 232) adopts a western imperialist 
approach in discussions of Omani history, such as by asserting that Oman had been fully controlled 
by Britain since the 19th century because of its strategic importance. Halliday concludes that the 
British government assertion of the independence of Oman was actually a cover to serve its own 
interests in the region and to conceal the consequences of its national policies (ibid, p. 331). Others 
support this assertion that Oman was under British influence (Abdulsamed, 2016, p. 273; Beasant, 
2002, pp. 200-201; Fadel, 1995, p. 212; Sultan & Naqeeb, 2008, p. 26). 
Many studies provided specific examples of this British influence and imperialism. For 
example, Wilson(2012, pp. 331-332) claims that in order to protect its interests in Oman, the British 
informed all tribal chiefs that they would not allow any attacks on Muscat in 1914. The Imam of 
Oman retorted by attacking Muscat in an attempt to oust the British in 1916, in response to which 
the British forcefully protected the Sultan’s interests, killing more than 300 of the Imam’s forces. 
The British also pressured the Sultan to end cooperation with France in 1891, which would have 
limited British influence, demonstrating clearly that they were unwilling to share their authority in 
Oman with another country. The contemporary writings of Miles (1920)also offer interesting 
insights into British influence and imperialism. 
However, they tend to focus on the treaties that 
the British signed with political and tribal 
leaders in the area, which enabled them to 
control the Indian Ocean area (figure 4). Certain 
tribes were given special treatment when they 
lived in strategic locations, such as near sea 
ports that could be used as naval bases, or open 
areas that could be used as airfields. This is 
especially true of areas like Dhofar, which were 
believed to have oil reserves. Miles (1920, pp. 
222-230)analysed tribal loyalties to provide an advantageous position from which the British could 
begin negotiations and extend their influence and illustrates one way in which the British were 
always looking for ways to enhance their long-term economic interests. In a similar manner, 
Owtram (2004, p. 16) argues that British imperialism practiced an informal colonisation with 







Fig. 5: Map of Al Buraimi oasis in red 
(Source: Oman National Survey Authority, 
NSA OM 67) 
 
as well as heavily influencing the course of events in the country, creating much of its modern 
history and even participating in the formation of the modern state of Oman. This can be seen in the 
example of the Al Jabal Al Akhdar War (1957-1959), which was funded by the oil companies with 
the full support of Britain. This conflict resulted in the expansion of the Sultanate of Muscat and the 
amalgamation of the oil-rich parts of the Imamate of Oman into the Sultanate. Importantly this 
occurred within the context of Anglo-American competition to recover and secure oil reserves in 
the Arabian Peninsula and eventually led to the formation of the current Sultanate of Oman, which 
might otherwise have been divided into three states. The focus in this literature is on the formal 
control of British imperialism in Oman.  
Other literature has highlighted the Dhofar War from an economic perspective. For instance, 
Wilkinson (2006) believes that oil companies were behind all of the major conflicts in the Sultanate 
in the twentieth century. In fact, he argues that the boundaries of the Middle East countries were 
ultimately shaped by oil companies, who financed conflicts for their own financial gains. Also 
relevant in this context is that Sultan Said deliberately entered into agreements with American oil 
companies to prevent British dominance, which angered his erstwhile allies. Morton (2013, p. 112) 
discusses the Al Buraimi Conflict (fig. 5) that occurred 
between Saudi Arabia and Britain in the 1950s from an 
economic and diplomatic perspective. He also addresses 
British diplomacy in Oman, explaining that Al Buraimi is 
an oasis located on Oman’s northern border and was 
believed to possess vast quantities of oil. Because of this, 
oil companies had been competing fiercely to enter the 
Gulf region, redrawing the borders on the maps in their 
favour, irrespective of the prevailing local conditions. No 
matter how hard Saudi Arabia tried to occupy the oasis, 
Britain successfully prevented Aramco (the US-Saudi Oil 
Company) from entering the area, defending the territory to 
enable and facilitate the presence of the British oil 
companies through effective use of international 







The reason for the involvement of Britain in Dhofar is also likely to have occurred because 
of its needs for naval and air bases or facilities, which made the strategic location of Oman 
especially valuable. Lunt (1981, p. 32) supports this assertion that British interests in the Arabian 
Gulf were principally concerned with ensuring control over this strategic economic area, because it 
initially secured the route to India. Importantly, this access also granted Britain the ability to move 
oil companies into the region to exploit the rich natural resources of the area at the lowest cost and 
to ensure uninterrupted oil supplies. In other words, strategic interests were driven by economic 
goals after the discovery of oil, which has played an important role in Dhofar’s modern history 
since the middle of the 20th century. Oil was also a pretext for the Americans to find their way to the 
Gulf States (Abdalsatar, 1989; Gardner, 2007).The interest of the Europeans and especially the 
British changed from originally securing the sea route to India to further economic interests once oil 
was discovered in the Middle East during the first half of the twentieth century. In effect, this 
discovery of oil changed their interest from a focus on the coastline to include the interior of the 
country.  
Although some have argued that the Gulf States were “puppet-like in the hands of western 
powers” (Abdalsatar, 1989, p.46), others have argued that Oman was not a British possession and 
that it enjoyed a certain political independence (Murad, 1989, p. 463; Shdad, 1989, pp. 122-123), a 
position explicitly rejected by Abdalsatar (1989). Geraghty (1982, pp. 98-100) is one of a number of 
experts who claims that Oman was not subject to British colonialism, with the British merely 
offering advice and assistance to the Sultan. Lunt (1981, p. 32) adopted a similar stance with respect 
to the importance of Oman’s location, resources and the British interest in the region. In addition, 
Philips, the economic advisor of Sultan Said stated that the British activities in Oman could not be 
described as imperialism, because the British were acting with the permission of the government 
(Philips, 2012, pp. 352-353). There is a limited literature which suggests varying degrees of Omani 
independence.  
Officially, however Oman was an independent, sovereign state. The cooperation of the 
Sultanate with the British was in the Omani national interest, characterised by the success of the 
Omani government diplomacy in persuading the British to intervene militarily in its internal 
disputes. This support in the Battle of Al Jabal Al Akhdar (1957-1959) and the Dhofar War (1965-
1970) was a major diplomatic achievement that ensured national unity by exploiting British military 







revolutions, especially the Dhofar war, given the support provided to the rebels by a number of 
regional and international powers. This thesis seeks to better understand the validity of the existing 
secondary literature, which generally depicts the British-Omani relationship in terms of British 
imperial control, Omani submission, non-independence, formal or informal colonialism, and to 
emphasise its role as an independent and sovereign state.Therefore, this research will examine 
whether the Omani government was more independent and self-motivated than the literatures 
argues, not functioning as a direct or informal colony, but instead with a developing and negotiable 
autonomy.  
 
1.6: The History of Omani-British Relations 
All of the secondary literature on Oman accords a prominent role to the relations with 
Britain. Anglo-Omani relations began with the first contacts between rulers of Oman and Britain in 
1644, which occurred as part of the Omani campaign to end the influence of the Portuguese, who 
occupied the region at that time. The then ruler of Oman, Imam Nasir bin Murshid Al Ya’rubi 
(1624-1649), requested an envoy from the headquarters of the East India Company in India, to 
undertake negotiations to establish business relations, as well as to oppose Portuguese economic 
interests in the region. An agreement was made whereby Englishmen were to enjoy the freedom of 
trade in Oman, the freedom to bear arms and the freedom of religious practice, in addition to 
regulations for the arbitration of disputes between Omani and British nationals (Al Dhoyani, 2004, 
pp. 234-235).  Although signed in 1646, this agreement was not implemented because of the impact 
of Dutch involvement on trade in the Arabian Gulf and as a result of the conflict between Imam 
Nasir and the Portuguese. The East India Company took the initiative in 1665, delegating Colonel 
Rainsford to establish a trade agency in Muscat. Negotiations were followed by a treaty under 
which Imam Sultan bin Saif (1640-1680)would grant one of Muscat’s forts to the British (1649-
1679), permitting them to establish a garrison of no more than a hundred soldiers, in return for an 
equal share of custom revenues. However, this treaty was also not implemented, because of the 
death of Rainsford and because Imam Sultan bin Saif later changed his mind, deciding not to allow 
any European presence in Muscat. It is worth noting that this approach regarding the settlement of 
foreign powers in Oman was a principle followed by successive Imams (Al Dhoyani, 2004, pp. 235-
236). In addition, the treaty was pressured by the Dutch gaining the support of the ruler of Oman to 







Netherlands began with both struggling to control trade in the region. The Dutch had the upper hand 
until the end of the seventeenth century, when British influence became preeminent in the 
eighteenth century onwards (Rushd, 2009, p. 70).  
When Britain reached India in the eighteenth century, it found itself in confrontation with 
the Omani empire, which stretched from the Persian Gulf to East Africa. Britain established good 
relations with the Omani empire in order to meet its two primary aims in the region: preventing the 
entrance of France into the region and fully controlling the area to ensure effective control in India 
(Al Qasimi, 2010, p. 7). The intervention of the British Empire in the affairs of Oman increased 
over time, through actions such as the exploitation of the differences between the rulers of the Asian 
part of the Omani Empire and the African part, effectively bringing an end to an Omani territory 
that had extended across vast areas of continental Asia and Africa. 
British control over India made it essential for them to retain influence over the Arabian 
Gulf, in order to secure the vital route to the east. At this time, the ruling family in Oman changed 
with the collapse of the Ya’raiba dynasty in 1741 and the rise of Ahmed bin Said Al Busaidi, the 
Imam whose family still rule the country today. During this period, the East India Company played 
an important political role in maintaining the commercial interests of Britain in the region, signing 
different political treaties with the Sultans of Oman, which were the first formal agreements 
between the British and the ruling families in the region. For example, Sultan bin Ahmed Al 
Busaidi (1793-1804) signed a treaty with the British in 1798 (Ateeqi, 2007, p. 11). In this treaty, the 
Sultan vowed not to cooperate with the French and Dutch, who were competing with the British 
over the Arabian Gulf. In addition, he granted the British a commercial agency in Bandar Abbas in 
southern Iran, which was part of Oman at that time. Sultan bin Ahmed Al Busaidi took control of 
the port of Bandar Abbas in 1798, in order to strengthen his grip on the Gulf, stimulate trade and 
resist the Wahhabis. This region remained underfull Omani control until 1871, when the Iranians 
regained Bandar Abbas. They have retained control of this port until today (Landen 1983, pp. 298-
299). 
Sultan Al Busaidi signed another treaty in 1800s in which A.H. Bogle was appointed by 
Britain as a representative of the East India Company in Muscat, where he established the first 
British agency. Bogle was the first British resident in the Gulf region, representing his country on 
the southern coast of the Arabian Gulf (Ateeqi, 2007, p. 12). During the Sultan’s era (1745-1804), 







Gwadar port, which the Omanis had seized in 1798 to secure access to the Sea of Oman, extend 
their commercial and military influence, as well as stimulate trade and resist the Wahhabis. In 
addition, the sultans used Baluchi at Gwadar as soldiers to fight any opposition to their rule (Al 
Batashi, 1998, p. 234).Gwadar remained under full Omani control until 1955, when it was sold to 
Pakistan by Sultan Said (1932-1970) in order to fund the Jabel Akhder War (1957-1959). 
Omani-British relations continued during the reign of Sultan Said (1806-1856) and the two 
parties cooperated in 1820 to subjugate the Al Qawasim, a tribe that controlled areas of northern 
Oman (now part of the United Arab Emirates) who were cooperating with Saudi Arabia to secure 
their independence from Oman. For this reason, a General Treaty was signed with the Sheikhs 
(tribal leaders) of the coast of Oman (known now as the United Arab Emirates), which is considered 
to be the beginning of the separation of the UAE from Oman by the British (Ghobash, 1997, p. 
173). Later, the two parties cooperated to suppress the revolution of Bani Bu Ali, an Omani 
Wahhabi tribe which was attempting to become independent from Oman in 1821, again with the 
support of Saudi Arabia. 
This relationship was crowned by the British treaty of Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation in 1898 (Baghi, 1981). A major objective of the Sultan was to reduce the influence of 
the Al Qawasim tribe, which had embraced the strict Wahhabi sect of Islam, which opposed the 
tolerant Ibadism of Oman. The Wahhabis had emerged in Saudi Arabia and expanded along the 
coast of what is now the United Arab Emirates, as well as occupying Buraymi and several areas 
along the north coast of Oman. The political difference between Ibadism, which originated more 
than 1,400 years ago, and Wahhabism, which was established in the mid-18th century, is that 
Ibadism is not used as a political tool, where the aspect of political control is central to Wahhabism. 
The Wahhabis spread their doctrine across the Arabian Peninsula, with the expansion of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its demands in the Buraimi and Phenomenon regions, as well as in 
Oman. The spread of this doctrine was accompanied by the formation of Islamic minorities that 
began to exert influence on their countries, such as in Syria, Libya and Yemen, for the benefit of 
Saudi Arabia. In contrast, the Ibadi doctrine is not actively spread and is largely confined to Oman. 
Ibadi is not only the oldest Islamic sect, but also the most tolerant. No terrorist groups are Ibadi, 
unlike Wahhabism which is followed by organisations like Boko Haram in Nigeria, Abu Sayyaf in 
the Philippines, Al Shabaab in Somalia and al-Qaeda. In general, the supremacy of the Ibadi 







Sultanate (Interview, Al Kharusi, 30thMarch 2018). The Sultan took several measures in an attempt 
to repel their influence, including forging an alliance with the British. Al Nomani (2013) argues that 
the treaty drafted by Britain in 1898 and called a treaty of friendship was in fact a treaty of 
protection that imposed many restrictions on the Omani people and controlled the future of the 
country to an unprecedented degree. 
In fact, the British signed treaties with the majority of the leaders of the Gulf region, 
imposing British protection on them. Oman was the exception, instead remaining outside actual 
British domination and only being linked to Britain by means of friendship and trade treaties. The 
British tried to intervene in the internal affairs of the Omani Empire during the time of Sultan Said, 
through the formulation of several arguments, including attempts to combat the slave trade. 
Although Sultan Said bin Sultan (1806-1854) signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Slave 
Trade in 1945, he was also able to limit British influence by adding a ban on the slave trade that 
required. British ships to be inspected by Omani vessels (Philips, p. 204-207). 
Oman was prevented from becoming a British protectorate by the legal status it enjoyed 
with countries like the Netherlands in 1666 and the US in 1833. This was reinforced by the Anglo-
French declaration of 1862, under which both countries pledged to respect the sovereignty of Oman 
and considered it to be an independent state. This situation led the British to search for alternative 
means by which to offer protection and exert control. Their close relations with the rulers of Oman 
granted the British the ability to pursue these goals through the use of subsidies. Perhaps the most 
important of these was the Zanzibar Subsidy, which came about after the death of Sultan Said bin 
Sultan (1806-1856), whose empire stretched from the Arabian Gulf to East Africa. After his death, 
the Sultan’s two sons disagreed over who should become ruler. Britain opposed the Omani ruler, 
Sultan Thuwayni, who was attempting to eject his brother, Majid, the ruler of the African part of the 
empire. This disagreement was settled in 1861 by the British, represented by Lord Canning, the 
Governor-General of India in 1861, who convinced the brothers to divide their empire: Thuwayni 
ruled the Asian part, with its capital in Muscat (1856-1866), while Majid ruled the African part, 
with its capital in Zanzibar (1856-1870). Due to the fact that Zanzibar was economically stronger 
than Muscat, it was agreed that an annual subsidy should be paid by the ruler of Zanzibar to the 
ruler of Oman. When the ruler of Zanzibar later refused to pay the subsidy to Oman, Britain 
pledged that it would pay, effectively putting political pressure on Oman to support British policies 







to a bilateral agreement being signed between the two countries in 1862, which provided that both 
Britain and France should respect the independence of Muscat and Zanzibar (Al Arimi, 2010, p. 
43). Another subsidy made by the British in an attempt to strengthen its relationship with Oman was 
the Arms Subsidy in 1889 (Al Hashmi, 2000, pp. 102-103). This agreement involved Britain 
persuading Sultan Thuwayni to adopt a British plan in return for annual compensation of 100,000 
rupees. The plan concerned the construction of an arms depot in Oman, thereby preventing the 
proliferation of weapons through northern India and the Arabian Gulf. This annual subsidy was 
continually provided to Oman, strengthening the bonds by which the Omani rulers were tied to the 
British (Fadel, 1995, p. 210). 
During the reign of Sultan Timour (1913-1932), a number of British employees were 
appointed to key government positions for Oman to capitalise on their expertise. These individuals 
served as the ministers of the Ministries of Foreign, Interior and Defence Affairs, which were three 
of the important departments in the government. The first British finance minister in the Omani 
government was McCollum in 1920, McCarthy was in charge of the Omani army in 1921, Bauer 
was responsible for customs in 1924, and Bertram Thomas was the financial adviser to the Sultan in 
1925, after which he was promoted to the rank of finance minister in 1926. All of these individuals 
played a role in quelling unrest and uprisings against the Sultan, using military force where 
necessary. They also wrested the concession of oil exploration in Dhofar from the Americans and 
officially influenced the Sultan only to grant concessions to the British. In addition, British 
ministers also interfered in the financial affairs of the Sultanate. The British planned to improve the 
Omani economy under the supervision of the British Consul Haworth, after whom the project was 
named. During this period, the British political agents and consuls often opposed Omani relations 
with other countries, even if these were simply personal visits. In this way, the British operated with 
a view to making Oman one of its protectorates, despite this not being the case from a legal 
perspective (Fadel, 1995, p. 212). 
The rulers of Oman refused any form of control, although the manner of their rejections 
varied from one Sultan to another, according to the circumstances and capabilities of each leader. 
Sometimes they expressed their rejection through indirect methods, such as pretending to be sick, 
travelling abroad, or abdicating the throne, while other rejections were articulated directly, by 
refusing all forms of British cooperation, including subsidies. However, those who rejected British 







the British Empire that protected Oman from many internal or external problems (Mowafi, 1994, 
pp. 10-11). This can be seen during the period of World War II, when both the British and Sultan 
Said recognised the need to ensure friendship and cooperation in order to prevent their relationship 
from dissolving.  
Nevertheless, Sultan Said bin Taimur (1932-1970) managed to recover a measure of power 
from the British, forcing the removal of many informal supervisors and experts who had been 
recruited in Oman in the years since 1889. Instead, he depended more heavily on Arabs who had 
anti-British feelings (Shdad, 1989, p. 122). Sultan Said realised that many of the problems that had 
faced his predecessors could be attributed to the high levels of national debt and the corresponding 
threat of subsidies being withheld by the British for non-compliance with their interests. As a way 
out, he attempted to use the few resources available in Oman to repay the national debt. Determined 
to possess a greater degree of independence than his father, he also confronted the British (Shdad, 
1989, p. 123) through the purchase of weapons from other countries. This policy reflected the 
Sultan’s general desire to retain his legitimate rights and his determination to be independent, with 
the freedom to act as he wished. In this way, Sultan Said negotiated and developed his autonomy as 
a ruler and the independence of his country. 
It is clear that the British feared the threat of international competition, recognising that any 
new power in the region would threaten its presence in India and potentially breach its security. For 
this reason, the British government in London took a hand in overseeing the internal and external 
affairs of the Sultanate. Sultan Said confronted a range of political, economic and military 
challenges. The most notable political issue was that of the Imamate (1913-1957) in the interior area 
of the country, which staunchly opposed his rule in the Sultanate, and which he managed to 
incorporate into Oman with British assistance. The continuation of the Anglo-Omani relationship 
was characterised by friendship and cooperation in all fields. A new agreement, the Treaty of 
Friendship, Navigation and Trade, was signed between the two parties in 1951 (Murad, 1989, p. 
463). The British Consulate in Muscat became the Consulate-General in 1957, during the reign of 
Sultan Said, later becoming an embassy in 1971, during the era of Sultan Qaboos. Oman was able to 
consolidate its national unity through the intensive military support provided by the British 
government to Oman, effectively eliminating the attempted separation of the interior (Izzi, 1994, p. 







Despite the closeness of this relationship, Halliday (2008, p. 331) argues that Britain has 
never recognised Oman as a British colony, because Oman had entered into treaties with Britain and 
France. Nonetheless, the British army and consultants supported and financed Sultan Said, 
providing half of his income until 1967, and were intimately involved in Omani affairs, although 
they gave free rein to Sultan Said provided that he protected the interests of Great Britain (Halliday, 
p. 331). The British withdrawal from east of Suez in the last 1960s also caused changes and 
potential instability for Oman. Ladwig (2008, pp. 106-108) provides interesting insights into the 
political decisions made in London regarding the withdrawal of the British Army from Aden and 
the Arabian Gulf between 1961 and 1969. The Labour Government, led by Harold Wilson, had 
surprised the world with its intention to withdraw all British troops from east of Suez by 1969. They 
were motivated to take this action by the sterling crisis of November 1967, which significantly 
damaged the British economy, clearly illustrating that Britain was in sharp decline as a world 
power. Worrall (2014, pp. 25,33)supports the argument that this withdrawal took place due to 
economic decline, adding that the Palestinian issue and the loss of Aden were also important 
factors. Peterson (2011, pp. 2,77)suggests that the withdrawal, terminating all obligations and 
limiting British influence was motivated by the ideological goals of the socialist government. He 
argues that the British economic situation only accelerated the withdrawal process, adding that the 
US tried to persuade Britain to stay in the Arabian Gulf by opening up business opportunities in 
Saudi Arabia. Obviously, the economic factor and the liberation movements that strained the British 
presence in regions, such as Yemen and Suez, led British politicians to expedite the withdrawal 
from the areas east of Suez. In general, the evidence however suggests that the real nature of the 
relationship between the Omani rulers and the British continued to be one of friendship, cooperation 
and exchange of mutual interests, as described by many non-Omani writers (e.g.Geraghty, 1982, pp. 
98-100; Lunt, 1981, p. 32; Murad, 1989, p. 463; Philips,2012, p. 352-353; Shdad, 1989, pp. 122-
123). 
In this sense, unlike the position of many Arab writers, particularly those biased towards the 
Imamate and the revolution in Dhofar, Sultan Said was not a traitor who laboured under the control 
of a foreign colonial power (e.g. Abdalsatar, 1989, p. 46; Beasant, 2002, pp. 200-201; Fadel, 1995, 
p.212; Halliday, 2008, p. 331; Miles, 1920, pp. 222-230; Omar, 2008, pp. 6-7; Owtram, 2004, p. 







Instead, the relationship was initially imposed on the Omani rulers because of their poor 
administrative and economic capabilities, which was exacerbated by their inability to confront a 
superior force, but this situation led Omani rulers to utilise the relationship with Britain to maintain 
national unity and stability, while creating a form of independence from Britain that was distinct 
from colonial relations. In sum, the Omani government developed a more effective autonomy and 
negotiated independence than argued by the extant literature. 
 
1.7: British diplomacy towards Oman in relation to the Dhofar War 1965-1975 
In terms of British involvement in the Dhofar War itself, Ladwig (2008, p. 17)focuses on the 
instrumental role played by the British troops in the victory in Dhofar in 1975, in which a small 
group of British officers, advisers and trainers led Oman to victory. The campaign was an excellent 
example of counter-insurgency using a minimum of men and money. Peterson (2007, p. 501) covers 
the war in Dhofar from a military and security perspective, discussing the nature of the insurgency 
and the measures taken to combat it. He outlines shifts in the war in 1968 from nationalism to 
Marxism, after which he summarises the military and security development since 1970 (Peterson, 
2007, p. 501). He argues that British diplomacy was based on creating political legitimacy, which 
was granted through providing locals with every day requirements, and the military effort, which 
was largely successful because of their support for Sultan Said and later Sultan Qaboos (ibid, p. 
501). In discussing British diplomacy in Oman, Peterson (2011, p. 110) also argues that there was 
an attempt to protect Western security interests in the Arab region before the withdrawal of the 
British in 1971. This process sought to ensure the strengthening of economic cooperation and the 
conversion of agents into allies. Some Arab Gulf Countries were even to become the West’s largest 
buyers of weapons, turning those customers to nominally independent allies. Peterson (2011, p. 
128)adds that there was Anglo-American cooperation at this time, in addition to an agreement about 
how best to facilitate strategic goals. In the same context, Worrall (2014, pp. 161, 197)explains that 
the rebels in the War of Dhofar sought the overthrow of the Sultan and to bring about the expulsion 
of the British from the region. This was a challenge to the Wilson and Heath governments in Britain 
and was confronted by securing the political system in Oman, thereby ensuring the protection of 
British interests in the future. It was only once those political and stability interests were secured 







Commonwealth Office (FCO) agreed that Britain’s interests in Oman were significant, particular in 
terms of oil (Worrall, 2014, pp. 17, 126). Alston and Laing also argue that, 
the point of departure in Oman was one in which the British Government took the 
precaution of concluding an agreement in 1923 with Sultan Taymur giving Britain 
exclusive rights to control oil exploration in the Sultan’s territories (2012, p. 264). 
Nevertheless, British policy towards Oman changed over time and in 1971, British aims in 
the Arabian Gulf were much more comprehensive: 
First, to contribute by all possible means to the creation of conditions which would 
ensure peace and stability. Second, to preserve as much influence as possible with a 
view to maintaining that stability and to limit communist influence in that area to 
the greatest possible extent. Third, to maintain the uninterrupted flow of oil on 
reasonable terms. Finally, to increase British exports to a rapidly growing market 
(Worrall, 2014, p. 96). 
In order to leave the Gulf in a stable and peaceful condition, as well as to maintain British interests, 
an entire modern state had to be constructed in the Sultanate (Worrall, 2014, p. 221). The creation 
of a settled area and stables state in the Arabian Gulf was incredibly important for British interests. 
Britain had recognised the importance of forming an active central government in the Sultanate 
shortly before the commencement of the war in Dhofar (Wilkinson, 2006, p. 451). Abdalsatar 
(1989, p. 153)argues that their interests in Oman led the British government to commit to a 
widening political and military presence to ensure Oman’s unity and settlement. Clearly, peace and 
stability in Oman was viewed as essential for the national interests of Britain, given the special 
relationship that they enjoyed with the Omani ruling family. British diplomacy was therefore 
predicated on protecting its own economic interests by ensuring the stability of Oman, and 
defending it against both internal and external threats. To this end, the British ensured that they had 
arranged Oman’s political system in their favour before withdrawing from the region in 1971 (Al 
Amri, 2012, pp. 235-236; Peterson, 2011, p. 110; Worrall, 2014, pp. 17,126). The long established 
independence of Oman in its relationship with Britain was thereby consolidated in an independent 
and stable state by the Dhofar War.  
 
1.8: Chapter I Conclusion 
The Dhofar rebellion began with an uprising against poverty, disease and the carelessness of 







major role in the Dhofar War, with the mountains and seasonal climate being instrumental to the 
guerrilla war tactics used against Sultan Said. This conflict was complicated and prolonged by the 
proximity of Dhofar to the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, which was able to provide 
international aid to the rebels after the British withdrawal in 1967. A number of regional and global 
states like Britain intervened in the conflict, both directly and indirectly, with the aim of serving and 
protecting their national interests. They were encouraged to take this action by the Sultanate’s 
wealth of oil and natural gas, as well as the sensitive location of Oman facing India and controlling 
the Strait of Hormuz, the waterway through which approximately 40% of the world’s oil shipments 
passed. Later, when the rebels adopted communism in 1967, the war received backing of powerful 
states in opposition to capitalist development, such as China and the Soviet Union, who provided 
support alongside other regional countries, including Yemen, Egypt, Libya, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, 
Syria, Algeria, Palestine, East Germany, North Korea, Tanzania, Vietnam and Cuba. In contrast, the 
Sultan relied upon backing from Britain and certain regional countries, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia 
and Jordan. 
British policy during this period seems to have been to provide support to the Sultans of 
Oman against any internal revolution in order to serve British own strategic interests. The Sultans, 
in turn, sought to exploit the presence of the British in order to perpetuate the independence of 
Oman. This relationship afforded Oman a degree of stability and security from internal and external 
threats. Officially Oman was not an imperial state or an informal colony, because of existing 
treaties with America, France and the Netherlands, as well as the control that the Sultans retained 
over the country. Economically, however, Britain gained more from the relationship. In essence, 
there exists a fascinating balance between the British interests in securing their national interests in 
Oman, versus the manoeuvring of the Omani Sultans to ensure the unity and security of the country 
from internal and external threats at minimal cost to themselves. In this sense, this thesis seeks to 
explore and question the validity of the existing secondary literature, which generally 
conceptualises the British-Omani relationship in terms of British imperial control and Omani 
subservience, lack of autonomy, and effective colonial role (e.g. Abdalsatar, 1989, p. 46; Fadel, 
1995, p. 212; Halliday, 2008, p. 331; Miles, 1920, pp. 222-230; Omar, 2008, pp. 6-7; Owtram, 
2004, p. 16; Samah, 2016, p. 273; Sultan & Naqeeb, 2008, p. 26; Wilson, 2012, pp. 331-332). 
However, it also questions the claims by other academics who describe the Omani 







Murad,1989, p. 463; Philips, 2012, pp. 352-353; Shdad, 1989, pp. 220-221). This thesis seeks to 
investigate whether the Omani government may be described as having a developing and negotiable 

















The First Phase of the Revolution 









Fig. 6: 1966, Sultan Said bin Taimur 
(Source: Royal Air Force of Oman 
Archives, RAFOSS 667) 
 
2.1: The Reasons for the Outbreak of the Dhofar War 
The revolution in Dhofar against the reign of Sultan 
Said bin Taimur (see figure 6) began in 1965. However, 
dissent had been fermenting since the late 1950s. When 
Dhofaris travelled to other Gulf Countries Council (GCC) 
countries to work, they formed organisations that had 
different ideologies, but which were united under the single 
goal of ensuring the independence of Dhofar. Later, the 
organisations united into a single group called the Dhofar 
Liberation Front (DLF). There are a number of important 
questions that are fundamental to the understanding of this 
important event in the history of Oman, such as what actually 
drove the Dhofaris to revolt against the reign of the Sultan? What were the organisations that 
formed the DLF? How did the Dhofaris plan to achieve their goals? How did they seek to 
implement those plans through their secret organisations that existed among the workers in the Arab 
Gulf States? What occurred during the early stages that paved the way to the unification of their 
organisations? Did they achieve their common goal after the declaration of the armed struggle on 9th 
June 1965? What was Sultan Said’s policy? How did the British policy deal with his political 
agenda during this phase? This chapter seeks to answer these questions and provide a cohesive 
understanding of the first phase of the 
revolution.  
 
2.1.1: Internal Variables 
The outbreak of the revolution 
against the rule of Sultan Said bin Taimur 
can be attributed to numerous individual and 
often interrelated factors. First, and perhaps 
most influential of these, was the situation of 
the population of Dhofar(see figure 7), which 
was characterised by widespread poverty, 
Fig 7: Dhofari man is using a camel for transportation of 









ignorance and disease, as well as harsh control from Sultan Said. The myriad prohibitions included 
one that forbade women and children under 18 years old from travelling. Even for men, the travel 
procedures were so complex that those Dhofaris who wanted to travel usually bought Yemeni 
passports to do so. Others used their Omani passport to travel to countries that had no entry 
restrictions and the Yemeni passport for ones that did. There were also extensive prohibitions on 
many products, like transistor radios, which could only be owned with a license, and on numerous 
activities, including smoking, football and cycling (Al Rayes, 2000, p. 2). It can be argued that the 
social, economic and cultural backwardness that prevailed in Dhofar was a result of the Sultan’s 
determination to exclude any form of modern civilization and progress from the region (Al Sa’adi, 
1976, p. 12). Until the mid-1970s, the World Health Organizations was not able to reach this place. 
This was especially problematic because the local culture of the people meant that many avoided 
visiting doctors. Because most of the locals did not travel abroad, modern life frightened them (Al 
Arabi magazine, 1973, pp. 83-90). Instead, many would gather around the graves of the righteous 
for them to be healed by proximity. Others visited popular healers who treated them with fire (ibid).  
When journalists from the Arabi magazine the most famous magazine in the Arab world 
visitedDhofar, they found the streets in some cities were paved with cows, goats and fish bones, and 
there were so many flies that they could not open their mouths. When the municipality employees 
were asked for the reasons for these conditions, they stated that Dhofar had not been cleaned in over 
40 years during the reign of Sultan Said (Al Arabi magazine, 1973, pp. 83-90).  
His constraints on public freedom and his closed method of rule forced people to migrate 
out of Oman, especially to Gulf countries, where employment opportunities were available as a 
result of the oil wealth (Al Khasibi, 1994, p. 157). Unemployment spread among Omanis during the 
reign of Sultan Said, despite the existence of work opportunities, because these were often limited 
to foreign workers (Al Zaidi, 2000, p. 310). Discrimination between citizens and foreigners in both 
training and accommodation increased the population’s feeling of differentiation and inequality. 
There are no statistics on poverty in Oman at that time, however, there were only three small 
hospitals, one of which was in Dhofar (OMH, 1980, p. 7) and only three primary schools in Oman, 
with only one being situated in Dhofar (OMH, 1980, p. 5). Of the regions of Oman, Dhofar has 
traditionally been one of the most economically and socially backwards, with most of the 
population working as farmers, and the region often experiencing widespread problems with 







Fig. 9: Map of GCC States 
(Source: Oman National Survey Authority, 
NSA GCC 154) 
 
were often oppressed and exploited by 
foreign companies in ports and oil fields, 
suffering from poor economic, social and 
health conditions. 
As a result of these factors, during 
the first half of the 1960s, immediately 
prior to the outbreak of the revolution, the 
number of Omanis who worked in other 
Arab Gulf states (see figure 9) was very 
high. Half of these migrant workers were 
from Dhofar (Interview rebel leader, 17th 
August  2016, RA1). A robust mountain people, the 
Dhofari Omanis were concentrated in physical 
professions, like the military and police. Dhofaris 
comprised half of all the police in Qatar, a quarter of 
workers in low-professions in Bahrain, half of all military 
personnel in the UAE, and a significant proportion in both 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (Interview Rebel Leader, 
17thAugust 2016, RA1). At that time, of the estimated 
150,000 Dhofaris, approximately thirty thousand lived in 
other GCC states as migrant workers (Interview member 
of National Center for Statistics and Information 16th 
March 2016,RA2). During this period, Oman became 
completely isolated from the surrounding region and the rest of the world. This situation was 
compounded by the isolation of every area within the Sultanate. Because they worked abroad, the 
Dhofaris became familiar with the different patterns of life in the Arab Gulf States, all of which 
were more advanced than Oman. This experience inspired a desire for change in the Dhofaris. 
Recognising this, the Sultan imprisoned some of those who had travelled abroad (Al Khasibi, 1994, 
p. 157). This is an example of the style of rule that characterised the rule of Sultan Said, which 
Peterson (1978, p. 501)argues was feudalistic with regards to the rule of Dhofar. 
Fig. 8:: A Dhofari family are in front of their house which is 
made from trees banches and leaves, 1966 (Source: Royal 








 According to historical sources, such as Landen (1983, pp. 480-481), Sultan Said did not 
trust even those who were close to him, and was known particularly to hate and distrust the 
Dhofaris. Peter Sichel observed that Sultan Said had commented that, “If you find a snake and a 
Dhofari in a place, kill the Dhofari and leave the snake” (Interview Peter Sichel, 8th December 
2015). This negative attitude that the Sultan harboured towards the Dhofari people was clearly 
illustrated by the anecdote of J.S.R. Duncan, a British diplomat who visited the Sultan in Salalah. 
Duncan suggested that Qaboos, his only son, should tour around the regions of Oman to meet 
prominent tribal leaders. Sultan Said welcomed the idea and expressed a preference for Qaboos to 
be accompanied by a British person because Omanis put their trust in him. This surprised Duncan, 
who stated the following:  
I then reminded him that he had spoken some time ago of his intention to send 
Qaboos on a tour of the sultanate. He said he still had that in mind but the problem 
was to find a trustworthy companion. Perhaps he would send Chauncy with him… 
I said I thought it would surely be better for him to be accompanied by leaders 
from amongst his own people. The sultan agreed in a quandary about this 
(UKNA, F.O, BC1015/7, 1965). 
The beginning of the revolution can, to a large degree, be attributed to the status of the 
Sultanate under the leadership of Said. This excerpt grants a useful insight into the range of 
challenges facing the Sultan at that time: 
The Sultan’s main problems were: firstly the creation of an administration more 
suited to the times; secondly the consolidation and development of his armed 
forces; thirdly, improvement of his international relations (which must include 
coming to terms with the rebels abroad); fourthly, a measure of constitutional 
devolution… first the primitive nature of administration in the sultanate (UKNA, 
F.O., BC 1015/13, 1965). (For the full document, see Appendix 1).  
In this respect, the Sultan’s dependence on foreign personnel and experts in the 
administration and in the Armed Forces was closely linked to his neglect of education. In effect, the 
limited development of education in Oman hindered the creation of an educated class that could 
play an important role in the administrative and economic development of the country. The Omani 
population also laboured under high taxes on internal trade, which in some cases reached 300%, 
severely limiting economic growth and driving many to make a living in other countries. When 
these people later returned to Oman, they found that the type of social services available abroad did 
not exist in their own country and that little had been done to improve the life of the people 







in the Arab world at that time, the journalists stated that Sultan Said had not completed his 
development projects. For example, the hospital in Salalah had been partially constructed and then 
left without a roof for 17 years. An agricultural survey had been carried out that froze the reports, 
but which did not result in any new alternatives being implemented. He brought in equipment for 
the construction of roads, but placed them in the yard of his palace and did not undertake the 
improvement of roads (Al Arabi magazine, 1973, p. 78). 
These factors contributed to a high risk of internal conflict in Oman which was evident to 
many commentators, as illustrated by a letter to Sir William Luce, the Political Agent in the Arabian 
Gulf, from D.C. Carden, the Consul General in Muscat on 15thJanuary 1966.This letter clearly 
placed the blame for the outbreak of the revolution on Sultan Said, who was said to be surprised at 
the number of people opposed to his rule in Oman. However, the Sultan still believed that there was 
no use in responding to the many criticisms he faced, including from international bodies like 
Amnesty International, who opposed the detention centres in Oman (ibid, p. 69-75). In a report 
addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations on 8thJanuary 1965, Abdul Rahman 
Bazwaq, the delegate of Afghanistan and President of the United Nations General Assembly for the 
1966-1967 session, stated that Sultan Said treated the inhabitants of Dhofar as slaves. He noted that 
there was little available employment in Dhofar, which was exacerbated by no support for the 
construction of houses, or imports and exports. Perhaps most seriously, he found that there were no 
schools or hospitals (1966, pp. 232-233). In effect, at least according to this perception, the Sultan 
did not care about internal and external public opinion, which left his population with very few 
meaningful options. 
 
2.1.2: External Variables 
The British also believed that the deterioration of Sultan Said’s reputation abroad had 
principally occurred as a result of the onerous restrictions that he had imposed on his people, as 
evidenced in the following commentary: 
It was not only ignorance of development which gave the sultanate a bad name 
abroad, but also reports of restrictions of personal liberty … Foreign opinion is very 
sensitive… The sultanate’s reputation abroad especially in the U.K. which must be 
of concern to H.M.G., would be very valuable if the sultan could bear this factor in 







In addition, one of the most significant problems facing Sultan Said was his relationships 
with various international organisations and regional countries. British government sources 
indicated the unwillingness of the Sultan to join international organisations: 
He feels reluctant to join international organisations because he is deeply 
embittered by his experiences with some of the organisations. He applied to join 
the World Health Organisation and was black-balled. The issue of his own 
postage stamps and the taking over of his postal services may provide an 
opportunity for him to join the postal union. If this were successful, other 
organisations could then be joined… His independent image in the outside world 
would grow in strength ... (UKNA, BC 1015/13, 1965) (see Appendix 2 for the 
full document).  
This issue was also recognised by other contemporary documents. A report to William Luce, the 
Political Agent in the Arabian Gulf, from D.C. Carden, the Consul General in Muscat in 1965 
stated: 
His image abroad is not that of an entirely independent country in that he neither 
makes contract with other countries in international matters such as air traffic 
regulations or postal communications, which could make full use of our good 
offices. The impression given is that of limited sovereignty, in the Arab world and 
the United Nations, his enemies… play on the theme of his dependence on the 
British government. It is clearly desirable that this image be repaired. He cares not 
one whit for international opinion nor any other opinion (UKNA, BC 1015/13, 
1965). 
 A letter sent on 4th April 1970 from D.G. Crawford in Muscat to the British Consulate 
General in Bahrain, M. S. Weir, also provides a useful insight into the opinions of “one of the main 
tribal leaders in the north of Oman, Sheikh (tribal leader) Ahmad bin Mohammed Al Harthi, who 
had met with Crawford. During the meeting, the Sheikh complained of a lack of job opportunities 
for the citizens, which necessitated many to look for work abroad. This was not a problem in itself, 
as they were only trying to improve the living conditions of their families in Oman, but those 
individuals learned new ideas when they travelled, which created resentment when they returned to 
visit their families. Sheikh Ahmad strongly believed that the British needed to explain to the Sultan 
the consequences of his policies. In addition, the Sheikh made suggestions to develop the 
agricultural sector, encouraging the use of Omani labour in order to reduce their need to travel 
abroad” (Al Harthi, 2007, pp. 611-621). It is worth mentioning that this Sheikh was one of Said’s 
top supporters and a loyal figure to the Sultan in the north of Oman. However, regardless of their 







towards the Sultan, even among those close to him. The failure of Sultan Said to establish effective 
international associations also undermined his government.  
 
2.1.3: The Sultan’s Perspective 
Given its importance to understanding the events that transpired in Oman during the Dhofari 
War, an overview will therefore be presented to offer an insight into the personality and core 
orientations of Sultan Said. Clearly, he was a man with a forceful personality and reputation, as 
noted in one anecdote: 
One of the tribal elders told a researcher that Sultan Said had a very strong and 
powerful personality, adding that he was tough in dealing with his people. He also 
recounted a story that he had witnessed the Sultan being greeted by a village man 
playing the drums. The Sultan reproved the villager so violently that the man 
urinated on himself (Interview with a tribal leader Al Ansari, 17th June 2014). 
A detailed profile was also recorded by George Thomson, the British Minister of State, in the 
Foreign Office, who noted in 1966 that Sultan Said was smart, educated, with a fascinating 
personality, and an attractive way of speaking. He added: 
Like most other people who visit the Sultan, I was impressed by his personality, 
frankness and logic within his own terms of reference. His interest in his 
development plan... what we call personal liberty and democratic rights, is 
obviously much more difficult. The Sultan believes that autocratic rule and 
extensive regulations are necessary to preserve the unity and national identity of the 
Sultanate (UKNA, FCO 8/569, FR: BC1/2, 1966). 
This account corroborates the impression of a leading British diplomat, Sir Alec Kirkbride, who 
foresaw problems for Oman when he met Sultan Said in Salalah, the capital of Dhofar in 1965. 
Kirkbride mentioned that ‘The longer the Sultan tries to keep a dam against the outside world, the 
worse will be the crash when it falls” (UKNA, BC1016/42, 1965). Nevertheless, US reports 
described the Sultan in 1965 as shrewd and energetic, strong willed, an attractive figure, prestigious, 
enjoying the spirit of quietness, and proficient in English (Al Harthi, 2007, p. 3). 
Given this knowledge and the personality of Sultan Said, it may be possible to determine 
what justifications existed for the application of his harsh policies. Importantly, when the Sultan 
took over rule of Oman in 1932, the country was totally bankrupt. After taking power, Said 







skill, laying the foundations to lead his country towards a relatively prosperous financial situation. 
His strong inclination to regulate financial affairs fulfilled the important aim of limiting the ability 
of the British to use his debts to exert diplomatic pressure. The Sultan was very sensitive on this 
issue of British control and always wished to be an independent decision-maker (Mansy, 1996, p. 
245; Ateeqi, 2007, pp. 211-212), even if this required years of sacrifice in order to ensure that debts 
were repaid. W. H. Luce, the Political Agent in the Arabian Gulf explained in 1965 that it was 
possible to see that the Sultan did not wish to start national development until oil export revenue 
had been received, in order to limit reliance on foreign powers (UKNA, BC1052/3, 1965). 
Oman benefitted from the economic reforms that the Sultan put in place, with foreign trade 
improving considerably under his guidance. During the first year of the Sultan’s reign, 1932-1933, 
the total value of Oman’s trade was about 5,444,445 Indian rupees, rising to 6,175,103 rupees in 
1934-1935, then 7,717,602 rupees in 1936-1937, and with total exports and imports reaching 
8,208,132 rupees in the fiscal year 1938-1939. In the fiscal year 1935-1936 Oman’s exports 
converged with its imports, with exports of 3,264,984 rupees and imports of 3,837,835 rupees (Al 
Harthi, 2007, p. 303). In general, it can be argued that Sultan Said was successful in improving the 
economy of Oman in the pre-oil era, relying on limited resources at the time and without any 
external loans. However, the popular aspirations in Oman were much greater and so these meagre 
resources did not allow him to develop the country as his people had hoped. A British diplomat, D. 
Pragnell, outlined some of the reasons given by the Sultan for delaying the country’s development:  
He had always been determined, not to borrow as this would put his country under 
the influence of his creditors. It was for lack of resources that his country had 
remained backward … H.M.G. had made certain grants for modest improvements 
possible. With the prospect of oil revenue he plans to embark on his wider 
plans… no palaces or Cadillac (UKNA, FCO 8/569, FR: BC1/2, 1967). 
Moreover, despite a desire to increase the wealth of the country and to lessen its reliance on 
international partners, the rule of the Sultan remained one characterised by isolation. This was an 
intentional move, based in large part on poor relationships with other parties and in fulfilment of his 
policy aims. As explained by a prominent British official, D.C. Carden, to the British Consulate 
General:  
Undeniable that he has erected a wall around his country… people of the interior 
have over the years hated non-Muslim intruders. The Sultan’s restrictions on 
foreigners entering the interior stem from this fact and from his dislike of the 







experiences of neighbouring Arabs having access to his country have been 
unhappy. The Sultan’s dealings with international organisations have also been 
unhappy (UKNA, F.O., BC1016/42 (8), 1965). 
This prohibition policy was also discussed in an interview between the Sultan and the 
aforementioned British diplomat, Pragnell: 
The restriction on personal liberty… e.g. the ban on the importation of dolls was 
rooted in his religion; the regulations about forms of dress, traditional Omani way 
of life and control on women going abroad, were designed to prevent abuse and 
were relaxed for good reasons. It was foreigners in the country who raised 
complaints ... many of his people especially those in the mountains were very 
conservative and suspicious of foreigners. … Change affecting religious matters 
would arouse hostility, upset unity and the balance of the country (UKNA, FCO 
8/569, FR: BC1/2, 1967). 
Overall, it seems that the decision not to develop the educational system was because the Sultan felt 
that this would necessitate the hiring of teachers from other countries. As will be discussed later in 
this chapter, he particularly feared the potential for a national intellectual Nasserite revolution, 
which could provoke the young Omani through the transferral of ideologies from foreign teachers to 
Omani students. This was mentioned in one British document: 
…The Sultan is persuaded that there is no desire for change on education. He sees 
perhaps one more primary school somewhere. He will not want teachers from any 
Arab country, except possibly the Sudan. That the Sultan believed that there should 
be restriction in the movement of expatriates, even the skilled labour required for 
the oil industry in the Oman. This position was explained by a desire to preserve 
the culture of Omani cities from sabotage… He will forbid the semi-skilled labour 
movement from within their barbed-wire entanglement. He would not like to see 
Mattrah and Muscat spoiled in any way(UKNA, BC1015/7, 1965). 
In summary, Sultan Said’s perspective was determined by fears of the destabilisation which might 
be caused by foreign debt, power workers and ideas.  
 
2.1.4: British Diplomacy towards the Sultan’s policy 
During this early phase of the revolution (1965-1967), British diplomacy seemed to ignore 
the Sultan’s treatment of his own people. A message to the British by the Imam’s government in 
exile clearly explained the reasons for the deterioration in the Sultanate and attributed the outbreak 
of the revolution in Dhofar to Britain’s decision to overlook Said’s policy. It stated that, “H.M.G. 







upon them to use their influence to promote political change there” (UKNA, BC1015/7, 1965). In 
response to the accusation that British diplomacy could be blamed for the miserable conditions in 
Oman, officials stated: 
the position of H.M.G. is that the sultan of Muscat and Oman is a sovereign 
independent ruler and H.M.G. are in no position to put effective pressure on him to 
increase the pace of economic and political development (UKNA, BC1015/7, 
1965). 
The British government did not put any pressure on the Sultan to develop his government at this 
time. William Luce, the British political resident in the Persian Gulf observed that when discussing 
the development of the Oman’s government administration with the Sultan, he found out that the 
Sultan had not yet made any progress and that he found it very difficult to see how it could be 
worked out (UKNA, BC 1015/13, 1965).Some writers, such as Halliday (2008, pp. 331-332) and 
Omar (2008, pp. 6-7), argue that Britain was responsible for the suffering of the Omani people. This 
position is based upon the argument that Britain allowed Sultan Said to isolate the country and not 
develop it, thereby causing the suffering of the population. A letter from George Thomson, the 
British Minister of State in the Foreign Office, shows Britain’s response to this argument was the 
formal (and indeed the actual) position that they had no responsibility for the affairs of the 
sultanate, which was a sovereign independent state. As a consequence, the British stated that they 
were in no position to advise the Sultan directly. 
We have repeatedly taken our stand on this position in face of attempts by U.N. 
committees and others (such as the Saudi government) to get us to admit to 
some responsibility for the internal affairs of Muscat and Oman, and I fear that 
if we gave any indication of a willingness to intervene- even from humanitarian 
motives (except of course in relation to British subjects) this would prove the 
thin edge of the wedge(UKNA, BC1081/7, 1965, 22nd October 1965). 
In response to international criticism, the Sultan also prevented journalists from entering Oman. 
This move was supported by the British. This suggests that the British were more interested in 
securing their own interests than improving the conditions of people in Oman. In a letter from D.C. 
Carden to Sir William Luce on 15thJanuary 1966, it was noted that,“…uncontrolled or premature 
entry of journalists in the sultanate would do more harm than good… could be allowed to travel to 
the sultanate as soon as there was some evidence of development”(UKNA, BC 1017/2, 17thJanuary 
1966).British diplomats came to realise that any decision to delay the development of Oman would 
be likely to form a counter-opinion that might embarrass them and potentially cause others to blame 







to try and persuade the Sultan that pressures of public opinion cannot be ignored in 
the U.K. even if they can in the Sultanate, and that if H.M.G. are to continue to 
support him as effectively as they would wish, he owes it to them to help on this 
issue (UKNA, BC 1017/2, 17th January 1966). 
British diplomacy also considered the conflict from an international angle, seeking to avoid 
being drawn into the internal war of another state, especially given the damage already done to the 
British reputation by the nationalisation of the Suez Canal by President Nasser in 1956. Secret 
documents suggested the solution to avoiding international condemnation was to crush any 
resistance to Sultan Said as soon as possible. In a letter written from Carden to Luce position on 
15thJanuary 1966, as the Dhofar rebellion emerged, he stated that: 
A possible objection to this plan is the political embarrassment that we might 
suffer if it becomes known that British aircraft were being used in support in this 
internal security operation in Sultanate territory. But there is no reason otherwise 
why we should not meet the request of a friendly government, and there are good 
arguments for doing so. It is very much in our interests that this rebel group 
should be eliminated as speedily as possible, lest its existence and success will 
become widely known and therefore an international embarrassment to us (Al 
Harthi, 2007, p. 69).  
In 1958 Britain agreed to provide annual subsidies to the Sultan for a “civil development 
program in the sultanate at the rate of £77,000 and £50,000 per annum”(UKNA, F.O., BC1102/16, 
1965; UKNA, BC 1051/15, 1965).Under the 1958 agreement, the British Government also agreed 
that they would provide secondary personnel to the Sultan of Oman Armed Forces (SAF) and meet 
their salaries and other expenses incurred in the UK, in addition to providing assistance towards the 
cost of the SAF themselves. They also agreed to meet the cost of the Sultan of Oman’s Air Force, 
including that of the necessary secondary personnel. It was estimated that recruitment expenditure 
would amount to £67,950 (9 lakhs) and the British government made provision to meet this cost 
(UKNA, BC 1051/15, 1965). 
British government sources also followed the development of the revolution and the 
increasing danger posed by the rebels after the Hamrin Conference. An official document warned 
that the life of the British in the region had become dangerous, especially those who were working 
in the RAF base in Salalah. The diplomats therefore urged the Sultan to take action in order to avert 
this serious threat: 
Her Majesty’s Government have become increasingly concerned about the problem in 







personnel, both civilian and RAF, are finding themselves in increasing danger from 
the rebel movement. (UKNA, NBM10/2, 1970). 
An important point within the agreement, signed between the two countries in 1958, was the 
permission granted for British troops to operate in two air bases, in Salalah and Masirah. The 
agreement stipulated that British forces were be entitled to use the two bases together or to 
withdraw from both bases. After the rebels increased the attack on Salalah base, the British side 
requested permission to withdraw and settle in Masirah. This was refused under the conditions of 
the agreement, meaning that the British were forced to enter the war to protect the base in Salalah. 
In this way, the Sultan achieved his aim of ensuring that the British troops were involved into the 
conflict, which wasto be highly significant in the events of the Dhofar War. 
Because of its economic situation, the United Kingdom was not able to help extensively in 
the development of Oman (UKNA, FCO 8/569, FR: BC1/2, 1967). However, the reasons that 
encouraged the British government to support Sultan Said’s regime were clarified in a very 
important document, entitled “Philosophy”, which states that: 
The philosophy behind the Muscat civil development subsidy has been as follows. A 
friendly and stable regime in Muscat is important to our political position in the 
Arabian Peninsula and affords us essential military facilities. We have in the past had 
to intervene militarily to support the Sultan against rebellion in the interior. This has 
caused us considerable international embarrassment; to avoid a repetition of this we 
pay the sultan a substantial military subsidy to maintain armed forces to deter future 
rebellion (UKNA, BC1051/10, 1965). (For the full document, see Appendix 3).  
‘Philosophy’ emphasised the importance of British national interests in the Sultanate of Oman and 
clearly indicated the need to support the regime in order to achieve these interests. Before their 
official withdrawal from Yemen in 1967, Britain also contributed to the drawing of Oman’s border 
in the Dhofar region with South Yemen. This was an important step towards the protection of 
Omani national security and ensuring its long term stability by defusing potential border crises 
between Oman and Yemen (UKNA, BC1081/7, 1965). Furthermore, the Sultan actively exploited 
his relations with the British in several areas, such as the creation of the first radio station in Oman. 
Said also requested the contribution of British experts and advisers in the field of petroleum, as 
stated in a classified British document (UKNA, BC 1052/3, 1965). The same document showed that 
the British position was that they were willing to help develop Oman and the Sultan’s government 
when the export of oil began: 
The Sultan’s administration is very rudimentary and inefficient. Before the 







recognizes the serious weaknesses and the need for change and has therefore 
asked for expert for about a month (UKNA, BC 1052/3, 1965).  
 
The diplomatic position of the British was to support Sultan Said in the hope that he would make 
more progressive development after exporting oil and receiving the needed money required for 
those improvements. The Sultan clarified that he had no intention to start developments until the 
export of oil began. 
 
2.2: The role of Jamal Abdel Nasser 
Jamal Abdel Nasser (1956-1970) was one of the foremost Arab leaders opposing 
colonialism in the 1950s and 1960s. He led the Free Officer Movement in Egypt that overthrew the 
monarchy on 23rd July 1952 and was later appointed as the President of the Republic of Egypt on 
23rd June 1956. It is generally agreed that his greatest achievements in Egypt were the 
nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956 and laying the foundation stone of the High Dam. He 
remained President of Egypt and the leader of Arab nationalism until his death on 28thSeptember 
1970. Through his revolutionary ideology, Nasser had a profound impact on the Arab world, 
including in Oman, influencing the hearts and minds of the people across the Arab nations. 
Many people were influenced by the Arab national tide in the 1950s, especially in the wake 
of the defeat of the combined force of Israel, Britain and France by Egypt in 1956. The Dhofaris 
were among those Arab people influenced by the Arab national ideology, largely due to the dire 
injustice under which many lived in Oman, especially in Dhofar. This situation played into the 
hands of the Arab nationalists because of Sultan Said’s role in the oppression and the accusations of 
his collaboration with the British government (Al Amri, 2012, p. 64). Nasser had successfully 
supported Yemen’s southern revolution against British colonialism until its independence on 30th 
November 1967, after which he established a union of Egypt and Syria to create the so-called 
United Arab Republic in 1958. He had further aspirations to unify the 22 Arab countries and it was 
this climate in which his beliefs took root in Dhofar. In fact, Egypt played a major role in the 
cooperation between the rebel leaders in Dhofar and the rebels in Southern Yemen (Bahbahani, 
1984, pp. 144-145). Nasser played a major role in the unification of the three organisations into 
“The Liberation of Dhofar”, providing rebels with aid, in order to create a strong national front like 








2.2.1: The influence of Nasserite principles on the revolution leaders  
In the Arab nationalist movement (otherwise known as Nasserite, after Abdul Nasser), the 
leaders of the revolution found ideology and motive to liberate them from the Sultan’s rule. It was a 
particularly attractive and compelling movement for Dhofaris, who felt that they were under 
occupation, as they believed that Britain indirectly occupied Oman under the cover of international 
conventions through the British Resident commissioner in Muscat (Al Rayes, 2000, p. 47). It has 
been argued that it was the construction of the air base in Dhofar during World War II that made the 
Dhofaris realise the degree of influence held by the British (Abbas, 1986, p. 103). These factors 
contributed to the Dhofaris feeling that the British exerted too much control over their country, 
which led them to push for separation from the remainder of Oman. The aforementioned spread of 
Arab nationalism and anti-imperialism in the area, principally supported by Egypt and Abdul 
Nasser, confirmed the direction of their movement.  
The first statement of the Dhofar front, which is discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter, stated an intention to free the Dhofaris from the British (DLF, 1974, p. 9). Sheikh Saleh, 
one of the important Omani tribal Sheikhs of that era, stated that Britain was the absolute enemy of 
Arabs, working hard to separate them and sow disunity (Oman Imamate Publications, 1945, pp. 6-
7). As part of the overall atmosphere in the Arab world and the growing influence of the Nasserites, 
one of the organisations formed in Dhofar shifted to the At Tayyār an Nāṣṣerī, otherwise known as 
“The Local Organisation of the Arab Nationalist Movement”. The organisation successfully 
recruited many young Dhofari immigrants in other Gulf countries in the pursuit of Arab 
nationalism. This movement can be defined as the belief that the Arab people share one identity, 
united by language, culture, history, geography and interests, and that one Arab state will be 
established to unite all Arab states into one entity. The first statement of the revolution carried many 
signs of the influence of Nasseri ideology. For example, the statement addressed the Dhofari people 
as the (Arab people in Dhofar) and it focused on the Arab identity of Dhofar as a part of the Arab 
homeland (People of the Arab Nation in the South and the Gulf and in every inch of the land of 
Arabism). In addition, it requested the provision of financial and moral support for the armed 
struggle in the Arab Dhofar. Importantly, the document also emphasised the belief of the Dhofar 
Liberation Front in Unity of the Arab Nation, which would eventually lead to Revolutionary 
Coalescence with revolutionary organisations in the Arab Gulf and the South. The statement ended 







slogan “long live Dhofar, Free and Arab” and “long live the Arab Nation Front”, which reflected 
the influence of the Nasserites on the rebels. As part of the support of the United Arab Republic, the 
Nasserite Subhi Abdul Al Hamid, commander of military operations, trained many of the Front 
members (approximately 160 soldiers) and provided them with weapons in 1963 (Haglawi, 2003, 
pp. 310-311).  
The support that Nasser provided for the revolution indicated his desire to achieve Egyptian 
national interests through forging close ties with the rebels. This support included a direct role 
played by the Egyptians, with three Egyptian officers spending three months in Oman studying the 
topography and talking to Omani rebel contacts inside the country (Barut, 1996 p. 395). 
Furthermore, Cairo became the media activity centre for the Dhofar liberation front (Haglawi, 2003, 
p. 310) and supplied fighters with money and weapons during the first phase of the revolution 
(1965-1967). Abdulkader Hatem, the Deputy Prime Minister of Egypt (1962-1966), stated that Arab 
nationalism was at its climax during Abdul Nasser’s era (1954-1970), manifesting itself in a 
political and military uprising across the Gulf that had a huge influence upon the revolutionaries in 
Dhofar. Likewise Sheikh Saleh, one of the most important tribal leaders in Oman, quoted Abdul 
Nasser in his speech to Omanis, saying, 
as the greatest President Abdul Nasser says: we will fight, we will fight, we will 
fight until the last drop of our blood, we will not give up, we are going to win, God 
with us, weapons in our hands and pluck in our hearts (Imamate Office, 1958, p. 8). 
Ahmed Al Falahi, an intellectual and one of the founders of the radio in Oman in 1970, claimed that 
a wide variety of people were listening to the famous (Arab Voice) radio, which was broadcast from 
Cairo (Interview Ahmed Al Falahi, 13th June 2012)(Appendix 4 shows an example of how this 
radio supported the revolution in Dhofar). This “radical support” reached the revolutionaries in 
Dhofar and provided military techniques through broadcasts, stating that “we must take-over the 
enemy weapons to arm new units in the liberation army, it is a war of life or death, we have to 
obtain the perfect military tactics for the civil war which is hit and run” (Halliday, 2008, p. 340).  
Records also exist of the Dhofari case being mentioned in the Egyptian press, which 
considered it as one of the essential issues in Oman at that time. The press also included some 
information about the Dhofar Liberation Front, with the Egyptian newspaper media reporting that 
“21 British soldiers were killed and a soldier was wounded during an attack on British bases by the 







press added that 11 soldiers had been killed and another 7 wounded during a clash between the 
liberation army in Dhofar and a British caravan in Hamrin region (The News Press, 1965, p. 4). The 
next day, it was reported that the liberation army force had shot down a military plane, destroying it 
completely and killing the pilot and three other soldiers (The News Press, 1965, p. 4). The Egyptian 
media (Republic Press) wrote a front page story about the visit of a delegation from the Dhofar 
Liberation Front to Cairo to hold talks with Egyptian officials in the Arab League about the military 
situation in Dhofar (UKNA, F.C.O., ME2655, 1967). A clear example of the Egyptian media 
support for the Dhofar revolutionaries can be seen in the following speech that was broadcast to the 
rebels from Cairo: 
Brothers in rebellious Dhofar… our armed revolution also aims at achieving for the 
people freedom, national independence and a dignified free life…forced the 
tottering regime of the sultan of Muscat. They are using every means to get 
supporters and friends among the sons of the rebellious people of Dhofar. … The 
best evidence that the regime of the Sultan of Muscat and imperialism wants to 
liquidate the people of Dhofar was the act of withdrawing the silver Riyal from the 
public and replacing it with a nickel Riyal. However, brothers, no matter what 
tricks imperialism resorts to, the revolution continues to gain strength and power, 
and freedom from the regime of imperialism and the Sultan is bound to be 
achieved. As long as we are vigilant, united and in solidarity, neither imperialism or 
the Sultan of Muscat nor the traitors can dominate us…so forward the sons of the 
people of Dhofar. Forward to the sacrifice of blood and lives in the fields of 
struggle and battle. Forward to freedom and independence, dignity and honour, our 
struggling masses (UKNA, F.C.O., ME2655, 1967). 
 
2.3: Organisations forming Dhofar Liberation Front and their union 
 At the beginning of the revolution, the Dhofaris initially formed a number of secret groups. 
The Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF) was subsequently formed through the union of the three most 
important of these organisations. In seniority they were as follows: The Dhofar Branch of the Arab 
National Movement (ANM), the Dhofar Charitable Association (DCA), and the Dhofar Soldiers 
Organisation (DSO). These organisations will be discussed in detail below and briefly compared.  
 
2.3.1:   Dhofar branch of the Arab National Movement (ANM) 
This organisation was formed in the late 1950s. Its membership comprised a large number 







was in Kuwait, although it also had links with the central administration of the Arab National 
Movement in Beirut. The organisation took the form of the majority of the political organisations 
that were prevalent in the Arab world at that time and adopted the same ideological thoughts as the 
Arab nationalist movement, calling for the glorification of Arabs and the establishment of a new, 
united country on the basis of blood, language, history and geography. Nationalism was very 
popular among Arab people at that time, especially after the rise of Nasser, and the union between 
Egypt and Syria under the name of the United Arab Republic and, it can be said that the Dhofar 
Liberation Front was derived from the Nasserite ideology. 
The Dhofar branch of the Arab National Movement was considered to be the least important 
organisation in the DLF, in terms of both number and popularity in Dhofar. However, unlike the 
others, its members were an elected group with political maturity(Al Amri, 2012, p. 67). 
Mohammed bin Ahmed Al Ghassani was one of the most important rebel leaders from its formation 
until 1986, when he left revolutionary activity and returned to the Sultanate of Oman. Another well-
known member of the organisation was Ali bin Ahmed Al Ketaini Al Rawas. He spent 5 years in 
the prison of Sultan Said bin Taimur until his release in 1970, after which he worked for the 
government of Sultan Qaboos and was even the Director of Sultan Qaboos Hospital in Salalah for 
many years. Said bin Masood Muraikh bait Said was an instrumental rebel figure at the beginning 
of the revolutionary action. As a result he was imprisoned for five years in Jalali fort (1965-1970) in 
Muscat, until he was released and rejoined the rebels. He is still alive at the time of writing. Said bin 
Faraj Al Rawas and his brother Mohammed bin Faraj Al Rawas were among the figures arrested by 
the Armed Forces of Sultan Said in 1965. They spent 5 years in jail and then they joined the work 
for the Government of Sultan Qaboos (Interview with current diplomat, 2nd August 2014, RA3). 
These figures are particularly significant in this context, except those who were captured, because 
that they took control of the revolution after the second conference in 1967. Most importantly, 
Mohammed Al Ghassani became the first leader of the revolution after the deportation of Musalim 
bin Nafal in 1968.  
 
2.3.2:  Dhofar Charitable Association (DCA) 
 This organisation was formed in the eastern region of Saudi Arabia in 1962 (Al Nafisi, 







Most of the founders were Dhofari who worked for the Arab American Oil Company (Aramco). 
The group had hidden objectives behind an overt goal. Its apparent objectives were charitable, such 
as the construction of mosques and helping the poor in Dhofar. However, its real objective was to 
incite the Dhofari to armed aggression against Sultan Said bin Taimur and his regime. The DCA 
enjoyed good relations with Imam Ghalib bin Ali Al Hinai, the last Imam and Governor of the 
Interior of Oman (1913-1957), who British troops toppled in favour of Sultan Said during the Al 
Jabal Al Akhdhar (Green Mountain) War in 1959(Al Amri, 2012, p. 67).The DCA was the most 
widely accepted and influential organisation in Dhofar before the integration of the three main 
groups, not least because of its charitable work. It also had a number of important external relations, 
especially with Imam Ghalib and with Egypt, the undisputed leader of the National Liberation 
Movement against western colonisation in the Arab World. The top leaders of the Association were 
also influential figures in Dhofar social life. Most of the leaders lived in Salalah, where the DCA 
enjoyed wide spread popularity (Al Amri, 2012, p. 67).  
 There were many high profile and influential figures in the Association, such as Sheikh 
Mussalem bin Nufl Al Kathiri, who is generally credited as firing the bullet that began the Dhofar 
Revolution in April 1963. He was the main figure in the drive to unify Dhofar’s various groups 
under one powerful and effective leadership, although he later worked for the Government of Sultan 
Qaboos as an undersecretary. Other influential figures include Salem bin Mohammed Shaaban Al 
Ojaili who was one of the founders of the revolutionary action and one of the top members in the 
Association. He was arrested in 1965 and imprisoned for five years. After his release, Al Ojaili also 
worked for the Government of Sultan Qaboos as an undersecretary. Until recently, he held the 
position of the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Oil and Gas in the Sultanate of Oman. An 
important rebel in Kuwait, Mohammed bin Alawi Ali Moqaibel, also continues to hold significant 
power. After chairing the liaison committee in Kuwait, he joined the Government of Sultan Qaboos 
and is currently an ambassador at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Other important members include 
Yousuf bin Alawi Abdullah Ibrahim, who has been the Minster for Foreign Affairs for more than 15 
years, Salem Bakhit Zidan Al Burama, Mussalem bin Amor Al Burama, Awad bin Abdullah Al 
Rawas, Said bin Ahmed Jaeidi Bait Fadhil, Ahmed Thairen Kashoob, and Mohammed Abdullah Al 
Bahar Al Rawas. Al Rawas joined the revolutionary action at the beginning and is still alive today. 
He entered government when Sultan Qaboos took power and was eventually appointed as the 
Minister of Information, a post that he occupied from 1979 until 2001. Other key members include 







Al Faqih Shaaban bin Salem Ali Al Ojaili. The Sheikh was a religious scholar, who died on 
10thMarch 1994 (Interview Rebel Leader, 2nd August 2014,RA3). The orientation of the association 
was generally religious in general, rather than in favour of communism and Arab nationalism. As a 
consequence of this, their relationship with Saudi Arabia and Imam Ghalib was good. 
It is worth mentioning here that the aims of this organisation were the construction of 
mosques and support for the poor and needy, such as through distribution of essential supplies. The 
leaders of the organisation, who were committed to Islam, also enjoyed a close relationship with 
Saudi Arabia. Their relationship with Egypt was largely attributable to Nasser speaking out against 
those leaders who cooperated with imperialism power. As Nasser considered the Saudi leaders to be 
serving as the right hand of American imperialism in the region, he was instigating people to 
overturn Saudi leaders and hence there are huge intellectual differences between the Arab National 
movement and the Dhofar Charitable Association the effects of which will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
 
2.3.3: Dhofar Soldiers’ Organisation (DSO) 
 The DSO was formed out of the integration of three small groups of Dhofari soldiers 
working in the Trucial States (UAE), Qatar and Bahrain. The first clandestine group was formed in 
1961 in the “Trucial Oman Scouts” in UAE, now known as the UAE Army. This was followed in 
1962 by a group of Dhofaris working in the Qatar military forces and later, in 1963, the formation 
of another organisation called the Bahrain Defence Force. These three clandestine groups 
eventually united in 1964, under the name “Dhofar Soldiers’ Organisation” (DSO).  
 The first union was achieved by three soldiers. The first of these was Mohammed bin Said 
Qoton who was the representative of the Dhofar soldiers in the Bahrain Defence Force. He reached 
the position of deputy commander of the Dhofar Liberation Army, which he eventually left after the 
Hamrin Conference. He joined the Special Force of Sultan Qaboos and reached the rank of 
Lieutenant Colonel. He is still alive. The next leader, Mahad bin Suhail Sirad Al Amri, represented 
the soldiers in the Qatar Force. He was one of the leaders at the beginning of the revolutionary 
action, leading to an accusation of treason and his subsequent execution. Finally, the leader of the 







organisation, achieving the first union between the members of Dhofar organisations who were 
working in the military forces of each of the three Gulf States. 
 After its formation, the DSO became the driving force to unify the other political 
organisations. After the DSO was formed, four people were nominated to represent the organisation 
in negotiations to unify revolutionary action in Dhofar with the other organisations in KSA and 
Kuwait: Mahad bin Suhail Sirad Al Amri, Mussalem bin Saad Omrah Al Kathiri, Ahmed bin Salem 
Al Nubi Al Kathiri, and Salem bin Mohammed Mahad Al Amri (Interview Ali Ghawas, 23rd 
January 2014). 
 The DSO was likely the most important organisation in the DLF, at least in terms of military 
power. Seventy percent of the first fighters who carried out military operations were from the DSO 
and its members can be described as the most willing to sacrifice their lives for the revolution, as 
well as the least likely to be working in pursuit of personal gain. However, despite its obvious 
importance and the significant role it played in unifying revolutionary activities, as well as 
providing the largest number of top fighters, the DSO is the least well known in historical writings 
about the Dhofar Revolution. This might be at least partially explained by its secret combat nature, 
which was not involved in politics. 
During the 1950s, soldiers left Oman to work in the military and security agencies of the 
United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain. As Qatar is situated between the UAE and Bahrain, the 
majority of their meetings were held there. The soldiers were close, especially because they all 
spoke Jabali, the language of the mountains of Dhofar. One of the reasons that this organisation was 
the most essential military arm of the revolutionaries is because its members were experienced from 
work in other Gulf countries. They decided to join the revolutionaries in Dhofar believing that it 
was their ethical responsibility to rescue the governorate from Sultan Said. The ideology of the 
soldiers was predicated upon a moral responsibility for improving the living conditions of the 
citizens of Dhofar. Since they were military trained, the members of this group believed that they 
were able forcefully to end the rule of Sultan Said, thereby providing the Dhofari people with a 
decent life. The members of the DSO were not ideologically oriented, because most of the soldiers 
came from minor tribes in Dhofar, rather than from strong tribes which had clear ideological 








2.3.4: Comparing the Three Organisations 
 When making a comparison between the three organisations, their location clearly 
influenced the formation of their ideologies. The Dhofar branch of ANM in Kuwait was heavily 
influenced by the Arab nationalism that prevailed at that time, marginalising the teaching of Islam 
(Barut, 1996, p. 395). Similarly, the DCA members were influenced by their life in the KSA, the 
birthplace of the Islamic religion and the home of the exiled Imam Ghalib bin Ali Al Hinai. The 
charitable works required under Islamic law, such as building mosques and helping the poor, were 
carried out by the DCA and served to attract the largest possible number of people in Dhofar in their 
attempt to overthrow the rule of Sultan Said (Dhiab, 1984, p. 87). Finally, the DSO was influenced 
by the military situation in the Trucial States of the Coast of Oman, Qatar and Bahrain, where 
British occupation was imposed by military power. The Trucial States of the Coast of Oman, now 
known as the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain, remained under British occupation through 
agreements with the princes of the coast. This lasted until the withdrawal of Britain from those 
states in late 1971. This situation resulted in the ideology of the soldiers being a hybrid of combat 
and revolt through the use of armed force.  
 Of the three organisations, the Dhofar branch of the ANM was the oldest and the most 
politically mature. It combined with the DCA to form a single organisation. Meanwhile the DSO 
was formed quickly in response to fast-moving events and was the first union to rebel against the 
rule of Sultan Said. It is important to note that all three organisations which had similar living 
conditions and geographic origins in Dhofar were formed by members who had one similar 
perspective, namely the desire to end the rule of Sultan Said. The majority of the nationalists and 
the Association members were from Salalah, although some came from the desert to the north. 
However, most of the soldiers were from the mountains of Dhofar. 
 Overall, each organisation had a special defining feature: the ANM was characterised by 
organisational and political maturity; the DCA was cultured because of its dependence on people 
living in cities, leading it to establish effective international relations; and the DSO was 
characterised by tough warriors of the Dhofar Mountains, who were driven by tribal unity. Thus, the 
union of the organisations brought together organisational and political maturity with education and 








2.3.5: The Union of the Dhofari Revolutionary Organisations 
 The beginning of the Dhofar conflict can be traced 
to an operation carried out by Mussalem bin Nufl Al 
Kathiri, who shot at a car belonging to a British oil 
company which was in a contract with the Omani 
government. Although this could be called an individual 
revolution, the action resonated throughout Dhofar. It was 
important to support this single act, which was well 
known in both local and foreign circles, and which was 
widely considered to be the beginning of a new phase of 
action against the reign of Sultan Said bin Taimur. Many 
parties wanted to make use of this action in the fulfilment 
of their aims. As a consequence, bin Nufl, the plotter and 
the executor, sent a delegation to Saudi Arabia to make 
contact with the Kingdom, in order to seek the material and political support of Imam Ghalib bin 
Ali. This move led the eastern region of the KSA to become the focus of Dhofari attention and the 
headquarters of the representatives of bin Nufl. Two main groups moved to KSA in 1964, the first 
of which was the previously mentioned group who sent a delegation of DSO from Qatar to 
Dammam in eastern Saudi Arabia to represent them in negotiations with the other organisations. 
This was the start of the early stages of the Union of the Dhofari Revolutionary Organisations. 
Negotiations were undertaken with Imam Ghalib regarding aid motives and the joint work to 
achieve their common goals, namely the liberation of Dhofar from the rule of Sultan Said. It wasa 
major shift in the Dhofari Revolutionary path, representing the first time in recent history that they 
had put aside tribalism and ethnicity to stand together against a common enemy. Despite its 
opponents and those parties ambivalent to the revolt, the majority supported the rebellion (Haglawi, 
2003, pp. 310- 311).  
 In Kuwait, other participants continued to discuss the integration of the three organisations, 
reaching an agreement on 26thDecember 1964 that replaced the individual groups with the Dhofar 
Liberation Front. To achieve this purpose, a pentagonal committee was formed with two members 
from DCA, namely Salem Shaaban Al Ojaili and Sheikh Abdullah bin Ahmed Al Marhoon; two 
members from DSO, namely Mahad Sirad Al Amri and Mussalem bin Saad Al Kathiri; and one 
Fig. 10: logo of DLF. 
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member from ANM, namely Mohammad Ahmad Al Ghassani. (Interview Ali Ghawas, 23rd January 
2014).These men were clearly selected as representatives of all three organisations. This Pentagonal 
Committee, was given three major tasks: preparing for the First Congress; making contact with a 
country willing to host the First Congress, with Iraq as the main contender; and making contact with 
key figures in the Dhofari organisations to assign delegations who would attend the First Congress. 
The extended meetings held in Kuwait were effectively the beginning of the integration of the three 
organisations (Al Rayes, 2000, p. 87).  
 
2.3.6: Representatives of bin Nufl in Saudi Arabia 
 When Sheikh Mussalem bin Nufl arrived in Dammam in KSA, the news of his operation 
was widespread. He met Imam Ghalib bin Ali, who provided unconditional assistance to the 
Dhofaris, and gifted him with weapons, mines and cash. Bin Nufl left a number of Dhofari 
representatives with the Imam. Foremost among these was Said bin Ali Jaih Quton, who had tried 
to lead armed operations against the Forces of the Sultan in 1964. The other representatives were: 
Said Suhail Al Ghadhban bait Kathir, Said bin Samhan Al Mashali, Ahmed bin Suhail Quintah Al 
Shanfari, Abdullah bin Ahmed Al Nahari, Hafeedh bin Abdullah Salmeen Al Rawas, and Masood 
bin Salem Jaaboub. Bin Nufl and his group eventually managed to successfully deliver the weapons 
and mines to Dhofar in 1963. In addition to this, Imam Ghalib provided money for the group to 
form armed organisations against his opponent, Sultan Said. Volunteers willing to take up arms 
against the Sultan received their initial instruction at the Imam’s training camp in Basra, Iraq, which 
had thirty volunteers under training by mid-1964, under the supervision of Said bin Ali Jaih Quton 
(Interview Salim Kashoob, 17th August 2013). 
 When the four representatives of the DSO (Maha Sirad Al Amri, Mussalembin Saad Al 
Kathiri, Ahmed Al Nubi and Salem AlAttar) arrived in Saudi Arabia, they were joined by another 
delegation representing nationalists who had come from Kuwait. This group comprised Mohammed 
bin Ahmed Al Ghassani, Salem bin Zidan Al Burami, Said bin Ahmed Jaeidi bait Fadhil, 
Mohammed bin Ahmed Al Rawas, Said bin Masood Muraikh bait Said, and Mussalem bin Amor Al 
Burami (Al Amri, 2012, pp. 75-77). The two delegations met with the seven representatives of bin 
Nufl and the members of DCA. The assembly had various discussions in an extended meeting that 







should be well organised. A meeting with the Imam was also necessary to gain an understanding of 
his motives for providing support to the Dhofaris, as well as to explain clearly their general view to 
him. For these reasons, a delegation was assigned to meet with Imam Ghalib in 1964. This group 
included the bin Nafal group, Imam Ghalib’s group and a total of 20 rebels from other groups. 
Those who reached Dhofar participated in the first conference and in the armed struggle against 
Sultan Said.  
 
2.3.7: The relationship between DLF and Imam Ghalib bin Ali 
The first chapter outlined the important Imamate issue in Oman, which was ruled over as an 
independent entity in Ad Dakhiliyah (the interior region) by Oman. The attempts of the British oil 
companies to include this province in its activities had encouraged Sultan Said to join the region to 
the territories of Oman. However, the Omani Imam was still able to prevent foreign oil companies 
from entering his territories. Saudi Arabia supported the Imamate leaders, due to existing hostility 
with Sultan Said with regards to the border dispute around the Al Buraimi Oasis. Nevertheless, 
British military air and naval intervention resulted in the defeat of Imam Ghalib in 1957, who ruled 
the interior of Oman with the accordance with the traditions of the Ibadism doctrine (see section 
2.3.1.2 for more details), after which he moved to Saudi Arabia, where he started a front against the 
Sultan’s policy and the British presence in Oman. Imam Ghalib’s government, in exile in Saudi 
Arabia, was one of the destinations of the Dhofari leaders after the rebellion in Dhofar had erupted. 
There, they attempted to get help against their common enemy, the Sultan and the British who 
supported him. 
 The DLF delegation met Imam Ghalib bin Ali in Dammam. “The first question of the 
delegation to the Imam was the reason for the Imam helping the Dhofaris, to which he replied: that 
they had a common goal: to fight Said bin Taimur and overthrow his regime. The second question 
was to know what was required from the Dhofaris. The Imam replied that currently, he was not 
asking for anything. Their goal was to eliminate the regime and they could ask the Arab Countries 
to help and provide material aid. Later, the members of the delegation explained their general point 
of view by saying they neither believed in the cause of the Sultan nor in the cause of the Imamate. 
Similarly, they were not going to fight on behalf of anyone neither the Americans nor British. They 







or overt conditions, then it was welcomed and therefore they ask for his political, military, financial 
and diplomatic support by facilitating their movements using the passport of Imamate of Oman. If, 
however, his support was conditional, they would consider his terms and decide accordingly" 
(Interview Ali Ghawas, 23rd January 2014). After a series of dialogues, the Imam agreed to provide 
unconditional assistance to the Dhofar rebels. A coordination committee was then named to 
supervise the delivery of the aid supplied by the Imam and to coordinate the political and military 
requirements of the rebels. The members of this committee were as follows: Awadh bin Abdullah 
Al Rawas, Salem bin Bukhait Al Burami, and Mussalem bin Amor Al Burami (Interview Salim 
Kashoob, 1st March 2014). This membership was clearly chosen because it represented the three 
organisations.  
 In November 1964, the representatives of the Dhofari Organisations were holding extensive 
meetings about how best to integrate the various Dhofari groups into one organisation. Said bin 
Jaih, who was a leader of Dhofar branch of the Arab National Movement, was summoned to attend 
the meeting in Kuwait, which he attended with a group of colleagues. However, the participants 
were unable to convince bin Jaih to join the united front. As a consequence, he returned to Saudi 
Arabia to terminate the understanding with the Imam, who in turn halted coordination with the 
Committee that had been assigned by the organisations, telling them that the assistance would be 
limited to representatives of bin Nufl. The representatives agreed that the aid the Imam provided 
was limited to bin Nufl and that the two Dhofari organisations did not have any moral obligation 
towards the Imam for the assistance he offered (Al Amri, 2012, p. 75).  
 The main reason for this disengagement was the disagreement between Said bin Ali Jaih and 
the Dhofari Charity Association, led by Mussalem bin Nufl. Said bin Ali Jaih was a man who had 
wanted more power for himself. Bin Jaih had been training recruits at the Imam’s training camp in 
Basra in Iraq when he received the news of the agreement between the Imam and the DSO 
delegation. He called for a demonstration by his soldiers, then stopped the training and returned to 
Saudi Arabia to terminate the agreement between the Imam and the delegation. There, Said bin Jaih 
asked Imam Ghalib to support the rebels through representatives from various organisations, rather 
than through Mussalem bin Nufl, who represented one of the three organisations that formed the 
DLF. The reason for Jaih’s action was the complaint that the aid was only serving bin Nafal, who he 
rejected as the representative of the Imam. This thinking illustrated significant ideological 







 In summary, this meant that the local organisation of the Dhofar branch of the Arab National 
Movementthat Said bin Jaih represented was an Arab nationalist group, whereas the Dhofar 
Charitable Association of Mussalem bin Nufl was religious and was close to the Imam. The ANM 
was explicitly opposed to the imperialist powers and any leaders who cooperated with them, as well 
as any monarchies or religious rulers, like Imam Ghalib, who were described as backward powers. 
At the beginning of the revolution, Egypt was in contact with the local Arab nationalist 
organisations, while Saudi Arabia supported the Dhofari Charity Association via the Imam. The 
support offered by the KSA to the rebels was intended to establish close ties with the anti-authority 
powers on one hand and to contain the expansion of the anti-monarchy Nasserites on the other 
(Dhiab, 1984, p. 90). Despite as a result of the disintegration of the Imam’s role, the character of the 
Union was dominated by the rebellion leaders, which continued to receive support from Saudi 
Arabia through the DCA. 
 
2.4: The Beginning of the Revolution  
The actual beginning of the revolution in Dhofar is measured from the shots fired by Sheikh 
Mussalem bin Nufl, which killed a British employee. Some considered this a purely individual 
tribal move, for the Sheikh sought to take revenge on Sultan Said bin Taimur, who had imprisoned 
him on multiple occasions in early 1952. While in Mirbat, he had used a transistor radio, a device 
that had been banned, to listen to broadcasts of the Voice of the Arabs from Cairo. The radio station 
vociferously attacked western colonialism and the Arabian sultans, emirs and kings who enjoyed 
good relations with the imperialist powers, and who were therefore described as traitors. Upon 
hearing that he was listening to illegal broadcasts, the Sultan gave orders for bin Nufl to be jailed. 
This proved reason enough for him to later merge the Dhofari groups into one organisation. Sheikh 
Mussalem participated in the meetings of the DCA, which were often held in the house of Sheikh 
Salem bin Mohammed Ghassani. Sheikh Mussalem bin Nufl, Said Al Hamar and Nasser Al 
Mashali staged the ambush in Harit area or (Um Al Khashab) between Salalah and Thumrait, in 
order to cut the road used by the oil company vehicles. He did not tell them of his intention, instead 
preferring to execute the operation with the help of his cousins (Al Amri, 2012, p. 68).Their 
objective was to start the revolution and to seize vehicles that could be used to cross the Empty 
Quarter towards Saudi Arabia. Three days later, two vehicles arrived from the John Mecom-Pure 







vehicles were attacked and one of their military escorts was killed. Both drivers, one from Yemen 
and the other from Italy, were released. The news of the attack spread widely and was quickly 
welcomed by Dhofaris at home and abroad. Certainly, Peter Sichel, who witnessed the war, made it 
clear to the researcher that most of the population in Dhofar supported the rebels in the early years 
of the revolution (Interview Sichel, 10th December 2015).  
 This attack on 13thApril 1963 is considered to be the beginning of the Dhofar rebellion. 
However, Sichel consider the initial meeting in Kuwait on 26th December 1964 to be the actual start 
of the conflict, while others argue that 9th June 1965 was the actual date, because this is when 
explicit approval to commence the revolution was officially given, after the First Congress in Al 
Wadi Al Khabeer (The Great Valley) in the central mountains of Dhofar. The revolutionaries 
asserted that this date was an important official reference point (Interview Sichel, 10th December 
2015). However, it is probable that without the shots of bin Nufl and his companions the Congress 
would not have been held nor would the revolution have been declared.  
 The Iraqi government agreed, upon the request of the Dhofari revolutionary groups, to host a 
congress in order to consolidate the various groups that opposed Sultan Said into a single 
organisation. The Iraqi government allocated one of its camps in northern Iraq for that purpose, as 
well as to train fighters in the guerrilla warfare necessary to wage effectively military operations in 
Dhofar. For this reason, some of the soldiers who had finished their mission from the Gulf countries 
went to the camp. Most of the 150 personnel who attended training had belonged to the previously 
mentioned Dhofari Soldiers Organisation (Barut, 1996, p. 354). However, security precautions led 
the rebels to shift their training facilities from Iraq to the mountains of Dhofar, which prevented 
Britain from carrying out acts against the revolutionaries abroad. This is important, because it 
demonstrates that British intelligence was actively operating in the area and was tracing the 
movements of the rebels, as a manifestation of its desire to eliminate the revolution in its infancy. 
 Three routes were identified back to Dhofar: by sea from Kuwait or Iraq through the Persian 
Gulf to the coast of Dhofar; by air from Kuwait to Yemen and then by land or sea to Dhofar; and 
the land route from Kuwait through Saudi Arabia and the vast desert of Rub' al Khali “The Empty 
Quarter” to Dhofar. Upon the arrival of the rebels, the conference would then be held in one of the 
caves in the mountains of Dhofar (Interview rebel leader, 26th January 2016, RA4). Since the return 
journey was extremely perilous, the first group of rebels returned by sea armed with weapons, some 







Basra in Iraq, but the rebels were arrested by the Iranian Navy and handed over to the British 
authorities (Al Rayes, 2000, p. 88), after which they were imprisoned in Muscat. The second group 
decided to return via Yemen, under the pretence of visiting relatives. They flew from Kuwait to 
Aden and then went by sea to Salalah during the months of April and May 1965 (Al Rayes, 2000, p. 
87). The arrests had a profound impact on the emerging revolution, especially as several important 
personalities had been captured, includingAli bin Ahmed Al Ketaini Al Rawas, Said bin Masood 
Muraikh bait Said, Said bin Faraj Al Rawas and his brother Mohammed bin Faraj Al Rawas 
(Interview with current diplomat, 2nd August 2014, RA3) (for more details, see section 2.3.1.1). The 
detainees were subjected to various torture in the prisons of Muscat and Salalah for five years, until 
they were freed by a general pardon, issued by Sultan Qaboos, in 1970. The third group, which 
included members from the bin Nufl faction, the men of Imam Ghalib, and 20 rebels from other 
groups, came via the Empty Quarter of Saudi Arabia and reached Dhofar safely (Interview rebel 
leader, 26th January 2016, RA4). 
Though remote from the rest of Oman, the revolt in Dhofar suggested problems for Britain’s 
national interests in the Sultanate as a whole. In April 1964, at the same time as the revolution 
began in the south, several fires occurred in the capital Muscat and Mutrah, destroying the homes of 
more than a hundred citizens and several facilities. It was theorised that sympathisers or front 
members in the south had deliberately started the fires to deliver a message to the Sultan and the 
British that the capital was not far from the hands of the revolution. It also effectively 
communicated to the north of Oman that the whole of the Sultanate was under threat (Al Harthi, 
2007, pp. 44-45). 
British intelligence was watching the movements of the rebels abroad long before the 
outbreak of the revolution. A secret telegram from Bahrain to the Foreign Office dated 29th 
September 1964 reported that, “Training of Omani rebels is going on in Syria and Iraq and possibly 
elsewhere” (Al Harthi, 2007, p. 19). British analysis of potential outcomes at the time stated that, 
This indicates the trouble which may be expected from small parties of rebels 
infiltrating back into Oman after they have completed their training. It is also likely 
that increased attempts will be made to smuggle arms by sea and land into the 
Sultanate’ (Al Harthi, 2007, p. 19). 







Relations with regional countries Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait and Egypt however facilitated 
communication between the rebel groups, as well as supporting them to start the revolution. 
Another important factor that contributed to the spread of the outbreak of the revolution was that 
bin Nufl who sparked the revolution was a well-known tribal leader “Sheikh” who enjoyed the 
support of his tribe and respect from the other tribes in Dhofar. In spite of British intelligence 
therefore the revolution rapidly spread. 
 
2.4.1: The First Founding Conference in the Mountains of Dhofar  
The first Congress was held on 1st June 1965, in a large cave in the mountains bordering 
what is known as the great valley. This was considered to signal the official start of the Dhofar 
Liberation Front, which was officially formed on 26th December 1964. During this conference, a 
joint command was elected, which contained twelve men (Al Amri, 2012, p. 84). It should be noted 
that despite the arrests of a number of key members of the revolution in April and May 1965, the 
conference was held as previously decided. This reflects the commitment and determination of the 
rebels to undertake the revolution at any cost. The conference was attended by representatives of the 
three organisations, as well as by a number of Dhofari rebels who belonged to the movement of 
Mussalem bin Nufl al Kithira. The Declaration of Armed Struggle document is provided in 
Appendix 5. The aims and commitments of the declaration can be summarised as follows: First, the 
organisations sought to end third party agreements in order to join the new front (Dhofar 
Liberation Front). Second, they continued with the armed struggle as the only means to overthrow 
Sultan Said’s regime. Third, the establishment of a national and constitutional Islamic rule. Fourth, 
the rebels are fighting only under the Dhofar Liberation Front’s umbrella. Fifth, a statement of the 
Armed Struggle Declaration to be adopted starting from 9th June 1965 to mark the death of Said bin 
Ghanim bin Salman Al Mashali Al Kathiri, first victim in Dhofar War. Finally, twelve members to 
be elected from Dhofar’s rebels. The document of the revolutionaries’ also mentioned the 
establishment of Islamic rule in Dhofar and the election of Mussalem bin Nufl, leader of the Dhofar 
Charitable Association, as the leader DLF of the Islamic-oriented leadership of the revolutionaries. 
 The Congress led to one national and constitutional government, with the terminology used 
in the convention being "regime in Oman not regime in Dhofar, indicating that the rebels were not 







given that Islamic law would be the source of laws in the new regime in an attempt to please the 
Dhofari Charity Association. The convention was also drafted based on the approach advocated by 
the Arab Nationalist Movement in a step to please the nationalists. A questions arise here. For 
example, given that the revolution called for the Liberation of Dhofar, why did the conferences 
agree to establish constitutional, national governance in Oman, rather than focusing on Dhofar? 
One of the former rebels indicated that these two questions were historical fallacies 
promoted by British diplomacy in an attempt politically and regionally to undermine the revolution. 
These myths would also create a good reason for the Sultan to eliminate the rebels under the cover 
of protecting his land (Rebel leader, 26th January 2016, RA4). It is also noticeable that the decision 
to mark 9th June as the date of official declaration of the armed struggle demonstrates clear 
appreciation and loyalty to the first victim of the revolution, providing a great stimulus to the other 
rebels to sacrifice themselves for its goals. Subsequently, the convention revolutionaries started to 
publicise their revolution, introducing it to the Dhofari people and the surrounding regions. The 
declaration was accompanied by a range of military operations carried out by the rebels against the 
forces of the Sultan. It seems to be clear that the initial aim of the revolution was to remove the rule 
of the Sultan from Dhofar only. However, with the gains that the rebels made on the ground, their 
aspirations grew to include the “liberation” of Oman, and with increasing victories, eventually the 
“liberation” of the entire Arabian Gulf. 
 
2.4.2: The reaction of the Sultan and the status of his Armed Forces 
The reaction of the Sultan towards the beginning of the rebellions was purely military, as 
mentioned by British documents (UKNA, BC1015/7, 1965) (Sultan Said’s reaction to the beginning 
of the rebellions is outlined in Appendix 6).  This document also illustrates the concern of the 
British government about the outbreak of the revolution, which they feared could develop into a 
serious guerrilla war. These predictions predominantly related to the civilian problems facing the 
Sultan as a result of the revolution, with the military challenges being outlined in another document 
(UKNA, BC1015/13, 1965) (see appendix 7 for more details). 
A memorandum discussed the position of the Sultanate and the Sultan’s force at the 







…pointing to the weaknesses in the Sultan’s administration and the dangers in the 
Sultan’s isolation and his failure to associate his subjects in any way with his rule 
there seems to be little prospect of the Sultan changing his policy on the S.A.F. in 
the direction of a national army…We can use the shortage of seconded and contract 
officers to point to the need for him to make more use of local material for junior 
officers in his plans for expansion (UKNA, BC 1015/13, 1965). 
The failure of the Sultan to associate his subjects with his rule in any way was and the relationships 
between the Sultan and other countries, tribal leaders, and even his own family, render his position 
difficult and unstable.  
 
2.4.3: The Sultan relationships with neighbouring countries 
 The Sultan’s unstable relationships with several of the neighbouring countries, especially 
Saudi Arabia, increased the internal difficulties of his governance. Importantly, Saudi Arabia was 
near to Oman, and shared a common borders with Dhofar in the west. King Faisal, the King of 
Saudi Arabia at that time, had a very negative impression of Sultan Said, as noted by a British 
report outlining the policy of Sultan Said: 
Produced a really bitter tirade from Feisal against Sultan Said who he castigated as 
a detestable and tyrannical usurper who had no right to any place but Muscat and 
who should really go home where he belonged - India. This monstrous fraud was 
keeping rightful owners out of the land to which they belonged and which belonged 
to them... Feisal wished us to do something about the problem otherwise security 
and stability which he and we wished to see preserved would be in jeopardy. His 
last words to me when I took my leave were “do not forget what I told you about 
the Omanis” (UKNA, BS 1922/31, 1965). 
Sultan Faisal described the rightful place for Sultan Said as India, perhaps because Sultan Said 
because this was the only other country with which Said had established a relationship. Sultan Said 
had also studied in India, and his father Timor, had taken one of his wives from India. However, it 
is important to note that Said’s own mother was Omani from the royal family and generally refered 
to the attempt to minimise the hostility and ridicule that King Faisal expressed towards of Sultan 
Said (Interview Al Falahi, 31st March 2018). It seems that the enmity that the Saudis bore for the 
Sultan led them to support the revolutionaries during the first phase of the rebellion. Nevertheless, 
the support that the British provided to Sultan Said enraged King Faisal: “It is doubtful whether 
anything we say in defence of the Sultan’s regime will make the slightest impression on Feisal” as 







As a result of the poor relations that the Sultan had with Saudi Arabia, weapons were 
smuggled into Oman. This was particularly common for the revolutionaries across the Saudi 
borders with Dhofar, with one document written by D.J. McCarthy at the Arabian Department in the 
British Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stating: 
Officer commanding R.A.F Salalah has today reported discovery by Sultan’s armed 
forces, about thirty miles away, of a large cache of arms and ammunition believed 
to have been brought in overland recently from Salwa (inside the Saudi Arabian 
frontier with Qatar) by dissidents (UKNA, BC1016/34/B, 1965). 
There is some evidence that Saudi Arabia increased support for the revolutionaries. McCarthy 
added that the British had obtained clear evidence in Muscat of the extent of Saudi support for the 
Dhofari dissidents. Moreover, he stated that the King’s strong personal dislike for the Sultan meant 
that Saudi support was not limited to the training or arming of fighters. Their movements were also 
secured inside Saudi Arabia: “Mussalem bin Nufl’s No. 2 in Dhofar had, under interrogation in 
Muscat, said not only that his convoy had come from Al Hasa but that it had had a Saudi escort” 
(UKNA, BC1016/34/B, 1965). The revolutionaries progressed by, benefitting extensively from 
Saudi support: “within the last week, Dhofar rebels have shown distinct signs of increased activity 
indicating both re-supply of arms and improved organisation” (UKNA, FCO 8/572, FR: BC1/4, 
1968). As a consequence of this support, British policy from 1966 focused on cutting supply lines 
by blocking the land road to Saudi Arabia, McCarthy stated(Halliday, 2008, p. 260). 
It is clear that the relations between the Dhofar groups and other countries in the region had 
a significant role in the course of events on the ground. This factor was not in favour of the Sultan, 
because of his hostility to the other countries of the region. In contrast, the good relations that the 
rebels enjoyed with neighbouring states helped to give their revolution great momentum. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that Sultan Said was the one who decided not to communicate with 
his neighbours, despite the efforts of the British side to influence him in this regard. Whether this 
approach was ultimately correct, this position indicated that Sultan Said was the absolute decision 
maker of his foreign policy.  
 
2.4.4: Britain involvement in the War 
British diplomacy was afraid of potential international condemnation for its intervention, 







The Sultan intended to keep a section of the S.A.F permanently in Dhofar. He… 
undertakes general patrolling with his own forces without the assistance of our 
troops for this purpose. However, in view of the embarrassment that can be 
involved in the use of British troops to support a ruler... we should be very cautious 
about publicising our involvement (UKNA, BC1016/33 (B), 1965). 
 Ladwig (2008, pp. 106-108) explains that the British decided to remove their army from 
Aden and the Gulf between 1961-1969, with the intention to withdraw all British troops from the 
regions east of Suez by 1969. This decision was undertaken by the Labour government led by 
Harold Wilson in 1966” (Fielding, 2003, p. 230).Peterson (2011, pp. 2,77)argues that Wilson’s 
socialist government had ideological reasons for seeking to terminate all obligations and end the 
British Empire abroad, although the economic situation of the UK in this era is likely to have 
accelerated the withdrawal process. Other scholars, such as Worrall (2014, pp. 25,33), believe that 
economic factors were instrumental in the decision to withdraw, although the Palestinian issue and 
the loss of Aden were also important considerations. The decisive and influential decision to 
withdraw the British military was made with the realisation that Britain was economically incapable 
of holding onto its colonies. This was supported by the ideology of the ruling Labour Party, which 
required that the focus be on resolving the internal problems of the UK and improving the level of 
services offered to British citizens, rather than on retaining distant colonies. This decision was 
reinforced by the sterling crisis of November 1967, which significantly damaged the British 
economy. The consequence was that British diplomats had no intention of involving their troops in 
the Dhofar revolution. 
Given the events in Palestine and Suez, Sultan Said was concerned about controlling British 
involvement. However, Sultan Said refused to allow British troops to withdraw from the RAF Air 
Base in Salalah to Masirah. As per the terms of the agreement between the two countries in 1958, 
he instead insisted that the troops either stay in both Salalah and Masirah, or withdraw from both. 
Therefore, in order to keep its troops in Masirah (see figure 11), the British defended Salalah base 
from rebel attacks. This event brought British troops directly into the line of fire and also 
demonstrates the independence of the Sultan from British influence. The British RAF base in 
Salalah was very important to the British Government and so it prioritised defending the base from 
the rebels, who had reached the surrounding hills (Al Harthi, 2007, p. 32). The British recognised 
that, should the base be attacked, there was a clear risk of destruction, casualties and loss of lives 







was a major priority of the British government. A telegram entitled “Situation in Dhofar”, sent 
from Bahrain to the Foreign Office, stated: 
...renewed dissident activity may be imminent, warning of possible attack on the 
R.A.F airfield and camp. The Sultan has authorized the dispatch of one platoon of the 
parachute battalion. He has already agreed to the use of British army units in this 
role. The platoon sent to Salalah at the end of May… was withdrawn to Bahrain a 
few weeks ago and there has been no reinforcement of R.A.F defence since (UKNA, 
BS 1922/31, 1965). 
The Sultan also committed to military progress by increasing the size of his forces in the 
province to 1000 men. Additionally, Dhofaris were excluded from his army after the failure of 
multiple coup attempts. Instead, he selected his army from loyal northern Omani tribes and 
supplemented their numbers with Pakistani soldiers (Baluchi). He then embarked upon an economic 
siege of the mountainous areas that was the home of the revolutionaries (Halliday, 2008, p. 260), 
which revealed his control of his military and was a sign of his capacity to take independent 
decisions and actions.  
During the first period of the Dhofar war, the Sultan was in close communication with the 
British, but rejected any British pressure, because he was confident that they would not allow the 
rebels to be victorious. This was, in large part, because of the support that the dissidents received 
from anti-western imperialist countries, their specific commitment to overthrow any ruler who 
collaborated with the British imperialists to control Dhofar and cause allowing the rebels to control 
Dhofar would deprive the British of their interests in Oman (Muqaibl, 2002, pp. 277-278). 
Telegrams from Bahrain to the 
Foreign Office noted that the Sultan’s Dhofar 
Forces were not yet capable of defending the 
region or important strategic locations, such 
as the British Royal Air Force base in Salalah 
or the port (see figure 12). As a consequence, 
British forces were obliged to become fully 
involved in the war (Al Harthi, 2007, p. 97). 
Another document adds that the British RAF 
base at Masirah was considered essential to 
the British civilian and military aircraft, 
Fig. 12: British and Omani solders during the war 









making the site of major importance: 
The Political Resident has recommended that since the protection of the RAF at 
Salalah is, a direct British interest and since it is in our general interest to get the 
SAF involved in Dhofar, we should not ask the Sultan to bear the cost of the 
operation. The Department agree (UKNA, BC 1051, 1965). 
As a consequence of this, British forces began to engage in direct confrontation with the rebels.  
When the Omani military was unable to defend Salalah, Sultan Said successfully dragged 
the British into the war through expansion of its operations. Initially, after the Sultan rejected their 
move to evacuate their air base, the British forces defended the base, the seaport and the road links 
between the two. The seaport was essential to provide the base with necessary materials. This 
situation is clearly illustrated in a confidential letter sent to the British Consulate General from C.D 
Powell in the Foreign Office in Muscat on 20th February 1965. It stated: 
troops which were sent to Salalah in 1964 are intended for the defence of R.A.F 
installations and patrolling was to be confined to the airfield, the jetty at Raisut and 
the broad linking the two. The Sultan suggested that it would be more sensible for 
patrolling to take into consideration other roads in the area which might be targets 
for rebel mine laying and this appears to have been respected (UKNA, BC 1102/9, 
1965). 
Another document, entitled “Trouble in Dhofar”, states that the Sultan’s local military 
division, the Dhofar Force, was independent from the SAF but that it was unable to defend Dhofar 
alone. Therefore, it was recognised as being essential for the British to transfer part of the SAF from 
Muscat to Dhofar to contribute to its defence. F.D.W. Brown, a British diplomat states that the 
“Sultan of Oman’s Air Force has virtually no transport capacity, their move would have to be made 
by R.A.F. aircraft”. In effect, the British became ready to defend the Sultan against the Dhofar 
rebels.“It is recommended therefore that, if the Sultan seeks our assistance over the plan outlined, 
we should help and seek to persuade the Ministry of Defence to waive or bear the cost. I attach a 
draft to the Ministry of Defence” (UKNA, BC 1098, 1964). 
Sir Lionel Hayworth wrote an important article on this issue in The Daily Telegraph, clearly 
indicating the relevance of the Gulf region to British national interests and the utmost importance of 
Oman (1951, p. 14). The British government was concerned with providing military support to the 
Sultan to eliminate the revolution. The document refers to the presence of Omani rebels in the 







Forty Omani children were at school in Moscow and there are others elsewhere. 
Indeed any Omani wanting advanced education had to seek it outside Oman, and 
usually finds it in countries hostile to the West (UKNA, BC 1051/20, 1965). 
The British were also carefully watching Omani nationals who were studying abroad, 
especially in communist countries. This careful scrutiny was because the British feared the rise of 
propaganda in areas that was hostile to Western states, such as the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe, as this would threaten Britain's interests. They noted that, 
at least seventeen Omanis were studying in Communist countries and a further nine 
in Cairo, pointing out the potential dangers of this to the Sultan. His reaction has 
been that if the Sultanate students are sent abroad, they will mix with Arab students 
and thereby become indoctrinated with Arab nationalist propaganda and that they 
would not be immune from this, even in London (Al Harthi, 2007, p. 513). 
Sultan Said succeeded in dragging the British into the Dhofar War through his refusal of 
their request to withdraw their forces from Salalah air base, ensuring that they retained soldiers at 
Salalah and Masirah. The Sultan realised that the British government would ensure the defence of 
Oman at the lowest cost, because of the recognition that the Sultan was the guarantor of its long-
term interests. This successful manipulation indicated his independence from the British 
government and illustrated the autonomy of the Sultan. 
 
2.4.5: Sultan Said Assassination Attempt 
The rebel operations evolved over the next two years, eventually enabling them to control 
large areas of Dhofar, except for the coastal towns. In an attempt to address the growing discontent, 
the Sultan allowed his army to recruit loyal Dhofaris. A total of 200 soldiers joined the Dhofar 
Force, however some secretly fought with the rebels. Recognising the threat to his person, Sultan 
Said withheld ammunition from his soldiers during his regular review of his forces. Despite this 
security precaution, ammunition was smuggled into a reviewin 1966, as part of an unsuccessful 
attempt to assassinate the Sultan (Interview with Ghawas, 23rd January 2014). In response to this 
attempt, the Sultan was isolated in his palace (Ordeman, 2016, p. 3). Two days after the attempted 
coup, the Sultan summoned Colin Maxwell, the commander of the SAF from Muscat to Salalah, to 
discuss the repercussions of the incident. Maxwell tried to persuade the Sultan to abolish the power 
of the Dhofar Force on the grounds that it could not be trusted. However, Sultan Said ignored the 







against him (UKNA, FO,371/185364, BC 1015/22, 1966). Again, this shows that the Sultan was 
responsible for making his own decisions and that his country was not subject to British pressure. 
 
2.4.6: Sultan Said and his brother Tariq 
Sultan Said followed an aggressive policy with his family, treating them the same as other 
citizens, which made his family dissatisfied. As a consequence, Tariq, the Sultan’s most significant 
brother, exiled himself from Oman in protest against his older brother’s stance. His younger 
brother, Faher, joined Tariq, and tried to convince the British to side with him in usurping Sultan 
Said. In a discussion with A.T. Lawb, in the British Political Agency in Abu Dhabi (UAE), Tariq 
promised to develop Oman and lift the restrictions on its people. The British position was that, 
Tariq should put out of his mind any thought that the British government would permit the 
overthrow of Sultan Said. The British side replied that they knew H.M.G. would protect the Sultan 
but it was impossible for it to protect him from an assassin’s bullet (UKNA, FCO 8/568, FR: 
BC1/1, A, 1967). 
Tariq harboured a deep hatred of his brother Said. Unbeknownst to most people in Oman, 
Sayyid Tariq even attempted to assassinate the Sultan, with sources indicating that Tariq “has made 
overtures to some Palestinians, there-about unknown, to recruit an assassination squad of two or 
three to kill the Sultan of Muscat during his forth coming visit to London” (UKNA, FCO 8/568, 
BC1/1, 1967).The main reason for the dissatisfaction of Sultan Said’s brothers was his cruelty. 
Said’s younger brother stated that Sayyid Tariq therefore communicated with Shell Oil Company to 
support him to overthrow his brother. A letter, “Sayyid Fahr”, sent from the British Consul General 
in Muscat, D.C. Carden, to H.M. Political Agency in Dubai, stated that: 
Tariq had sent a message to Shell with the intention to establish a new government 
in Muscat, but he needed money for this and he hoped that Shell would feel 
disposed to help. If they did, this would be of mutual and general benefit (UKNA, 
BC1/1, 1967).  
In September 1967, Tariq announced a temporary constitution that incited people all over 
Oman to rebel against the rule of the Sultan and to replace Said with himself. The temporary 
constitution introduction stated:  
In the name of God the merciful the companionate, Statement by Tariq bin 







and Omani citizens. ...citizens... Consider it the duty... of us all to work for the 
liberation of our fatherland and to remove (the present state of) injustice from its 
people and lift our people up, guided (as we are) by the precepts of the holy law 
that God has imposed on us (A letter From A. D. Parsons, to British Political 
Agency, 1967). 
In general, the constitution focused on the unity of Oman, explicitly noting that Dhofar is an 
integral part of Oman. In addition, it placed a heavy emphasis on the role of the Islamic religion and 
tribe in the country, stating that the autocratic government of the Sultan would be replaced by a 
democratic government. The constitution also stressed the importance of ensuring a strong, 
historical relationship with the United Kingdom. Sayyed Tariq clearly realised the importance of 
tribe and religion, as well as the relationship with Britain, as influential factors in the unity of Oman 
and winning the Dhofar War (for further information on the temporary national constitution 
distributed by Tariq, see Appendix 8). There was no organised institutional support for Tariq, with 
his support being limited to certain wealthy elites from the UAE and Turkey, the latter which could 
be partially attributed to the fact that he was married to a Turkish woman (interview, Sheikh Ahmed 
Al Falahi, 31 March 2018). 
After requesting assistance from the British to overthrow his brother, Tariq reassured them 
that he would consider their interests and that his main aim was to enhance and develop the 
situation in Oman. In response, the British diplomats investigated Tariq’s personality and his real 
intentions, looking at whether he was loved by the Omanis. This research was carried out indirectly, 
in interviews with Imamate leaders who lived as political refugees in Dammam in the Eastern 
province of Saudi Arabia. Imam Ghalib and his defeat in Al Jabal Al Akhdar war (1957-1959) was 
discussed in chapter one, section 1.3. This consultation by the British suggests that they were also 
aware of the importance of religious and tribal leaders in Omani affairs. The Imamate leaders were 
hugely popular in Oman, since the Imam was selected consensually by the people. They expressed 
the following opinion about Sayyid Tariq, 
All of us know who Tariq is and… known by the mountains of Oman and its 
valleys, in the houses and in the mosques, its children, its women and its sheikhs… 
Tariq has killed the innocent, violated, demolished houses, destroyed irrigation 
canals... to be king. Tariq is a war criminal (UKNA, BC1/1, 1967). 
It is worth mentioning here that Tariq had commanded his brother’s armies in the Al Jabal Al 
Akhdar war that overthrew the Imamate system, which is almost certainly why the Imams accused 







represented the most significant dissent since 1967. An important question on this matter is whether 
Tariq succeeded in drawing people’s attention to the rebellion in the north of Oman in order to 
overthrow his brother and put himself on the throne.  
The failure of Tariq's efforts is evident for several reasons, most notably that the tribal 
leaders in northern Oman favoured the return of the Imam to administer the country, as well as the 
fact that the people in the south supported the revolution in Dhofar. Secondly, many people did not 
trust Tariq, because he had been so helpful to Sultan Said in the Al Jabal Al Akhdar War (1957-
1959). In addition, the public impression was that Tariq was trying to gain power, rather than to 
reform the country. Tariq was also not able to receive support from any regional country to conduct 
his plan. However, the refusal by Sultan Saidto accept the withdrawal of the British from the air 
force base in Salalah and the air base in Masirah forced them to take action. In defending the base 
and the port from rebel attacks, the British found themselves directly involved in the war. 
Numerous authors (e.g. Abdalsatar, 1989, p. 46; Fadel, 1995, pp. 220-221; Halliday, 2008, p. 331; 
Miles, 1920, pp. 212; Omar, 2008, pp. 6-7; Owtram, 2004, p. 16; Sultan & Naqeeb, 2008, p. 26; 
Wilson, 2012, pp. 331-332) have argued that Oman was like a puppet in the hands of the British. 
Owtram (2004, p. 16) argues that British imperialism was responsible for the formation of the 
Sultanate of Oman in 1920 and was significant in the years since, including in the eventual 
exploitation of oil. In effect, Britain played a major role in shaping modern Oman. In addition, the 
assistance that the British provided to the Sultan during the 1957 Al Jabal Al Akhdar helped to unite 
Oman. However, the Sultan’s manipulation of the British to ensure their involvement in the war 
indicates that Sultan Said had huge influence over British actions. Despite the relative weakness of 
Oman, he succeeded in involving one of the most powerful countries in the world as a direct party 
in the Dhofar conflict. During this phase of the revolution, British diplomacy did not seem to be 
inclined to change Sultan Said, even with the option to replace him with his closest relatives such as 
his brother Tariq. In general, Tariq fell because of his bad relations with tribal and religious leaders 








2.5: The British interests and the nature of the relationship with the Sultan Said  
2.5.1: Oil in Oman 
Oil was to become extremely significant in the future development of Oman. It played an 
important role in the Sultanate's efforts to diversify the Omani economy, enabling the promotion of 
the Omani government and private sector investment, as well as the construction of modern 
infrastructure (Kiyumi, 2011, p. 21). In effect, oil enabled the country to achieve modernisation and 
rapidly rise out of poverty.  
After efforts by the British and Sultan Said, the first crude oil shipment was exported from 
Oman in July 1967. A British report covered the story of this achievement, which would change the 
fate of Oman and all Omanis (UKNA, FCO 8/600, FR: BC12/2, 1967). Nevertheless, Sultan Said 
did not seem to have a clear vision regarding the importance of starting the development of Oman 
after the receipt of oil revenues. A letter which was sent from J.S.R. Duncan, a British diplomat, to 
Major Chauncy, the British Consulate General in Muscat, stated that Sultan Said, 
has developed no sense of urgency in planning for the advent of oil. You will 
remember the new administrative ‘family tree’…it is now hacked about and under 
further consideration since Major Chauncy, UK consul general, Muscat, had said he 
thought it too ambitious(UKNA, BC1015/7, 1965). 
This view confirmed the policy of the Sultan in refraining from spending the financial resources 
that he received from exporting oil, contrary to the wishes of his British partners. A report by 
William Luce, the British political resident in the Persian Gulf, provides a useful insight that locals 
were angry with the Sultan, because the discovery of oil in Dhofar had changed nothing in their 
lives. He stated that the Sultan held that “his family was useless, that there was nobody he could 
trust”, adding that he was ruling Oman from Dhofar “through the radio telephone and it was really 
impracticable in any matter of urgency and complexity, such matters would inevitably multiply if 
oil production began” (Al Harthi, 2007, p. 3).Nonetheless, the Sultan contracted American 
exploration companies, such as Dhofar Cities Service Petroleum Corporation, Service of America, 
Richfield Oil, Reach Field, Consortium and J.W. Michom (Al Badi, 2011, p. 66; Clark, 2007, pp. 
14-15). In 1964, the Shell Company discovered the first oil reserves in Oman that were available for 
exportation in commercial quantities. This was kept a secret between the company and the Sultan, 
even being hidden from the locals. However, the Sunday Times published the news in the first page 
of its issue on 26th July 1964 with the headline “Shell wins the biggest prize by discovering huge oil 







Company built the infrastructure of the oil industry in Oman, which consisted of 279 pipelines and 
a port for direct export. Its cargo reached (54,800) barrels of crude oil the first crude oil commercial 
shipment left Oman on 27th July 1967 (Petroleum Development Oman, 1990, pp. 14-15). Al Badi 
(2011, p. 80) argues that oil exportation and exploration privilege contracts were more beneficial for 
the British oil companies than they were for the Omani government. According to a privilege 
contract, the government did not even have a right to control the price of oil, which significantly 
affected its ability to secure oil revenues. However, Sultan Said's permission for American 
companies to drill in Dhofar, despite traditional British influence in Oman, signifies that he was 
autonomously moving away from British influence to ensure self-rule for the Sultanate. 
 
2.5.2: British economic interest  
        Despite established British interests in Oman and the surrounding area, the US eventually 
managed to exert its influence in the region. It achieved this goal by taking advantage of aid to 
Britain after the First and Second World War, which allowed it to call for an ‘Open Door’ policy 
that forced the UK to surrender to US demands in the Gulf States. This situation resulted in Britain 
not being able to fully control the sources of energy in the region, which subsequently became 
incredibly important in geopolitics. The two nations then divided the Gulf between themselves, with 
the US companies dominating the petroleum market in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and half of Kuwait 
(Al Kharusi, 1982, p. 206), and British companies controlling the oil of the remaining Gulf 
countries, including Oman. In observing the Sultan’s oil contracts, British diplomats stated:  
The new agreement between Petroleum Development (Oman) Limited and the 
Sultan was signed. First, the agreement gives the sultan as favourable conditions 
as those enjoyed by the OPEC countries. Second, the company relinquished much 
of their concession that is covered by the Sultanate territorial waters in the Gulf of 
Oman to grant the Sultan its concession to any other company. Thirdly, they will 
relinquish other parts in March 1970; fourth… rent due since May 1966 became 
payable… giving the Sultan… £400,000" (UKNA, IOR/R/15/6/424, 1967). 
The British government clearly also indicated a preference that Oman should remain an exclusive 
market for British arms: 
The objections to the US supplying arms to Muscat is that it has been and should 
remain a British market for military equipment, that it is heavily subsidised by the 
British, and that it should in any case standardize equipment whatever pattern 







In negotiating with both British and the US over oil concessions, the Sultan showed that he was an 
autonomous decision maker and that his diplomacy sought to negotiate greater freedom from 
Britain, as well as ensuring the freedom to make political decisions away from external pressures.  
British relations with the Omani rulers were largely informed by the importance of their 
interests in the region.This position is evident in a confidential letter that was sent to William Luce, 
the Political Agent in the Arabian Gulf at the British Residency in Bahrain on a change on British 
diplomatic status, which also emphasised Sultan Said’s independence of policy and obstinacy: 
Our present policy towards the sultanate is based partly on longstanding 
friendship with a succession of sultans but mainly on our wider interests in the 
Gulf area generally. The degree of our involvement in Sultanate affairs does not 
seem to me to be affected one way or the other by the form of British 
representation. Nor do I think that the Sultan would regard a change of 
ambassador as any kind of disagreement by H.M.G. from the Sultanate; if he did, 
he probably would not want the change. The suggested change is the danger that 
the already isolationist Sultan would relapse into even greater isolationism and the 
Sultanate would become increasingly introverted. I would be the last to claim that 
the political resident can do much to reduce the Sultan’s isolationism, but at least 
he provides some contact with the outside world and on occasions can bring rather 
heavier guns to bear than can the consul general or ambassador (UKNA, BC 
1052/6, 1965). 
The relationship between the Sultan and the British was also clarified by T.F. Brenchley, the 
Head of the Arabian Directorate in the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who stated that, 
It is true that we have some position of influence in the Sultanate, but it is severely 
limited by the Sultan’s extreme stubbornness and in a case like this he would 
certainly take offence at representations on what he would regard as an entirely 
domestic matter(UKNA, Letter from the Minister of State, Foreign Office, 1965). 
British diplomats realised that delaying the development of the country created the risk of 
forming a counter-opinion among the population that could potentially affect the British, by 
embarrassing them through implication and making them partly responsible for the revolutionary 
situation in Oman. However, British diplomacy did not consider changing from a Consul to 
Ambassador. Officially, the British always treated Oman as an independent state. A British 
government documents stated, “even in our own service, only those officers who have actually dealt 








However, after the US stated their intention of opening an embassy in the Sultanate, the 
British position moved towards changing from a Consul to Ambassador. This decision was 
evidenced by a letter sent by E. M. Rosein the Foreign Office, to the British Residency in Bahrain, 
in which was stated that, “the American intention of seeking to open an embassy in Muscat clinches 
the question of our future level of representation, very desirable that we should broach the idea of 
an embassy to the Sultan before the Americans do so” (UKNA, BC 1052/6 (A), 1965). This 
comment clearly indicates that British diplomacy desired to maintain the privacy of the relationship 
between the UK and Oman, in an attempt to serve its far-reaching interests. The British also realised 
the importance of connecting the Sultan’s intelligence in Oman with the British intelligence centre 
in Bahrain to guarantee far-reaching interests of Britain. An additional confidential letter issued by 
Rose in the Foreign Office was sent to the British residency in Bahrain on 20th December 1965 and 
stated that:  
As regard the importance and delicate subject of the intelligence organisation in the 
sultanate and its links with the intelligence centre in Bahrain. I think that among 
ourselves we should regard this as an aspect of politico-military co-ordination and 
aim to preserve the present arrangements for as long as possible (UKNA, BC 
1052/6 (A), 1965). 
The British government sought to obtain information about the Sultanate to help secure its long-
term interests but it recognised the Sultan as being autonomous and independent in his policy and 
decision making. The problem for the British government was exactly this autonomy and 
independence.  
 
2.5.3: Sultan Said and British influence  
The Sultan spent most of the last decades of his government in Dhofar away from the capital 
of Muscat. Mansy (1996, p. 282) argues that the Sultan wished to avoid the surveillance of British 
diplomats and exercise autonomy. This position was apparently well known, as seen when the 
British asked the Emir of Kuwait, Subah Al Salim, to mediate between the Sultan and the Imamate. 
As outlined in a secret document from D.C. Carden, the British Consulate General in Muscat, to 
M.S. Weir, the British Consulate General in Bahrain, on 22nd December 1965, the Emir stated: 
You should go on to say that we cannot understand why the Amir, or for that matter 
any other member of the U.N., should think that we are able to force the Sultan's 







One of the British reports moved beyond this position, stating that the Sultan’s reliance on the 
British was overstated: 
What is more, it is wrong to suggest that the Sultan is dependent on us more that we 
are dependent of him. Our good relations with the Sultan are important in 
preserving the overflying and landing facilities that we enjoy in his 
territories(UKNA, BC 1016/42(B), 1965). 
According to a secret document sent from W. H. Luce, the Political Agent in the Arabian 
Gulf, to E.M. Rose, in the Foreign Office, on 20th December 1965, the British government believed 
that Sultan Said had left Muscat to stay in Salalah because of financial problems: “The Sultan will 
certainly return when he has money… I doubt if he will return this winter”(UKNA, BC 1052/6 (A), 
1965).This claim was supported by Sheikh Ahmed Al Harthi, chief of the Al Harthi tribe, one of the 
most important tribes in Oman. However, he also believes that the main reason for the Sultan 
staying in Salalah was to free himself and Oman from British pressure and influence, because their 
diplomats were based with the British Consulate General in Muscat. The Sultan put Thwini bin 
Shihab, one of his family members, in charge of Muscat, although he commanded him not to do 
anything before consulting him by telephone (Interview Ahmed Al Harthi, 4th October 2016). 
Sultan Said promised to return to Muscat at the right time, because the British diplomats wished to 
communicate more easily, but eventually changed his mind, stating that he would only return after 
receiving the revenues from oil exports as stated in a confidential brief, entitled "Record of the 
conversation between the political resident and the Sultan in Salalah” was published on 27th March 
1965.  
A secret British document, entitled Disruptive Activities in the Persian Gulf, 6th February 
1969 from J.S. Longrigg, at the British Residency in Bahrain, to C.J. Treadwell, at the Consulate 
General in Abu Dhabi. 
The political resident said that one thing which of course contributed to all this lack 
of purpose was the Sultan’s remoteness in Salalah. He did hope that the Sultan was 
still planning to return in the winter. The Sultan said he thought he might now wait 
till he had money (UKNA, BC 1015/13, 1965). 
The decision to move from Muscat to Dhofar shows that the Sultan wished to enjoy his 








2.6: Chapter II Conclusion  
In examining the first phase of the Dhofar War (1965-1967), numerous factors, including 
injustice, economic suffering, lack of education and poverty, led to the War. These problems were 
exacerbated by the experiences of Omani youth, who migrated to work in other Arab Gulf 
countries, which were relatively more prosperous than Oman after the discovery of oil (UKNA, 
BC1015/7, 1965).Furthermore, Sultan Said stimulated the rebellion by his extremely tough stance 
in dealing with his people, even going so far as to refer to them as “non-human” (Al Rayes, 2000; 
Abdul Redha, 1972, p. 58; Zaidi, 2000, p. 310; Al Khasibi, 1994, p. 157; Al Sa’adi, 1976, pp. 84-
85).  
Although the evidence does support the assertion that the Omani people suffered as a result 
of many of these policies, the Sultan had what he believed were good reasons for his policy 
decisions. Certainly, Sultan Said was able to repay Oman’s debts to the Indian government and 
traders in 1932, within one year of taking office, which he managed by adopting an austerity policy 
that focused on reducing the number of government employees and reducing development projects 
to a minimum. He promised not to borrow funds in order to secure independence of decision for the 
country from the pressure of payable debts, having learned from the mistakes of his predecessors. 
However, after his first visit to Britain in 1939, Sultan Said was convinced of the importance of 
entering into an alliance with the British for the long term national interest of his country. The 
Sultan spent the last decade of his rule in Dhofar in an effort to enjoy his autonomy (Ateeqi N. S., 
2007, p. 107). Another important objective of Sultan Said was the move to isolate Oman from the 
propaganda of Nasserites and to reduce the influence of Saudi Arabia in Oman. Ultimately, this 
approach failed, because these influences ignited the spark of revolution. The revolution comprised 
three organisations: the Arab Nationalist Movement, the Dhofari Charity Association, and the 
Dhofari Soldiers Organisation. These bodies united as a result of ideological and political reasons, 
but a further important reason for their cooperation was the stipulation by Saudi Arabia and Egypt 
that the rebels would only receive the support needed if they worked together. Regional countries 
played a significant role in the revolution through the provision of aid to the rebels. Furthermore, 
the wave of anti-colonial and Arab nationalist sentiment created by Nasser supported the rebels in 
ideological terms. 
Sultan Said correctly recognised the threat borne by these regional powers, despite the role 







During the first phase of the revolution (1965-1967), British politics focused on exploiting 
the economic opportunities, including the oil discoveries and the removal of any competitors. At 
that time, British diplomats closely monitored the progress of the revolution and the movements of 
the rebels outside Oman. They also made plans to derail the revolution diplomatically and 
militarily, in order to protect British interest with regards to the RAF base on Masirah Island. After 
the outbreak of the clashes in Dhofar in 1965, British diplomats immediately requested permission 
to leave the British RAF base in Dhofar, stating that it should be handed to the Sultan, and that they 
should be centralised in the base in Masirah Island away from Dhofar. The Sultan rejected this 
request, stating that the 1958 agreement between them stipulated that the British must either keep 
troops in both bases or to leave the country. By using this policy, as a fully sovereign ruler the 
Sultan managed to involve the British in the war, using his allies to bolster his forces to defend 
Dhofar against the externally supported revolutionaries. 
Some historians (e.g. Abdalsatar, 1989, p. 46; Beasant, 2002, pp. 200-201; Fadel, 1995, 
p.212; Halliday, 2008, p. 331; Miles, 1920, pp. 222-230; Omar, 2008, pp. 6-7; Owtram, 2004, p. 
16;Samah, 2016, p. 273; Sultan & Naqeeb, 2008, p. 26; Wilson, 2012, pp. 331-332)accuse the 
Sultan of being puppet-like in the hands of western powers and argue that Oman was functioning as 
either a formal or an informal colony. However, there is ample evidence to suggest that this view is 
inaccurate. The Sultan left Muscat for Dhofar to maintain full autonomy, as well as obliging the 
British to enter the war, despite their earlier refusal in order to avoid international condemnation in 
the wake of the Suez War 1956 and Harold Wilson’s Labour Government decided to withdraw all 
British troops from the areas to the east of Suez by 1969. Owtram (2004, p. 16) argues that British 
imperial influence had primary responsibility for the formation of the Sultanate of Oman from 1920 
onwards, delineating the borders between Oman and Yemen, and providing essential military and 
civil support in 1958. They also helped in petroleum exploration and managed the petroleum 
companies, as well as urging Sultan Said to use oil revenues to develop Oman. All of these actions 
contributed to the creation of a new country in Oman, but Sultan Said was an autonomous if 
authoritarian leader, who used the British in order to better serve his country. British diplomacy 
perceived him to be an independent leader ruling an independent country, so they encouraged but 
could not oblige him to start developing his country immediately after receiving oil revenues. 
Moreover, the Sultan did not give any promises about his intended actions in this matter, perhaps 
wishing to postpone such radical and costly developments. The events of the first phase of the war 







government than the literature argues, and that it was operating with a negotiated autonomy and 















The Second Phase of the War  








 Fig. 13: Map showing Dhofar province 
(Source: Oman National Survey Authority,  
NSA DR 74) 
 
This chapter will discuss British diplomacy regarding the Dhofar war during its second phase, with 
particular reference to the Sultan’s reaction towards this diplomacy to uncover the nature of the 
relationship between them. It will also discuss and analyse the events that transpired during this 
period in an attempt to determine the motives and the changes of diplomacy that coincided with the 
rebel successes. The reason for choosing1968 as the beginning of the second phase of the war is the 
major ideological implications of the decisions that the leaders of the revolution made in the 
meeting at Wadi Hamrin, otherwise known as the second conference of the leaders of the 
Revolutionary Front. These decisions profoundly influenced the course of the revolution, 
accompanied by a dramatic change in British diplomacy in Oman. Most importantly, the decision 
was made at this time to withdraw British Forces from the regions located east of Suez Canal, 
including Oman by the end of 1971. This created a time pressure that had significant impact on 
British attitudes and strategies. The most important decision made at the Hamrin meeting was that 
the rebels would expand their ambitions to ‘free’ the Arab Gulf, rather than limiting its focus to 
Oman. On the international stage, the rebel enforcement of Chinese communist idea was also 
accompanied by extensive Chinese aid and support. This ideological shift also reflected a change in 
revolutionary leadership. In addition, Yemen's independence from British control in November 
1967 was an important event that contributed significantly to support of the rebels at that time. 
Oman also began the commercial export of oil during this period, which was accompanied by the 
arrival of British oil companies and the growing desire of the Omani public to see improvement in 
their daily lives. These important changes all contributed to shift the focus of British diplomatic 
priorities in the region and especially their diplomacy regarding the Dhofar war. 
 
3.1: Reasons for holding the Hamrin Conference 1968 
The Hamrin Conference is considered to be the 
most important event for the rebels during the second 
phase (1968 - 1970). This second conference of the 
Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF) was held in September 
1968, in Wadi Hamrin (see figure 13), which is located 
at the centre of the Dhofar Mountains. The rebel 
leaders invited the most prominent revolutionary 







leading military action and those abroad who were ensuring political and diplomatic support, such 
as Musalim bin Nafal and Mohammad Al Ghassani. What were the internal and external variables 
that motivated the revolution leaders to hold the conference? What were its most important 
decisions? What were the positive and negative effects that the conference had on the rebels? How 
did the diplomacy of the British and the Sultan change with regards to the revolution after this 
conference and the declaration of its decisions, objectives and results? What did these events signify 
for the autonomy of Sultan Said? The decision by the revolution leaders to hold the HC was 
motivated by a number of political and military variables (both internally and externally) during this 
period. Given that the conference caused a significant shift in the course of the revolution and 
British government attitudes, it is important to understand more about these influential factors.  
 
3.1.1: External variables 
The external variables are considered to be the key reasons that prompted the revolution 
leaders to call for a second conference of the Dhofar Liberation Front, the most important of which 
was the desire of the rebels to attract greater Chinese support. 
Chinese Support 
The significant need for the rebels to ensure sources of support and funding was the biggest 
incentive to consolidate the relationship with China. The rebel delegations that visited Cairo in early 
1967 had support from the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to contact the Chinese Embassy in 
Cairo, who they were able to convince of the advantage of strengthening relations between the 
rebels and Chinese officials (Barut, 1996, p. 401). As a consequence of this meeting, the rebel 
delegation received military aid from the Chinese government (ibid, p. 401), which arrived in 
Dhofar through Yemen, and promises of greater political, military and economic support in the 
future (Al Harthi, 2007, pp. 475-476). 
 The Chinese support for the rebels was not limited to the provision of weapons and 
equipment, but also extended to spreading communist ideas and the provision of expertise. This has 
led Peterson to suggest that the ideology of some revolutionaries had begun to transform from a 
nationalist approach to that of Marxism (2007, p. 501). Meanwhile, the Chinese goal for this 







economic boom that had occurred due to oil discoveries (Al Amri, 2012, p. 105). Al Harthi (2007) 
states that a rebel was killed in Dhofar in June 1968 while wearing a Chinese military uniform. The 
rebel died holding a book of Mao Zedong and carrying a Russian-made weapon. In September of 
the same year, a Chinese communist was reportedly seen working with the rebels in Dhofar (Al 
Harthi, 2007, pp. 475-476). Another British confidential document indicated that a delegation of the 
rebels visited China in 1967, returning with promises of weapons and other aid worth ten thousand 
dollars (Al Harthi, 2007, pp. 511-512, 527-529, 532-533). Al Rayes (2000) adds that the growing 
relations with China divided the rebels in Dhofar into two distinct factions: the first faction were the 
interior fighters, who welcomed and supported these relations, given their need for weapons to 
continue successful fighting the Sultan’s forces. (Al Rayes, 2000, p. 94). This group generally 
comprised members of the Dhofar branch of the Arab National Movement and the Dhofar Soldiers’ 
Organisation. In contrast, the other faction opposed the idea of association with China, because of 
the contrast between National Islamic revolutionary ideology and that of the Chinese Communists. 
This opposition existed abroad, especially among the members of the Dhofar Charitable 
Association. When the two revolutionary leadership teams were unable to reach a compromise on a 
viable approach to deal with the influence of China, they decided to hold a general conference for 
the rebels to resolve the dispute regarding cooperation with China and the extent to which it should 
be allowed to intervene in the region (Interview Rebel leader, 2ndMay 2016, RA9). China sought to 
gain a foothold in the Arab region, as well as to promote competition and oppose Britain and US 
policies through the use of communist ideas (Al Amri, 2012, p. 105). 
The revolutionary triumph in Yemen 
The success of the revolution in South Yemen and the corresponding evacuation of British 
troops was a key factor in the Hamrin Conference being held. A secret British document, entitled 
“Disruptive Activities in the Persian Gulf”, was sent on 6th February 1969 from J. Longrigg, at the 
British Residency in Bahrain, to C.J. Treadwell, at the Consulate General in Abu Dhabi. This 
missive stated that the triumph of the Yemeni revolution against British troops on 30th November 
1967 represented one of the most influential external influences over the revolutionary work in 
Dhofar (UKNA, LR/17/30/5-1). Yemen had a number of important motives for supporting the 
rebels of Dhofar, including opposing the unpopular Sultan of Oman and the Yemeni perception that 







should the Dhofari people be motivated to establish unity with South Yemen, then Yemen would be 
able to benefit from their natural resources (Thesiger, 1998, p. 69). 
The rebels in Yemen expressed their sympathy and camaraderie towards the rebels in Dhofar from 
the beginning of the revolution. The role that Yemen played in supporting the Dhofari rebels 
increased after defeating the British forces and a decline in Egyptian involvement after their loss to 
Israel in 1967, while its independence also made Yemen a source of inspiration to the Dhofari 
rebels (Dansair, 2011, p. 1). They helped the rebels in Dhofar by facilitating their movement within 
Yemen and supporting them militarily and economically. After the triumph of the Yemeni 
revolution, the level of support and backing for the Dhofar Revolution increased, including official 
political, military and economic support from the new Yemeni government until the end of the 
Dhofar War in 1975. The republic was opposed to the ideology of Sultan Said. Yemeni military aid 
also helped the rebels to outstrip the official Omani military. In January 1968, there was evidence of 
an unexpected increase in the rebel activity and use of ammunition. The rebels received guns of 
larger calibre and range, which increased the conflict by enabling the rebels to hit the British Royal 
Air Force (RAF) base in Salalah, the capital of Dhofar. The DLF leadership was also able to open 
headquarters in Hawf, a Yemeni town near the border of Dhofar (see figure 14), which then served 
as a base for its communications equipment (Al Harthi M., 2007, pp. 370-371 .373-377). 
Al Harthi (2007, pp. 440) notes the aggression of the South Yemenis and that the provision 
of Yemenis assistance to the rebels in Dhofar might have enabled the regime in Muscat to be 






Fig. 14: Map showing 
Yemen and Dhofar 
(Source: Oman 
National Survey 








support for the rebels in Dhofar. Al Harthi (2007, pp. 441) adds that the Dhofar rebels were able to 
use the lands of South Yemen as a base to move their weapons and supplies and with the 
permission of Yemeni authorities to use their transportation network. As an example of this support, 
Yemen authorities transferred injured rebels to receive medical treatment in the hospital in Aden, 
the capital of South Yemen. This close relationship was illustrated by newspapers in the South 
Yemen Republic publishing the decision of the second conference to change the name of the front 
from “Dhofar Liberation Front” to the “People’s Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab 
Gulf” before any other local media. Ahmed Al Ghasani was assigned as the head of the movement 
office in Aden (Al Harthi, 2007, pp. 440-441). Indeed, one rebel leader interviewed in this research 
added that without the courageous and generous support that Yemen provided to the rebels, they 
would not have achieved nearly half of what they were actually able to achieve. Another important 
factor in this support was the geography of the land: in viewing the border between the rebel areas 
and the borders to Saudi Arabia and Yemen, it is clear that the lands separating the areas of the 
revolution and the Saudi border were desert. Therefore, the convoys of the rebels were exposed to 
the SAF before reaching the Saudi border, whereas the border with Yemen was close and 
mountainous and covered with trees, making it a much safer route to supply support to the rebels 
(Interview with Front ex-leader, 9thDecember 2016, RA5). 
Yemeni support for the Dhofar issue almost certainly came as a result of it securing its 
independence from British colonisation. Thus, Yemen offered support to nations that were fighting 
the same coloniser and to the leaders who supported these uprisings. This helped Yemen to gain 
acceptance by the liberation movements in the Arab world. However, this popularity came at the 
expense of Kuwait, who represented the most important link outside the Dhofar region. As a 
consequence, the influence of religiously conservative Dhofari rebels in Kuwait was reduced, while 
the leverage of pro-Communist Dhofar leaders, who had relations with the Yemeni rebels, was 
significantly increased. This competition between rebel representatives in Kuwait and Yemen 
resulted in the decision to hold a second conference.  
Israel defeats Egypt 1967 
Whereas Yemeni independence in 1967 influenced the revolution in Dhofar positively, there 
was another event in the same year that had a negative effect, and represented foreign instability 
that also necessitated the Hamrin Conference being held. This event was the Six-Day War in 1967, 







those of Egypt and Syria. This war had important negative repercussions for the Dhofar rebels, who 
received political, military and moral support from Egypt under President Nasser in position of 
liberation movements across the Arab world in the wake of its victory in the Suez War in 1956 
(Haglawi, 2003, p. 307). The defeat of the Egypt and Syrian alliance by the Israeli air force 
deprived the rebellion of a significant ally in the figure of Nasser, whose support to non-liberated 
countries in the Arab region was affected by its need to recover from defeat (Halliday, 2008, p. 
384). For this reason, Arab societies refer to the 1967 conflict as the war of setback. This war 
deprived the rebels of an important source of support, with military assistance stopping entirely and 
political and media support falling to minimal levels. 
A British confidential document on disruptive activities in the Persian Gulf mentioned that 
two main events that dominated the unsettled situation in early 1969: the consequences of the 
Israel-Arab war in June 1967 and the announcement of the British withdrawal in January 1968 
which would take place at the end of 1971. After this war, the British felt that the activity of the 
United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria) against British interests in the area had reached a low 
level. As a result of the June war, the Suez Canal was closed and Egypt lost financial standing 
because she depended largely on the Suez Canal for economic revenue. This could be the main 
factor for the relative calmness of the political Arab civil movements during 1968. There was a 
noticeable cessation in the activity of the Egyptian Intelligence (Al Harthi, 2007, pp. 511-512, 527 - 
529, 532-533). The British government continued to monitor Cairo’s activity in supporting the 
Dhofar rebels, but they noticed that support decreased after the defeat of Egypt in the war against 
Israel (Al Harthi, 2007, pp. 511-512, 527 - 529, 532-533).The Egyptians were forced to focus on 
liberating their territory that was now occupied by Israel, rather than continuing to support 
liberation movements in the Arab world, including the Dhofar rebels.  
The defeat of the Egyptian forces led by the President Nasser in 1967 affected in particular 
the moderate right-wing rebels, as they had lost their greatest military, political and economic ally. 
As a consequence of this, left-wing Dhofar rebels turned to China to replace the support previously 
offered by Egypt. This shift was evident in the proceedings and decisions of the DLF in the second 
conference at Hamrin in 1968. The Arab setback in June 1967 was one of the important variables 
that affected the revolution in Dhofar, as it divided the Arab anti-Israeli and anti-imperialist forces 
into distinctly different camps, each believing that its ideas and approach would secure the 







strengthening the Arab nationalist Marxist trend within the DLF. Mohammad Al Ghassani was one 
of the most important figures of this group and he gained great importance during this period, 
largely because of his role in negotiations with China. Through his leadership, the ideas of Mao 
Zedong spread among the rebels in Dhofar. In contrast, the moderate Arab nationalist movement 
became weaker after the Israeli defeat of Egypt, which had been seen to create a compromise 
between Arabism and Islam. This trend was represented by members of the Dhofar Charitable 
Association, including Awadh Al Rawas, Mohammed Al Baramai, Musalim bin Nafal, and Yusuf 
bin Alawi. 
The Maoist ideology was attractive to the Dhofar rebel leaders. This may have been because 
Chinese foreign policy during the 1960s had a revolutionary internationalist thrust, focussed on 
helping people to force: 
…imperialism out of Asia, Africa and Latin America. As seen most clearly in 
China's staunch support for the Vietnamese war of liberation, African liberation 
movements, and the Palestinian liberation struggle(MLM Revolutionary Study 
Group in the US, 2007, p. 21). 
Moreover, the Chinese supplied military aid to the PFLOAG, and to Marxist-Leninist forces in 
southern Yemen (ibid, p. 53).In contrast to the Soviet Union, China's military support was provided 
free of charge. In 1971, a leading Chinese party member told a delegation of members of the 
Revolutionary Union from the US: 
We give all military aid free, and we only give it to people resisting aggression and 
fighting imperialism. If they are resisting aggression and fighting imperialism, why 
charge them? If they are not resisting aggression and fighting imperialism, why 
give it to them? (ibid, p. 25). 
The defeat of Egypt and Syria by Israel in 1967 led to a reorientation of Dhofari rebels to 
Yemen and the People’s Republic of China in support of their revolution.  
 
3.1.2: Internal variables 
In parallel with the external variables, a number of internal variables also contributed to the 
decision to hold the Hamrin Conference. The first was the fact that the revolution leaders embraced 
two profoundly different intellectual trends: one can be called the moderate right-wing stream, 







the other can be called the Marxist trend, as represented by Arab nationalists and some of the 
leaders of DSO (see section 2.3.1).This emergence of two leadership streams was a serious 
development in the revolution. As the disharmony and competition grew, the dispute escalated in 
severity, quickly overshadowing some of the decisions taken by each faction. The rebel leaders 
decided to hold a conference in an attempt to unify the very different perspectives of each group. 
Additionally, the limited communication between the leaders of the revolution inside and outside 
led to duplication in leadership, with the lack of effective communication over great distances 
preventing the groups from liaising effectively. An example of this can be seen in the degeneration 
of the relationship with the Imam, which ended because of this difference between the Dhofar 
branch of the Arab National Movement and the Dhofar Charitable Association (see section 2.3.5 for 
more details). 
The leaders of the rebels also realised that communication was poor between the leaders of 
the revolution inside and outside Oman, as the link was weak between the Liaison Committee in 
Kuwait and the Front branch in both the UAE and Qatar, as well as between the Front offices in 
Iraq and Egypt and the field leaders of the rebels fighting the forces of Sultan. Holding the second 
conference in the mountains of Dhofar can therefore be perceived as an attempt to solve this 
problem of limited communication between the revolution leaders who conducted diplomatic work 
outside Oman and their counterparts who were leading the military action inside the country. The 
decision to hold the conference was also driven by the emergent need for new military tactics and 
weapons suitable for the new phase of armed action. Guerrilla warfare was no longer sufficient to 
achieve victory on the ground, even after the successful use of the tactic in gaining control of most 
of the Dhofar Mountains (Al Amri, 2012, pp. 102-104). As a result, the conference was held in the 
Dhofar Mountains and was attended by 100 of the most influential figures in the political and 
military revolution (National Struggle Documents, 1974, p. 12).  
 
3.2: The Second Conference (Hamrin) in 1968 
In response to the aforementioned internal and external variables, the second conference was 
held in Hamrin in the central mountains of Dhofar from 1st – 20th September 1968 (National 
Struggle Documents, 1974, p. 12). A total of 100 delegates attended the conference. These 







rebels, and also included representatives from the Front's organisation abroad. The meeting was also 
attended by two Chinese delegates who were visiting the area to assess the status of the revolution 
(Bahbahani, 1984, p. 179). 
It was important to resolve the duplication of the leadership of the amalgamated organisations, 
which led to the selection of a new leadership of 25 members and a revision in ideological 
orientation. This group consisted of five committees, each comprising five members, to take 
responsibility for military, political, and economic matters, as well as relations with local and 
international powers. Mohammed Al Ghassani was the head of the Executive Committee which was 
considered the central leadership of the Front. Al Ghassani was chosen as the most influential in an 
alliance rapprochement with China, as well as it was one of the most important leaders in Dhofar 
branch of the Arab National Movement (Interview Imamate leader, 19thJuly 2013, RA6).He 
overshadowed the other dignitaries of the Front at the meeting. Al Ghassani supported communist 
ideology, leading the negotiations with China and spreading the ideology of Mao Zedong among 
the rebels. Mohammed Al Yafei was the head of the organising committee, while the military 
committee was led by Ali Al Hafeez. The political committee was led by Salim Al Ghassani and 
Salem Al Harizi was head of the economic committee (Al Rayes, 2000, p. 49). It is noticeable that 
these new leaders, including Mohammed al Ghassani,did not wield any tribal influence. This was in 
stark contrast to the leaders of the Dhofar Charitable Association. It marked the beginning of the 
overthrow of the role of the tribes in influence on the revolutionaries. Arguably, this shift occurred 
as a consequence of the influence of the communists on the rebels, as tribal leaders were seen as 
feudal in communist terms. In addition, due to the aforementioned developments in the Gulf, the 
Arab Nationalist trend was also 
reduced (Interview Imamate leader, 
19thJuly 2013, RA6). 
The leaders of the Dhofar 
Charitable Association were the most 
prominent members eliminated from 
Fig. 15: Yousuf bin Alawi, the Sultanate of Oman's current Foreign Minister 
(right) and Musalim bin Nafal, who had fired the first bullet in the revolution 
(left), were ousted along second conference, 2000.(Source: Ministry of Media, 








the leadership during this conference. The list of those ousted includes a number of influential 
figures, including: Sheikh Musalim bin Nafal (figure 15), who had fired the first bullet in the 
revolution; Awadh al Rawas and Musalim Al Buramai, who were responsible for the Front's 
communications abroad; Said Jae'idi, who had been a member of the Front Command and the 
Commander of the Liberation Army; and Yousuf bin Alawi, the current Foreign Minister of the 
Sultanate of Oman (see figure 15), who had been the representative of the Front in Egypt. Having 
led the revolution during its first phase (1965-67), these members later became an effective 
opposition wing in the Front. 
The most important resolution of the Conference  
Despite the divergence of views between those attending the Hamrin Conference and the 
opposition of the original revolution leaders, the decisions of the conference members were 
enforced, the new leaders insisting the decisions were binding and irreversible. The statement was 
issued by the General Command of the Front on 10thNovember 1968. The main points were as 
follows: 
First, commitment to organise revolutionary violence as the only route to defeat 
imperialism, reactionaries, and bourgeois feudalism. Second, change the name of 
the DL to the ''Peoples Front for Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf” PFLOAG, 
thereby linking the struggle of the people of Dhofar to that of the masses in the 
Gulf. Third, the conference strongly condemned Muscat and the Imamate of Oman, 
as well as all the traditional and political forces in the Gulf. Fourth, the conference 
strongly endorsed the struggle of the Palestinians and the struggles of all peoples 
fighting against imperialism and feudal regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America. 
Fifth, the conference strongly denounced the racial regime in Rhodesia (now 
Zimbabwe) and condemned racism and discrimination in America. Sixth, the 
conference changed the name from the Liberation Army to the Popular Liberation 
Army. Finally, the Military Committee appointed field commanders for all sectors, 
with periodic changes of leadership as the committee considered appropriate. 
Military field commanders were to receive their directives from the political 
commissar at a given camp or military area, who would be appointed by the 
Military Committee after consultation with the remaining committee leadership (Al 
Harthi, 2007, pp. 528-533). 
It is clear from the populist revolutionary discourse of the statement, particularly in its focus on the 
struggles of the other peoples against imperialism and the expansion of the revolution to include the 
entire Arabian Gulf, that the new leaders were strongly influenced by the tenets of Maoist 
communism. In addition, the revolution became more anti-UK and anti-US.A secret British report 







the resolutions. The report also noted the presence of the Chinese at the conference. It also noted the 
PFLOAG had an office in Cairo that not only organised publicity for the group but also acted as a 
conduit for aid from the Soviet Union and China (Al Harthi, 2007, pp. 528-533). 
The second conference contributed significantly to the reduction of the influence of the Arab 
Nationalists who were located in Kuwait. It also signalled the beginning of the end for the liaison 
committee located there. In addition, the power of the Dhofar Charitable Association was also 
drastically reduced. In effect, this conference marks the point at which the younger communist 
generation overcame the old nationalist guard. It is clear that the conference resolutions served to 
drastically modify the strategic path of the revolution, as well as to widen its circle of opponents. 
Importantly, the role of the group was no longer simply the overthrow of Sultan Said and ensuring 
freedom for Dhofar. Instead, they sought the destruction of world imperialism, with Britain at its 
head, and the destruction of feudalism and capitalism. The whole of the Arab Gulf was now to be 
liberated from those rulers that were collaborating with western powers, particularly Britain and the 
US. Hence, the goal of some decisions of the conference was to arrange and organise the military to 
its ability to more combat the Sultan's forces effectively and the British troops that supported him. 
The change in the ideology of the rebels is also evident in the differences between socialism and the 
dominant Islamic principles of most of the rebel; and because of the relative backwardness and high 
level of illiteracy that prevailed in Dhofar at that time. The conference condemned the Imam Ghalib 
who was also attempting to overthrow Sultan Said. This estrangement between the Imam and the 
Front constituted a backward step given that the Imam had provided invaluable support to the rebels 
at the start of the rebellion. The same view point attacked the traditional political forces “tribal 
system” that had prevailed for centuries in Dhofar. This antagonism was to have serious 
consequences for the revolution, as the tribal system was the most important source of financial and 
human resources for the rebels in Dhofar. 
 
3.3: The positive and negative repercussions of communism 
Communism is a social, political and economic system based on collective production and 
the removal of social structure. The principle of communism is that all individuals are equal, with 
no person being better than another and all individuals working to the full extent of their own 







and social rules governing society, instead focusing on the role of matter in the production of 
society. Marx developed the foundations of communism, with an idea of an equitable society that 
spread rapidly to many countries around the world, the most important being the Soviet Union and 
China(Moussa, 2012, p.10). The first real occurrence of communism dates back to 1917 and the 
outbreak of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. 
The change in the ideology of the revolutionaries from Arab nationalism and Islam to one 
predicated on Maoist communism, blended with nationalism had major positive and negative 
repercussions on the history of the Dhofar rebellion and directly impacted British diplomatic efforts 
to contain the rebellion after the change of direction that occurred after the conference. Analysis of 
the conference decisions, demonstrates that the conference had several positive roles in the 
evolution of the revolutionary work in organisational, political, economic, military and social 
spheres. 
 
3.3.1: Positive repercussions 
Organisational development of the revolution 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, a leadership of 12 revolutionary members was elected 
at the beginning of the armed struggle and tasks were distributed to them. In addition to this, Dhofar 
had been divided into three military sectors: in the east, the centre, and the west. Each sector was 
led by one of the twelve leaders, who belonged to one of the tribes in that area. The forces that these 
commanders led joined the Liberation Army as either regular forces or secret organisations 
(Interview Rebel leader, 15th June 2016, RA5).After the conference, this organisational aspect 
evolved dramatically, as PFLOAG came to resemble a transitional government that consisted of a 
presidential council with many functionaries. Importantly, all of the new leaders became 
communist. As part of the new rebel organisation, the Presidential Council of the Front consisted of 
the heads of the executive, organisational, military, political and economic committees. The 
leadership of PFLOAG was chaired by Mohammad Al Yafei at its inception. A new military sector 
was added, the, with Saeed bin Gonah appointed as the commander of this Passage sector and 
Rames Ja'aboub as his deputy. This change was an important military organisational development 
that focused on the road linking Dhofar with the rest of Oman. The leadership approved the practice 







concepts (Interview Front ex-leader, 9th December 2016, RA5). One rebel leader interviewee 
explained that these commissars were distributed between units. Their work was organised so that 
there would be a general commissar in each unit, who would be assisted by a group of commissars 
in the sub-units. The unit consisted of 20-60elements. The leadership of PFLOAG rearranged its 
organisational branches abroad and chose new leaders of the branches in line with the new 
approach. The Front also opened a representative office in Aden, which became responsible for the 
Liaison Committee. The office coordinated with the embassies of friendly countries, as well as 
receiving donations sent from regulatory branches abroad (Interview Ali Ghawas, 16th June 2016).  
At the organisational level, it is evident that the leadership of the Front expanded and unite. 
Military forces were also re-organised. As a consequence, the military districts were the Eastern 
Region, the Central Region, the Passage Area, and the Western Region (Dhiab, 1984, p. 167). These 
changes were intended to organise the rebels from both military and ideological perspectives, 
meaning that the military commander of the region was no longer the only decision-maker in the 
area. Instead, the political commissars were given the final word on all decisions, in order to ensure 
that communist principles were properly applied in all operations. The political commissars more 
experienced in the communist world than their colleagues, indicating the determination of the 
leaders of the revolution to root new communist principles among all the rebels. 
Military Superiority of the Rebel Organisation  
One of the most important accomplishments of the 
revolution, from its inception until mid-1971, was the 
military superiority of the Dhofar rebels over the forces of 
Sultan Said bin Taimur. If the Dhofar Rebellion led Sultan 
Said to stay at his Palace in Salalah and to be further 
isolated from the public, the operations carried out by the 
rebels after the Hamrin Conference paralysed the 
capabilities of his forces, preventing them from working in 
the mountains and besieging them in the coastal city and 
towns (figure 16). This culminated in 1969, when rebels 
managed to cut off the only transportation route between 
Muscat and Salalah, which they named the “Red Line” 
Fig. 16: Dhofar towns 
(Source: Oman National Survey Authority, 








(Fayyad, 1975, p. 150). This success became possible after the rebels developed new military 
tactics, which were a consequence of the Hamrin Conference. Mandalawi explains that Chinese aid, 
including wireless communication, had strengthened rebel superiority (2001, p. 69). This gave the 
PFLOAG the ability to control most of the areas in Dhofar, leaving the SAF with only the coastal 
towns, except Salalah, Taqah, Mirbat, and Sadah. However, the forces of the Sultan retained air 
superiority with the assistance of the British Air Force, which was crucial in preventing the rebels 
from occupying cities and towns or appearing in open lands. This also restricted their control in the 
mountainous areas. The rebels had high morale and a mastery of the terrain (figure 17). 
The rebel military superiority 
continued as the rebels used the monsoon 
(Khareef) season to their advantage. In the 
autumn, rebels attacked all the various 
military bases of the government forces by 
attacking under the cover of clouds and 
across the grass and bushes. During this 
period, the rebels managed to occupy the 
western town of Dhalkut from the beginning of 1969. Popular Liberation Army troops moved to 
Rakhyut and occupied it on 23rd September 1969, arresting Hamed bin Said, Wali, Governor of 
Rakhyut, and a number of his men. They executed the Wali after his trial on charges of treason and 
cooperation with Britain, while the other men were released (Dhiab, 1984, p. 100). This resulted in 
PLA troops tightening control over the mountains and towns of the western region of Dhofar, 
leading to the use of the term (liberated territories). The rebels then headed for the eastern region of 
Dhofar to add to their liberated areas (Muqaibl, 2002, p. 52). At this point, the PLA troops managed 
to seize the coastal town of Sadah in March 1970, after which the rest of the Sultan troops withdrew 
to the Salalah and Mirbat, which were surrounded by barbed wire(Interview Imamate leader, 19th 
July 2013, RA6).The military situation continued to develop in favour of the PLA forces, which 
controlled the Dhofar Mountains from the furthest point in the east to its western borders. The 
Sultan’s forces were under pressure from the PLA, and when Sultan Qaboos assumed power after 
the removal of his father on 23rd July 1970, the military situation was in favour of the rebels. This 
development represented the success of Maoist military tactics of guerrilla warfare and liberated 
Fig. 17: Rebels ‘military superiority after the Second 
conference, 1960’s (Source: Royal Air Force of Oman 








which had been used successfully in China and other communist countries. These skills and 
strategies played a major role in rebel field victories. 
Political development 
Since the beginning of the revolution and the Hamrin Conference, the policies of the 
revolution revolved around attracting Dhofaris with the offer of a better lifestyle after the fall of 
Sultan Said. This approach was heavily reliant on influential figures in Dhofar’s social and tribal 
structure. In contrast, after the Hamrin Conference there was a significant change in approach to 
traditions and tribal customs. It was no longer important for a member of the leadership team to be 
from one of the socially influential tribes. Instead, leaders needed to have adopted the new open 
policy on the whole of the Arabian Gulf, and to support communist ideas, reflecting the growing 
importance of that party at this stage. As a result, a PFLOAG statement called upon all 
“revolutionary factions in the Arabian Gulf to bear historical responsibility for the armed revolution 
and the conference decisions”. It has also stressed the need to meet the national forces in an open 
arena and its commitment to organised revolutionary violence, “which distinguished it from other 
reformist trends that believed in the possibility of developing the current tribal systems and 
achieving accomplishments under the reformist horizon” (National Struggle Documents, 1974, p. 
8). The second conference held in Hamrin was therefore a clear victory over the nationalist and 
Arab perspective that prevailed between the Dhofar rebels before the conference. It also challenged 
the Islamic values of the local people. The left controlled the decisions of the conference and, in this 
way, assumed leadership of the revolution. A new stage of the revolutionary work in Dhofar began 
with the new leadership. The rebel ideology closely resembled that of Chinese communism. The 
decisions of Hamrin Conference also moved the revolution from the local and regional frame to a 
global scale, with the PFLOAG becoming an integral part of the world socialist revolutionary 
movement and offering them access to a wealth of experience from these systems in other countries. 
Media Development 
The initial media activity of the rebels was a radio from Cairo. The radio allocated a half-
hour weekly programme for the Dhofar Revolution, which was presented by Yousaf bin Alawi, the 
representative of the DLF in Cairo and the current Minister of Foreign Affairs in Oman. This 
operated from 1965 to the middle of 1968. After the Hamrin Conference, the media aspect of the 







revolutionary organisations in Yemen and Palestine. The media institutions of the Dhofar rebels 
were established in Yemen, with the assistance of Palestinian expertise. The PFLOAG radio was 
one of the most successful low level media channels at the local level, due to the low cultural level 
of many Dhofaris, most of whom were illiterate unless they had been educated in other countries in 
the Arab Gulf. After Hamrin Conference, in 1968, the leadership also worked to establish a radio 
station for the revolution based in the city of Mukalla, Yemen, which is situated near the Oman 
border. The station broadcast programmes for Dhofaris for two hours a day. In addition the Front 
had a daily radio programme broadcast from the radio of the Democratic Republic of Yemen 
(Fayyad, 1975, p. 166). Moreover, after the conference, the Front also issued several magazines, the 
most important of which was “9thJune Magazine”, a monthly journal (Suna'Allah, 2000, p. 211). 
The magazine was issued in Aden by the Central Information Committee of the Front and bears the 
name of the day upon which the declaration of the armed struggle in Dhofar began. It was 
supervised by the Front office representatives in Aden, although the majority of the magazine 
editors were Palestinian volunteers, who lacked media expertise. The Front also published a 
magazine entitled Voice of People from Aden in 1969. Initially, the publication was written by hand 
and developed into a weekly newsletter, with the assistance of Palestinian technical staff. During 
this phase, the Front started to produce a number of films and songs, eg. (The Hour Liberation 
Knocked; The song of Liberation Hour is ringing colonisation; Dhofar Front Days; Leftists in 
Dhofar).These films were presented in various film festivals and aroused great interest. In light of 
the media developments, the Information Office for the Front was entrusted with the task of 
following up media activities, such as sending media delegations to different regions, meeting the 
visiting media delegations, and arranging their visit programmes to the revolutionary institutions 
and controlled areas(Fayyad, 1975, p. 167). These films make it clear that the morale and 
determination of the rebels were very high. Indeed, they were ready to sacrifice in order to achieve 
their goal, which was not only end the rule of Sultan Said, but also the “liberation” of the entire 
Arabian Gulf from their rulers, who they described as “servant of global imperialism” (National 
Struggle Documents, 1974, pp. 25-27). 
Social transformations 
After the Hamrin Conference in 1968, the new revolutionary leaders launched a social and 
economic programme to help spread socialist revolution among the people. The first step 







formation of a revolution camp in Hawf, a city in South Yemen near the Dhofar border, which was 
the main training camp for the revolutionaries led by Abdul Aziz Al Qadhi (Al Rayes, 2000, p. 
118;Interview Imamate leader, 19th July 2013, RA6). The most important the decision of the 
Popular Front leadership and outcome of the training camp was to abolish the social discrimination 
that was experienced by many Dhofaris. This policy sought to remove tribal intolerance, removing 
masters and slaves, and making all equal before the law (National Struggle Documents, 1974). 
However, there was a downside to this decision to combat social discrimination, which constituted a 
serious social shift in the tribal society of Dhofar. The regions of Oman had operated under an 
Islamic tribal system for more than1200 years before the application of communist ideology. This 
change was limiting for the revolution because it resulted in tribal leaders losing their influence 
over the people of their regions. As a result of the liberation of women and equality of men in 
accordance with communist ideology, the rebels began to lose access to the popular incubator 
control and influence provided by tribal leaders. The liberation of women and their position fighting 
alongside men, including the ability of women to choose their partners without consulting their 
guardian, stirred hatred among the local population against the rebel leaders. The films in the 
previous section (Media Development) show the Dhofari women fighting beside the men, which 
became common not only in Dhofar, but across all of the Arabian Peninsula. This item was 
problematic for many tribal men and therefore limited the appeal of the revolution.  
The educational role of the Front 
A Kuwaiti political newspaper dated 16th July 1971 shows that, after its establishment in 
Hawf in January 1969, the rebel camp became also a major social and educational achievement of 
Fig. 18: Right: Huda with another Dhofari fighter women in the field, 1968,. Left: There was an educational role of the 








the rebellion. Despite the fact that the camp initially provided basic military training to Liberation 
Army members and the popular militia, it evolved into an important centre for literacy (see figure 
18). (Adayyen, 1971, p. 3). The newspaper Adayyen, 17th July 1971, explains that the camp had 
been named the School of the People, before being renamed the Lenin School on 1st April 1970. It 
was run by a Bahraini woman named Huda (real name Lila Fakhrow) (see figure 18) who held a 
master's degree in statistics from the University of Beirut (Al Wasat newspaper, ‘Reballion in 
Oman’, 8th Feb 1971, p. 1). The school accommodated a large number of Dhofari children, teaching 
approximately 400 students between the ages of six and sixteen by mid-1971 (Adayyen, 1971, p. 3). 
The school was considered to be an important educational social achievement during the phase that 
followed the conference (Halliday, 2008, p. 278). 
The women’s role in the revolution  
Significant changes also occurred in the life of Dhofari women during this phase (1968-
1970). These developments enabled them to contribute in supporting the rebels from the beginning 
of the declaration of armed struggle in 1965. During 
the first phase of the revolution (1965-1967), the 
role of women had been limited to logistical 
support. This role evolved after the shift in the work 
programme and ideology of the Front brought about 
by the Hamrin Conference, which allowed women 
to fight alongside men (see figure 19). The Front 
enacted laws specifically for women, which were 
applied in virtually all areas that were controlled by 
the rebels. A Kuwaiti political newspaper (2nd 
August 1971) highlighted another positive social repercussion of the revolution at that time, which 
was the decision of the Front to reduce a woman's dowry to 12 riyals (approximately 20 pounds). 
This decision was considered positive and important, as it contributed to the simplification of 
marriage procedures and, as such, benefitted a significant proportion of the population. 
In September 1970, the General Command of the Front issued a decision to allow men and 
women to choose their partners freely and without any pressure or interference from any third party 
(Halliday, 2008, p. 384). In addition, the Front banned polygamy and unequal divorce, as well as 
Fig. 19: Women played a bigger role in the 
revolution after the Second Conference, 1968 









allowing women to be educated and trained 
with the men. The Front also allowed women 
to use weapons and fight on the front lines of 
the PLA. The most famous of the women 
fighters in the rebellion, Fatma Al Amri, was 
held up as an example, until she passed away 
in north Hasik area in 1973. The Front 
prohibited the use of the prohibited word 
hareem (women), instead using the word 
rafiqah (partner)to address women (DLF, 
1974, p. 24). These decisions, contributed 
significantly to the transformation and 
development of the social life of the Dhofari community. The Front took upon itself the liberation 
of women, empowering them to learn, fight and contribute to the new society (see figure 20). 
However, the decision to liberate women had a negative impact for the rebels within the tribal 
community of Dhofar. 
Economic transformations 
The economic policies of the revolution focused on animal resources and agricultural 
capacity in Dhofar. In order to achieve its aims, the PFLOAG formed awareness committees to 
educate citizens about how best to manage their animal resources. Agricultural committees were 
formed to encourage them to work in farming and to be self-reliant on providing food. The Front 
also cancelled the tribal borders, which were customary in Dhofar, thereby enabling free access to 
grazing for all people. The PLA forces even helped the citizens to prepare the land for agriculture 
and harvesting (Fayyad, 1975, p. 162). New and previously unknown forms of agricultural 
equipment and supplies from the Democratic Republic of Yemen entered the areas that the rebels 
controlled, awaking the desire for change in the Dhofari people. This resulted in the PFLOAG, 
receiving broad popularity among the masses, due to the sudden feeling of hope that they would be 
able to improve from their miserable living conditions (Hala, 1970, pp. 10-15). 
Overall, it is evident that the second conference of the revolutionaries (Hamrin Conference) 
had positive effects on the revolution, including the organisation of the work being undertaken, the 
Fig. 20: Dhofari girl is grinding seeds to make bread for the 







development of education, media and society, and the improvement of gender relations and 
economic development.  
 
3.3.2: Negative repercussions 
 Although the decisions that resulted from the Hamrin Conference reflected positively on 
many aspects of the revolution and Dhofari life, as outlined above, the declarations also had several 
negative long-term social effects. The level of defections among rebel groups was perhaps the most 
important of these. The defections occurred as a result of the abolishment of the tribal system, the 
liberation of women and the adoption of socialist ideology, resulting in the negation of the role that 
Islam played in public life. The decision to change the name of the Front was also generally 
negative from a regional perspective, as Gulf Arab counties now considered the Front to be an 
enemy posing a direct threat to their (western-supported) governmental systems. The adoption of an 
Execution and Confiscation law in the areas controlled by the Front also harmed perceptions of the 
rebellion, as did the removal of the prevailing and centuries-old customs and traditions in Dhofar 
community. 
During the first phase of the revolution (1965-1967), which was spearheaded by DLF, the 
revolutionary work more closely resembled tribal alliances, typical of Dhofar society, than an 
organised revolution. The DLF was the umbrella that gathered Dhofaris for the first time in 
contemporary history to achieve the common goal of undertaking a unified military action against a 
common enemy: Sultan Said. This unrivalled unity achieved its desired objectives by securing 
control of vast tracts of land in a short period, as well as gaining widespread sympathy in Dhofar, 
with even soldiers loyal to the Sultan expressing a degree of affinity for the revolutionary 
movement. However, the decisions of the Hamrin Conference led to the abandonment of this 
approach, resulting in defections and total estrangement between groups of rebels: the right-wing, 
which led the DLF, and the left-wing, which led the PFLOAG. As a result, the initial revolutionary 
leaders formed an opposition abroad against the new approach, which they called Sultan Qaboos to 
join (Dhofar Liberation Front)(Dhiab, 1984, p. 95). This opposition group joined Sultan Qaboos bin 
Said after he assumed government on 23rdJuly 1970, contributing significantly to the fight against 







The negative repercussions of the adoption of socialist ideology were also extensive. Many 
authors (e.g. Al Amri, 2012, p. 116; Al Nafisi, 1976, p. 44)argue that Dhofar was not a fertile 
ground for communism, as neither the Islamic teachings of by the indigenous people nor the 
intellectual level of the general public were able to accept this new way of thinking. Dhofar had no 
class struggle that tallied with Marxist concepts: there was neither a working class nor a feudal 
society, at least in its political sense. In effect, the Dhofari tribal structure was a graveyard for any 
idea that came from abroad. Marxist ideas were alien to Omani society, as they conflicted with its 
deep rooted traditions and religion (Hashmi, 2013, pp. 90-91). In general, communism was 
therefore broadly inappropriate for this stage of revolutionary work in Dhofar, because the general 
thinking of the population across the Arabian Gulf was unable to accommodate to the ideas that 
were central to this approach. 
 
3.4: The Change of Relations with Regional Organisations after the Second Conference in  
1968 
3.4.1: Imamate, UAE, Yemen, Egypt and Iraq 
The political relations between the PFLOAG and the regional countries and organisations 
after the Hamrin Conference witnessed a huge change. At the Gulf regional level, the decisions of 
the Hamrin Conference led the relationship between the Popular Front and the Imamate of Oman to 
become argumentative, marred by severe condemnation. This was exacerbated by their strong 
condemnation of all the traditional political forces in the region and even the accusation that 
Imamate was affecting the public cause with pseudo-revolutionary slogans (see appendix 9: Hamrin 
Conference decisions). In broad terms, the communist ideology of the revolutionaries influenced 
relations with the Imamate, turning the relationship from friendliness to hostility, because of the 
profound differences between communism and Islamic thought. In fact, these two ideologies are 
almost oppositeto one another, given that the imamateis centered on the application of Islamic 
Sharia (Islamic law)with the rule according to the traditions of Ibadi doctrine. For example, after 
they became communists, the revolutionaries prevented people from religious practices, such as 
prayer, fasting and charity to the poor (zakat). In addition, communism liberated women and 
encouraged them to abandon obedience to their parents. In Islam, women have to obey their 
guardians and are prevented from marriage without the consent of guardians. Another reason for the 







Imam was in exile in Saudi Arabia. The leaders of the revolution condemned Saudi Arabia and 
accused it of being an instrument in the hands of American imperialism(Interview Imamate leader, 
19thJuly 2013, RA6). As a consequence of this, it should have been expected that the relations 
between the rebels and the Imam would deteriorate. 
In the same context, those attending the Hamrin Conference condemned the Unity of the 
UAE and described it as fake. This was a clear hostility expressed towards the traditional, 
succession systems in the Arabian Gulf, at the same time as being an open invitation to the non-
traditional Gulf opposition (left-wing) to cooperate with the Dhofar rebels to fight against those 
regulations that they described as reactionary and bourgeois. At the level of the Arab Gulf 
countries, the agenda of the policy of the revolutionaries had moved away from governments of the 
region, instead focusing on anti-government groups. This policy attracted many opposition figures 
in the Arabian Gulf but proved insufficient to overcome the governments of the region (Fayyad, 
1975, pp. 106-107). 
The relations between the Front and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen became 
closer at all levels. After the independence of Yemen from Britain in 1967, it allocated significant 
resources to support the Dhofar rebels. Because of this, the Front representation office in Al Mualla 
in Aden soon became the first and most important political office, managing the Front’s diplomatic 
and media affairs. The Yemen Embassy in Kuwait was also used as a liaison with the organisation 
members of the Gulf region. Yemen contributed more than two-thirds of the annual budget of the 
Front (Al Rayes, 2000, pp. 114-115). The support that Yemen offered to the rebels resulted in a 
notable increase in the rebel military activity and use of ammunition. In addition, the DLF 
leadership was also able to open headquarters in Hawf, a Yemeni town near the border of Dhofar 
(Al Harthi, 2007, pp. 370-371, 373-377). 
The relations with Egypt and Iraq were characterised by relative apathy in the period that 
followed the Hamrin Conference. Egypt’s preoccupation with the Israeli occupation of Arab lands 
after its defeat of 1967 significantly contributed to its disinterest in maintaining its relationship with 
the Front. This was amplified by the reservations expressed by Egyptians toward the changes that 
had occurred in the revolutionary work in Dhofar, with many of the figures that were popular in 
Egyptian official circles having been excluded from the Front leadership. A British document 
indicated that Cairo Radio was broadcasting a daily programme to support the rebels, entitled “half 







The external representation office in Iraq was closed and Front office in Cairo was neglected 
as a result of the reticence of the Egyptian government to deal with the Front delegation headed by 
Mohammed Al Yafei and with the membership of Saeed Al Kathiri, Rajab Abedraboh, Ahmed Al 
Omari, and Salem Al A'Waed. The delegation had gone to Cairo to inform the Egyptian 
government about the new changes in the revolutionary work being undertaken in Dhofar, as well 
as to outline its leadership and work methods. However this delegation failed to obtain the blessing 
of the Egyptian government and so the representative office there was neglected.  The delegation 
had travelled earlier to Kuwait at the beginning of October 1968 to inform the Front members of the 
Hamrin Conference decisions and the new regulations of the Popular Front leadership which 
resulted from the Second Conference, but had also failed to convince the Dhofari opposition in 
Kuwait of these decisions and the reasons behind them. Therefore, the relationship between rebels 
and the Egyptian government was officially broken (Al Rayes, 2000, pp. 98-99).  
It seems likely that the Egyptian government also rejected the new communist leadership of 
the rebels because of the non-alignment movement policy that Egypt had helped to found. Abdel 
Nasser stressed Egypt’s commitment to the movement by hosting the second conference of the 
movement in Cairo in 1964. The goal of this movement was to spread the ideology of Arab 
nationalism to other Arab countries and for the rebels to acquire weapons from the Egyptian army. 
The nationalist ideology was considered to be a compromise between Islam and communism, as 
unlike communism it respected religious freedom (Hamroush, 1978, pp. 59-60)(Appendix 10 
explains the support from other countries, which is less relevant).  
 
3.4.2: China 
The Front’s relationship with China was the most important of the global relationships that 
had been developed since the beginning of the movement in 1967. This relationship evolved 
significantly over the following years and became close, due to multiple visits between the 
members of the Popular Front and Chinese officials. A delegation of the Front, headed by Salim Al 
Ghassani, head of the Political Committee, visited China in February 1970 (Bahbahani, 1984, p. 
183). The delegation spent five weeks there, culminating in a meeting with the Chinese Prime 
Minister Zhou Enlai (1898-1976) and with the Chief of General Staff of the Chinese People’s 







relations between the rebels and China, as well as the desire of the rebels to obtain more aid from 
China (ibid, p. 183). During this period, the Chinese government made promises to the rebel 
delegation that it would provide them with military support (Al Harthi, 2007, pp. 511-512,527 – 
529, 532-533).When Sultan Qaboos rose to power in mid-1970, the relations between the Front and 
China were at their highest level. During the Front delegation visit to China, one Chinese official 
said that the situation was excellent and that the development and victories of the armed struggle of 
Dhofar rebels would promote and develop the national liberation struggle of the entire Gulf region 
(YitzhakShich, 1979, p. 153). 
After the rebels embraced the communist ideology, their relations with the regional 
countries declined. Indeed, Yemen was soon the only gateway to the revolutionaries, after Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia withdrew their support. However, despite the growing influence of the military 
actions undertaken by the rebels after the Hamrin Conference, Sultan Said insisted that he would 
not open any channels of communication with other countries in the region, clearly indicating his 
position and ability with regards to the sovereignty of his country. 
 
3.5: The Sultans Diplomacy during this second period 
In many ways, the diplomacy of Sultan Said in the second period of the revolution (1968-
1970) seems to have been similar to the first period (1965-1967). His mistreatment of citizens in 
Dhofar continued and his relationship with the regional countries remained unstable. Sultan Said 
also continued to refuse to follow British advice, as one of his main priorities was to maintain the 
independence of his country and his own sovereign right to make decisions. The Sultan was keen to 
reserve his legitimate rights, discretion and independence (Ateeqi, 2007, p. 54).A confidential 
telegram, “Security-Muscat and Oman”, sent to T.F. Brenchley, the Head of the Arabian 
Directorate in the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from E.F. Henderson, the British Political 
Agency in Doha (Qatar), illustrates that the Sultan’s policy had not changed since coming to power 
in Oman. The document mentions that the Sultan did not permit British interference in matters of 
internal security in his country. It also notes that the lack of communication between the Sultan and 
the public increased every year that he spent in his remote retreat (Al Harthi, 2007, pp. 143-144, 







the rebels controlled most of the mountains surrounding Salalah, the Sultan stayed in his palace in 
Salalah asserting his authority over the region. 
After starting oil exports and achieving some economic prosperity, British diplomats 
however sought to suggest to the Sultan the importance of developing Dhofar, as this would gain 
the respect of the people and quell the revolution. In this context, British documents mention that 
the development in Oman did not meet people's expectations and was known to be much lower than 
other countries in the region: 
Given the possibility that there might in the future be an increased opportunity for 
trouble to be created in Oman from outside. HMG felt that the speed of 
development in Oman did not match with the growing expectations of the people, 
many for whom had experience of what was happening in surrounding states, and 
that tension and possible threats to stability could result (UKNA, NBM10/2, 1970).  
The Sultan however firmly believed that the British would not leave him to fight the rebels 
alone, because a rebel victory would adversely affect their long-lasting economic interests 
(Interview Moss, 9thNov 2016). The British had helped the Sultan to win the Jebel Al Akhdar War 
in Al Dakhiya in 1959, which enabled both parties to benefit from the oil located under the Imamate 
controlled regions (see Chapter One). Therefore, the Sultan was equally sure that the British would 
help him to end the Dhofar War, especially after the adoption of communism by the rebels and the 
interference by the Chinese. In addition, the Sultan was uninterested in strengthening his 
relationships with the surrounding countries, especially KSA, and his relationships with them 
generally remained unstable and acrimonious. The Sultan was determined to maintain his discretion 
and the independence of Oman, declining to implement any of the British suggestions unless he was 
personally convinced that it was the right course. This resulted in his failure to develop the region 
and therefore remove a primary driver of the revolution. Recognising the relevance of stability and 
security to their future plans, British politicians started considering a replacement for Sultan Said. 
The emergence of this British policy will be discussed in detail below.  
 
3.6: British Diplomacy 
3.6.1: Ensuring oil flow 
During this period, the level of oil exportation from Oman increased exponentially, rising 







382,000 barrels a day by 1969. Therefore, the oil industry became the top priority of the British 
government for multiple reasons. The first was the security matters represented in protecting oil 
pipelines and facilities from any damage. The Dhofar revolution caused serious security worries for 
British oil companies, due to the increased likelihood that the nascent oil industry in Oman would 
be damaged. A British confidential telegram sent on 19thJuly 1966, from E.F. Henderson, the 
British Political Agency in Doha (Qatar) to T.F. Brenchley, the Head of the Arabian directorate in 
the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs, discussed the fears that the regional supporters of the 
Dhofari rebels, especially the Iraqis and Egyptians, might cause damage to the oil industry. 
Assuming that the oil company through cooperation with the government would 
take enough precautions to ensure the safety of the pumping stations which are 
connected to the pipes and the gas stations which are located in fields and even in 
ports, the oil industry in Oman was still the least secure industry in the Middle 
East and the Sultan’s relationships with the rest of the Arab world was the worst 
among the rulers’(UKNA, BC 103125/1, 1966). 
In fact, the Sultan had many opponents and his security enforcement did not meet the required 
standards.This situation was therefore highly important for British interests in the region, not only 
to ensure operation of their oil companies, but also to guarantee the economic development and 
security of the country, thereby helping to stabilise Oman before the agreed British withdrawal from 
the Gulf at the end of 1971. Hence,  
Miles (1920) has argued that the economic factor was the most important factor behind all the major 
struggles in Oman as the borders between countries were set by oil companies in a scheme to share 
authorities. The economic factor was also the top of British priorities (Miles, 1920, pp. 201-
203).AlHarthi (2007, p. 376) also confirms the importance of the economic aspect in the British 
policies, especially the stability of the region in the long-term, considering the threats and damages 
that could be caused to the facilities of the Petroleum Development Oman Company, of which Shell 
Company owned 85% stock (Al Harthi, 2007, p. 376). 
 
3.6.2: Encouraging the Sultan to communicate with his people and start developing Dhofar 
The British government therefore seized the opportunity to reconnect the Sultan with his 
people and end his isolation when Oman started to export large shipments of oil in August 1967. 







development, thinking that this would contribute significantly to ending the revolution in Dhofar. A 
British confidential telegram, Oil Shipments from Muscat(27July 1967), stated the necessity of the 
Sultan achieving some of the outcomes that his people expected as a result of the new oil revenues, 
because postponing these developments would anger the people and weaken the Sultan’s position. 
As the Sultan did not have a radio station or other media, he agreed to be interviewed by an Arabic 
speaking employee of the BBC regarding his development plans. The interview was set to coincide 
with the first oil shipments in 1967, in order to ensure that the Sultan’s words would have a strong 
impact on his people and encourage the Sultan to be closer to his people by announcing his 
development plans (Al Harthi, 2007, pp. 257-259). 
Sultan Said delivered a rare speech to his people in January 1968. During this speech, he 
reviewed the poor financial situation of the Sultanate when he took power in 1932, his 
achievements in organising an effective modern army, the victory in the Green Mountain War 
(1957-1959), and his ability to obtain British subsidies from 1958 to 1967, the year of oil 
exportation. He added that he had signed agreements for oil exploration that were similar to the 
agreements signed by other oil countries. He explained that the development process would be 
phased, with government offices being established first, followed by housing for the workers of 
companies that would undertake projects, after which he would provide schools, hospitals and 
roads, according to the needs of each city. The Sultan added that a number of projects had already 
begun in the areas of water, electricity and the construction of a shipping port, all in the capital 
Muscat, in addition to a project to issue a national currency (Appendix 11: Sultan Said Speech, 
January 1968).  
An important British report, “The Sultanate of Muscat and Oman Steering Brief for 
Review”, concluded that Sultan Said could not win in Dhofar if the military operations did not 
coincide with civil aid and regional developments. It stated: 
The Sultan's military effort in Dhofar will not be successful without a measure of 
civilian development. Likewise, there cannot be civilian development without 
some reform of administration (UKNA, FCO, 512/1202, 1970).  
Moreover, in “Civilian development in Dhofar”, the brief added: 
Civilian development in Dhofar in support of the military effort there is as essential 
as the military effort itself. It is generally agreed (though not necessarily by the 
Sultan) that the war in Dhofar cannot be won and possibly not even contained by 







The same report pointed out that British government paid great attention to the country’s 
development because it would lead to more stability: 
The Secretary of State indicated in his letter, the Sultan and H.M.G. share common 
interests, that development in the Sultanate are therefore of considerable concern to 
H.M.G which is preoccupation with the new danger which have arisen to threaten 
stability in the Sultanate (UKNA, FCO, 512/1202, 1970). 
When the Sultan refused to start the development programme after the beginning of oil exports, 
British diplomats tried to tempt him with the offer that they would reinforce the level of military 
cooperation and increase British aid to Oman once he had started the projects. 
The negotiators could then sit into a discussion of the four main topics in question 
i.e. the military situation, civilian development in Dhofar, civilian development in 
Oman and reform of administration. The Sultan should be persuaded to agree to the 
measures we consider necessary and to ascertain precisely what will be necessary 
in the way of British assistance(UKNA, FCO, 512/1202, 1970). 
Providing the discussion has gone well and that the Sultan has clearly indicated that he was 
prepared to implement some of the measures recommended in the civilian field, those diplomats 
had the discretion to offer him some or all of the assistance. In an attempt to convince the Sultan to 
start development, the British diplomats suggested changing their representation from a Consulate 
General to an Embassy. They stated that, 
The British diplomats have discretion, again if the discussions go well, to offer to change 
British representation from a Consulate General to an Embassy (with an Ambassador of 
Grade 3 rank) if they consider that the Sultan would respond favourably to this. 
The summary mentions that if the Sultan’s refusal continued, the British Prime Minister, Harold 
Wilson, would be asked to meet him and exert efforts to convince him. Alternatively, 
that time and in advance of the Ministerial visit further decisions will have to be 
taken by Ministers on what H.M.G.'s relationship with the Sultan will be if the 
latter continues to refuse to give satisfactory undertakings(UKNA, FCO, 512/1202, 
1970). 
From the summary, it is clear that during this period (1968-1970), the British government insisted 
on attempting to convince the Sultan to start the development programmes in Oman, especially in 
Dhofar, as soon as possible. It also becomes clear that Halliday (2008, p. 331)is incorrect to argue 
that the British invested the Sultan full authority as long as their interests were protected. 
Regardless of whether the decisions of the Sultan were correct, he insisted on the implementation of 







of foreign pressure, suggesting that the government of the Sultan had more independently from the 
British government than much of the literature argues (see section 1.3 for more details). 
 
3.6.3: British diplomacy’s fear of apolitical vacuum in Oman as a result of the death or 
assassination of the Sultan 
Despite the failure of an assassination attempt on Sultan Said in 1966, it confirmed the 
isolation of the Sultan from his people (see section 2.4.5 for more details). As a result, British 
diplomats recognised the possibility of a future assassination attempt on the Sultan being 
successful, leading them to develop scenarios for the potential aftermath in case this should occur. 
Britain discussed the risks that British national interests would face in Oman if any assassination 
attempt succeeded during the second period of the revolution (1968-1970). The reasons for this 
approach are the aforementioned repercussions of the Hamrin Conference, the major military 
development of the rebels, Yemeni independence, the adoption of communist thought by the 
rebellion and Sultan Said’s refusal to develop Dhofar, despite its economic revival due to oil. 
Despite these factors being significant motivators for the rebellion, there had been no change made 
to the infrastructure or any measures taken to meet the needs of the people despite access to new 
and lucrative revenue streams (Al Busaidi, 1965, pp. 3-5).  
A top secret telegram was sent to the British Political Agent in Bahrain, Sir Stewart 
Crawford on 14th January 1969. Issued by D. Carden, the British Consulate General, it was entitled 
“The Death of the Sultan” and stated that if Oman should be ruled by a new government capable of 
maintaining the unity of the country, it would be possible to resolve disputes with the Arab 
countries, win the civil war in Dhofar, and prevent foreign intervention (Al Harthi, 2007, pp. 536-
537). These four aspects were likely British diplomatic priorities at that stage. When Sultan Said did 
not respond to repeated British demands to start the development of Dhofar, the British government 
sought to inform him, with an implicit threat, that he should take their diplomatic proposals 
seriously: 
The situation in Dhofar is that it can be held indeed improved, provided the 
necessary measures are taken by the Sultan and his administration. The trouble has 
been that the Sultan’s complex and difficult character has moved far too slowly in 
approving the military measures recommended to him, he is reluctant to authorise a 
speeding up of development projects in the civilian field in the Sultanate in 







cannot be permanently improved unless the Sultan makes his rule more attractive 
to the Dhofaris and shows them that he has an interest in their welfare. We have 
decided that we should review the whole situation with the Sultan (UKNA, FCO, 
512/1202, 1970). 
In the same context, a British document stated that a political review of British policy to Sultan Said 
should be conducted after his refusal to start the development or to comply with their suggestions. 
For this reason, the British considered securing the appointment of a Chief Secretary to ensure that 
decisions were made more smoothly, stating that “the Sultan urgently requires an experienced Chief 
Secretary to whom he would have to give the necessary power to supervise development on a much 
wider scale” (UKNA, FCO, 512/1202, 1970). Stewart Crawford, the British Residency in Bahrain, 
explains the three aspects that the British sought to develop in the Sultan’s Government for this 
reason: 
We want the Sultan to install a more modern administration under a Chief 
Secretary, we want to encourage the Sultan to employ more Omanis and to give his 
people more freedom... we want to get the Sultan to delegate responsibility for 
development, in Dhofar (UKNA, NBM10/2, 1970). 
Eventually, however, the British government lost hope in the Sultan’s possible cooperation and 
willingness to start the Dhofar development proposals. In the Sultanate of Oman Steering Brief, 
“The Sultanate Muscat and Oman”, Crawford states that, 
A more modern code is required. There are many other small reforms necessary to 
move the Sultanate towards the twentieth century. It is unrealistic to think however 
that the Sultan will move very far or very fast (UKNA, FCO, 512/1202, 1970). 
Sultan Said, however, stuck to his decision, as indicated in a secret British document: 
The Sultan has over the past months received clear and consistent military advice 
from the Commander of his Armed Forces, from his new Defence Secretary ... 
from the Commander British Forces Gulf. There is no reason, given the seriousness 
of the present deteriorating situation, why he should not take the necessary 
decisions on their merits. It should be the first aim of the British diplomats to 
ensure that he does. Failing this the Sultan must be asked why he feels unable to act 
when he has received the necessary advice and when he has the financial means to 
do what is required (UKNA, FCO, 512/1202, 1970). 
The implications of Sultan Said’s death were secretly discussed with his son, Sultan Qaboos, in 
1969. The meeting was held to ensure that there would be no political gap that enabled the rebels to 
seize control of Dhofar, or the entirety of Oman, in the event of the Sultan’s death for any reason. 







was also discussed in another secret telegram, “Mr. Qaboos and the death of the Sultan”, from D.C. 
Carden at the British Consulate General in Muscat on 30th June 1969 to Sir Stewart Crawford, the 
British Political Agent in Bahrain(Al Harthi, 2007, pp. 539-540). This message stated that the 
British had advised Sultan Qaboos, in the case of the assassination of his father, to travel to Muscat 
immediately and consult prominent Omani figures about the procedures that should be adopted. 
After gaining control of the tribes, he should ensure the support of the Sultan's Armed Forces and 
not release the tribal figures who had been imprisoned by his father. Once the situation in North 
Oman was stable, he should take the necessary measures to calm the situation in Dhofar. It was also 
made clear that the Oman Oil company would recognise the new Sultan if he came to the throne (Al 
Harthi, 2007, pp. 539-540). It should be noted here that British diplomatic arrangements to replace 
Sultan Said, which began during this period, are deemed by Omani and Arab historians as 
stemming primarily from Britain’s pursuit of its own economic and security interests in the region 
(Almari, 2012, pp. 151-152; Trabulsy, 2004, pp. 177-178). This seems to be true, as the British 
government sought to arrange the situation in the region before final military withdrawal. 
Ultimately, they wanted to ensure sufficient diplomatic influence to protect their long term national 
interests.  
Such documents related to the Sultan Said’s relationship with the British, make it clear that 
he was not as has had been described by many Arab and western writers a puppet in the hands of 
the coloniser (e.g. Abdalsatar, 1989, p. 46; Beasant, 2002, pp. 200-201; Fadel, 1995, p.212; 
Halliday, 2008, p. 331; Miles, 1920, pp. 222-230; Omar, 2008, pp. 6-7; Owtram, 2004, p. 
16;Samah, 2016, p. 273; Sultan & Naqeeb, 2008, p. 26; Wilson, 2012, pp. 331-332). Instead, it 
seems evident that Sultan Said was keen to maintain the independence of Oman to make the 
decisions that he deemed appropriate, whether or not they were contrary to the wishes of the British 
government. Most significant was his decision to refuse to commence regional development, 
despite the availability of the necessary financial resources. The concern of the British government 
about the possibility of his sudden death and the resultant problems that it would cause for Oman 








Fig. 21: The British troops were supporting the Sultan’s Forces in Dhofar, 1969 
(Source: Royal Air Force Archives, RAFODR 82). 
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3.6.4: Sultan’s Diplomacy with regard to Military Affairs 
 During this phase, with support of the British, the Sultan nonetheless sent several units 
against the strongholds of the rebels in the mountains. These units were led by British officers and 
supported by soldiers from north Oman, as well as Baluchi soldiers from Pakistan (see figure 21). 
These raids were victories for the rebels and a loss for the forces of the Sultan, largely thanks to the 
high morale of the revolutionaries and the inability of the Sultan to deal with guerrilla warfare 
(Jeapes, 1996, p. 11). The rebels also benefitted from support from abroad, especially from South 
Yemen. The success of Yemen in liberating their country from British ‘colonisation’ provided 
considerable moral support to the revolutionaries in Dhofar, who were also able to receive aid 
through Yemen. Since 1968, the Dhofar Mountains and desert were controlled by the rebels, while 
the Sultan only controlled Salalah and some major towns. The British responded by trying to adopt 
more effective operational tactics than those implemented during the first phase of the war (1965 - 
1967) in an attempt to blockade the rebels, weaken them, and cut off their lines of supply, especially 








3.6.5: Avoiding the involvement of British troops in the Dhofar War 
After the Suez War in Egypt in 1956, the British government became more cautious about 
using British troops in internal wars. The damage to the prestige of Britain and the political 
credibility of its leaders led Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, to resign in January 1957 (Milner, 
2011, p. 2). Therefore, the British government sought to prevent the involvement of British troops 
in the Dhofar war, as illustrated by a secret telegram addressed to the British Foreign Office, which 
was sent from DJ. McCarthy, in the Arabian Department in the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
to MS. Weir, the British Consulate General in Bahrain on 2nd October 1968. The contents of the 
message indicate that the form and manner of British military intervention in the Al Jabal Al 
Akhdar war in 1958 could not be allowed to happen again under any circumstances due to the 
embarrassment caused to the British government by the United Nations General Council adopting 
discussions on the issue of the Imamate of Oman (Al Harthi, 2007, pp. 440-441).Qualified British 
officers who had mastered guerrilla warfare were, therefore provided to lead the Sultan's Armed 
Forces in the Dhofar War (Ladwig, 2008, p. 17). This has led many writers to claim that the Dhofar 
War was a secret war (Fiennes, 1974, p. 15; Halliday, 2008, p. 331; Jeapes, 1996, p. 11; Ordeman, 
2016, p. 2). Its secrecy was certainly a part of British efforts to avoid international condemnation 
for involvement in internal wars in Gulf States. 
 
3.6.6: Ensuring British national interests before British withdrawal from east of Suez in 1971 
A secret document entitled RAF Salalah was sent to the British Consulate General in 
Bahrain, M. S. Weir on 5th April 1968, and issued by British Political Agent in Bahrain, Sir Stewart 
Crawford. This document stated that the British government realised that keeping security and 
stability in Oman before their withdrawal from east Suez in 1971 had become a priority (1968-
1970). For the British government, stability in the Sultanate was stated as an, 
important factor to keep peace and development in the Gulf Emirates in the next 
few years that will witness a withdrawal from the Gulf. Her Majesty’s Government 
will always be concerned about the stability in the Sultanate and the region in the 
long run (Al Harthi, 2007, p. 376). 
A confidential British letter also outlined some of the features of Oman’s geographical 







air station for the RAF and the importance of the country as a site for a radio reinforcement station 
to enable the British Broadcasting Corporation to broadcast to South Asia (Al Harthi, 2007, p. 376). 
These matters were further discussed in an important letter entitled "The Sultanate Muscat 
and Oman", from A.A. Land, the Secretary of State to the Secretary of State for Defence. The 
contents of the letter discussed the diplomatic arrangements after the withdrawal, the need to ensure 
the long-term interests of the UK in Oman, especially economically, and the threat that the Dhofar 
revolution could pose to British interests if no resolution was found before the withdrawal:  
I am increasingly concerned about the situation in the Sultanate and in particular in 
Dhofar and consequent danger to British personnel, both military and civilian, in 
Salalah... In addition, we have a considerable interest in the maintenance of 
stability in the Sultanate both before and after our military withdrawal from the 
Persian Gulf. A serious deterioration in the situation in the Sultanate before 1971 
could adversely affect the plans and model for our withdrawal. A spread of 
communist or extreme Arab nationalist influence thereafter could affect our 
extensive oil and commercial interest in the Gulf States (UKNA, FCO, 512/1202, 
1970).  
 Likewise, a confidential telegram sent to Sir Stewart Crawford, British Political Agent in the 
Persian Gulf, from the British Residency, Bahrain on 12thJanuary 1969, signed by DC. Carden 
included and annual review for the year 1968. The document mentioned that the most important 
event in 1968 was the decision to withdraw the British troops from the Gulf by the end of 1971. It 
emphasised that this decision might reduced the opportunities to sustain the security, tranquillity, 
and prosperity of the British interests in the Oman. The document also mentioned requests to 
establish facilities for British forces, the BBC radio station, and to review oil development 
programmes, while noting visible and invisible British exports in the form of weapons for the 
Sultan’s Armed Forces, equipment for development projects, and transfers of British employees. 
The factors that would have helped the Sultan to have control over the tribes 
determination was to use the countries resources to benefit the people, and in 
spending oil revenues in Dhofar development. However, there are factors which 
may have threaten the continuity of the Sultan’s rule and our interests as well. 
these includes the British withdrawal from the Gulf, the slow pace of 
implementing development projects, the Sultans reluctance to establishing a new 
government agency which can transform oil revenues into benefiting the people, in 
addition to his unwillingness to change the restrictions imposed in Dhofar, like 
allowing Dhofaris to have a kind of independent management of their own affairs 
as well as the growing influence of communists in Dhofar. It is important for the 







trust other people and grant them the appropriate authority may have lead to the 
collapse of his rule. 
This document outlines the consequences of overthrowing Said: 
 If the Sultan’s rule was overthrown, the doors will be opened in front of the 
various wings to fight over power; some of which will be supported by external 
forces. This means the end of the prevailing peace in Oman currently. Chaos and 
instability of the country, which would have threatened British interests in the 
country to varying degrees (UKNA, DS 11/12, File 2/7, 1969). 
 The British government focused on imposing stability with minimal human, political and 
material costs, thus contributing to the British national interests on the economic and military sides 
particularly in preparation for after the withdrawal period as outlined in the ‘RAF Salalah’ 
document issued on 5th April 1968, which stipulated that the British policy had to deal with the 
Dhofar Rebels, 
until the withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971, and in the long-term if possible 
minimise the risk of injuries, loss of lives and destruction of the Royal Air Force in 
Salalah and minimise the risk of implicating British troops in military operations to 
defend the airstrip (Al Harthi, 2007, pp. 370-377). 
In sum, this situation required covert British military intervention to assist Oman. 
 
3.7: Chapter III Conclusion 
The second conference of the revolution, otherwise known as the Hamrin Conference, was 
held in 1968. It constituted a major turning point in the Dhofar revolution, as the leaders of the left-
wing Dhofar Branch of the Arab National Movement assumed control over decisions by replacing 
the more moderate group that controlled the leadership of the DLF, including the members of the 
Dhofar Charitable Association. The communist trend in the revolutionary movement in Dhofar can 
be said to have been a new ideological approach that was caused by the multiplicity of internal and 
external variables surrounding the revolutionary work. This new approach effectively took over 
control of the rebellion at the Hamrin Conference, the consequence of which is that the conference 
concluded with a new leadership and new decisions at all levels, including strategically, 
ideologically, politically and militarily. 
The Hamrin Conference had both negative and positive effects on the rebels. The external 







and Egypt, which had been the most influential supporter of the rebels during the first phase. 
Additionally, the rebels made Britain their explicit enemy at this stage. The internal disadvantages 
included a rejection of the new communist way of thinking by many of the conservative nationalist 
rebels, including many who had been leaders during the first phase. The new leaders of the 
revolution declined to compromise, instead applying the new communist approach by force, leading 
to decisions about the execution law, the abolition of class and even women’s liberation that were 
negatively received by the established Dhofar tribal society. The Front started losing popularity 
because the majority of the Dhofari people did not accept the new communist ideology, at least 
partly due to their deep-rooted tribal system, as well as the fact that Dhofari society is entirely 
Islamic. However, the rebels benefited from the decisions of Hamrin Conference through increased 
support provided from communist countries and organisations, especially the high levels of 
military, media and political support from China and Yemen. This provided the rebels with a major 
military and moral impetus that allowed them to develop the revolutionary areas in organisational, 
military, political, media, and educational terms. It enabled the rebels to defeat the Sultan forces and 
British advisers in most towns. Ultimately, however the rebels did not take care of the core values 
of Omani political relations with the adoption of communism. By fighting Islamic and tribal 
customs and traditions, even actions such as liberating women, the rebels lost the support of the 
tribes that were the most important pillars of their influence. They also lost Saudi and Egyptian 
support, leaving only Yemen as regional ally.  
On the other side, the diplomacy of Sultan Said did not change much during this phase, as 
he maintained the independence of his decisions and continued to have poor relations with his 
people, particularly in Dhofar. The Sultan also made no effort to improve his relationship with other 
countries in the region or to develop his government. 
The British government was however more flexible, having changed to maintain pace with 
the field gains acquired by the rebels after the Second Conference, as well as to react to the 
variables that arose during 1968, the most important of which was commercial oil export from 
Oman and its own withdrawal from the areas to the east of Suez. The British government sought to 
maintain British national interests in Oman in the long-term and to protect the nascent oil industry 
in Oman by securing its production and exporting sites, as well as trying to convince the Sultan to 
use oil revenues to achieve prosperity for his people in an effort to win the hearts and minds of 







recognising that this was significantly related to the stability of the entire region and therefore their 
own national interests after they withdrew from the region. The British government also attempted 
to avoid direct involvement in the Dhofar War, because of international criticism. Therefore, the 
UK intended to provide military experts and consultants to lead the Sultan’s Forces in Dhofar. 
However, some British interests in Oman remained important from the beginning of the revolution, 
such as the strategic location of Masirah Island in the east of Oman, the promising oil market, and 
the location of the British radio station.  
It is clear that British diplomacy and military intervention in Dhofar was intended to ensure 
that the war was won and to prevent foreign intervention in Oman, in so doing securing British 
interests with minimum human, political and material costs. Ironically Sultan Said’s assertion of 
independence of foreign influence and pressure in terms of his domestic policy decision was to 





















The Third Phase of the Revolution 









4.1: The Reasons for the Coup against Sultan Said  
4.1.1: Sultan Said’s policy and the Coup  
Sultan Said’s ongoing cruelty to his people and his decision to postpone the socio-economic 
development of Oman, despite the increased income from oil revenues, created widespread 
indignation that inflamed the conflict in Dhofar. He was also opposed by other members of the 
ruling family, one of whom was his brother Tariq. Peterson (2007) argues that Sultan Said failed in 
ruling Oman during that period, since because of the anxiety over his governance that had spread 
across all Oman and even affected his own family. Therefore, many of Al Busaidi’s family 
members left Muscat and headed to other Arab and European countries. Sultan Said also faced a 
challenge from his brother Tariq, who left the country in November 1962 in disappointment at the 
Sultan’s refusal to give him a significant position in government (p. 201). After four years, in a call 
to unseat the Sultan, Tariq communicated with other disaffected groups, one of which was the 
revolution leaders in Dhofar. He also established (the Omani Kingdom) constitution for the country 
that he hoped to establish after overthrowing the regime of his brother. The purpose of the 
constitution was to clarify his intentions for the shape of the regime in Oman after the overthrow of 
Sultan Said, in which he was clear that the Sultan would have an honorary post rather than reigned. 
In addition, citizens would enjoy greater freedom and privileges. 
Qasem (2000, pp. 412-413)argues that another reason for the coup was the political isolation 
of Oman. Although Oman was linked by some covenants to other countries, especially Britain, the 
United States, France, and the Netherlands, Sultan Said was not ready to represent his country 
abroad, justifying this decision by the huge expense involved. Therefore, the only representation of 
Oman outside its borders occurred in India, where the Sultan established an Omani Consulate in 
1953. The Sultan’s refusal to utilise the discovery of oil for the benefit of his country also frustrated 
the British government, who had been hoping to use developments to spread stability in Oman, 
thereby suppressing the revolution in Dhofar by winning over the hearts and minds of the locals 
(Clements, 1980, p. 63). A British secret letter addressed to D. Hall, at the Defence Department and 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, entitled “Assistance in the Sultanate of Oman”, indicated that, 
“the Sultan's refusal, despite our own advice and the accretion of considerable oil revenues 
(approximately $40 million a year), to embark on any significant programme of civil development 








The refusal of Sultan Said to develop Oman or become more open to other countries in the 
region therefore left Oman dependent on the provision of British support to suppress the revolution. 
Sultan Said seemed sure that the British would not allow the rebels to dominate Dhofar, as this 
would make it excessively difficult for them to protect British oil interests in the area, should it fall 
into the hands of Dhofar communists. Simultaneously, the British government sought to avoid the 
involvement of its forces in the war during this critical period, in an attempt to prevent a repeat of 
the Al Jabal Al Akhdar War in 1957, when they had intervened in an internal war. Nevertheless, as 
outlined in a British Confidential Brief, “The Unknown War”, from PJ. Dun, Arabian Department, 
to Colonel Adler, British troops had been compelled to fight with Sultan Said in an attempt to 
combine the oil areas held by the Imamate into the lands of the Sultanate. 
The discovery some ten years ago that there might be oil in the Sultanate forced the 
British to take an interest in this feudal country and Said bin Taimur, the Sultan, 
was aided by British forces in overthrowing the unruly tribes of central Oman. The 
British then set about helping to train bin Taimur's own private army so that the Al 
Busaidi dynasty could maintain its precarious grip on the Sultanate (UKNA, NBM 
1/1, 1971).  
The intervention by the British still however provoked a degree of condemnation, as mentioned in a 
secret Foreign Office Steering Committee brief on international organisations, which was entitled 
“The Question of Oman”:“We were freely accused of colonial interference in the affairs of Muscat, 
the Arab Delegations and five others brought forward a motion recognising the right of the people 
of Oman to self-determination and independence and calling for reference of the question to the 
committee of twenty-four” (UKNA, D.S. 11/12, FILE 2/7, A 459, 1968). However, the intention 
that the Labour government issued in January in 1968 to withdraw from the areas east of Suez, 
including the Arabian Gulf, by the end of 1971, put the British government under pressure and 








4.1.2: British Diplomats Fearfulness of Course of Events 
British concerns were also increased by the Sultan’s 
failure to keep the military operations of the 
revolutionaries’ in Dhofar under control, as this put British 
regional interests in huge danger. The revolutionists’ 
attempts to overthrow Sultan Said continued to grow as 
they seized control of the Strait of Hormuz (see figure 22), 
the active road for international petroleum exportation. The 
escalation of political events in Oman in early 1970, 
especially the militarily operations of the rebels, caused the 
British government to search for a way to maintain their 
national interests in the area. They were afraid that the 
rebel leaders in Dhofar might take over the government, 
which would present very dangerous challenges for Britain 
and its interests in Oman and across the Arabian Gulf as a whole. This change in rule would also 
threaten the Oman coast Emirates (United Arab Emirates) and petroleum supplies (Clements, 1980, 
p. 63). As mentioned in a secret letter sent to S.L. Egerton Esq, at the Arabian department, issued by 
the British embassy Muscat: 
Active communism must be halted militarily as far as possible away from Northern 
Oman. Protection of our current and likely oil sources depends upon a continued 
presence in Dhofar by SAF. It is clear to me that the Sultanate cannot afford to lose 
the Dhofar plain... A collapse of stability in Oman could affect other parts of the 
Trucial coast and bring about the very conditions which it is our policy to prevent. 
It is therefore in the UK's interest to assist the present Sultan, to whose rule there is 
at present no satisfactory alternative, in maintaining stability and in promoting 
economic and political advancement. In Oman there is at this moment a direct and 
overt threat to stability – the rebellion in the province of Dhofar. The defeat or at 
least containment of this rebellion is fundamental to the security of the present 
regime. British military support to the Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF) in generally 
maintaining stability throughout the country and specifically in countering the 
rebellion is therefore justified (UKNA, NBM 10/5, 1971). 
Such documentary evidence illustrates that prior to the coup, the British faced the legitimate 
and serious risk that Oman was gradually falling into rebels’ hands. At the same time, this 
document indicates that the independence and sovereignty of the Sultan’s decision was recognised 
as being far-reaching. 
Fig. 22: Strait of Hormuz. Oman controls 
the deepest parts, but the area controlled 
by Iran is very rough (Source: National 








The situation in Dhofar will progressively deteriorate unless urgent steps are taken. 
In the rest of the sultanate… it is essential to press ahead with development 
activities now that they are sufficient revenue from oil royalties in Oman. All the 
evidence show that unless the sultan is given a serious jolt, he will always do too 
little, too late and in some fields be unwilling to move at all. The paradox is that his 
survival is almost wholly dependent on British support… in spite of this, he has 
shown himself largely unresponsive to British advice (UKNA, D.S. 11/12, File 2/7 
(E115), 1970). 
In an attempt to solve the growing problem in Dhofar, especially given the approach of the 
time at which their forces were set to withdraw from the area, the British government examined 
options that could turn the table on the rebels in their favour: 
The possible Courses of Action were: 
(a) Immediately increase British military commitment to deal with the situation in 
Dhofar. Militarily, this would no doubt be possible. … H.M.G. would also 
come under considerable criticism from the United Nations and from Arab 
nationalist regimes. 
(b) Withdraw British military support or threaten to withdraw… withdrawing the 
seconded officers… and ceasing to operate certain facilities at Salalah airfield. 
These measures, if carried out, would be likely to result in Dhofar falling to the 
rebels, with unpredictable consequences for Oman and possibly the Persian 
Gulf states… contrary to British interests. 
(c) Attempt to change the regime. We know that the Sultan’s son, Sayyid Qaboos, 
committed to an existence of total inaction by the Sultan, is frustrated and 
restive and sometimes thinks of moving against his father (UKNA, D.S. 11/12, 
File 2/7 (E115), 1970). 
Most importantly, paragraph (c) indicates that Sultan Qaboos was considering the intention to seize 
power from his father and the British government saw this as an option opportunity. 
 
4.1.3: Dhofar Palace Coup 
Peterson (2007, pp. 201-202) states that the British government prepared for the coup after 
opposition in the royal family centred around Qaboos, the son of Sultan Said, after his return to 
Oman. The coup was arranged carefully, as it was highly dependent on the cooperation of the new 
Sultan’s allies in Dhofar, namely Brik bin Hamood Al Ghafri, the son of Dhofar’s governor; Hamad 
Bin Hamood Al Busaidi, the Sultan’s secretary; and an unnamed intelligence officer from the SAF 
in Dhofar. Secret communications between these allies had been conducted in Muscat through 







with Sultan Said (ibid, pp. 201-202). On those occasions, these OPC employees also took the 
chance to hold talks with Qaboos. The British government also supported the change of Sultan 
Said’s system to make political and military adjustments in an attempt to halt the deteriorating 
situation in Dhofar (ibid, p. 202). Agwani (1978, p. 71) also mentions that, in response to these 
dangerous developments, Britain intended to support attempts to replace the ruling system, which 
ultimately led to the coup on 23rd July 1970. 
There was also cooperation between the Consul General in Muscat, David Trafford and the 
British Political Resident in the Arabian Gulf, Geoffrey Arthur. Some of the British allies of Said in 
Oman disagreed with the notion of the coup, such as Oman’s Minister of Defence, P.R Waterfield. 
He was therefore replaced by Col. Dean H. Oldman, a former RAF commander (Peterson J. E., 
2007, p. 202). In this way, a major obstacle to planning for the coup was removed and replaced by a 
person who could provide administrative continuity immediately after a successful coup. Many 
significant foreigners were not informed about the conspiracy, out of fear that their loyalty to Sultan 
Said would lead to its failure. These foreigners included: F.C.L. Chauncy the Sultan’s special 
advisor; C.C. Maxwell, the deputy commander of the Sultan’s Royal Air Force (SAF); and the 
British Bank Administrator in the Middle East (Peterson JE., 2007, p. 213).Peterson (2007) adds 
that those who perceived the necessity to remove Sultan Said were led by Captain Tim Landon, the 
chief intelligence officer in Oman. He had guaranteed Tariq’s cooperation with Qaboos in a 
meeting held in Dubai in March 1970, enabling preparation 
for the coup, although it had been delayed several times. 
However, attacks by PFLOAG on cities like Izki in north 
Oman in June 1970 accelerated the progress of the coup. In 
particular, there were some dangerous complications 
involved in the revolution’s extension to north Oman, since 
the petroleum pipelines (see figure 23)that passed through 
these cities were under risk (Peterson J. E., 2007, p. 202). 
It has been argued that the coup was largely driven 
on the Omani side by the desire of an elite group of Omanis, 
led by Sultan Qaboos, with the support of his uncle Tariq (Al 
Amri, 2012, pp. 153-152; Bahbahani, 1984, p. 155; Jeapes, 
1996, p. 27; Kechichian, 2013, p. 259; Muqaibl, 2002, p. 
Fig. 23: Oil pipeline in Oman  
(Source: Oman oil company library, 








285). Others (Halliday, 2008, pp. 348-349; Petersen, 2011, pp. 201-202) and Trabulsy (2004, p. 
177) however argue that the British government planned and set the date of the coup, simply using 
Sultan Qaboos and his uncle as tools. Unfortunately, there are no documents in the British National 
Archives giving details of the coup, although this may have been a deliberate ploy to not release 
information about this critical and delicate strategy. One Omani diplomat who held important posts 
in the 1970s however mentioned important details about the coup that could determine the extent of 
Britain's involvement in the event. He noted that the head of the team storming Sultan Said’s Palace 
Brik bin Hamoud Al Ghafri, was the commander of the special guard of Sultan Said and a friend of 
Sultan Qaboos. He was accompanied by Hamad bin Hamoud AlBusaidi, the secretary of Sultan 
Said, and Tim Landen, an intelligence officer in the Sultan Air Force. Landen had been a colleague 
of Sultan Qaboos at Sandhurst and was a contract officer with Sultan Said. The fourth figure was 
Said bin Salem Al Wahibi, an officer in the SAF. The interviewed diplomat argued that “the coup 
would not have succeeded without the support of both Sultan Qaboos, who represented the internal 
opposition, and his uncle Tariq, who represented the external opposition”. With this coordination, 
the loyalty of the commander of the armed forces was guaranteed. Although the commander of the 
SAF and Omani intelligence were British, they operated under the authority of Sultan Qaboos and 
according to his policies. This means that the British government did not directly intervene in the 
coup and it was therefore attributable to the evolution of events in Dhofar. The SAF perceived that 
it was in their best interest to change the Sultan to ensure necessary internal and external support for 
the operations against the rebels (Omani diplomat, 1st June 2017, RA7). 
A British report, entitled "The Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, H.M.G.’s Policy", sent to 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Secret on 24th May 1970, indicated that the British government 
did not object because of a belief that Sultan Said would not change his policy despite it affecting 
British interests negatively. 
Sayyid Tariq, the ruler’s half- brother, was reported to have had some contacts 
in order to co-ordinate efforts to overthrow the Sultan and to replace him with 
his son Qaboos. Despite the encouraging developments mentioned… I cannot 
yet change the conclusion in my Annual Review for 1969 that the Sultan’s 
performance remains unhelpful to our interests, nor my scepticism about his 







On the day of the coup, the Sultan’s 
palace guards had been bribed to be absent, 
allowing Brik bin Hamood to lead a group of 
guards through the palace gates to the 
Sultan’s private department (see figure 24). 
There was an exchange of gunfire with the 
Sultan and his guards. The Sultan’s 
carefulness had led him to put guns and 
weapons in every corner in the palace, even 
in his own rooms to enable him to be 
defended. Brik was shot and withdrew to the 
palace courtyard. There, he met a British 
officer who led the attacks inside the palace 
with a group of soldiers. The Sultan was forced to surrender and signed a resignation letter. He was 
transported from one of the air bases to Bahrain and his injuries treated, after which he was sent to 
one of London’s private hospitals for several months. He settled in London until his death on 19th 
October 1972 (Clements, 1980, p. 63). 
Sultan Qaboos bin Said had spent six years of his life between London and west Berlin, after 
graduating from Sandhurst Military Academy in 1966. When he returned to Muscat, his father sent 
him on a journey around the world for a year. After he returned, his father isolated him in his palace 
in Salalah (Liberty magazine, 1970, p. 6). Ail Al Harthi, one of the sheiks who witnessed the 
events, said that Sultan Said had decided to alienate his son because he suspected that there was a 
conspiracy for his son to replace him (Interview Ali Al Harthi, 2nd September 2012). An important 
British document supports the argument that the coup was carried out without the direct knowledge 
of the British government. Thebrief entitled “Former Sultan of Muscat and Oman”, from P.T.E. 
England, to APS Secretary of State, on 25th August 1970, two months after the coup indicated that 
the coup was carried out without the direct knowledge of the British government. They were 
however concerned that the intervention of their secondment officers in the internal affairs of an 
independent country created the possibility that other countries would lose trust in the British 
officers working with them. In effect, they were concerned that the UK would be accused of 
intervening in the coups of other countries, potentially putting their officers and interests at risk. 
Therefore, the document stressed the importance of keeping the former Sultan in his exile in 
Fig. 24: Two military aircrafts belonging to Sultan of Oman 
Air Force flown by British pilots in a mission to attack rebels. 
Behind, the Sultans palace (Al Hafa palace, where the coup 








London to avoid any lawsuit being brought against the British officers who collaborated with the 
new Sultan during the coup. 
The coup could not have been successful without the help of the British officers 
serving on secondment with the Sultan’s armed forces. A public argument about 
whether the action of the seconded officers went beyond the maintenance of law 
and order could never be conclusively settled and would provoke speculation which 
might damage not only our interests in Oman but also in other countries which 
employ British service men in their forces. It will therefore be important to extract 
the undertakings proposed by the Foreign and Commonwealth secretary and if 
these can be presented as being in the former Sultan’s own interests so much the 
better. It should certainly be easier to keep an eye on the former Sultan’s activities 
if he is allowed to remain in this country (UKNA, M.O. 5/49 (F 55) DS11/2/7/2, 
1970). 
The news of the coup was not announced until after the weekend. On 26th July, Sultan Qaboos bin 
Said issued a statement to Omani citizens and the whole world saying: “I have noticed the increased 
anxious and dissatisfaction with my father’s inability to get things under control and now, my 
family and my Armed Forces have taken an oath of allegiance to me. The former Sultan has left the 
country and I promise that I will devote myself to form a 
new government as soon as possible” (Ministry of 
Information, 1995, p. 13). After the success of the coup, 
Sultan Qaboos sent a message on 27thJuly 1970 to the 
British government informing them that he had come to 
the throne and asked for their recognition (UKNA, NBM 
2/2, 1970) (see appendix 12).Sultan Qaboos was 
recognised by the British government eight days after 
the coup, in a message from the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office and it was announced that, “the 
Department of External Affairs announced this morning 
that recognition had been received from her Britannic Majesty's Government” (UKNA, NBM/4, 
1970).After several days, Sultan Qaboos undertook his first visit to Muscat (see figure 25) and was 
received enthusiastically by its locals. Almost at the same time, Tariq bin Timor (see figure 26) was 
announced as Prime Minister. 
Fig. 25: The moment of Sultan Qaboos’ 
arrival to Muscat, 1970 (Source: RAO 








 The administration in Muscat had been modified and many key assistants to Sultan Said’s 
system were removed by Qaboos, who asked them to leave Muscat. Senior Omani staff in Sultan 
Said’s government resigned, including: Ahmad bin Ibrahim Al Busaidi; Shehab bin Faisal and 
Ismael bin Khalil Al Rusafi. On 8th August, Tariq declared the formation of the first ministries, 
assigning Saud bin Ail Al Khalili as the Minister of Education, Dr. Asem Al Jamali as the Health 
Minister, Bader bin Saud Al Busaidi as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Mohammad bin Ahmad 
Al Busaidi as the Justice Minister. A short time later, Tariq departed to West Germany to make the 
necessary preparation for the arrival of his German wife and other family members in Muscat 
(1970, p. 161).Other Omani exiles were also invited to participate in the new government. 
 
4.2: The new policy of Sultan Qaboos' Government 
4.2.1: The Sultan’s speeches 
Upon coming to power in Oman on 23rdJuly 1970, Sultan Qaboos immediately gave a brief 
speech to outline his new policy approach(Sultan Qaboos website) (see appendix 13). His speech 
showed evidence of major differences in the approach to the internal and external policies of Oman. 
He addressed his people, saying: 
I promise you to oblige myself to start as soon as possible to create a modern 
government, and my first goal is to abolish the unnecessary restrictions that 
burdened your lives. My people, I will proceed immediately to offer you a 
comfortable life with a bright future. Each one of you has to play his part to achieve 
this goal. We used to be a very famous and powerful country in the past and if we 
collaborate and unify our efforts, we will regain our glorious past and we will have 
Fig. 26: Left: Sultan Qaboos and his uncle Tariq, 1971. 
(Source: RAFO Archives). Right: Tariq receives a guest 
from the UAE, representing the openness of the Sultanate 
on the outside, 1971. (Source: RAO Archives, RAFOSQ 











a prestigious place in the Arab World. I will make legal proceedings to gain 
recognition from neighbouring countries and I am looking forward to their support 
and warm co-operation and to deliberate the future of our region together. I am 
urging you to keep living as usual. I will be in Muscat in the next few days and I 
am going to inform you of my future plans. My people, I and my new government 
are aiming to achieve our common goal. Yesterday was complete darkness; 
however, with God’s help tomorrow is going to be a new dawn on Oman and to its 
people (Ministry of Information, 1995, p. 13). 
His policy for the next phase was clearly to modernise his government as quickly as possible, which 
involved the abolishment of rules and restrictions from his father’s time and taking immediate 
action to please his people and to guarantee a prosperous future for them. He made their support a 
duty, as he sought to restore Oman to its rightful place in the Arab world and stressed that 
cooperation and unity were important factors in returning Oman to its glory and 
civilisation(Ministry of Information, 1995, p. 17). 
A day after this speech, the new Sultan travelled to the capital, Muscat, where he was 
received warmly. He said in a brief speech, “unless there is cooperation between the government 
and the people, we will not be able to build our country with the speed required to free her from the 
backwardness she has endured for so long” (Ministry of Information, 1995, p. 17).  Sultan Qaboos’ 
longest and most significant speech during this period was given on 9th August 1970 via Oman’s 
Radio from Muscat. The speech announced a series of actions and development plans. He stressed 
to his people that his government would be transparent, ensuring that the locals were aware of his 
plans and achievements. His uncle, Sayyid Tariq, was assigned as Prime Minister, with the 
command to take immediate actions to form his government. Qaboos also instructed the ministries 
to write to all citizens inside or outside of Oman, calling those abroad to return to help rebuild their 
country under the new government. He mentioned that qualified citizens should fill some positions, 
as well as employing experienced foreigners to train Omanis as quickly as possible to occupy these 
positions, in order to ensure the “country’s government rule is by the Omanis for the Omanis” 
(Sultan Qaboos Speech, 1973).In this sense, it was an assertion of an independent Omani policy, 
which Sultan Said also had pressure in much more restrictive and oppressive forms.  
 In addition, this speech outlined the very important step, of changing the name of the 
country to “The Sultanate of Oman” instead of “Sultanate of Muscat and Oman” in an attempt to 
unify the country. Sultan Qaboos clarified that “there is no difference between the coast, internal 







Information, 1995, p. 17). Qaboos stated the intention to undertake a range of legal changes, 
including modifying the shape and the form of the national flag, as well as announcing an amnesty 
to government opponents with a quote from the Quran “God has forgiven what has happened in the 
past”. He also committed to simplifying travel procedures and lifted unreasonable bans, as well as 
distributing land for locals to build better houses, and plans to develop his armed forces. His speech 
included announcements of many different development projects, including agricultural projects, 
digging wells for drinking water, transportation, health, education and roads projects, in addition to 
projects to develop the media sector. In an attempt to guarantee tribal support for the government, 
the Sultan acknowledged his support and appreciation of the tribal system and paid a salary to the 
sheiks of the tribes for them to govern the activities of their tribe members. This action was a stark 
contrast to the plans of the revolutionary leaders, who had stated their intention to destroy the tribal 
system after the second (Hamrin) Conference. The speeches of Sultan Qaboos from Dhofar and 
Muscat, where he focused on development while reissuing the tribal leaders with powers over their 
tribesmen, indicated that he had learned from his father's mistakes, as well as those made by the 
revolutionaries. The new approach in Dhofar was to ensure the loyalty of the tribal leaders, who had 
not been paid any attention by the former Sultan. His amnesty demonstrated that he recognised that 
tribal loyalty would be an important factor in winning the war.  
 
4.2.2: Sultan Qaboos’ Internal Policy 
Peterson (2007, pp. 205-207) argues that the change in the political leadership in Oman on 
23rd July 1970 ended the domestic isolationist policy of the government of Oman. The ascension of 
Sultan Qaboos was an important milestone in the internal and external politics of the Sultanate. The 
new Sultan stressed the need to stabilise the situation inside Oman and to halt the armed revolution 
in Dhofar. He sought to remove the onerous restrictions imposed by his father, such as closing the 
doors of Muscat daily after three hours of sunrise, as well as lifting various trade restrictions, 
restoring personal freedoms, and granting permission for the return of Omanis working abroad 
(Ibid, pp. 205-206).Sultan Qaboos also paid special attention to education (Al Othman, 2013, p. 2) 
and the removal of unnecessary laws in order to develop national unity and a modern state, 








The Sultan also took care of important service projects. During his first three years of his 
rule, he carried out a number of vital projects such as supplying the capital Muscat with water, 
establishing a modern power station, founding schools for boys and girls, and establishing hospitals 
and necessary government departments. In addition, he funded the construction of modern roads 
and the design of the main city of Muttrah Al Kubra “great Muttrah”, near the city of Muscat. The 
Sultan also implemented a number of development projects in Oman, establishing Raysut Port in 
the Dhofar Governorate, creating two experimental farms in Dhofar, and launching radio and 
television stations (Peterson, 2007, pp. 206-207). During the early years of his rule, the Sultan also 
built a modern administrative apparatus for foreign and economic affairs, transport, public services, 
media, labour, social affairs, land affairs, endowments, and Islamic affairs (Ibid; p. 207). Many 
Omani immigrants began to return to their country, in response to the call of the new Sultan, 
optimistic about the new rule. 
A letter entitled “Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, Recognition of Qaboos”, was sent from 
J.M. Edes to the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Undersecretary, P. T. Hayman. This document 
indicated that the new Sultan had made the development of Dhofar a top priority: 
Qaboos has already decided, among other things, that a major program of 
rehabilitation in Dhofar should be instituted as a matter of urgency. Once this 
program gets under way, it could do much to remove the discontent which the 
Dhofaris felt under the ex-Sultan's repressive regime and was in large part the cause 
of their rebellion … In his minute submitted on 24thJuly, 1970, he expressed the 
hope that the new government could take action to get some Arab Rulers to come in 
Qaboos' support as quickly as possible (UKNA, NBM 2/2, 1970).  
Another secret diplomatic note, “What about Oman”, from A. A. Land, Secretary of State 
for Defence, illustrates the tendency of British government to serve its interests for the long-term: 
There is currently no pressure from the Sultan to alter the basis of our relationship 
(in some ways it has been strengthened since Qaboos’s accession) and our interest 
of diplomatic relations with other countries which were to be frustrated because of 
allegations of undue British influence in the sultanate and of British bases, the 
Sultanate authorities might seek a change in their present relationship with us 
(UKNA, NMB 3/548/2, No. 289/71, FILE 2/7, 1971). 
The internal and external policies that Sultan Qaboos implemented, as well as procedures for 
winning the war in Dhofar, showed that he acted as an independent ruler and held the full 
sovereignty in his country. In effect, his accession and state transformation supported the diplomatic 







4.2.3: The Foreign Policy of Sultan Qaboos with the British Government 
 
Oman’s foreign policy during the early rule of Sultan Qaboos is recognised as being more open than 
his father’s. Qaboos rejected Said’s isolationist policy, instead attempting to strengthen and 
diversify foreign relations with the rest of the world. He had a special relationship with the United 
Kingdom, although it was weakened by his openness to many other countries after 1970 (Peterson 
J. E., 2007, p. 212). Nevertheless, the British realised that the Sultanate’s openness to other 
countries was very important. In order to guarantee their longer interests in Oman. British policy 
was outlined in a secret letter entitled“HMG’s policy towards the Sultanate of Oman”: 
a. on the assumption that there is no early crisis, we should in the immediate future 
take full advantage of the unique advisory role and influence (exercised in the main 
on a personal basis by the political resident and consul general), which we still 
enjoy but will progressively lose as Oman develops relations with other countries; 
b. fill key posts with British appointees (the emphasis should be on key posts 
although there may be other civilian posts in which it would be useful to place 
Britain’s subject to political consideration...); 
c. the main basis for a policy to safeguard our interests in the short, and probably 
medium terms, would seem to be as follows; 
d. encouraging Oman to join international organisations at the right pace, to 
establish relations with western and friendly Arab countries and to obtain expertise 
and assistance from such bodies (for example the IBRD and FAO) and states; 
e. maintaining British influence through British personnel, but keeping the British 
civilian… below the level which might lead to charges that the Sultanate was under 
British control (UKNA, B3118, D.S. 11/12, 1971). 
 The British government also encouraged Sultan Qaboos to send for Arab leaders to seek 
their recognition, as detailed in a letter sent from the British embassy in Muscat to the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office:“‘I have been encouraging the Sultan to send further messages to the Arab 
world and the Shah”(UKNA, NBM 2/2, 1970).In early August 1970, Sultan Qaboos requested to 
join the Arab League. Although the request was delayed because the board of the League was 
already deliberating the case of the Imamate, the Sultanate was accepted on 6th October 1971 (Al 
Baharnah, 1973, p. 81). On 24th August 1970, Sultan Qaboos sent a cable to the Secretary General 
of the United Nations to request Oman’s enrolment as a permanent member in the United Nations. 
This request was also postponed due to the Imamate case in their agenda. However, Oman was 







acceptance into the Arab League. A British document entitled “Oman: Annual Review” on 3rd 
January 1971, from the British ambassador in Muscat, to the British Minister of Foreign affairs 
detailed added that, 
Many great achievements occurred in the government of the Sultanate in 1971, despite the 
internal problems faced by the internal government due to the war in Dhofar. The government 
initially focused on foreign affairs, with an Omani goodwill mission touring the Arab capitals in 
January and February 1971. As noted above, Oman accepted membership of the League of Arab 
States on 29th September 1971 and the United Nations on 7th October 1971. Subsequently, several 
countries, including Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United States and several Arab countries, agreed to 
establish diplomatic relations with Oman. Sultan Qaboos also sought and maintained good personal 
relations with other rulers, from Shah of Iranand the King of Jordan, who both offered him help 
(UKNA, NBM 4/1, 1972).In addition, the British government played an important role in 
encouraging the leaders of the region to recognise Sultan Qaboos, as mentioned by a secret letter 
from the Foreign Commonwealth Office to Bahrain on 6th April 1970: 
We propose to telegram tomorrow to HM’s representatives in certain Arab capitals, 
explaining development to them in strict confidence and seeking their views on 
how best the Government to which they are accredited can also be encouraged to 
express support for Qaboos (UKNA, NBM 2/2, 1970). 
Sultan Qaboos followed a policy of openness in his relations with Arab countries, beginning 
with an Omani delegation that visited several Arab states to request their support for his new regime 
in early 1971. This was followed by the Sultan’s visit to Saudi Arabia on 11th December 1971, 
during which he met King Faisal bin Abdul Aziz (1964-1975). During the meeting, the two parties 
reached an agreement about the traditional border dispute over Al Buraimi Oasis. In addition, the 
Sultan obtained Saudi support against the Dhofari revolutionaries, as well as in strengthening the 
development in Oman (Peterson, 2007, p. 20). This was outlined in a British document, “Oman: 
Annual Review” which was issued on 3rd January 1972, from the British ambassador in Muscat to 
the British Minister of Foreign Affairs. The document outlined the visit of the Sultan and his 
mission to convince the Saudis to sever support for the Imamate opposition, in addition to providing 
support to contribute to the war effort in Dhofar(UKNA, NBM 4/1, 1972). 
 In 1971, Sultan Qaboos also visited Iran(see figure 27), where he met Shah Mohammad 
Redha Pahlavi, the King of Iran (1941-1979). At this meeting, the Sultan asked for Iranian military 







between Sultan Qaboos and the Shah of Iran, the Shah offered to support the Sultan in the war in 
Dhofar: 
The Shah had expressed a desire for close and cordial relations with Oman and 
had offered military assistance if the Sultan should need it. Army, Air Force 
and naval forces would be put at Qaboos’ disposal for the Dhofar war if he 
requested them. His offer had clearly been made in earnest and the Sultan had 
thanked the Shah but had naturally entered into no commitment. The Sultan 
has accepted an offer to pay a state visit to Iran next year (UKNA, NBM 1/1, 
1971).  
Soon after, Qaboos met King Hussein of Jordan and, as a 
consequence of their meeting, Jordanian officers were 
assigned as military trainers for the Sultan’s armed force. In 
December 1972, the Sultan visited Libya and met Col. 
Muammar Al Gaddafi. After telling him that the Omani state 
was fighting a Marxist threat, Al Gaddafi sent Libyan 
officers to explore the situation in Oman. Finally, in March 
1973, Sultan Qaboos visited Sheik Zayed, the President of 
the United Arab Emirates, to seek assistance to confront the 
rebellion in Dhofar (Owen, 1970, p. 271). Sheik Zayed 
pledged to provide financial, military, and developmental 
support to the Sultan. According to a British document sent 
on 3rd January 1971 from the British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office to the Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs, entitled Oman Annual Review 
1971, the attempts by the Sultan in the field of personal 
diplomacy were highly successful. He had not only made major gains in Saudi Arabia, but was also 
able to establish personal relations with the Shah, and King of Jordan (UKNA, NBM 4/1, 3rd 
January 1972).Sultan Qaboos seems to have believed that he could not rely on British forces as a 
major foreign support to win the war, especially given their impending withdrawal by the end of 
1971. He also believed that he would not be able to win the war alone in the face of Chinese 
communist support of the revolutionaries. His development of help from regional countries, 
especially Iran, represented a major shift in strategy and further assertion of independence in 
foreign and domestic policy.  
Fig. 27: Shah of Iran receives Sultan 
Qaboos in 1971(Source: Minister of 








4.2.4: The Sultan’s procedures to resist the rebellion in Dhofar 
Unlike his father, Sultan Qaboos nonetheless took the 
advice of British diplomats in military and other strategies to 
resist and defeat the rebellion in Dhofar. After assuming the 
reins of power, Sultan Qaboos implemented a new media 
strategy to confront the armed revolution in Dhofar. Mention of 
the Dhofar War was strongly evident in the Sultan’s speeches 
from the time he came to power in 1970 until the end of the 
war in 1975. Unlike his father, Sultan Qaboos took full 
advantage of every media podium, utilising national and 
religious occasions, ministerial sessions, foreign visits, and 
numerous meetings to clarify and defend his policies on the 
war. He also participated in numerous interviews with 
journalists from different Arab and the international press to 
win over hearts and minds in the region. It is particularly 
important to highlight Sultan Qaboos’ informational speeches 
during the Dhofar War, because they clearly illustrated the 
Sultanate’s new policies for dealing with the revolution after the 
coup (Oman Newspaper, ‘Operation in Dhofar’. 25th November 
1972, Issue 1 and 2, p. 2).In addition, the Sultan broadcast the 
narrative of the war using the new media that he had established 
after coming to power (see figure 28). Examining all the issues of 
Oman Newspaper during the years from 1970 to 1975, the 
speeches made by Sultan Qaboos’ during this period clearly 
demonstrate that he had divided his procedures for eradicating 
the revolution into six themes (Oman newspaper, 1970-1975). 
These will be examined individually in the following sections. 
 
4.2.4.1: First, the Sultan focused in his speeches on the holiness of the Dhofar War. He 
framed the conflict as an attempt by communism to destroy Islam, making the fight against it into 
Fig. 29: A government leaflet thrown by 
aircraft in rebel-held areas, with an Arabic 
inscription "God's hand is the crash of 
communism"(Source: Minister of Defence 




Fig. 28: Sultan Qaboos and his follow-up 
to press organisations (Source: Minister of 








the defence of Islam. The government considered Islam as a pillar of the Sultanate. On this matter, 
the Sultan said “we are Muslim people, proud of our religion and faith, and we are putting our 
religion above everything”. The Sultan reinforced that all Muslim countries must become involved 
in the war and termed the fight against the revolutionaries as a holy war against “the enemies of 
Islam” (Oman Newspaper, ‘Sultan Qaboos’ Speech’, 22th November 1975, issue 160, p. 3) (see 
figure 29). 
A secret British note about a meeting, published by Brigadier J. Graham, Commander of the 
Sultan of Oman’s Armed Forces, to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, explained that the new 
communist doctrine of the Dhofar Liberation Front was unsatisfying for committed Muslims, being 
unpopular with both the fighters and supporters of the rebels. Sultan Qaboos focused on this idea in 
his speech: 
At about the same time as the coup, a Maoist group called PFLOAG (Popular 
Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf) began to take control of 
the Dhofar rebellion. This has had advantages and disadvantages from the 
military standpoint; the main advantage has been that hard-core communists 
have alienated the Muslim believers (UKNA, DS 11/12, File 2/7/2, 1971). 
In the same context, the Sultan praised Saudi Arabia’s Islamic policy with regards to the 
relationship between the two countries, adding that, “the Islamic policy that Saudi Arabia calls for, 
led by King Faisal, is the best policy to upgrade the Arab and Islamic nations’ place, since the 
Islamic principles are valid for every time and place” (Oman Newspaper, ‘Sultan Qaboos’ Speech’, 
2nd December, issue 163, p. 3). This showed that Sultan Qaboos had considered the communist 
ideology, previously unfamiliar in Omani society, as an enemy that must be fought to maintain the 
continuation of 1400 years of Islam 
It is also clear that Sultan Qaboos tried to gain Saudi Arabia’s favour, considering it as an 
influential regional power and thereby taking the position that Oman would be fighting “a common 
religious enemy” on behalf of Saudi Arabia. This approach was due to Oman’s need for Saudi 
support in meeting the high expenses of the war and applying the “winning the hearts and minds” 
approach, one of the great development programmes that he had proclaimed. In another declaration, 
the Sultan added that “we are standing firmly to confront destructive operations, atheism, and 
communist ideologies, in order to preserve the sanctity of our holy places” (Oman Press, 1973). 
The public notion that Sultan Qaboos raised through the media was that communism was a danger 







(1978) argues that the new government focused on Islam in an effort to encourage the 
revolutionaries to join governmental forces, since they brought some preachers from Al Azhar to 
argue with them, accusing them of being atheists and infidels (Halliday F., 1978, pp. 16-17). This 
policy elicited a direct reaction because Al Azhar, which is an Egyptian religious institution, is 
considered to be one of the most important Islamic institutions in the world. It follows the Sunni 
doctrine, which is also more predominant in Dhofar than any other area in Oman. This Islamic 
development and focus on Islam, enabled by the openness of the Sultan to neighbouring countries, 
are common factors through which he was able to achieve an anti-communist strategy and unity. 
The Sultan was self-ruling and that was moving away from British influence of his own volition. 
 
4.2.4.2: The second theme focused 
on the military(see figure 30) since all of the 
speeches and interviews of Sultan Qaboos 
praised the governmental armed forces and 
mentioning its crucial role in fighting the 
rebellion, in an attempt to motivate them to 
continue their hard work in building a new 
Oman. In one of his speeches, the Sultan 
stated: “my faith in your abilities to achieve 
the ultimate triumph was and always will be 
strong because you are the descendants of 
great men who made the history and glory of 
this nation in the hardest circumstances” (Sultan Qaboos Speech, 1975, p. 1). He also called the 
governmental armed forces the “home shield and protectors”(ibid, p. 2). In another speech praising 
his armed forces and appreciating their efforts in the revolutionary war, he said “My heroes, I am so 
proud of you and also my loyal people who are standing here today to praise your fixed steps and 
your patience with all their feelings” (Sultan Qaboos, 1975, p. 1). It seems that the Sultan’s policy 
was based on advancing his intended changes to Oman by also putting the revolutionaries under 
military pressure. He warned those who supported the rebels in their fight, saying, 
as for those who are deceived and sneaking behind borders, their voices are louder 
than their actions. We are heading forward building with one hand and fighting 
Fig. 30: Government forces during an operation against the 








with the other one. We keep giving a hand to good people, but those who want to 
cause harm will be punished (ibid, p. 2). 
On another occasion, the Sultan stated that “many of the rebel leaders had surrendered to authority 
and we keep capturing them; at the same time we are building schools, hospitals, and roads in the 
liberated areas”(Sultan Qaboos, 1975, p. 1). Sultan Qaboos had a two strand strategy of counter-
insurgency namely economic development and military strategy.  
In this latter context, Al Nafisi (1976, p. 31) states that Sultan Qaboos planned to isolate the 
revolutionaries geographically by counter-attacking their military operations and forming a modern 
army capable of regaining the areas dominated by revolutionaries. The Sultan’s interest in forming 
strong armed forces to confront the rebels in Dhofar has been discussed by several historians (e.g. 
Buttenshaw, 2010; Dunsire, 2011; Fiennes, 1974; Gardner, 2007; Jeapes, 1996), who argue that the 
formation of strong armed forces, such as through diversification of their weapons, was one of the 
basic measures that Sultan Qaboos took to defeat the rebels after coming to power in 1970. In the 
same context, Sultan Qaboos requested the support of the British Special Forces in the Dhofar War 
according to a secret document which was sent from Bahrain to the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office in 1970. In this document, the British Political Agent in Bahrain, Sir Stewart Crawford 
“recommended immediate response to the Sultanate request for S.A.S. assistance in Dhofar” 
(UKNA, F 52/1, 1970).The British Prime Minister, Edward Health, granted permission to sanction 
the participation of British Special Forces in the War on the condition that the Omanis pay the 
expenses incurred during their involvement (UKNA, FCS/70/56, 1970). Sultan Qaboos developed a 
composite strategy of using military sources from different countries (Britain, Iran and Saudi 
support).  
The government official statistics published by the Omani Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry (Oman Economy in Ten Years, 1980, p. 20) show that oil prices rose sharply in 1974 due to 
the war between Arabs and Israel in October 1973. This was in large part to a decision led by Saudi 
Arabia to reduce oil supplies to foreign countries that supported Israel during the war, such as 
America and Britain. Many Arab countries followed Saudi Arabia’s decision to halt the export of 
oil to countries that supported Israel. Sultan Qaboos refused to be part of the oil embargo, justifying 
that he was in particular need of money because of his war against Dhofar’s rebels. This decision 
significantly increased governmental budget, despite oil production remaining the same. Higher 







1980, p. 20). This funding increase allowed the Omani government to invest in military and socio-
economic development. The government invested significantly to defeat the rebels by confirming 
the “winning hearts and minds” programme on one side and military organisation against the rebels 
on the other side. Due to arms purchases and army recruiting undertaken to defeat the 
revolutionaries, governmental expenses in the defence sector increased from 2.3 million OMR in 
1970 to 4.1 million in 1971, and 11 million in 1972, 13.1 million in 1973. Defence expenses then 
doubled in 1974 to 46.4 million OMR (ibid, p. 20). A British document entitled “British policy 
towards Oman” shows that the British were interested in training and developing the SAF, noting 
that it was important that “the Omanisation of the SAF is not too rapid, because this would certainly 
not be compatible with the security of the state and the regime” (UKNA, DS 11/12, B 8093, 1971). 
The refusal of Sultan Qaboos to enter into the oil boycott against Western countries and Israel, 
despite his good relations with the leader of this axis, Saudi Arabia, provides another example to 
show that Oman exertedfull freedom of decision-making in their foreign policy, although it was 
presumably to British national interest to have Omani oil exports exempted from oil embargo.  
 
4.2.4.3: A third theme in the eradication of the revolution concerned inclusive development 
programmes, which were started in Oman in general and in Dhofar specifically. Sultan Qaboos 
carried out numerous development programmes in Dhofar, which adversely affected the Dhofar 
Liberation Front in Oman, because the locals welcomed the official development. The people 
perceived the coup as a way to obtain social gains, guaranteeing a better future for themselves and 
their children (Worrall, 2014, p. 79).A secret document sent from D.G. Crawford in the British 
Embassy in Muscat to the British Consulate General in Bahrain, M. S. Weir, entitled “Situation in 
Oman”, on 17th August 1970 added that: 
Sultan Qaboos toured the Sultanate. The policy of meeting the people increased his 
popularity. His tour achieved unprecedented success. During the tour, he agreed to 
start some projects. People gathered around Sultan Qaboos in large numbers as 
soon as they heard that he was talking to pedestrians and wandering the roads. A 
sense of confidence among Omani citizens that things have started to improve in 
the Sultanate has been reinforced by the removal of the restrictions imposed by the 
former Sultan, as well as the government projects and actions announced by Sultan 
Qaboos (UKNA, FCS/70/51) 
The British encouraged Sultan Qaboos to begin the enhancement projects in Dhofar as a part 







because of the benefits of such a strategy, as mentioned in a secret report from Colonel H. R. D. 
Oldman, the Oman Defence Secretary: 
I consider that the Sultan must be persuaded to adopt a less hard line politically 
with the rebel movement. No political carrot has yet been offered to the opposition, 
nor has any proper development plan for the Jebel (mountains) areas been 
considered by the Sultanate Government. No thought has been given to buying off 
the rebels for a combination of hard cash, a development programme and a more 
liberal political offer. I believe that our embassy could play an important part in 
such persuasion (UKNA, F.C.O, 8/14/14 A, Former Reference BC1/1 (NBM 1/1), 
1971).  
The “hearts and minds winning” policy was applied to 
persuade the rebels and revolutionaries in Dhofar and the local 
surrounding area to surrender. This was achieved by delivering 
an intellectual and emotional message to convince them that the 
causes of the revolution no longer existed, with the government 
cruelty and lack of housing, food, health, or education(see 
figure 31), having been addressed. Ja'boub(2010, pp. 248-249) 
argues that the publicity campaigns of the rebels collapsed 
before the Sultan’s highly successful programme. The Sultan 
clarified that the hearts and minds winning’s policy was to 
remove the causes of the rebellion from the rebels’ hands” by 
addressing and removing the main factors of the revolution. 
The Sultan announced that the development programmes had 
started to show results. He said, 
life in Oman has started changing for the better after a series of completed 
developmental projects which returned the spirit to Oman and reinforced its ability 
to keep up with developed countries. Social and economic developmental processes 
which move rapidly, are able to end any intentions of rebellion because there are no 
justifications for rebellion anymore (Sultan Qaboos, 1973, p. 1). 
He compared the developmental situation in 1970 and 1974, claiming that, 
Oman went through many changes during that period, because the government 
made huge efforts to do its duty to Omani citizens. Here, I am speaking as an 
Omani citizen not as a leader of the country because I feel satisfied with what have 
been achieved in the past few years and I see that there is no reason for any 
rebellion (Sultan Qaboos, 1974, p. 2).  
Fig. 31: An image showing Sultan 
Qaboos' interest in developing the 
educational process(Source: Minister of 








Sultan Qaboos confirmed that the educational development policy was a particularly vitalpart of 
the inclusive development policy. In an interview with the Oman Newspaper, he proclaimed that, 
by the help of God, we fought to lift up the closed door policy and we started the 
education by opening the doors of the Ministry of Education which we supported 
with the best potential of efforts to break down the chains of illiteracy (Oman 
Newspaper, ‘Operation in Dhofar’. 25th November 1972, p. 2).  
In a speech delivered by Sultan Qaboos in 1973, upon the occasion of opening the 
governmental ministries complex, he summarised this achievements by stating that the development 
efforts that had been made under his rule sought to make Oman a prestigious place and that 
“citizens deserve to live a decent life in their land under social justice” (1973, p. 1) (Appendix 14). 
It is essential to return to an examination of the official statistics in order to deduce the 
success of the developmental operation in Oman started by Sultan Qaboos in 1970. It is obvious 
that the development plans resulted in the improvement of Oman’s infrastructure. According to 
official statistics published by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, governmental investment in 
construction activity increased from 8.5 million 
OMR in 1970 to 58 million OMR in 1974. 
Governmental investment in the transportation 
and communications fields also increased 
drastically, rising from 0.7 million OMR in 1970 
to 12.3 million OMR in 1974. Similar, 
investment in the water (see figure 32)and 
electricity sectors rose from 0.1 million OMR to 
2.2 million OMR during the first four years, 
while similar gains were seen in internal trade, 
which increased from 1.6 million OMR to 27.2 
million OMR. Omani banks witnessed 
enormous changes, since investment rose through the first four years from 0.6 to 3.5 million OMR. 
Finally, many Omani immigrants returned and the desire to invest in Oman increased, the 
consequence of which was that earnings from residential rents increased from 1.5 million OMR in 
1970 to 4.8 million OMR in 1974 (Oman Economy in Ten years, 1980, p. 20).  
Fig. 32: The process of drilling a well after the control 
of government forces on the areas in the hands of the 
rebels as part of the programme to win hearts and 









Due to the growth in the construction sector in 
Oman, the number of foreign workers employed in 
various projects increased from 120 in 1970 to 4180 in 
1975 (Oman Economy in Ten years, 1980, p. 69). 
However, due to the closure of some important oil fields, 
oil production fell from 121.3 million tons in 1970 to 
107.6 million tons in 1979 (ibid, p. 141). Despite that, 
governmental infrastructure projects were given top 
priority and continued to develop, as the statistics clearly 
illustrate. The government took out loans for the 
infrastructure projects and expenses of the war, which 
raised the national debt by prodigious levels, from 7.2 
million OMR in 1972 to 168.2 million OMR in 1979 (ibid, p. 489). Before the overthrow of Sultan 
Said, the national debt had been zero. The government was also interested in diversifying the 
sources of income, since non-oil exports were 0.4 million in 1970, increasing to 4.7 million in 1979 
(ibid, p. 585). The number of banks in Oman had increased from 3 in 1970 to 20 in 1980(ibid, p. 
346)(see Appendix 15: schedules illustrate the large difference in Oman’s economy after Sultan 
Qaboos assumed rule over Oman). 
The comprehensive and living standards development programme adopted by Sultan 
Qaboos in Dhofar resulted in a huge rise in satisfaction among the Dhofaris, who had largely 
instigated the revolution to meet the particular needs being addressed. Once projects are began and 
started to serve larger segments of the society, the rebels no longer had a pretext to fight, as their 
main demand were starting to bemet. 
 
4.2.4.4: A fourth theme was exemplified by governmental propaganda directed against the 
rebels with the help of British experts. The new government used propaganda and psychological 
warfare as a tool to weaken the spirits of the rebels, using publications that called upon them to 
surrender using both rewards and threats (Al Hadaf, p. 11). Halliday cites several methods of 
propaganda used by the government, such as using money as a way to weaken the rebels. In this 
approach, the government announced a £500 reward for those who provided information about the 
rebels’ weapons stashes. The government also assigned the fugitives from the rebels’ forces to spy 
Fig. 33: Two Dhofari residents in their 
traditional clothes on a mission for the 
government, 1970(Source: Minister of 







for the British and the Sultan’s forces. In addition, it printed photographs of important rebels in 
private publications that were dropped into rebel areas. This tactic had a direct effect, since many 
fighters left to join the forces of the Sultan (Halliday, 1978, p. 15). Such governmental propaganda 
stated that Arab nationalism, which was represented by the character of Abdul Nasser and which 
was very close to the hearts of some rebels, had the support of Sultan Qaboos’ government. 
Halliday (1978) provides examples of this, such as one of the military squads in the Sultan’s force 
being named after Jamal Abdul Nasser. An official statement was also issued comparing the coup of 
23rd July 1970 and the Egyptian revolution of 23rd July 1952 (Halliday, 1978, pp. 26-27). It was an 
attempt by the Omani new government to appease and attract rebels who respect President Nasser. 
Sultan Qaboos was particularly effective with the British help in his use of propaganda against rebel 
forces.  
 
4.2.4.5: The fifth theme was based on an amnesty policy for the rebels. A short time after 
coming to power, Sultan Qaboos declared an official amnesty for all those armed rebels in Dhofar 
who surrendered themselves and their weapons to government authorities (Peterson, 2007, p. 20). 
Sultan Qaboos mentioned this policy in an interview with the Oman Newspaper and clarified that 
his aim was to win his people’s hearts, even of those who fought against him. In addition, he stated 
that: 
our attitude towards what is called the Oman and Arabian Gulf Liberation Front is 
the same attitude with which we started our new era. We have said before, God has 
forgiven what has happened in the past, return to your home and start building it. 
The darkness of yesterday will be transformed into light and we all are facing a 
historical responsibility towards our country and we must cooperate to build the 
modern country (Oman Newspaper, ‘Chinese and Communist support for the repels 
stopped’, 15th September 1973, Issue 5, p. 5). 
An amnesty was important for building Oman. Sultan Qaboos’ vision of the amnesty policy was 
that all individuals are the sons of the country and their country needed to include them, rather than 
alienate them. In another statement, the Sultan stated that, 
they are our sons after all and they are surely going to return one day to their home. 
We absolutely do not want to begin a war of annihilation against them, while we 
could do so; however, now, we try to win them to our side by convincing them to 







The Sultan reinforced his speech, adding that “tolerance is not a weakness and those who insisted 
on destroying and rebelling or trying to mess up with security, we will strike them strongly and they 
will suffer the consequences of their actions” (ibid,  p. 4). 
In an interview with one of the former rebels, Mohammad Ghawas, he indicated that the 
offer of amnesty for Dhofar’s rebels violently shocked the Liberation Front and its supporters, 
especially after groups of fighters began to surrender themselves to the Sultan’s forces. Ghawas also 
mentioned that government airplanes dropped publications at rebel locations. These publications 
were from the government to the rebels, promising to guarantee good treatment for the rebels, 
including protection and financial rewards that would increase if the rebel also surrendered his 
weapon (Interview Ghawas, 27thOctober 2016).Al Rayes (2000, p. 99)argues that before the 
amnesty, some of the rebel leaders had not been able to confess due to a fear of being oppressed. 
Qasem (2000, p. 416) agrees that the amnesty resolution gave Dhofari opponents of the policies of 
the rebel leaders the green light to withdraw support for the Front. 
To demonstrate the dangerous impact of this law on the rebels, Kelly (1972) explains that 
some of the leaders from the eastern area in Dhofar, led by Mohammad Salim Al Mashani, sought 
separation from the Front through the Sultan’s amnesty decision on 12th September 1970. To 
implement this decision, these leaders arrested 40 rebels and many of the other rebel leaders who 
refused to join the Sultan’s forces. They occupied areas, money, and possessions of the Eastern 
Area’s Front, with the intention of handing over the detainees, the Eastern area, and what had been 
confiscated from money and possessions to the governmental authorities. The popular Front leaders 
took quick and firm reaction, blockading and arresting the traitors and removing them in a series of 
trials and executions. More than 300 rebels were executed in the period between October and 
December 1970, including all of those suspected of surrendering themselves to the governmental 
forces, with many of the remainder being forced to join the Lenin school for re-education (1972, p. 
143). 
A statement for the rebels mentioned these events, warning of any betrayal to government 
forces (DLF, 1974, p. 91). The consequences of the coup negatively affected the rebellion, with 
tribal leaders withdrawing their forces from the rebellion to join Sultan Qaboos. This was largely 
made possible because of the amnesty law and generous rewards offered to those who sided with 
the government. Defecting rebels were then organised into special teams to fight against their 







used some of the previous rebels to spread propaganda in order to damage the trust between the 
popular Front leadership and the Dhofari tribesmen (Agwani, 1978, p. 71). The amnesty decision 
issued by the new government and general dissatisfaction with the revolution communist ideology 
encouraged significant rebels decided to surrender themselves to the government authorities. The 
most important of these was Sheik Musalim bin Nafal, whose shots had began the Dhofar War. 
Another to volunteer himself was Sheik Salim bin Sha’ban Al Aejaili, one of the important tribal 
leaders in the mountains. Those figures and others who returned to the government forces were 
considered invaluable sources of information, since they informed the government about the rebel 
locations, intentions, and plans, as well as their local, regional, and international 
relationships(Interview Ali Ghawas, 16th June 2016). The reaction of the rebel leaders towards the 
amnesty law was for the Popular Front to issue an amnesty to the Dhofaris who the government 
forces called to return to the armed struggle (DLF, National Struggle Documents, 1972, pp. 93-94). 
Overall, the amnesty policy was widely effective in gaining hearts and minds as a development 
policy. In this way, it was perhaps the most important non-military tactic utilised in the war. The 
revolutionaries were assured that the new Sultan could understand their demands and that he did not 
want anyone to be punished. The policy of amnesty was also welcomed by tribal leaders, as well as 
encouraging rebels to defect from the revolution to join the government forces. All of these steps 
were undertaken in the interest of Omani national unity. 
 
4.2.4.6: A sixth theme for combating revolution was exemplified in Sultan Qaboos’ 
resistance to the rebels by seeking the approval of the leaders of neighbouring countries and his 
success in making those leaders feel involved in the Dhofar War. This was primarily achieved by 
arguing that once Dhofar’s rebels controlled Oman they would continue extending their struggle to 
other regional countries (Peterson J. E., 2007, p. 20). Sultan Qaboos called on the Gulf States to 
confront the common communist threat (Communist Threat, 1973). The Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs, Qais Al Zawawi, also warned that the invaders from the south not only targeted 
Oman, but sought the occupation of the Gulf as a whole (Danger of the Communist, 1973). 
The first chapter of this thesis mentioned that historians like Haglawi (2003) argue that the 
survival of the revolution was dependent on the assistance of the countries that supported them, 
such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and China. Sultan Qaboos succeeded in convincing many of these 







supporting the rebels, significantly increasing the challenges facing the revolutionaries. In addition, 
Sultan Qaboos called “all Arabian Gulf countries to confront the communist danger that threatens 
all Arabian Gulf areas not only Oman”(Sultan Qaboos, 1973, p. 1).He attempted to persuade them 
that Oman was only the beginning of the communist mission in the Gulf, arguing that if the rebels 
succeeded revolution would quickly spread to neighbouring countries. In this context, Sultan 
Qaboos proclaimed that “we are insisting on purifying our land from the communist abomination 
and its cunning agents” (Sultan Qaboos, 1975, p. 4). In support of this statement, the Sultan’s 
informational speech described the Dhofar War as being generally waged against all Arabs and 
Islamic nations. 
The British government was relieved when they found that the Sultan shared their vision of 
how to defeat the rebels. In a confidential letter from it was Arthur at the Bahrain Residency to the 
Arabian Department in the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that, 
the Sultan needed very little prompting. His own political action in Dhofar is all 
that we could wish for, though he stops short of the idea of autonomy. His notion is 
rather to improve communications between Muscat and Salalah, and to bring 
Dhofaris into central Government (UKNA, NBM1/1, 1971). 
The new openness of the Sultan to the regional states uenabled him to persuade them to contribute 
to the defeat of communism by jointly fighting the communist rebels who might influence the entire 
region. This approach, and the associated British commentary, indicates that Sultan Qaboos nor 
only maintained independence for Oman, but also exerted increasing autonomy for Oman from 
external influence by his clever regional strategies.  
  
4.3: The Effect of Sultan Qaboos’ policy on the rebels and the rebels’ third conference 
 (Ahleesh Conference) in 1971 
 
4.3.1: The rebels’ reaction towards Sultan Qaboos’ assumption of poweron 23rd July 1970 
 The rebels specified their attitude towards Sultan Qaboos’ government from the first moment 
of its formation. In a statement that was issued on 29th of July 1970 by the Front, they announced 







interference as “another face that imperialism has presented and it was not new or surprising”. Their 
official statement added that, 
the events that occurred in the area before announcing this step was stating that the 
occupier and reactionaries had a huge desire to change Sultan Said. The occupier and 
their allies in the area had adopted for a long time a policy to prepare and modernize 
the countries of the area to make them able to stand against the masses’ revolutionary 
movement (NSD, 29 July 1970). 
The Front claimed that the new government was a sign of the main goal that led the British 
government to contribute to the usurping of Sultan Said, namely to push forward the development 
process in Oman in an attempt to counteract the rebellion for British economic purposes. The Front 
issued a statement to confirm that they would “keep fighting until they win against all the 
occupation conspiracies in Oman” (NSD, 29 July 1970). The leadership of the rebellion did not 
show any willingness to negotiate with the new government, with the consequence that the military 
option remained their only real choice. An official declaration by the Popular Front confirmed that, 
the occupier long-term plan for the area was to replace a leader by another 
according to the circumstances in the Arab world in that period, so they can exploit 
the area more and loot its riches to a maximum level… The armed struggle was not 
directed only against the Sultan, since it was directed against the British pressure in 
the area in the first place… They rejected Sultan Qaboos’ rule of Oman” (NSD, 29 
July 1970, pp. 29-42). 
In this way the Front asserted their primary aggression towards the British, who they 
accused of being protective and supportive of Omani leaders, regardless of the locals’ popular 
desires. After the ascension of Sultan Qaboos, the Front embarked on numerous military operations 
against the forces of the British and the Sultan, particularly in the form of ambushes and continued 
shelling of the British troops’ locations. According to the Popular Front’s references, 290 clashes 
occurred in the three months after the coup, in which 136 soldiers from the Sultan’s troops were 
killed and 21 of the rebels (DLF, 1974, pp. 143-144; Halliday, 1976, p. 272). 
The Sultan’s forces were supported by the British and escalated military operations against 
the rebels in the west in an attempt to control the supply lines that came through Yemen and into 
that area. As a reaction to these operations by government forces, the rebels waged attacks in 1973, 
successfully controlling the coastal city of Murbat, close to Salalah, for approximately one day. 
This operation showed that the rebels still had a lead in the war, despite the change of government 







cost before its withdrawal from the area by 1971, PFLOAG decided to unite with all of the political 
organisations in the area that followed the same ideologies. Intensive talks were begun with the 
Arab Labour Party in Syria, which had been founded in 1970. This party comprised members of the 
Ba'ath Arab socialist party from Syria and Iraq, as well as the Arab Nationalists Movement from 
Egypt. The talks and communications led to direct meetings being held between the leadership of 
the Front and the Arab Labour Party in November 1972. The meeting decided to form common 
regional leaderships and central committees, agreeing that the Popular Front would undertake 
armed struggle to liberate Oman and the occupied Arabian Gulf framework (26 Nov. 1972, pp. 110-
119). In the same way that Sultan Qaboos had marshalled regional state support, the PFLOAG 
sought to unite left-wing groups in the Gulf States in opposition to the Omani government. 
 
4.3.2: The Front’s Third Conference (Ahleesh conference) in December 1971 
The leadership of the rebels realised that they were in a difficult situation after the increase 
in foreign support for Sultan Qaboos, especially with intervention from Jordan, Saudi Arabia and 
Iranian precursors. In addition, the Saudi, Omani and British worked militarily against the armed 
struggle (Yodfat and Abir, 1977, p. 102). In an attempt to confront the setbacks that followed the 
replacement of Sultan Said with Sultan Qaboos and the adoption of policies to divide and polarise 
the revolution members, the rebel leaders decided to hold the Third National Conference of 
PFLOAG. This conference took into consideration the developments and political events since the 
decision of the British government to withdraw its military from the area by end of 1971. The 
conference was held from 9st to 19th December 1971 in the Ahleesh region, west of Dhofar’s 
mountains. The conference aimed to allow the rebel leaders to study their experience during the 
three years that followed the second conference and to confront the changes that accompanied the 
fall of Sultan Said. The conference issued a statement that insisted on the: 
necessity to form a republican revolutionary party leading the armed struggle in all 
phases, guided by Marxism and working on expanding armed struggle and the 
necessity of hard work for the unity of revolutionary factions in Oman. The 
conference also approved the formation of popular councils in Front controlled 
areas (Arab World Record, July- December 1974, p. 105).  
The most important decision of the conference was to change the name of the organisation 







Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf”. On the Arab level, the statement confirmed the 
necessity of strengthening relationships with all national movements and Arabian Gulf countries, 
then coordinating with them in order to change the general political circumstances of the region. 
The statement also stated the importance of strengthening politics and relationships with the 
National Front in Yemen. The statement went on to discuss the progressive forces in the Gulf and 
the Arab peninsula, and announced the absolute support of the Popular Front for the Palestinian 
revolution. It insisted on the necessity to maintain close ties with the Palestinian revolutionary 
forces and those of other armed revolutions in the Arabian Gulf. However, from a global 
perspective, the declaration indicated that the Front stood with national liberating movements in the 
third world against global imperialism and capitalism. (National Struggle Documents, 1974, pp. 25-
27). The conference concluded with a request to “the national troops in Oman and the Arabian Gulf 
area to begin solidarity relationships between them and to create organisational forms that are able 
to face dangers”(PFLO, 1975, pp. 39-44). This statement was broadcast on the Oman Voice radio, 
an Arab station in Al Mukalla, which had been founded by the Yemeni government (Nyrop, 1977, 
p. 392) (see appendix 16: Ahleesh conference political statement). 
It is clear here that, in contrast to the policies of the new Sultan to win the loyalty of tribal 
leaders in the fighting areas and increasing regional support for his government, the rebels appeared 
to be isolated. The main cause in this regard was that the rebel leaders had become inflexible with 
regards to their policies. It could be argued that the rebels were fighting to ensure a better life, rather 
than to gain power in Oman. However, with the arrival of Sultan Qaboos life appeared to be 
improving in the region, but the rebels did not change course or negotiate with the Sultan. In this 
lack of flexibility, the rebels were repeating the same mistake of their old enemy, Sultan Said, who 
had not been flexible in response to the rebels. Moreover, they did not show any attempt during the 
latter stages of the Dhofar War, at flexibility in relations to Islamic values or improved relations 
with tribal leaders. This inability to adapt undermined their strategy and made Sultan Qaboos’ 
alternative more attractive. 
 
4.3.3: Attempted coup against Sultan Qaboos in 1971 
The failed attack at Murbat on 19th July 1971 led to an increase in pressure on the rebel 
troops. This was, in large part, due to Sultan Qaboos’ reform policies that increasingly attracted 







Sultan’s troops, especially Iran. Given that it was important 
to work on reducing the Omani military’s pressure on the 
Front forces in Dhofar, the Front therefore, planned for a 
coup attempt, seeking to overthrow Sultan Qaboos on New 
Year’s Eve, 31st December 1972(Interview with the brother 
of a rebel on 20th June 2017, RA8;Al Rayes, 2000, p. 104). 
This was planned in Iraq in October 1972 by members of The 
Popular Front for Liberating Oman and the Arabian Gulf, as 
well as some members of the Political Office in Southern 
Yemen (Qasem, 2000, p. 161). The movement was headed by 
Zahir bin Ail Matar, a member of the central committee for 
PFLOAG. Each of the coup cells consisted of 4 groups: an 
executive committee, regulatory committee, economic 
commission, and the military commission. 
The committee members were planted in areas in north Oman, especially in Muscat, Rustaq, 
Bidbid, Sameal, Nizwa, and Al Jebel AKhdar (see figure 34). The plan was for the organisation 
members to undertake armed rebellion operations in those areas simultaneously to coincide with 
assassination operations against the Sultan and his advisors. Attacks would expand to include 
governors, army officers, and important traders, followed by attacks against army camps. This was 
almost certainly an attempt to drag government armed forces from Dhofar to aid the government 
forces in northern Oman, which were expected to be insufficient to deal with the coup attempt. 
Ultimately, this would reduce the military pressure on the rebels in Dhofar. After this, the rebels 
planned to set ambushes for the troops that would come to suppress the rebellion. The rebels would 
then move back to caches in the mountains north of Oman, where they would wage a guerrilla war 
that would be the first of its kind in north Oman since Imam Ghalib bin Ali’s revolution in Al Jebel 
Al Khdar in 1957. However, if the assassination attempt failed, the rebels would wait for a popular 
movement to overthrow Sultan Qaboos. The coup planners predicted that the Sultan would driven 
out of the country after a few weeks in the event that the rebels were not able to assassinate 
him(Interview with the brother of a rebel who was captured and executed on 20th June 2017, RA9; 
Muqaibl, 2002, pp. 318-319). The plan was implemented by some of the Front’s supporters, who 
organised a workers’ strike in Muscat, on 1st September 1971, led by some of the Front’s leaders in 
north Oman. The protests extended to Muttrah, a city next to Muscat, which justified the protests 
Fig. 34: A map showing towns north of 
Oman) (Source: www.ezilon.com, 








based upon government distinctions between Omani and foreign worker pay. However, the issue 
was dealt with quickly by the security authorities in Oman (Avant-garde magazine, 1972, pp. 16-17, 
98). Official security services arrested Ali Mohammad bin Talib Al Busaidi, one of the popular 
Front leaders in Muttrah in November 1972 during his attempts to organise the armed struggle in 
that area. He confessed to being a political guide for the Front and a member of the Lenin unit in 
Dhofar. As a result, the security service in the Sultanate were put on alert and were therefore able to 
put many of the Front’s supporters under intensive supervision for six weeks. On 23rd December 
1972, large groups of rebel sleeper cells were arrested in north Oman, comprising a total of ninety 
Popular Front members, eight of whom were women. Investigations with detainees led the 
government soldiers to stores of arms and ammunition, as well as many Chinese weapons caches in 
caves and seas along the coasts in north Oman. These had been planned for the coup against Sultan 
Qaboos (Oman Newspaper, 26th April 1975, p. 1; Al Amri, 2012, pp. 205). As a result of the 
coordination between the Sultanate and neighbouring countries, security forces in the UAE arrested 
several people one week later. These individuals were charged with distributing publications calling 
for the “revolutionary violence” in the Arabian Gulf (Al Nafisi, 1976, p. 58). This catastrophic 
failure affected the rebels negatively and by the end of the investigations, eleven of the detainees 
were sentenced to death. 
When comparing this coup to the assassination attempt on Sultan Said in 1966, it is clear 
that the coup attempt in 1971 was revealed before it was carried out, unlike the assassination 
attempt of Sultan Said, which was not discovered. This indicates the growing role played by 
security forces in Oman and suggests the sympathy of the people with the new government. The 
Omani government also requested assistance from the government of the UAE to extradite the 
defendants, which was carried out and therefore illustrates the improvement of Omani relations with 
the countries of the region. All this demonstrates the increasing independence and growing regional 
influence of the new Omani government in securing the cooperation of other neighbouring 
countries in the war against the rebels.  
 
4.4: Chapter IV Conclusion 
The rebel leadership in Dhofar attacked the coup which put Sultan Qaboos in power. The 







government of Sultan Qaboos, as well as to banish British influence from the region. The rebels 
enjoyed military superiority until July 1970, when Sultan Qaboos came to power. The new Sultan 
made many military and developmental revisions that profoundly shifted the balance in favour of 
government forces. In addition, the arrival of soldiers from other neighbouring countries in 1973 
greatly enhanced the position of the Sultan’s troops. Soldiers eventually also formed from the 
popular liberation army forces that answered Sultan Qaboos’ call and joined his side under his 
amnesty policy. They formed “national teams” that included soldiers experienced in guerrilla war 
and who were aware of the nature of land and the rebels’ methods. This regional support that 
increased the governmental forces played an essential role in strengthening Sultan Qaboos’s 
military. 
It is clear that these effective governmental measures caused the revolution leadership to 
carry out two important actions. Firstly, they called the third conference (the Ahleesh conference in 
1971) to evaluate their progress after the second conference (Hamrin conference 1968) and to react 
to the changes wrought by the new Sultan Qaboos. The conference statement indicated a 
commitment to overthrowing the rule of the Sultan and to remove British influence in the region. 
The second action was the violence in north Oman, which was perpetrated to overthrow Sultan 
Qaboos’ government in Muscat. This was intended to spark revolution in the north of Oman, to 
increase pressure on the Sultan, and to ease the pressure on their activities in Dhofar.  
The coup attempt was planned by the rebels to take place on New Year’s Eve, 31st 
December 1972 (Al Rayes, 2000, p. 161; Qasem, 2000, p. 104). However, the bold plan ended in 
catastrophic failure for the rebels, after one of the leaders was arrested. After he confessed, the 
information he provided led to the arrest of sleeper cells across Oman and UAE and the execution 
of many of their members. The northern revolution ended before it began, which was a harsh 
setback for the rebels in their fight against Sultan Qaboos. The failed coup attempt affected the 
spirits of the fighters in Dhofar and ultimately shifted the tide of war from offensive to defensive. 
Despite these gains, the rebels did not show any desire to negotiate with the new government, which 
had focused on amnesty and developmental policies that were successfully restoring the respect of 
tribal leaders although it was frequently achieved with the help of foreign support and military 
collaboration. All of these developments demonstrate Omani independence, especially in terms of 

















The Fourth Phase of the Revolution 









5.1 Foreign support for Sultan Qaboos’ government in confronting rebels 
Sultan Qaboos’ policy of openness to the world led directly to the improvement and 
consolidation of his relationship with other countries in the Arab Gulf and beyond. This policy 
helped to limit and even completely halt foreign support for the rebels. Regarding British 
involvement, the main reason for secrecy was to avoid irritating the British parliament and people. 
According to a secret letter sent from the British embassy in Muscat to the Arabian department, L. 
Egerton, stated that: 
although it is well know that British service personnel are loaned to the SAF, the 
extent of UK military involvement in Oman is not widely known. A significant loss 
of British lives or a significant increase in military support or expenditure might 
arouse parliamentary and public anxiety and criticism (UKNA, NBM 10/5, 1971). 
This approach meant that it was necessary to limit the degree and visibility of British military 
involvement in the war. A secret letter from the British Embassy Muscat, to S. L. Egerton, Arabian 
Department, mentioned that “The provision of direct military assistance in operations would 
increasingly lay us open to adverse criticism. It should be decreased as the military situation 
allows”(UKNA, NBM 10/5, 1971). In order to fill the void that resulted from their inherently 
limited involvement and to defeat the rebels as soon as possible, the British government advised the 
Sultan to seek support from other countries, stating “Oman may have to be encouraged at the 
appropriate time to seek assistance from other sources, e.g. friendly Arab or (in certain 
circumstances) the United Nations”(UKNA, NBM 10/5, 1971). Such a direction was not consonant 
with informal British imperial control or influence. 
 
 5.1.1 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), the second 
largest country in the region in terms of geography and 
influence after Iran, shares a border with Dhofar. After the 
outbreak of the revolution in Dhofar, Saudi Arabia 
supported the Dhofar Charitable Association due to its 
conservative Islamic tendency and it was also one of the 
organisations that contributed to the formation of the 
Dhofar Liberation Front. Saudi Arabia aimed to have 
influence over the revolution in Dhofar, guiding its 
Fig. 35: Sultan Qaboos (right) visit King 
Faisal, (left), 1971(Source: Minister of 








progress to get rid of Sultan Said, based on his hatred of Saudi Arabia, a position that the Saudis 
reciprocated. Generous Saudi support for the rebels continued until 1968, when after the ideological 
change in the rebellion at the second conference Hamrin Conference, when the Front chose to 
follow Marxist-Leninism. This change negatively affected the relationship between the Front and 
Saudi Arabia, as the latter adheres closed to conservative Islamic teachings that were directly 
contrary to communism. King Faisal bin Abdul Aziz (1964-1975), the King of Saudi Arabia, was a 
staunch opponent of communism and refused any relationships or political representations with 
communist countries. He did not want any ideology that opposed Islamic teachings to exist in Saudi 
Arabia (Al Saud, Moqatel website, 2016). As a consequence, the KSA severed its relationship with 
the Front.  
After Sultan Qaboos took over the rule of Oman, he made an important visit to Riyadh (see 
figure 35) in 1971. After resolving the border dispute between the countries. According to Peterson 
(2007), the new government of Oman granted Saudi Arabia some of the areas that it had been 
demanding, including the oasis of Al Buraimi. This oasis was granted in exchange for the provision 
of financial support to the Sultanate, as well as forbidding Imam Ghalib, who was still residing in 
its territory, to act against the Sultan's government. Saudi Arabia then gave these villages to the 
UAE, in exchange for other land(Peterson, 2007, p. 20). Sultan Qaboos was able to obtain promises 
from King Faisal, that he would provide the Sultanate with developmental and military support to 
confront the rebels in Dhofar. Fayyad (1975) adds that the support from Saudi Arabia was in line 
with the Saudi policy of standing against any revolutionary movement that aimed to overthrow the 
absolute monarchs of the Arabian Gulf. 
Therefore, Saudi Arabia put aside its 
differences with Britain, the UAE, and Iran 
to devote its efforts to face its most 
dangerous challenge, exemplified in the 
Dhofari communist rebellion (ibid, p. 213). 
In an article in Al Rayed Newspaper, 
Qais Al Zawawi, Oman Minister of Foreign 
Affairs was reported as stating that the Saudi 
government agreed with Sultan Qaboos in 
December 1972, promising the delivery of 
Fig. 36: Strike Master aircraft played important military 
role in attacking rebel locations(Source: Minister of 







military and economic support for Oman from Saudi Arabia, which it provided by paying $150 
million to Oman in 1975 (Al Rayed Newspaper, 31st May 1975, p.8). Al Rayes (1973, p. 73) notes 
that Sultan Qaboos responded with a concession to cede the Al Buraimi Oasis to Saudi Arabia, 
thereby settling the main dispute between Sultan Said and Saudi Arabia. The treaty also indicated 
that the Sultan should support the Saudi international situation and that he should recognise Saudi 
leadership over the Arab world. Sultan Qaboos’ government benefited from this support to 
strengthen its military and political position against the rebels. Furthermore, £60 million pounds of 
Saudi support were used to build roads, schools, hospitals and to augment the new Omani army. Al 
Rayes (1973, p. 73) adds that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia provided shipments of other arms to 
Oman in January 1973, among which were numbers of British (Strike Master) jet planes (see figure 
36). In addition, the KSA sent a permanent military mission to perform military coordination tasks 
between the two countries.  
This financial aid provided by Saudi Arabia to Oman during difficult periods was reported 
by the Al Anwar Al Beirutyah magazine. During the financial crisis that Oman suffered after the 
purchase of British air missiles (Repair system) worth £200 million, Sultan Qaboos had to visit 
Saudi Arabia to request aid from King Faisal. In June 1975, the King pledged to provide support to 
confront this crisis after several foreign and Arab banks refused loans to Oman (Al Anwar Al 
Beirutyah Journal, 1975, p. 2). 
Sultan Qaboos praised the financial and political assistance provided by Saudi Arabia in an 
interview for the Saudi news agency, Oman Newspaper, which quoted Sultan Qaboos as stating, 
“Saudi Arabia is our big sister in the area and King Faisal was very understanding of our policy and 
he was helpful to a huge extent” (Sultan Qaboos Speech, 1973). In another statement, Sultan 
Qaboos thanked King Faisal for the Saudi contribution in building Oman, as they had provided 
educational, health, agricultural, and informational support (Sultan Qaboos Speech, 1973). The 
Omani-Saudi relationship achieved multiple national goals for both countries. In addition to solving 
the border dispute with Oman, Saudi Arabia protected its eastern borders. It also stopped supporting 
the Front and instead provided a range of aid to the Sultanate that played an important role in 
ending the war. The developments that the government of Sultan Qaboos made in to its foreign 
relations showed that the Omani government was much more independent than much of the 
literature suggests. In this sense, it had a negotiated independence and sovereign autonomy, rather 







5.1.2:  Jordanian military support for the government of Sultan Qaboos began in late 1971. On 
24th June 1972, when the first Jordanian battalion, consisting of 400 soldiers and officers, reached 
Oman, Sultan Qaboos visited Jordan. His talks with King Hussein bin Talal resulted in the promise 
of more Jordanian forces to assist in the war to eliminate the armed rebellion in Dhofar (Al Adad 
magazine, 1975, p. 12). In a press interview with the Al Hadaaf magazine on 30th June, King 
Hussein pronounced that “there are Jordanian forces in Oman and added that they are intended to 
provide extra Jordanian militarily support to Oman to face 
any developments in the military situation with the 
rebels” (Dhofar Revelation, 19thJuly 1975). Sultan 
Qaboos also announced the presence of Jordanian troops 
in his country, asserting in a statement to the Lebanon Al 
Nahar newspaper that the Jordanian officers were present 
to train the Omani army in a consultation role that had 
them safely away from the fighting (Al Nahar 
Newspaper, ‘Dhofar War’,21st March 1973,p. 9). The 
British government praised the support provided by Saudi 
Arabia and Jordan for the Sultan, especially given that 
“the Saudi and Jordanian militarily system was based on 
western military traditions” (Al Nahar Newspaper, 
‘Dhofar War’,21st March 1973, pp. 8-9). 
 
Jordanian support proceeded in line with Iranian support for Oman in late 1973 as the 
amount of regional support for the Omani government increased over time. Three different 
battalions of Jordanian troops were present in Oman until 1st March 1975 (Kuwaiti Al Taleyaa 
magazine, 517, March 1975, p 16). In the same year, a Jordanian soldier delegation visited Muscat 
led by Zaid bin Shaker, the Chief of Staff of the Jordanian Army (Fayyad, 1975, p. 275). During the 
visit, he met Sultan Qaboos and declared a gift of 31 fighter planes, (Hooker Hunter) (see figure 
37), to help strike the meeting places of the rebels. After this deal, Jordanian officers stayed to train 
Omani soldiers (ibid, p. 22). The first batch of theses airplanes was delivered on 27th February 
1975. The Omani Secretary of Defence, Sayyid Faher bin Timor, supervised and stated that “the 
Fig. 37: Hunter plane flying over Murbat fort 
in a combat mission, 1975 







planes have been received as a gift from a neighbourly Arab country and they are going to 
strengthen Omani air defence in facing the communist threat” (Al Hadaaf magazine, 1975). 
 King Hussein made an official visit to Oman in 1975 and met with Sultan Qaboos (see 
figure 38 and 39). The support given by King Hussein to Oman was another example ofsupport 
from Arab countries in the face of communism(Fayyad, 1975, p. 223). King Hussein visited his 
troops, who patrolled the road between Salalah and Thumrait. The Jordanian support for Oman was 
not however limited to the military and intelligence fields, but also educational, political and 
diplomatic aspects in different ministries (Ibid, p. 223).It has also been claimed that the Saudi 
government financially enabled Jordan to provide military support to confront Dhofar’s rebels in 
Oman, since Jordan was not wealthy enough to fund military interventions abroad without financial 
support (Interview, Zahran, 20th May 2009). In sum, the Jordanian support of Oman’s new 
government testified to Oman’s new independent roll in the Gulf States.  
 
5.1.3: British support 
The British government was on alert after the rebels opened a new very dangerous Front in 
north Oman’s cities, especially in Nizwa and Izki, which contained petroleum pipelines to the 
export port. This was stated in a document sent from E.F. Henderson, the British Political Agency 
in Doha (Qatar) to T.F. Brenchley, the Head of the Arabian directorate in the British Ministry of 
Fig. 39: King Hussein (left) and his wife (right) 
Sultan Qaboos in the centre are following a 




Fig. 38: King Hussein addresses a speech to some of his 
forces participating in Dhofar. Sultan Qaboos appears the 










Foreign Affairs(UKNA, BC 103125/1, 1966).Explosions in cities in north Oman near the oil 
pipelines threatened to undermine the British government efforts to use petroleum sources to 
maintain security and stability in Oman and to defeat the rebels in Dhofar. Because of this, British 
troops made a nautical and air attack at Raykhut from 15th to 21st January 1970, in an attempt to 
expel the rebels from the city. However, this operation failed with British losses in men and 
equipment, including a Hooker Hunter airplane. Halliday (1976, p. 268) notes that the British 
government confirmed its withdrawal in the face of rebels’ attacks. 
Before its planned withdrawal from the region, the British government perceived that it was 
important for the Sultanate to receive immediate support, as mentioned in a report published in 
early September 1971 “to start the crucial stage that the war in Dhofar was reaching, our aim should 
be to give as much immediate support to the Sultanate authorities as possible short of overt help” 
(UKNA, B1/56, D.S. 11/12, 1970). Another secret document, entitled“ Chiefs of Staff committee 
Defence Operational Planning Staff, The Situation in Muscat and Oman”, written by the Defence 
Operational Planning Staff, also stated the need to give this support and maintain British interests. It 
mentioned that Oman’s stability was very important since it was connected with the British interests 
in the area and that, 
…increasing instability in the Sultanate could jeopardize the stability of other states 
in the Gulf. This in turn could have far-reaching consequence and would no doubt 
affect the UK's extensive commercial interest there. Thus the UK cannot escape 
involvement (UKNA, AG 51, DOP Note 705/70, 1970). 
The British government realised the importance of accelerating the elimination of the rebellion in 
Dhofar, noting that it had the potential of spreading instability across the region and adversely affect 
British interests. A secret letter from the British Embassy in Muscat to S.L. Egerton, in the Arabian 
Department, stressed the importance of keeping British government influence in Oman strong. 
Another document clarified the general policy of the British government Oman: “British influence 
is powerful in Oman affairs and it is in the UK's interest to maintain it” (UKNA, NBM 10/5, 1971). 
As a consequence of all these diplomatic statements of British strategic interests in Oman, in 
October 1971, British troops began to conduct wider military operations in the eastern region than 
before. This was called the “Fahad” (Tiger) Operation. The Omani and British troops were 
supported by the British Special Air Service (SAS), who attacked the eastern region to dominate the 
rebel locations. At the same time, secured locations were established in the desert to prevent the 







British forces gaining control of some rebels’ defensive sites by December 1971. The goal of the 
operation at this critical time, immediately prior to the withdrawal of British troops from eastern 
Suez, seems to have been the defeat of the rebel forces. However, despite these victories the balance 
of the war remained in favour of the rebels (Buttenshaw, 2010, p. 7; Halliday, 1976, p. 272). (For 
more details, see appendix 17 which has a Secret Intelligence Memorandum published by CIA 
Document services, 19th May 1972, No. 2034/72, sentence 22-27, entitledThe Mountain and the 
Plain: The Rebellion in Oman). 
After the Fahad (Tiger) Operation, SAF initiated new military operations in the west with 
full support of the British troops, in order to weaken the rebels from more than one side. This began 
with the commencement of the ‘Simba’ (Lion) operation(see figure 40)on 18th May 1972, which 
was intended to cut the supply network arriving from Yemen. The attack made intensive inroads 
into South Yemen, with 300 British soldiers being air dropped into the city of Habroot. On 24th May 
1972, 200 more British forces air dropped into the Dhyoof area, 10 miles away from Hoof city 
(Halliday, 1976, pp. 272-274). Some of these soldiers attacked rebel locations in the mountains and 
others attacked the areas in the borders of Yemen. On 25th May 1972, the British RAF attacked 
Hoof, although it ultimately failed to sever the transportation networks between the Front and 
Yemen or to gain a foothold in the eastern area in Dhofar close to the Yemeni borders (Buttenshaw, 
2010, p. 7). 
After the failure of this operation, the British troops intended to conduct depletive military 
campaigns in the eastern and western areas in late May 1972, in an attempt to control the “Ho Chi 
Minh” road, a strategic path that linked the eastern and western areas through the Al Wusta 





Fig. 40: SAF helicopters  
during Simba operation, 1975.  
(Source: RAO Archives, 








cooperation with the forces of the Sultan, the British forces waged an attack in the eastern region on 
23rd September 1972 supported by helicopters and fighter aircraft. This attack failed. In early 
December 1972, the British again took a defensive position, since they held the mountain centres 
that could not be supplied except by helicopters (Halliday, 1976, p. 275). 
  Sultan Qaboos diplomatically responded to these charges in press interviews that the British 
role in Oman had been limited, stating that “there is a limited number of British experts who work 
in Oman and they receive commands us and we could ask them to leave the country” (Sultan 
Qaboos, 1973, p. 4). This speech was directed to the Arab and Omani peoples and was intended to 
confirm the sovereignty of Oman, stating that the British were present at the request of the Omani 
government. The Sultan also answered the rebels’ accusations about the support of imperial power 
from Britain, noting instead that: 
we are getting support from Saudi Arabia and Britain to perform Oman’s internal 
reform project… we do not find difficulties in dealing with the British because they 
are here to work as experts for us and we take advantage of their experiences in 
reforming the country and building the army (Sultan Qaboos, 1973, p. 1). 
It is clear that Sultan Qaboos gave convincing arguments on the British presence in Oman, stating 
that the amicable relationship between the Omani and British governments was based on their 
historical friendship and dictated by common purpose. In this sense, they were sovereign countries 
that were respecting and supporting each other’s interests.  
 
5.1.4: British diplomacy and interests in Oman 
British diplomacy towards Oman during the phase after Sultan Qaboos took power was 
highlighted in an important secret document entitled British policy towards Oman, which was sent 
by C.G.H. Arnold on 24th May 1971. He stated: 
Continuing stability and integrity of the sultanate of Oman can only be maintained 
by an efficient and non-politically motivated army... Oman does not have trained 
and suitable replacements immediately available. Any attempt to ‘rapidly’ 
Omanise the Sultan’s armed forces is fraught with dangers and could very well be 
counterproductive to HMG(UKNA, DS 8/3640, 1971). 
Another British secret letter entitled ‘The Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, H.M.G.’s Policy’, 







Her Majesty’s government policy continues unchanged, to preserve stability in the 
Persian Gulf and safeguard British interest there it is necessary that the sultanate 
should remain an integrated unit under friendly control. British policy is to help to 
strengthen the authority of the Sultan and the security of the sultanate without 
further recourse to open intervention by the British troops. Although we consider 
it desirable that a reconciliation between the sultan and the rebels should be 
achieved, it is essential that this should not be obtained  at the cost of weakening 
the Sultan’s position or giving to his local opponents and their Arab backers an 
opening for further subversion (UKNA, D.S. 11/12, File 2/7 (E115), 1970). 
 Another secret letter, ‘The Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, H.M.G.’s Policy’, sent from the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 24th May 1970, mentioned that the following objectives 
must be clarified for international organisations in order to avoid condemnation of the British for 
their involvement in the conflict. 
a. To reiterate that under article 2(1) of its charter, the United Nations has no  
right to discuss the internal affairs of the Sultanate which is an independent 
state. 
b.   To demonstrate that there is absolutely no evidence to support the  
  allegations that the question of Oman is a colonial issue (and that hence the  
  reference of it to the committee of 24 was improper). 
c.   To counter statements by the rebels and their sympathizers (UKNA, D.S.  
 11/12, File 2/7 (E115), 1970). 
This document also provides valuable insights into British interests in Oman during this 
critical period, immediately prior to the withdrawal of the British from the region and the objectives 
of British diplomacy in Oman: 
a. To prevent the Sultanate from disintegrating or falling under communist, 
extreme left-wing or Arab nationalist control with the result that stability in  
 the Persian Gulf might be threatened particularly before British withdrawal  
or Britain’s extensive commercial and oil interests might be threatened after  
withdrawal. 
b.    To maintain the RAF staging facilities (essential for our existing far  
         eastern commitments) and the BBC station in Masirah. 
c. To maintain the flow of high quality oil from petroleum development  
(Oman) Ltd. Operations (85% owned by Royal Dutch Shell). 
d. To maintain and increase British exports, both goods and services (UKNA,  
 D.S. 11/12, File 2/7 (E115), 1970).  
An important secret British report titled “HMG’s Policy towards the Sultanate of Oman, 
British Interests in Oman” was sent from Foreign and Commonwealth Office to R. A. Lloyd Jones, 







a. To maintain good relations with the present and any successor regime in the     
Sultanate. 
b. To maintain continued and unhindered support, and search for high-quality 
oil by petroleum development (Oman) Ltd. 
c. To maintain and increase British exports, both goods and services. 
d. To maintain RAF staging facilities and the BBC station at Masirah (UKNA, B2930 
(D.S. 11/12, May 1971). 
Another secret (UK eyes only) British document, “Future United Kingdom Defence 
Activity in Oman”, also points to British interests in Oman. This message was sent from the British 
Embassy (Muscat), to S. L. Egerton, Arabian Department on 16th September 1971. 
The objectives of British policy in the Gulf area as a whole, including the 
Sultanate of Oman are: 
a. The promotion of stability and peace 
b. The preservation of British and the limitation of communist influence 
c. The maintenance and expansion of UK trade and economic interests,  
including the uninterrupted flow of oil on reasonable terms (UKNA, NBM  
10/5, 1971) 
All of these documents indicate that British national interests in Oman and the Arabian Gulf, 
which were primarily embodied in economic and geo-strategic interests, were directly dependent on 
the stability, unity and integrity of the Sultanate of Oman. Therefore, Britain sought to help Oman 
to achieve stability and support the country in international forums, and preventing from either 
disintegrating or falling under communist, extreme left-wing or Arab nationalist influence. 
 
5.1.5: American Support 
Wahem (1982, p. 67) argues that after the Second World War, the US started to extend its 
influence towards the Arabian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula in an effort to guarantee its economic 
interests. However, its encounters with the British in different eras prevented the US from 
promoting its influence in the region earlier. Murad (1982, pp. 16-17) argues against this position, 
claiming that there was an agreement between the British and Americans to share influence in the 
area and that America had interests in petroleum, since the United States had monopolised an 
abundance of important petroleum privileges in Arabian Gulf countries from 1925 to 1938 and after 
the end of World War II. The American administration developed privileged relations with the Arab 
Gulf States, considering it as a pressure point that they could use against the western European 







The importance of the Arabian Gulf for America increased due to fears that the Soviet 
Union would control the region and thereby control the access of oil to the US and its allies in 
western European countries and Japan. Political instability in the Arabian Gulf countries was 
therefore of great concern to the US, who noted the arrival of communist revolutionaries in Oman 
and other countries, which they felt could affect future US interests in the region. Harold Brown, 
the US Secretary of  Defense (1977-1981) warned that “support from South Yemen to the rebels in 
Oman threatens the Choke Point of the Arabian Gulf which would negatively affect oil access to the 
area”. This “Choke Point” is the strategic Strait of Hormuz in the Sultanate of Oman and through 
which 60% of the world’s oil exports pass. Therefore, the US let Britain deal with Oman, because it 
was convinced that British diplomacy would be able to suppress the rebellion in Dhofar and spread 
the peace and stability that they required in the Strait of Hormuz (Murad, 1982, pp. 16-17).  
This American policy became clear after analysing Sultan Said’s visit to the US in 1939. It 
contrasts with the argument put forward by Wahem (1982), who claims that a fierce competition 
existed between America and Britain to share areas of influence. Instead, Britain and the US seem 
to have been harmoniously and flexibly dividing their areas of influence in the region. Nakhla 
(1982) adds that, in order to guarantee its interests in the area, the American government called for 
the support of local and regional common efforts to maintain stability without foreign interference. 
It also sought to ensure the peaceful solution of regional disputes and expansion of its financial and 
economic interests with the Arabian Gulf (ibid, p. 49). Jassim (1997, p. 396) agrees that American 
policy showed sympathy with the political and military procedures that Sultan Qaboos exerted to 
defeat the armed rebellion in Dhofar, with the government officially stating that “the Popular Front 
for Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf is a terrorist destructive movement” (Sultan Qaboos, 
1971, p. 5). A report published in the American newspaper Washington Post on 21st January 1975 
indicated that the American army had sent a team to observe the war in Dhofar several years before. 
The team advised the US government that since the conflict resembled the Vietnam War in 1960s, it 
would be better for the US not to interfere directly (Mangold, 1983, p. 85). As a consequence, the 
United States supported Sultan Qaboos indirectly through Iran, which was a strong ally of the US at 
that time. It also sold military equipment to Oman after 1971, with payments amounting to 
$2,693,000 by 1975 (U. S. Congress Study of the Persian Gulf, 1980).The US intensified its efforts 
to implement its new policy in Oman specifically and the Arabian Gulf area generally by preparing 
Iran to perform the role of “the Gulf police officer”. This would enable the US to protect its 







included reinforcing Iran militarily by agreeing to supply it with arms and sophisticated military 
equipment in accordance with American strategy since the US defeat in Vietnam in the 1960s. This 
strategy which was known as the Nixon Principle confirmed reducing US foreign responsibilities. 
The aim of this “Nixon Doctrine” was to reduce the participation of US forces in armed conflicts 
around the world and instead ensuring the achievement of geopolitical objectives through the 
strengthening of US allies rather than the direct involvement of US troops. Therefore, the US 
wanted to decrease American military expansion in the Gulf by making their allies stronger, which 
they achieve by facilitating access to arms and military equipment, whether through foreign support 
or sales. This approach protected the external interests of America at a lower financial and human 
cost (Murad, 1982, p. 18). Iran was chosen to play the role of the “Gulf police officer” for two main 
reasons: the Shah of Iran was sympathetic to American interests and the Iranian population had 
increased substantially, alongside rapid social and economic development, which gave Iran the 
ability to practice its sovereignty in the Arabian Gulf (Murad, 1982, p. 19). In fact, Iran had 
considered this role even before this date, since the Shah stated that Iran started thinking that it 
should obtain military power in the area since after 1959, “We realised that US cannot play the role 
of the international police forever… our responsibility is not national or local only, but we plays the 
role of defender of 60% of the world oil reserve” (Fayyad, 1975, p. 175). Therefore, in 1968, the 
Shah of Iran declared that Iranian troops would preserve the safety and stability of the Arabian Gulf 
after the withdrawal of the British and that the Pax Iranian would replace the Pax Britannica. The 
Shah claimed to be the real defender of the Arabian Gulf and therefore started to form a powerful, 
well equipped army to fill the political and military void left by the British (Nakhla, 1982, p. 38). 
In this way, American policy became consistent with the ambitions of the Shah and his 
expanding policy in the Arabian Gulf. The Shah publicly announced that he would protect 
American interests and suppress any movement that targeted them in the area (The Gulf and the 
Arabian peninsula documents, 1975, pp. 379-389).It is therefore clear that the powerful Iranian 
military intervention in Oman against the rebels in Dhofar in December 1973 effectively expressed 
the Nixon Principle. It also illustrated Iran’s desire to expand its military, regional, and political 
role, undermining developing forces like Saudi Arabia and Iraq, which could threaten its policy in 
the area. This may have been caused, at least in part, by the US convincing Iran that it was the best 
country to play that role, as well as the provision of military and diplomatic support to that end, in 







5.1.6: Iranian support 
5.1.6.1: The relationship between Iran and Arab countries 
The Iranian presence in Oman however caused popular and official criticism from many 
Arab people and governments, who were, for historical and ideological reasons, even more sensitive 
to Iranian support than that of western countries. Islam is divided into different doctrines, with the 
Iranian following Shia, while Sunni is the state religion of all Arab nations, except Oman. Oman 
follows a doctrine called Ibadism, which is considered to be a middle ground between the two more 
widespread doctrines. The political differences between these beliefs primarily arise from the 
principle of electing the ruler, with an Ibadi preacher being called upon to choose a ruler from any 
tribe and as long as he is an adult Muslim. In contrast, the leaders in Shiite regimes are elected from 
the House of the Prophet Muhammad and those in the Sunni regime are elected by a Quraysh 
ruler(Interview of Al Harthy, 2nd January 1999). This has traditionally made Omanis more tolerant 
of the Iranians than other Arabs. Nevertheless, while Ibadism is the oldest and the most moderate 
doctrine of Islam, it is also the least followed (Ghobash, 1997; Landen, 1983).  
Sectarian division between the Arab nations and Iran has meant that neither side wanted the 
other to form a regional power that would prevent the other from being dominant. Most Arabs 
perceived any Iranian intervention in Arab area as an expansion that must be resisted, resulting in 
many proxy wars even in recent years. Most Arab countries support one party in these countries 
while Iran supports their opposition. However, it should be noted that Iran at the time of the Dhofar 
War was a monarchy under the Shah’s rule and allied to the West. In 1979, the Al Khomeini 
revolution established an Islamic theocratic republic after overthrowing the royal system of the 
Shah, changing Iranian relationships and making the country vehemently opposed to western 
powers, most especially the United States. 
 
5.1.6.2: Reasons for the Iranian support 
Dhabih and Berwyn (1980, pp. 65-66) indicate that one of the factors that motivated Iran to 
intervene militarily in Oman was the decision of the British government to withdraw from the 
Arabian Gulf by the end of 1971. The British withdrawal would leave a political and military 
vacuum, indicating a need for a party to continue the implementation of British policy by filling as 







to play that role. Iranian involvement in Oman can be interpreted as a practical reflection of its 
desire to increase its regional role, as well as to cooperate with the global powers (Worrall, 2014, p. 
30). Moreover, the success of the rebels in Dhofar raised the concern that insurgent groups would 
be gradually able to remove Gulf regimes. This would allow the Strait of Hormuz to be in the hands 
of hostile parties, threatening the interests of Gulf States by harming the international oil trade from 
which Iran benefited(ibid, p. 30). 
The Shah of Iran expressed on many occasions Iran’s responsibility to protect the Strait of Hormuz 
from the rebels in Dhofar. According to The Arab Revelation Journal, the Shah stated that: 
there is a possibility that some of the Gulf systems would be overthrown due to the 
actions of the rebels and vandals there. for example, the rebels in Dhofar, and try to 
imagine what we will face if the rebels succeeded in controlling the ruling regimes, 
since Muscat is located in front of the Strait of Hormuz. At first, several shots will 
be fired, then freely, artilleries and missiles will be lunched and I cannot be lenient 
with these destructive activities(1974, p. 13). 
The Iranian government therefore strengthened its ties with the new government in Oman, through 
support in the political and military sectors. In July 1972, an Omani delegation led by the Sultan’s 
advisor, Thuwaini bin Sehab, visited Iran. At this meeting, the two parties signed an agreement for 
Iranian military intervention in Oman to suppress the revolution in Dhofar (Ella Al Amam 
magazine, 1974, p. 18). Khaneer (1981, p. 33) indicates that Iranian officials had been requested by 
Oman to sign a treaty under which Iran would inspect the ships passing through the Strait of 
Hormuz on behalf of Oman, Britain and United States and that Oman had strongly agreed with this 
step. Assistant of the Secretary of State, Josef Sysco, said in an announcement “we trust in Iran’s 
ability in spreading safety and stability in the Gulf area” (ibid, p. 33). In summary, Sultan Qaboos 
used regional powers in Oman’s national interest. In particular, he secured the assistance of Iran to 
suppress the Dhofar revolution. Iran agreed to this request for a number of reasons, including the 
possible threat that the rebels posed to joint shipping routes between Oman and Iran. Nevertheless, 
it is important to note that Sultan Qaboos did not seem to care about Arab criticism of Iranian 
assistance, because he viewed Oman as being a sovereign state and judged that Iranian assistance 
like British assistance, was the optimal way to achieve his own sovereign aims and not a concession 








5.1.6.3:  Iranian military support 
The Iranian government agreed to the request by 
Sultan Qaboos to support his government troops in the 
Dhofar War with substantial Iranian troop deployment. 
Therefore, the Iranian fleet started to move towards the 
Dhofari coasts on November 1972, since the Omani 
authorities had temporarily given Iran the Al Hallaniyat 
islands (Kuria Muria) (see figure 41) off the Dhofar coast, to use as a military base. These islands 
provided an Iranian airport from which aircraft could strike the rebels (NSD, National struggle 
documents 1965-1974, 1974, pp. 76-77). In addition, they wanted to keep the Iranians away from 
the media and avoid official commentary across the Arab world. The Iranian role in Dhofar worried 
other Arab countries, because of the aforementioned historical and doctrinal disputes. 
Through the Dhofar War, the Iranian government therefore found a chance to expand its 
influence in the area by fighting the rebels. The Iranian forces increased over time, reaching 20,000 
fighters, by far the biggest military contribution to the war. Fayyad (1975, pp. 178-180) mentions 
that Iran sent military support to Oman during the first half of 1973 as a first phase, then Iranian 
officials to supervise the support provided, and 20 helicopters (see figure 42) with pilots and 
soldiers to Salalah and the Al Hallaniyat islands. 
The first Iranian military operation, called “Big Station”, started on 20th December 1973. 
According to Fayyad (1975, p. 181), this operation had strategic goals to defeat the rebels. They 
also threatened Yemen directly that she should reduce its military support for the rebels. With 
respect to these goals, the military goals were primarily concerned with ensuring control of Al 
Wusta (Middle) province and keeping open the road that links Salalah and Thumrait, Muscat. This 
road is called (the Red Line) which is considered as the only transportation line that links Salalah 
and other desert military centres. The Iranian troops moved in 1973 in two directions: north from 
Salalah to Al Wusta (Middle) province and south, from the desert to Dhofar’s mountains. Using 
helicopters, these troops were able to centre at a number of locations along the Red Line to reopen 
the road and to prevent the arrival of support to the eastern rebel controlled area of Dhofar, in effect 
dividing the governorate into two parts. After a month of continual fighting, Iranian troops were 
unable to reopen the road and some were surrounded by the rebels in Dhofar’s defensive locations 
(Halliday, 1976, pp. 284-285). The ordinary troops in this campaign were two Iranian brigades of 







military commander Bradley Smith as well as Omani forces. These were supported by three 
companies of the Omani desert battalion and the British RAF (Halliday, 1976, pp. 14-15). 
 
5.1.6.4: Government Informational Policy to Allay Arab Criticism of Iranian Support 
The Iranian and Omani governments sought to impose an informational overview of this 
campaign. Sultan Qaboos denied the existence of the Iranian military in Oman in an interview with 
one of the Lebanese magazines quoted by theOman Newspaper in April 1973. He stated “there is no 
single Iranian soldier in Dhofar, however, there are some Jordanian officers who assumed training 
of different army sectors”(Oman Newspaper, ‘Communist threat’,28th April, p. 1). The Sultan was 
telling the truth in his speech, since the Iranian troops only arrived in Oman on 30th November 
1972. He did not deny his intention to allow Iran to support Oman in the near future, though he 
highlighted the role of the Jordanian forces by placing stress on the Arab role in the war and 
delighted those who opposed Iranian intervention. After the arrival of the Iranian forces, the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf hurried to castigate the Omani government for 
allowing the arrival of Iranians, which led Sultan Qaboos to announce formally and explain the 
Iranian presence at a press interview on April 1973 (ibid, p. 1).  
The Sultan spoke to his Arab critics and outlined the reasons for him permitting Iranian 
military troops to intervene in Dhofar. After he first mentioned the Jordanian presence, which 
represented the Arab military role in the Dhofar War, he spoke candidly about the Iranian 
contribution to the Omani civil war. After Sultan Qaboos met the Shah of Iran and members of the 
ruling Tudeh Party in 1971, Iranian troops were deployed in support of the Sultan’s military 
campaign against the rebels, with the provision of thousands of fighters equipped with the latest 
American arms. These had been provided to Iran to reinforce its role as an aspiring regional power. 
The US interest in the region was the same as that of Britain, namely spreading peace and security 
for the betterment of long-term influence and consideration of the value of energy security through 
oil wealth. Iran acted as their proxy force. Ultimately, this support was placed in the national 
interest of Oman and the unity of the country. Syltan Qaboos stated: 
there are also Iranian fighting forces and engineering forces to build a barrier to 
prevent the rebels from sneaking from the west. Iranian forces came to help Oman 
in some of the operations in the resistance areas and they have been given a special 
mission, cooperating with the Sultan’s armed forces to enable these forces to do 







In this speech, the Sultan attempted to win the trust of his people and the wider Arab community, 
reassuring them of Iranian goodwill. He asserted, on more than one occasion, that all the war’s 
special affairs were under the control of the Omani government, which regulated the situation with 
clear policies. He assured the audience that foreign troops would return home after the rebels were 
defeated, proclaiming that, “all came to help us, and when this crisis ends and peace and safety 
spreads, the Iranian and Jordanian troops will return to their homelands”(Sultan Qaboos, 1975, p. 
1). In addition, the Sultan declared that “we are using Iranian troops to suppress the armed rebellion 
in Dhofar because the Popular Front is in alliance with the Communist party in Iran and that there 
are more than 300 Iranian soldiers and Special Forces Brigade in Oman” (ibid, p. 1). The Shah also 
indicated that some of his forces were in Oman, explaining that “we provided the support that 
Sultan Qaboos had requested. Our infantry exhausted themselves with glory when they cleansed the 
only road that links Dhofar and Muscat which was under the rebels’ control” (The Arabian 
Rebellion, 1973-1974, p. 18). After the general failure of the Iranian campaign, many clashes 
occurred between the rebels and Iranian forces. Fayyad (1975, p. 184) observes that, according to 
the military data of the Popular Front, the Iranian forces suffered 368 casualties from20th December 
1973 until 12th March 1974.  
A number of important British documents also directly clarify the British diplomatic 
approach in Oman during that period in the fulfilment of long-term British interests in the region, 
especially from an economic perspective as mentioned in a secret report entitled “HMG’s Policy 
towards the Sultanate of Oman”, which was sent from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to R. 
A. Lloyd Jones, in the British Minstar of defence: 
The continuing stability and integrity of the Sultanate of Oman is the first British 
interest… Our very close relations and indeed involvement with the present regime 
would make way difficult the achievement of good relations with certain types of 
successor regimes (UKNA, B2930 (D.S. 11/12), 1971). 
Due to Sultan Qaboos's policy, which exploited the sovereign position of his nation, he managed to 
improve relations between Oman and the regional powers. In this way, he persuaded them to 
participate militarily or financially in the war. This marked a shift in events in favour of the 
government and corresponding losses for the rebels, who began to lose their positions militarily, 
financially and diplomatically. It would have been difficult for Sultan Qaboos to make these 








5.2: External support for the rebels (1970 - 1975): Yemen 
The fourth chapter discussed the policy adopted by the Government of the Democratic 
Republic of Yemen (see figure 43) with regards to the revolution in Dhofar, after its independence 
from Britain in 1967. Yemen played an important role for the revolutionaries in Dhofar, providing 
physical, military and media support to the rebels as part of its patriotic and national objectives (The 
National Democratic Revolution in Yemen, 1972, p. 24). This was observed in a document entitled 
‘Oman: Annual Review’ 3rd January 1971, which was sent from the 
British Ambassador in Muscat to the British Minister of Foreign Affairs. This report mentioned that 
Yemen had continued to send assistance to the rebels, even after the Sultanate had received 
recognition from the Arab League (UKNA, NBM 4/1, 1972).  
South Yemen established bases for military and ideological training on its territory, in 
addition to offering comprehensive medical support and access to its various diplomatic channels. 
The Yemeni authorities also allowed a radio station to be established for the opposition, which 
broadcast daily from the Mukalla neighbourhood in the capital Aden. The rebels’ media campaign 
relied heavily on this radio station and their offices in Yemen represented the backbone of external 
communications, as well as providing a meeting centre for movement supporters abroad. In 
addition, Yemen oversaw diplomatic communications with Arab and foreign countries which 
supported the revolution (Al Rayes, 1974, p. 9). Yemen prepared bases for daily military training 
for the rebels, in Hof, Hadeidah, Mukalla and Aden. Hof was one of the advanced ration centres for 
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(June) school, which was responsible for the political education of the fighters, as well as training in 
heavy weapon use. Aden played a key role in the provision of medical services to the fighters and 
also offered military training (ibid, p. 9).  
Rebel leaders were in constant contact with the political leadership in Yemen to coordinate 
with them on various political matters. During its periodic political conferences, the leadership of 
the Dhofar revolution expressed continued support for all the actions taken by Yemen (National 
Struggle Documents, 1974, p. 11). Al Nafisi (1976, p. 150)notes that Yemeni support for the rebels 
evolved to include the provision of military protection to rebel units near the Sultanate borders. 
Yemeni forces also provided protection to the rebel supply routes into Omani territory and Yemeni 
officers provided training in guerrilla warfare. However, this does not mean that Yemen played a 
direct role in the war against the Sultan’s forces. Al Rayes (1974) explains that the Government of 
Yemen provided financial aid for the rebels of approximately 180 thousand Yemeni dinars 
annually. The Yemeni government also provided the rebels leaders with passports, while its 
embassy in Kuwait kept close contact with the rebels in the Arabian Gulf region. It also placed its 
diplomatic pouch at the service of rebel-mail, enabling it to be transferred to various Arab and 
foreign countries that supported the revolution (Al Rayes, 1974, p. 9). In essence, after securing its 
independence from British occupation, Yemen became the main gateway for the revolutionaries in 
Dhofar to the world. The political, financial, medical and logistical support that Yemen provided 
was generous and therefore extremely valuable to the revolutionaries.  
Sultan Qaboos made media statements that accused Yemen of plotting against the Sultanate 
through their support of the rebels. Furthermore, he pressured other countries to help prevent 
Yemen giving support to the rebels, warning that the revolutionary plan was intended to spread to 
other countries in the Gulf. He stated that: 
everyone knows that the southern state of Yemen embraces communist principles, 
and supports movements that claim to be made for the Liberation of Oman and the 
Arabian Gulf. The existence of such revolution backed by South Yemen, and other 
countries in the region, in addition to communist states, is conclusive evidence that 
there is a conspiracy. There is a scheme against the Arabian Peninsula, and the 
bridge, which was established in order to reflect upon their plans and their plots, 
became crystal clear, and is present in southern Yemen(Sultan Qaboos, 1974, p. 2). 
In his speech, the Sultan Speech urged all Arab countries to consolidate their efforts in the struggle 








stop the penetration of communism, and eliminate its risks from the Arab nation. 
No one denies that Aden spread this danger, and its rulers declare their 
determination to export this danger to Oman and the Arab Gulf countries, in word 
and deed (ibid, p. 2).  
The rebels’ relations with the Democratic Republic of Yemen did not remain constant, 
facing apathy in late 1974, as the Yemeni government evaluated their involvement in response to 
pressure exerted by Arab countries. Sultan Qaboos welcomed the Arab efforts to improve the 
relationship and cooperation between the Sultanate and South Yemen, especially as this undermined 
the efforts of the rebels. He stated in a speech in 1974 that: 
We have declared more than once that we welcome any kind of effort between us 
and our neighbour, southern Yemen, to stop embracing the rebels and providing 
them with support in all its forms...We have received in our country, the Arab 
League delegation. I have talked to the delegation and to Mr. Mahmoud Riadh, and 
placed all facts in front of them. I hope that the result of this endeavour is to reach a 
solution or persuade the Arab League, that sparing Arab blood is the most 
important... I have been waiting, since Oman became a member of the Arab 
League, for brothers to undertake to stop this bleeding (Sultan Qaboos, 1974, p. 1). 
Mahmoud Riadh, referred to in this speech, was the Secretary-General of the Arab League at that 
time. It should be noted that the pressures exerted by the Omani government on southern Yemen 
and the isolation of the country from regional financial and political support ultimately led Yemen 
to review its relations with the rebels, as these pressures had started to make the relationship more 
detrimental than beneficial. Sultan Qaboos added pressure by opening his door to any mediations 
leading to the cessation of Yemeni support for the rebels.  
Nakhla (1982, p. 35) also suggests a military explanation for the decline of Yemeni support, 
claiming that Yemen realised in 1973 that the Iranian forces, along with soldiers of the Omani, 
British and Jordanian forces, were advancing to resolve the war in favour of the Sultan. In response, 
the Kuwaiti mediation between the Sultanate and Yemen in 1973 began preparations for a 
resolution of the dispute between them over Yemen's support for the rebels. The government of 
Yemen began to reduce its political isolation with its neighbours from the Gulf States, in an effort to 
create an atmosphere of solidarity. Fayyad (1975, pp. 189-190) has come to another conclusion, 
arguing that the Iranian and British troops may have threatened the government of Yemen through 
the application of military pressure on its border adjacent to the Sultanate. This pressure would have 
been intended to ensure control of the western region facing the borders of Yemen, enabling them 







through which supplies passed to rebel forces, reducing Yemeni military aid that could reach the 
rebels and delivering a clear message to countries sympathetic to the rebels that Iranian, British and 
Omani government forces were in control (ibid, p. 189-190). It seems likely that Yemen realised 
that if the rebels continued to use their bases within Yemeni territory, the joint military forces of the 
Sultan could violate their sovereignty by entering into Yemen to destroy the military bases of the 
rebels. As a consequence, the rebels became trapped with no support from neighbouring countries. 
In addition to the military factor mentioned by both Nakhla(1982, p. 35) and Fayyad(1974, 
pp. 189-190), which resulted in Yemen reducing its support for the rebels, Hensel (1982, pp. 199-
200)argues that the economic factor played an important role in the change in Yemeni involvement 
in the conflict. He argues that the government of Yemen started to reconsider its policy towards the 
Arab Gulf states in November 1974, in an attempt to secure access to foreign capital and end its 
isolation since its independence in 1967. In response, Yemen received promises of economic aid 
from the other Gulf States, provided that they stopped supporting the Dhofar rebels, leading Yemeni 
contributions to the rebellion to decrease sharply. Fayyad (1975, p. 114) adds however that even 
though Yemen reduced the size of its military aid to the rebels, their official government statements 
remained supportive of the revolution. They also condemn Iran's military intervention in Oman. The 
closure of the Yemeni border was a severe blow to the rebels, as this denied them all foreign aid, 
such as from the Libyan Republic (see section 4.5.1) and the Soviet Union (see section 4.5.5). The 
arrival of the joint forces at the Yemeni border was therefore essential in stabilising and ensuring 
Omani sovereignty on the border, which had been outside the control of the Sultan’s government 
since 1967.  
 
5.2.1: External support for rebels: Libya 
The contribution of Libya was characterized by instability, as the Libyan government took 
two contradictory stands on the Dhofar revolution. With the political changes in Libya after the 
September 1969 revolution, Muammar came to power in Libya. Gaddafi shared the same belief as 
Abdul Nasser, the President of Egypt, as he perceived that the solution for Arab peoples lies in faith 
and the application of Arab nationalism (Al Rayes, 1973, pp. 9-10). Libyan-Omani relations 
became closer after the Sultan’s visit to Libya in December 1972, during which Gaddafi showed 







Dhofar. He also expressed his understanding of the presence of British officers in the Sultanate 
army. He expressed a desire to stand against communist ambitions in Oman, which Oman would 
not be able to resist without the support of a super poweror British forces. The outcome of this 
meeting resulted in Gaddafi sending a delegation of Libyan soldiers on a fact-finding mission 
headed by Colonel Hamid BelQasem. The delegation arrived in Oman on 10th January 1973, where 
they visited Salalah, the centre of military operations command against the rebels. The delegation 
had discussions with the Sultan and senior officials the possibility of providing Libyan aid in 
various fields. After returning from Salalah, BelQasem stated that, “your cause against communist 
rebels in the Sultanate of Oman is fair. The Sultanate is considered the front line of the UAE and 
Arab countries in their struggle against communist belief in the Arab world” (Al Rayes, 1973, p. 
9).The undersecretary to the Omani Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that “Sultan Qaboos’ visit to 
Libya hadachieved positive results. It was hoped that the visit of the Libyan delegation would 
contribute to the defeat of the communist terrorists in Dhofar” (Oman Newspaper, 1972, p. 1).  
The Libyan government decided to mediate between the Sultanate of Oman and the 
Democratic Republic of Yemen, in an attempt to restore political relations between the two 
countries, and to end the military aid provided by the government of Yemen to the rebels in Dhofar. 
For this reason, a Libyan delegation visited Aden in 1973, during which they visited areas 
controlled by the rebels. Later the same year, in September 1973, the Libyan government invited a 
delegation from the PFLOAG to visit. The rebels received a positive response from the Libyan 
leaders with regards to the provision of military aid. A Libyan military aircraft arrived in Aden in 
November 1973, carrying weapons and military equipment for the revolutionaries. Another 
delegation from the front visited Libya in December 1973, leading to an office being opened for the 
Front early in 1974 (Al Rayes, 1974, p. 6). Al Rayes (1974, p. 6) notes that the cause of the change 
in the Libyan position can be traced to the decision of rebels to hide, 
the face of the Marxist revolution by replacing pictures of Lenin and Guevara with 
pictures of the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, and they replaced Marxist books 
with the Holy Quran, in order to gain the sympathy of the Libyan government, and 
to persuade the Libyan delegation that they are fighting against the influence of the 
imperialist powers and the power of Iran cooperating with it (Al Rayes, 1974, p. 6). 
Fayyad (1975, p. 133) suggests that the rapid and sudden change of the Libyan position can be more 
easily explained as a reaction to the arrival of Iranian forces in the war in 1973. This dissatisfaction 







to the intervention of Iranian forces. Thus, the nature of the Libyan anti-revolution position was 
completely reversed. The Libyan media started to publish news about the revolutionaries and their 
battles with Iranian forces, even urging Arab countries to provide unlimited military aid to the 
rebels (ibid, p. 122). Dhiab (1984, p. 164)also attributes the rapid change in Gaddafi’s policy 
towards the Dhofar rebels to another factor, which is Sultan Qaboos’ refusal of Gaddafi’s opinion 
regarding annexing the UAE to the Sultanate. This theory is informed by Gaddafi already having 
told Sultan Qaboos that Libya was ready to unite UAE with Oman if Sultan Qaboos is hesitant 
about it. Examination of the Green Book (Libya’s constitution) (Muammar Al Qaddafi, 1977, p. 13) 
demonstrates that the general reason for the sudden and rapid change in the Libyan position was 
influenced by Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi’s faith in the Arab nationalism. Gaddafi considered 
himself to be the heir to Nasser in the leadership of Arab nationalism, which compelled him to 
reject any external intervention in an Arab problem, especially from Iran. Instead, he called for any 
problem and conflict in the Arab region to be solved internally between the countries of the Arab 
world. The encouragement Gaddafi offered to Sultan to annex the UAE is situated in the same 
context as Arab nationalism, namely in opposition to the establishment of any new entities in the 
Arab region in favour of the comprehensive unification of all Arab countries.The Libyan president 
decided to change his policy with regards to the Sultan, because Arab nationalists were extremely 
sensitive to the Iranian presence in the Arab world. Sultan Qaboos did not however respond to 
Gaddafi’s demands for the removal of the foreign forces supporting him. This principle of not 
allowing intervention from any outside forces in Omani decisions or affairs demonstrates that the 
Sultan had retained primacy over Oman affairs. 
 
5.2.2: Iraq 
Relations between the rebels and Iraq were strengthened significantly in 1973, due to the 
military intervention of Iran in Oman, as a result of its perception of Iran as a common threat to 
both parties. The Iraqi government accused the Iranian government of conspiring against the 
national government in Iraq by raising the Kurdish matter and conducting military provocations 
along the border with Iraq, thereby preventing Iraq from forming as a regional power to rival the 
Iranian role(Fayyad, 1975, p. 123). The Iraqis provided financial support for the rebels during this 
period, donating 100-120 thousand Iraqi dinars annually (70,000 – 84,000GBP) (Al Nafisi, 1976, p. 







well as opening training centres for the rebels on various types of weapons inside Iraq. Iraqi media 
organisations played an active role in news coverage of the rebels, publishing detailed news about 
the military operations that they carried out against the Sultan’s forces and foreign forces in 
Oman(Ba'ath Party, 1975, p. 3). In 1972, the Iraqi government agreed to open an office of the 
Popular Front in Baghdad, in order to support the media position of the Front. The Iraqis bore all 
the financial expenses of the office, which was very active in media and political matters (Al Nafisi, 
1976, p. 153). Iraq also embraced at the end of March 1974 the International Conference for 
Solidarity with the Struggle of the Arab people and the Arabian Peninsula. The conference was 
attended by the permanent Secretary of the Organisation of Afro-Asian and National Council for 
Peace and Solidarity and aimed to help Arab nations to remove imperial influence. In his opening 
speech, Na’eem Haddad, a member of the national leadership of the Ba’ath Arab Socialist Party, 
stated that Arab nations should stand by the Arab revolution in the Arabian Gulf, adding that Iraq 
was willing to provide support for the Arab revolution to achieve its goals (Ba'ath Party, 1975, p. 3). 
A conference was held in Baghdad in March 1975, to seek an end to the Iranian “intervention” in 
Oman, under the title “Oman and the Arabian Gulf Week” with participation from Arab 
delegations, under the slogan “Defeating the Iranian invasion in Oman, and repelling Iranian attacks 
on Iraq is the duty of every honest nation” (Ba'ath Party, 1975, p. 3). The Baath Party Socialist 
National Leadership condemned the Iranian attacks on Iraq and Oman, and demanded that “all 
means were taken to condemn the colonial conspiracy against the Arab revolution in the Arabian 
Gulf” (Ba'ath Party, p. 3). Through its representative in Iraq, the PFLOAG praised the Iraqi 
government’s political and financial support of its revolution in Dhofar. Iraqi support for the Dhofar 
rebels was a reaction to Iranian support for the government forces in Oman, in which Iraq attempted 
to use the rebellion as a proxy war against Iran, due to the involvement of Iranian forces in Dhofar. 
Iraqi assistance to the rebels entered across the Yemeni border, as blockades by the joint forces 
began. Oman seemed to become a location for Iraq-Iranian agendas of leadership in the Gulf States 
in 1970-75.  
 
5.2.3: Syria and Egypt 
The relationship that the rebels enjoyed with Syria was limited during this phase, with the 
Syrian media focused on the events in Oman, particularly after Iran's military intervention against 







revolutionaries on the Iranian assault (Fayyad, 1975, p. 126). Like Iraq, Syria was governed by the 
Ba’ath Socialist Party (Rayes, 2011, p. 2), an Arab nationalist group who opposed Iranian 
interference in the Arab world.  
Meanwhile, relations between the rebels and Egypt went through two contradictory stages. 
The first was in the era of the late President Jamal Abdel Nasser (1956-1970), where relations were 
very sophisticated, with extensive Egyptian support being provided for the rebels. Following the 
Egyptian defeat in 1967 by Israel, relations were curtailed to the establishment of special offices for 
the Front in Cairo, in addition to ongoing media support for the revolutionaries in the form of data 
and reports broadcast by the Egyptian media (Fayyad, 1975, p. 126). The second phase was 
represented by a wave of sudden political changes in the relationships between the Front and Egypt. 
This stage took place after the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat came to power, following Nasser's 
death in 1970, and was characterised by the deterioration in relations between Egypt and the 
revolution leaders. The Egyptian authorities closed the PFLOAG office in Cairo and asked the 
representatives of the revolution to leave the country. At the same time, the Egyptian government 
began to establish closer ties with the government of the Sultanate of Oman, following its 
recognition by the Arab League on 29th September 1971. The Egyptian media also turned against 
the rebels, broadcasting and publishing advertisements and news stories about the achievements of 
Sultan Qaboos in various fields (Fayyad, 1975, p. 127). Fayyad states that Egyptian policy towards 
the rebels changed because Egypt established close relations with both the government of the 
Sultanate and the Shah of Iran. The main reason for the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat stopping 
support for the rebels and evicting their representatives can be attributed to a national shift of Egypt 
away from revolutionary Arab nationalism. Indeed, the nationalist movement was abandoned in 
Egypt with the death of Abdel-Nasser, as evidenced by the establishment of diplomatic relations 
with Israel in the Sadat era (ibid, p. 127). The defeat of Egypt in 1967 profoundly affected the 
revolutionaries. Egypt responded by attempting to minimise the profound repercussions of the 
outcomes of the war, which had deprived it of the ability to properly support Arab nationalist 
revolutions. The transformation of the revolutionaries to a communist stance also negatively 
affected the relationship with Egypt, because this ideology was perceived as a tool of Soviet and 








5.2.4: Algeria and Palestinian 
The rebels’ relations with Algeria continued through the Front office in Algeria (Fayyad, 
1975, pp. 125-126). Algerian media attention regarding the rebels increased during the first years of 
the 1970s. On 27th July 1972, the Algerian People's Daily called upon “sincere and honourable” 
forces in the Arab world to provide both material and moral assistance to the rebels, condemning 
foreign interference in Omani affairs. In addition, it demanded national unity for all political 
currents in the Gulf region, in an attempt to remove any conspiracies being hatched in the region 
(The Arab World Record, 1972, pp. 23-25).After 1973, the Algerian government followed a 
balanced policy in its relations with both the rebels and the Sultan (Fayyad, 1975, p. 126).  
The relations between the revolution leadership and the Palestinian leaders were very good, 
with the rebel leaders in Dhofar taking a hostile stance against the schemes to end the Palestinian 
revolution. When the Rogers Project, which sought convergence of the Arabs with Israel, was 
initiated in July 1970 and accepted by both Egypt and Jordan, the General Command of the 
PFLOAG condemned this project, and announced its full support for the Palestinian command 
(Fayyad, 1975, p. 133). Later, there was an exchange of official visits between the leadership of the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf and the Democratic People's Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine. In August 1970, talks were held between the two delegations, 
headed by Saleh Raafat, as the representative of the Palestinian side, and the Dhofar Front, led by 
Mohammed Ahmed Al Ghassani, a member of the Executive Committee General of the Front 
command (National Struggle Documents, 1974, pp. 101 -104). The position of the Palestinian and 
Dhofari Fronts were supportive of the Dhohar revolution which was described as a “Popular Arab 
revolution”, against Sultan Said and against Israel. This was demonstrated through the political 
statement of the PFLOAG, which stressed that the “unity of the Palestinian work, and the 
commitment to the strategy of a People's Long War, is the optimal reaction to the capitulatory 
solutions and conspiracies that face the Palestinian revolution” (National Struggle Documents, 
1974, p. 24).  
After the October 1973 war between the Arabs and Israel, the rebels clearly defined their 
position towards the US and any convention, which stressed the legitimacy of Israel's control of 
Arab lands. The statement of the PFLOAG stated that the: 
wide US movement, and the accompanying proposals, if accepted, will lead to 







Palestinian people to liberate the entire territory…The United States provides its 
base, Israel, with all military, political and economic needs, and the struggle against 
Israeli aggression, and Israeli racial entity, cannot be separated from the struggle 
against the US imperialist presence... Any convention with Israel cannot be a 
conference for peace, but it would be a conference for surrender, and the beginning 
of the implementation of all the imperialist projects to liquidate the Palestinian 
cause (National Struggle Documents, 1974, p. 51).  
In a short period of time, the leadership of the Palestinian revolution surpassed verbal and 
rhetorical support by offering real action and diverse support for the rebels in the Dhofar. Nafisi 
(1976, p. 156) notes that the People's Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine sought to 
provide military and technical assistance to the rebels in Dhofar, including weapons training and 
assistance to perform assassinations inside the Sultanate in 1972. Fayyad (1975, p. 139) adds that 
the Palestinian National Liberation Movement “Fatah” supported the Dhofar rebels in their war 
against the Iranian forces in 1974 by providing military advice on tactical issues. The Palestinian 
media also played an important role in transferring the events in Oman to the Arab people from the 
standpoint of the revolution. Palestinian organisations denounced external interference in Oman’s 
internal affairs and Iranian interference in particular. On 18th March 1975, the military source of the 
Palestinian News Agency (WAFA) stated that “this intervention will lead to a real disaster, not on 
the Gulf Arab level, but on the Arab national level”(Fayyad, 1975, p. 1).  
It should be noted that there was no significant official support for the revolutionaries at a 
level that was equivalent to the military support that the Omani governmentreceived from Iran or 
Jordan, or its financial support from Saudi Arabia after Oman became a member of the League of 
Arab States. That meant that the government of Sultan Qaboos was officially recognised as the sole 
representative of the Omani people. The Omani government utilised a policy of gaining recognition 
by the League of Arab States before requesting Iranian assistance in the war, in order to ensure that 
Iranian support would not be a reason to delay accession of Oman to the Arab League. This 
recognition by all 22 Arab countries was absolute proof of the sovereignty of Oman and the 
government of Sultan Qaboos as representative of the Omani people. 
 
5.2.5: Rebel relations with foreign countries 
China was one of the first foreign countries to establish direct relations with the revolutionary 







exchange of visits between members of the PFLOAG and Chinese officials. In February 1970, a 
delegation from the Popular Front spent five weeks in China, where they held meetings with 
Chinese Premier of the State Council Zhou Enlai, in order to obtain military aid. After the Hamrin 
Conference in 1968, the Chinese applauded the new line championed by the Front, in which 
Chinese politicians confirmed that: 
the situation is excellent for the development of victories of the armed struggle of 
the Dhofar people. The Chinese urged promotion of the development of the 
national liberation struggle of all the peoples of the Arab Gulf region” (Shichor, 
1977, p. 153).  
The Chinese government used the New China News Agency in Aden to publish press reports about 
the ongoing war in Oman (Shichor, 1977, p. 53). It also covered all military operations of the rebels 
directly from the battlefield. The revolution leaders praised the material and moral support provided 
by the Chinese (ibid, pp. 153-154), which continued in 1972 and 1973. The rebels received large 
quantities of weapons, in addition to supervision and assistance from Chinese experts in the rebel 
centres which were established in Yemen (Worrall, 2014, p. 80; Shichor, 1977, p. 53). 
The Oman Newspaper reported China's support for the Dhofar rebels and denounced China's 
interference in Oman's internal affairs(Oman Newspaper, ‘Facts about Marxism’, 1973, p. 5). In 
addition, Sultan Qaboos denounced China’s decision to provide aid for the rebels, considering it 
more dangerous than the support offered by the Soviets (The Arab World Record, Arab Gulf 
Countries, 1972, p. 45). However, 1972-1975 witnessed a clear deterioration in the relations 
between China and the rebels of Dhofar. Behbahani (1984, p. 164) argues that this occurred as a 
result of the changes that had occurred in China’s foreign policy at the global level, which took 
place after the Cultural Revolution. Kraus (2012, pp. 10-13) explains that this took place between 
1969 and 1976, culminating in the visit of President Nixon to China in 1972. Beijing and 
Washington worked to eliminate hostility and restructure the international politics of Asia by 
planting the seeds of decades of spectacular economic growth in China. 
Such economic development was accompanied by China's growing interest in establishing 
sophisticated economic relations with the governments of the Arab Gulf countries that the political 
and military programme of the Front sought to overthrow (Bahbahani, 1984, p. 164). Kraus (2012, 
pp. 91-94) supports this theory, noting that the Chinese global strategy after the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution was defined by an attempt to earn “friends all over the world”. This was accompanied 







providing aid to the rebels, the Chinese started to develop peaceful relations with the independent 
countries of the Arabian Gulf, regardless of the nature of their regimes(Yodfat and Abir, 1977, pp. 
70-74).This was accompanied by a reduction in the provision of Chinese aid to the rebels. In 
addition, China also recognised the independence of a number of Gulf Arab Emirates, which gained 
their independence in the early 1970s and subsequently formed the United Arab Emirates. The 
change in China’s foreign policy toward the countries of the Arab Gulf led to the consolidation of 
relations with these countries, especially Iran, as China sought to establish optimal trade and 
economic relations. The Chinese government praised the policy of the Shah of Iran and completely 
stopped the provision of military aid to revolutionaries (Al Nahar magazine, 1974, p. 19). In June 
1973, the Chinese Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei visited Iran and told the Iranian news that: 
Iran’s plan to start a broad arming programme is a natural, logical and intelligent 
plan, so that Iran could eliminate the insurgency and sabotage movements in the 
region, which forms a threat to its stability and prosperity (The Arab World Record, 
July and December 1974). 
There is no doubt that the PFLOAG was on the list of movements indicated by this statement, 
suggesting a reversal of Chinese foreign policy toward the revolution in Dhofar. 
At the time China was reducing its support for the Front, the aid provided by the Soviet 
Union became extremely important. Page (1971, p. 94) argues that the Front became gradually and 
increasingly more reliant on the Soviets after 1971. However, the Soviet Union was not enthusiastic 
about supporting the rebels before that date, because of their previously close ties with China. 
Hensel (1982, p. 189) highlights that the Soviet Union recognised the intense hostility between the 
rebels and Iran. As it did not want to strain its relations with the Shah, which had improved 
significantly from the 1960s, there was a corresponding delay in Soviet support to the rebels. 
However, the Soviet Union had supported the revolution in Dhofar from the beginning and 
was still interested in its success. The Soviet media paid close attention to the activities of the 
rebels, particularly after 1967 when the People's Front adopted a Marxist Leninist approach. The 
Soviet press demonstrated its interest in the revolution through a number of articles that were 
published in Soviet newspapers in 1969 (The Arab World Record, Arab Gulf countries, July-
December 1974). For instance, the Soviet media highlighted relations with the rebels on 25th 
October 1969, with Moscow radio reporting that Soviet civilians made their first visit to “Dhalkut” 
village, which was controlled by the rebels. In November 1969, a delegation from the Popular Front 







Ali, a Member of the Political Committee, were also reported visiting the Soviet Union. This visit 
took place at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with the Peoples of Asia and 
Africa to discuss matters of interest to both sides (The Arab World Record, December 1969, p. 91). 
Nevertheless, the degree of support that the Soviets provided the rebels was extremely limited in 
comparison to Chinese support. At the beginning of September 1971, the Soviet Afro-Asian 
Solidarity Organisation invited a delegation from the Front to visit Moscow. This was followed by 
the Soviet newspapers highlighting the activities of the rebels against the government of Sultan 
Qaboos, described as “powered by foreign countries” (Freedman, 1978, p. 67).  
Yodfat and Abir (1977, p. 74) argue that the magnitude of Soviet support for the rebels had 
significantly increased by the end of 1971, with the Front relying heavily on Soviet aid, instead of 
Chinese aid. Nafisi (1976, p. 153) adds that, following the severance of relations between China and 
the Popular Front in 1973, the Soviets replaced China in financing the rebels militarily and 
overseeing their training. They also became the main supplier of weapons to the rebels. 
Mughisuddin (1977, p. 129) adds that the Soviets supervised the training of several rebel groups on 
fighting methods, in addition to spreading the principles and ideas of Marxism. According to 
Halliday (1976, p. 269), dozens of Soviet military consultants joined the rebels to provide military 
expertise in the use of weapons. In addition, the Soviet Navy played a key role in delivering 
weapons to the rebels through the ports of Yemen. It also provided military information to the 
rebels on the movements of government armed forces, by spying on their wireless signals. Sultan 
Qaboos accused the Soviet Union of supporting the rebels as he announced in March 1973 that 
communist ships approached the coast of his country some rebels at the beginning of the same year 
(Raafat, 1976, p. 61).  
In addition to military training, the Soviet Union provided scholarships for students of the 
Popular Front. Delegations from the rebels paid periodic visits to Moscow for that purpose (Al 
Nafisi, 1976, p. 153). A current Omani diplomat mentioned that he studied in Soviet schools in the 
beginning of the seventies. Students from the Front were provided with all possible means of 
support and care (Interview with current diplomat, 2014, RA 3). However, it is less clear how the 
Soviet Union maintained its relations with the countries of the region, particularly Iran, while also 
managing to support the rebels. Hensel (1982, p. 197) suggests that the Soviet Union was critical of 
Iranian interference in Oman, but that they limited this criticism to Soviet media in the Arabic 







China, the Soviet Union did not want to sabotage its relations with Iran because of a desire for 
access to Iranian gas. In effect, the Soviets were performing two different roles at the same time. In 
1974, a general tepidness arose in the Soviet relations towards the revolution leadership, largely as a 
result of the serious attempts of the Soviet Union to develop and expand its relations with Arab oil 
producing countries, regardless of the nature of their regimes. At the same time, the Soviet Union 
tried to appear as the global leader of communism and liberation movements. This policy gave a 
bad impression about the contradictory position of the Soviet Union to the leaders of the revolution 
(Yodfat and Abir, 1977, p. 90) (For more details of Soviet support, see Appendix 17, Secret 
Intelligence Memorandum, U.S.A Directorate of Intelligence, No. 20 34/72, entitled “The Mountain 
and the Plain: The Rebellion in Oman”, 19th May 1972). 
Foreign Assistance 
The relations between Cuba and the rebels also grew stronger from the beginning of 1973, 
when two Cuban missions visited Hof in Yemen on the Omani borders. They crossed the border 
into Dhofar to explore the situation there, as well as to study military preparations for the rebels. In 
early August 1973, a delegation of the Popular Front travelled to the Cuban capital, Havana. During 
their week-long visit they were briefed about guerrilla training. Another Cuban delegation visited 
Hof in Yemen in the same year. The delegation included members of the military and Cuban 
Intelligence Agency in addition to some journalists. The visit lasted nearly two weeks, during which 
the delegation was able to visit some of the rebel sites in the western region of Dhofar (Al Nafisi, 
1976, pp. 153-154).  The role of Cuba was limited to training the rebels on guerrilla tactics and 
first-aid (Al Rayes, 1974, p. 9). Fighters were trained in the small camp of Aden, while the medical 
training was carried out in the (Habakon Martyr) hospital at Hof area. Cuba did not provide any 
financial and military aid, such as weapons or ordnance materials. Instead, the Cuban medical 
mission working with the rebels in March 1974 confirmed that it was a modest contribution 
provided by the Cuban government to support global national liberation movements (Fayyad, 1975, 
pp. 146-147).Newspaper reports on 6th April 1974 however claimed that 8,000 Cuban soldiers had 
arrived in Aden under a secret military agreement, some of whom would support the actions of the 
revolutionaries in Dhofar (Oman Newspaper, ‘Speech of the two Leaders’,4th March 1974, p. 4). 
The rebels also enjoyed good relations with the German Democratic Republic. In 1973, 
Germany sent two delegations to Aden. They visited Hof and held direct meetings with the Front 







hand grenades and anti-tank mines. They also provided a range of military expertise to some of the 
front members, in the field of penetrating government forces lines, intelligence operations, and 
methods to supply weapons and ordnance materials to the fighters. (Al Rayes, 1974, p. 154).Rebels 
also received limited military assistance from North Korea, such as light weapons, in addition to 
training some rebels on assassinations strategies (Al Rayes, 1974, p. 9). As part of the revolutionary 
programme to establish sophisticated relationships with all national liberation movements in the 
world, the Revolution Command also forged links with the National Liberation Front of South 
Vietnam, culminating in a visit from a Vietnamese delegation to Hof and the western regions of 
Dhofar in September 1972. The Vietnamese delegation was headed by the Võ Hồng Phúc, a 
member of the Central Committee of the National Front for the Liberation of Vietnam. Amer Ali, a 
member of the Central Committee of the PFLOAG attended on behalf of the Front. The parties 
agreed to act quickly in order to forge closer ties between the two groups, as well as to exchange 
material and moral aid: “Both parties condemned the imperialist scheme hatched against them, in 
order to thwart their efforts towards liberation and independence” (The Arab World Record, Arab 
Gulf Countries, 1972, pp. 104-107). 
The revolution leadership was able to establish relations with some international 
organisations, the most important of which was the World Peace Council. On 11st to 13th March 
1974, there was a meeting in Aden between a delegation from the revolution leadership headed by 
Mohammed Abdullah, a member of the central leadership, and Romesh Chandra, the President of 
the World Peace Council. The statement issued after the talks stated that, “the World Peace Council 
condemned Iranian military intervention against the rebels, and also announced full solidarity with 
the people of Oman in their struggle against imperialism and reactionary”(DLF, National Struggle 
Documents, 1972, pp. 111-112). Fayyad (1975, p. 147)states that a seminar was also held in 
Baghdad in February 1975, in solidarity with the people of Oman, attended by the General 
Secretary of the World Peace Council. The seminar confirmed the support of the World Peace 
Council for the Revolution in Dhofar, and liberation movements in all Arabian Gulf. It also 
denounced the Iranian and Omani attacks, adding that these were backed by American imperialism. 
Pro-revolution committees were established in many countries. As a result of the expansion of 
international relations of the revolutionaries, the pro-Oman Revolution Conference was held in 
Paris at the end of December 1974. This gathering confirmed the significant role that these 
committees played in spreading awareness to the global public opinion about the revolution in 







It is clear that after the Hamrin Conference in 1968, the revolutionaries were able to open up 
globally, establishing diverse relations with a number of nations around the world. However, their 
relations with regional countries were more important, because of the geographical proximity. At 
this time, Yemen provided incalculable support for the rebels, in much the same way that Iran 
provided support of incomparable value to the government of Sultan Qaboos. Indeed, the value of 
relations with the neighbouring countries was a major factor influencing the course of the war in 
Dhofar. The recognition of the Sultan Qaboos government by the Arab League in 1971, followed by 
the acceptance of Oman as a member of the United Nations in the same year, radically altered the 
course of the conflict. Importantly, it showed the sovereignty of the state under the authority of 
Sultan Qaboos Government, comprising the highest degree of Arab and international recognition 
that Sultan Qaboos was, the sole sovereign ruler of Oman. 
 
5.3: The Fourth “Emergency” Conference in 1974 and the Rebels’ Defeat in 1975 
Every year, during the rainy season of Al Kharif (June to September), the forces of the Front 
had been able to dominate all of the mountain areas in Dhofar province. The rebel troops forced the 
Sultan’s troops and their allies to withdraw from all mountain areas before the rainy season to avoid 
attacks. However, in 1973, there was a huge change in the balance of power, since the troops of the 
Sultan and their allies were able to stay throughout the Al Kharif season in some mountain areas, 
such as JibJat, Al Haq city, and Tawi Ateer. The powerful Iranian intervention brought about a shift 
in the balance of power in favour of the allied troops. TheOman newspaper referred to these 
developments in its analysis of the words given by Sultan Qaboos and Shah of Iran during the 
Sultan’s visit to Tehran on 8th March 1974(Oman 
Newspaper, Speech of the two Leaders, 8th March 
1974, p. 1). In addition, they benefitted from British 
military, intelligence, political support and 
experience in guerrilla war, as well as from the 
involvement of Jordan, and the financial assistance 
provided by Saudi Arabia. As a result, the rebel 
forces were driven back to the western areas along 
the Yemeni borders and declined in the mountains 
during the rainy season that year. At the beginning 
Fig. 44: Two rebels during operation, 1973. 








of this phase, the rebels also failed militarily, such as in the Murbat attack in 1972 and their failed 
coup attempt in north Oman. Many of the activists and leaders of the movement were also arrested 
in both north Oman and in the Emirates (Al Amri, 2012, p. 206), which was compounded by the 
decision of ten important political leaders to join the Sultan’s troops in 1972, including well known 
figures like Mohammad Al Amri, Sahal Al Hafeez and Salem BaOmar, who were Lenin team 
members (Interview with ex-Omani officer involved in Dhofar War, 3rd June 2017, RA10). These 
events led the rebellion leaders to hold a conference in an attempt to recoup what had been lost, to 
maintain their success and sovereignty, and to attempt to find solutions to prevent the situation from 
worsening.  
 
5.3.1: The Emergency Fourth Conference (August1974) 
In an attempt to overcome the numerous emergent challenges that marked the beginning of 
the defeat of the rebels in their battle against the Sultan's forces, the leaders of the Front decided to 
hold an emergency conference in Aden, the capital city of South Yemen. The fourth “emergency” 
conference statement was issued, containing the provisions agreed at the meeting, the most 
important of which was a commitment to continue the war in Oman, against the “reactionary 
system” that was being helped by the Iranians. The rebels were focused on fighting against Iran 
considering it as the agent of imperialism in the area, which had assigned itself to police the Middle 
East. They perceived that Iran planned to control the Arabian Gulf. The rebels also stated a 
commitment to continue the war against Saudi Arabia, considering it a tool of American 
imperialism and enemy of the nationalism and national progressive movements in the area. They 
also accused Saudi Arabia of being cooperative with the colonial tendency of Iran (Al Rayes, 1974, 
p. 108). The tasks and goals of the Front for the next phase were also determined in 17 provisions 
(see appendix 18: the Front emergency fourth conference provisions). The most important decisions 
of the conference were to reduce the aim of the rebellion to the liberation of Oman, in order to focus 
on the Arab character of the area and confront Iranian expansion (PFLO Emergency Conference 
Decisions, p. 19), as well as a commitment to stand with the Palestinians and to follow an 
independent, neutral foreign policy (Fayyad, 1974, pp. 277-292).  
It is clear that the purpose of this fourth conference was, wherever possible, to remedy the 







from PFLOAG to PFLO which clearly illustrated the limitation of the Front’s ambition to bringing 
about a change in the ruling system in Oman. The Front leaders realised that their dream of 
“liberating” the Arabian Gulf had became impossible to achieve after the dramatic changes that 
accompanied the coronation of Sultan Qaboos and the decline in support from countries like 
Yemen, China, and Egypt (Oman Newspaper, ‘Chinese and Communist support for the repels 
stopped’, 15th September 1973, Issue 5, p. 5). The ambition of the revolution leaders declined 
geographically, returning to the comparatively humble aims of the rebellion, when it began in 1965, 
namely to secure Dhofar’s independence from Sultan Said’s rule. In addition, the rebels issued a 
policy of neutral foreign independence, as part of the decisions of the emergency conference 
intended to deliver a message to the most influential powers in the area, especially Britain, America, 
Iran and Saudi Arabia. These signs indicated that if the rebels succeeded in controlling Oman, it 
would be a non-aligned country, rather than under the influence of the international communist 
camp (Al Amri, 2012, pp. 216, 223, 226, 236). The rebels made the same mistake as their original 
enemy, Sultan Said, namely inflexibility and an inability to change in response to current 
circumstances. 
 
5.3.2: The Military Progress of the Sultan’s armed Forces and the Allied forces  
On the fourth National Day on 18th November 1974, Sultan Qaboos delivered a speech 
expressing his determination to beat the rebels (see appendix 19), Iranian troops and those of the 
Sultan, supported by British troops, moved to the western area in Dhofar in December 1974. These 
troops fought through many battles to fix military centres in areas under rebel influence, which 
would provide a launch point for military campaigns against the other areas controlled by the rebels. 
Iranian troops also formed military lines to isolate the rebels’ areas of influence from each other in 
an attempt to cut the lines of transport and military supplies from the rebels. One of these lines is 
the line that the British call Hornim, which is a strategic path area that separates east and west 
Dhofar. This line was 85 km long and was built of barbed electric wires and land mines. The Iranian 
troops formed a line from Salalah to Thumrait (Al Nafisi, 1976, p. 62).  
On 5th January 1975, the Iranian forces succeeded in dominating Rakhuot with the help of 
the Sultan and British forces. After this success, a third line was formed from the military centres to 







the rebel leadership, located in the Shanshiti caves. Military operations had occurred in the lines 
north of Hornim, where government forces took controll of the military equipment centres of the 
rebels and massive stockpiles of arms and ammunitions. At the end of February 1975, focused 
campaigns were waged against the rebel locations and other operations in the Al Wusta and Al 
Sharquia Middle and Southern provinces. In addition, government troops were able to enter Rasham 
valley west of the Middle Road for the first time, which was an important and powerful area of 
influence for the rebels (Clements, 1980, p. 100). 
This campaign proved the inability of the rebels to face combined Iranian, Omani and 
British troops in other military operations in the future. The expeditions then stopped until the end 
of the rainy season, as the weather profoundly affected transportation and vision in the difficult 
terrain of the mountain regions. After the success of the second campaign against the rebels, 
military preparations were commenced to undertake a third campaign to stop the continued attacks 
against the locations of the Iranian and Sultan’s forces. This campaign began on 6th October 1975 
and it consisted of British, Iranian and Jordanian troops, working in collaboration with the soldiers 
of the Sultan. It took place in the west of Dhofar, which aligned with the Yemeni borders. The 
Iranian and British forces initiated support with aircraft and artillery, attacking Hoof Port in South 
Yemen, which is close to the Omani borders (Al Hadaf magazine, 1976). This is the port at which 
the rebels imported foreign support and the supplies that they needed in their operations against the 
Sultan troops and his allies. In the western area, the Iranian troops carried out a full-scale attack in 
four directions and achieved important successes (9th of June magazine, 1976) 
The Iranian troops launched another sustained attack at the western area in Dhofar province 
that attempted to sever the remaining supply roads for the rebels travelling from Yemen (National 
leadership of the Al Ba’ath Socialist Party, 1975, pp. 221-222). The Sultan’s forces mounted an 
attack on the rebel bases and their leading centres in the Shanshiti caves. They succeeded in 
controlling this area on the third attempt, seizing a massive cache of supplies and arms. After the 
Iranian forces managed to tighten the blockade on the rebels who withdrew to Yemen through 
valleys, the military operations in this phase were close to an end. The rebels’ areas of influence had 
been completely controlled by November 1975 after the government forces moved from Sarfait to 
the east in order to rendezvous with the Iranian forces that were attacking from the west. 
By 1st December 1975, the rebels had been expelled from the coastal town of Dhalkut 







Iranian forces (Clements, 1980, pp. 100-101). The huge success of this operation was illustrated by 
the large number of rebels who surrendered themselves to the governmental forces. However, 
shelling operations continued against Omani and Iranian troops along the border areas in Yemen, 
especially in Sarfait. The effect of this was insignificant and the combing operations continued in 
east and middle Dhofar until March 1976 (Clements, 1980, p. 101). On both sides, thousands of 
people were wounded and killed. On the National Team Force side, which had split from the rebels 
and joined the government force, Mohammad Al Amri and Ahmad Al Amri were killed. Mahad Al 
Mashani was also killed while he was calling the rebels through speakers in an attempt to convince 
them to stop fighting and join the government forces. On the rebel side, Amer Al Amri, leader of 
the Eastern area; Ahmed Kattan, leader of the Western area; and Said Kattan, one of the main team 
leaders were also killed. The Iranian forces killed Muslim Gabob and Omar Jameda, who were part 
of the upper leadership of the rebels at that time (Interview Rebel Leaders, 9thDecember, RA7).  
 
5.3.3: Announcement the victory, 11th December 1975 
Sultan Qaboos praised the troops that allied with him in many informational statements. In 
his fifth National Day speech in 1975 (see appendix 20), less than a month before declaring victory, 
he stated, 
we also celebrate constant victories achieved by our heroic Armed Forces and 
National teams supported by friendly forces which have achieved real victories for 
our beloved Oman in the history of their battles and record… They are the 
protectors of our noble Islamic faith (Sultan Qaboos, 1975, p. 4). 
In a speech called The Victory Speech on 11th December 1975(see appendix 21). Sultan Qaboos 
pronounced that Oman’s achievement “is the first to be achieved by an Arab country over world 
communism in the battlefield in a war which lasted many years, and the second victory by an 
international state”(ibid, p. 4). He added that this victory was not only beneficial for Oman, but had 
been carried out “for the good and welfare of our neighbours also” (ibid, p. 4).  He then expressed 
his disapproval for those countries that had given support to the rebels, saying, 
…we made them perceive the truth and liberated them from their delusions in 
supporting evil people who commit acts of terror, killings and destruction in a part 
of a peaceful country. They kill their brothers, plunder their properties and destroy 
their homes for nothing but simply in order to terrorize, plunder and destroy (Sultan 







With Sultan Qaboos’ declaration of triumph, the revolution in Dhofar was officially over. 
Many of the rebels returned to Oman from abroad in 1975, after Sultan Qaboos renewed the 1970 
amnesty law to include all rebels without exception. By the end of November 1975, 222 rebels had 
returned to Oman. The good treatment that the returners received from the government motivated 
others to return home, ultimately leading to the unification of Oman for the first time in the 20th 
century.  
After Sultan Qaboos announced victory in Dhofar, the rebellion operations were confined 
and the revolutionary action oriented towards the 
provision of political opposition to the Omani 
government from abroad. The revolution 
leadership in exile focused on the educational side 
of their mission, with envoys sent to a number of 
international universities and countries that 
supported the rebellion, as well as donating 
scholarships. Several years later, in the 1980s, 
after the extensive development of Oman, the rest 
of the rebels returned to Oman. In addition, many 
were employed in the government sector in order 
to make best use of their experiences. The political 
opposition waged by the rebellion abroad ended gradually and the rebels eventually merged into 
Omani society without discrimination. 
In order to enhance the security and stability of Oman in the long term, Sultan Qaboos 
decided to allow US forces to utilise some of the Omani air bases in logistics operations in 1980. In 
the same year, Jimmy Carter, the President of the United States, met with Minister Zawawi, the 
Omani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. President Carter stated that:  
The United States welcomed the defeat of the rebels, as the President Jimmy Carter 
expressed his deeply felt gratitude and strong feelings about and admiration of the 
courage exhibited by the Sultan in standing firm against the very serious 
communist and Soviet threat to the region. The U.S. shares the concerns of Oman 
and looks forward to a close relationship. We appreciate the Omani decision to 
permit U.S. forces to use facilities in Oman. This will send a clear signal to Oman’s 
neighbours and the Soviets not to interfere in the internal affairs of the nations of 
the region. He added the geographical placement of Oman is of great strategic 
Fig.45: Sultan Qaboos (centre) celebrating the 
winning of the war with some Omani and 
Jordanian troops, 1975. (Source: RAO 








importance (Summary of the President’s Meeting with Minister Zawawi, Oman 
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, 1980).  
After the end of the Dhofar War, Oman was governed by national unity under Sultan Qaboos, in 
which the government and the citizens joined hands in developing the country and improving its 
relations with other bodies, whether countries or organisations, around the world. A wealth of 
literature discussed the great developmental renaissance experienced by Oman after the Dhofar war. 
For example, the Russian politician and historian Sergei Plekhanov(2004), the Egyptian writer and 
journalist Asem Rashwan(2015), the Irish and Omani writers, Vincent McBrierty and Muhammad 
Al Zubayr (McBrierty & Al Zubayr, 2004), and the Egyptian politician and writer, Emad Al Blak 
(Al Blak, 2011). As a result of the respect that Sultan Qaboos showed for the five distinguishing 
factors of the political relations in Oman during the Dhofar War, Oman has always been among the 
most stable and most rapidly progressing countries in the Middle East. For example, the Institute for 
Economics and Peace (IEP) categorises Oman as the forefront of peace and stability in the Middle 
East (The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), 2016, p. 46). 
 
5.3.4: Reasons behind the failure of the rebellion 
It is important here to describe the reasons that led to failure of the decade long revolution in 
Dhofar, which was one of the longest conflicts in the history of the region. The instrumental factors 
are believed to be the coup, Sultan Qaboos’ new policy, the depth of foreign military support, and 
the end of Yemeni support for the rebels. In all, the failure of the rebels began after Sultan Qaboos 
came to power in 1970, although their military failure came in late 1973, due to the wide and 
powerful coalition that the Sultan had brought to bear against them (Al Nafisi, 1976, p. 126). At this 
point, it became increasingly difficult for the rebel forces to confront the situation militarily. Before 
this date, they had moved freely in the Dhofari countryside. In the beginning of 1970, they had even 
begun to threaten Salalah, yet this movement had become impossible by 1974, after the rebels were 
expelled from the eastern and middle areas of Dhofar and much of the west. This decline happened 
due to the presence of huge forces, especially the Iranian military, which had more sophisticated 
arms than the rebels. Hassan (1975, pp. 30-31)asserts that the Iranian presence profoundly shifted 
the balance of power. For example, Iranian helicopters made an essential contribution in 
transporting equipment and soldiers to locations in rough terrain. The effectiveness of Iranian air 







Others emphasise the importance of British military support for the Sultan to help him 
confront the rebels (Peterson, 2007; Worrall, 2014, pp. 97,161).Hassan (1975, pp. 30-31) adds 
another factor that concluded the other in favour of government forces, namely British experience 
in guerrilla wars, which gave them numerous effective methods to confront the rebels. Structuring 
the military buffer lines was a similar strategy to that the British used against rebels in South-east 
Asia. These lines were then used as a launch site against the rebels in order to build strong 
defensive fortifications, some of which extended from the coast to the north and divided the area 
into small parts that could more easily be controlled (ibid, p. 30). The Iranian troops, according to 
British experience and advice, formed three main parallel lines of Hornhim, Deyfind and Sarfait. 
They also applied a search and destroy policy, hunting and destroying the rebels between the buffer 
lines. This policy achieved remarkable success in the Iranian campaigns against the Front (Hensel, 
1982, p. 31). 
 In addition to the military element that shifted the balance of power to the governmental 
forces’ favour, Al Nifisi (1976, pp. 126-128)opines that the defeat of the rebels could be partially 
attributed to the declining relationship between the Front and Omani citizens. The offers that the 
rebels made to the tribal leaders and the local population could no longer match the propositions 
made by the government. As a result, the front lost its popular base. Internal disputes also erupted 
between the rebel staff, after the application of communist teachings in Dhofari society. This led 
some of the front leaders to collaborate with the new government, while others continued the armed 
struggle.  
Some historians have focused on the importance of the coup as one of the essential factors in 
ending the rebellion and by which Sultan Qaboos came to power in 1970, as these events effectively 
opened the Omani government to the world (Al Tikriti, 2013, p.140; Kareem, 1972; Rabia, 2011, 
p.76).Gabob (2010) indicates that the winning people’s hearts and minds programme that Sultan 
Qaboos launched was able to end the rebellion. Al Hamdani (2010) agrees with this proposition, 
adding that this programme alleviated poverty, enabling the new government to gain the trust of 
locals. 
A secret British document entitled “Oman: Annual Review”on 3rd 1971, sent to the British 
Minister of Foreign Affairs by the British Ambassador in Muscat, noted that the Arab League 
recognition of Oman also played an important role in ending the war in favour of the government 







who suggests that the Arab League had completely failed to solve the Dhofari problem. The 
recognition of the Arab League by Oman as a member on 29th September 1971, resulted in many 
Arab withdrawing support for the revolutionaries. Oman's admission to the Arab League was the 
key to its acceptance as a member of the United Nations, which led to lessened international support 
for the rebels from parties like Egypt and Algeria. It was accepted by 117 votes at the UN General 
Assembly, with only one vote against, which was cast by the People's Democratic Republic of 
Yemen. This led to Oman being accepted as a member on 7th October 1971. Saudi Arabia abstained 
from voting because of its support for the issues of the imamate, and the border claims that Sultan 
Qaboos eventually resolved (UKNA, NBM 4/1, 1972). 
Experts who discuss the war in Dhofar typically attribute the failure of the rebels to a 
number of important factors, the most important of which include external military and financial 
support, the recognition of Oman by the Arab League and the United Nations, the policy of amnesty 
and development, and the emphasis on the sanctity of the war and the threat to all neighbouring 
countries. In addition, the change in Egyptian policy after the death of Nasser and the change in 
Chinese policy with the Cultural Revolution both adversely affected levels of support for the rebels. 
These circumstances were all in the interest of the new Omani government. It is clear that the rebel 
leaders did not try to negotiate with the Sultan and achieve political gains in response to new 
conditions, instead relying on continued military aggression and resulting ultimately in the failure of 
the rebellion after a decade-long conflict.  
The military, financial and political support that the government of Sultan Qaboosreceived 
from regional countries was also an important factor in military victory due to the new approach 
taken his diplomacy, which involved solving arguments with other countries and establishing close 
ties with them. This diplomacy propagandised that the rebellion targeted the government, people 
and religion of all countries in the region. The realisation of this threat posed by a successful 
revolution seems to have contributed to the wealth of support that the Sultan received.  
 In 1973, the balance of power had shifted in favour of the government forces and their allies. 
The rebels had exercised control over all the mountain areas in Dhofar and most of the coastal areas 
from the first years of the rebellion until 1972. However, with the support of the Iranian, British, 
and Jordanian forces, in addition to Saudi financial support, the army of the Sultan was able to shift 
the balance of power in favour of the Omani government. In fact these developments threatened to 







“emergency” conference in Yemen in 1974. This location was significant, since the preceding three 
meetings had been held in Dhofar, which strongly suggests that the rebel strongholds were no 
longer believed to be safe from strikes. In essence, the location was an indication that the rebels had 
lost their military lead and even been pushed back into their strongholds in the mountains. An 
important decision of the fourth conference was to change the front’s name from the PFLOAG to 
the PFLO. The Front shifted focus to a non-aligned policy with a particular international faction, in 
a time in which the world was divided into two sides: the west, led by the US, and the east, led by 
the Soviet Union or the People’s Republic of China was also an indication of defeat. 
It is clear that most of the provisions of the fourth conference focused on sending a message 
to neighbouring countries, especially those that supported the Sultan. They made it clear that the 
revolution had confined itself to exclusively targeting the Omani ruling system. The conference also 
indicated that this popular rebellion aimed to ensure that the Omani people would have the right to 
choose its leadership. The conference also clarified that the rebels no longer considered themselves 
a part of the communist eastern camp that the USSR or China controlled, in opposition to the west. 
The Front also warned the Arab people and governments against both Iran and Saudi Arabia, since 
the conference stated the ambitions of Iran to control Arab nations and named Saudi Arabia as the 
biggest accomplice to western imperialism. It seems these those decisions aimed to isolate regional 
countries from Oman, as it had been during the rule of Sultan Said, as well as to help the rebels 
obtain support from the countries that opposed the Iranian presence in the Arab region. 
Overall, historians have discussed the reasons for the rebels defeat, typically focusing on 
one of two factors. The first is foreign military support, which is emphasised by academics like Al 
Nafisi (1976), Hensel (1982), Peterson(2007), and Worrall(2014). The second factor is Sultan 
Qaboos’ new domestic and external policies which led the rebels to lose the support of the Omani 
people and Yemen, as discussed by Al Hamdani (2010), Al Nafisi (1976), Ja'boub (2010), and 
Kechichian (2013), Rabi(2011, p. 76), Takrit(2013, p. 140). Above all, they emphasise the success 
of Sultan Qaboos in isolating Yemen politically and economically by improving Oman's relations 
with the Gulf States and convincing them that the revolution in Dhofar also threatened them, and 
that Yemen was responsible for supporting the rebels.  
Most of the reasons that experts have provided for the defeat of the rebels are important, 
including foreign military support, the coup, Sultan Qaboos’ new domestic policy and the loss of 







to new developments. Moreover, the revolution leaders did not negotiate their ambitions with the 
new Sultan, instead continuing to fight as though in a continuation of their conflict from the era of 
Sultan Said, following the same ambition to (liberate) the Arabian Gulf. They failed to understand 
that the new government had a wider domestic and diplomatic perspective, which granted it access 
to extensive military support, in addition to a wide range of non-military policies that took the 
rebels by surprise. For example, the comprehensive enhancement programmes in the areas from 
which the rebels were expelled, the amnesty policy, openness to regional countries, and the 
recognition from official organisations like the Arab League and United Nations. Most notably the 
Sultan also moved away from British influence and embarked upon a period of focused self-rule 
and independence of British pressure, demonstrating that he was a global regional agent, who was 
in sovereign command of his own governance.  
 
5.4: Chapter V Conclusion 
The timing of the coup that overthrew Said bin Taimur, the strongest Sultan of Oman since 
the mid-nineteenth century, was planned and undertaken very carefully. This was intended to make 
people consider it as a corrective revolution that was being carried out to ensure a better life for the 
people, in the same way that Nasser’s coup had been conducted against the monarchy in Egypt. 
Although most of the planners and executors of the coup were Omanis, it is evident that there was a 
great deal of support provided by British contracted officers who were working in the military and 
intelligence services of Oman and who had very good relations with Sultan Qaboos. It was also 
British oil company staff that enabled much of the communication with Sultan Qaboos before he 
took office. British documentary evidence indicates that those few British officials who supported 
the coup had received no official instructions from their government, instead operating on their own 
initiative. The British government had been concerned that the action may have resulted in a 
dangerous loss of confidence in the British secondment officers serving in the forces of a number of 
countries, by opening them to accusations of interfering in the internal affairs of states (UKNA, 
M.O. 5/49 (F 55) DS11/2/7/2, 1970).Historians have argued a number of reasons for the coup 
against Sultan Said. Peterson (2007, pp. 201-202) highlights the important role played by Sayyid 
Tariq in persuading the British government to help organise a coup support the Sultan. Others place 
greater importance on the fear of British diplomats regarding increasing rebel threats to the Strait of 







the change of political system in Oman. Meanwhile, Qasem (2000) argues that an important reason 
for the coup was that Sultan Said had isolated Oman politically. Whichever reason is proposed, it 
included the importance British policy of eliminating the Dhofar revolution, especially once its 
activities started increasing in the north of Oman, threatening its nascent oil industry. This oil was 
invaluable to the British and they needed to defeat the rebels and achieve stability and peace in 
Oman before their planned withdrawal from the region at the end of 1971. Ultimately, however 
Britain was part of a wider alliance of force which Sultan Qaboos constructed rather than an 
informal imperial government determining policy.  
After assuming power Sultan Qaboos pursued a number of integrated external and internal 
measures to control the rebels in Dhofar in contrast to his father who had solely focused on military 
solutions. The external measures began when the British government advised Sultan Qaboos of the 
importance of improving relationships with neighbouring countries, leading to his historic visits to 
Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Jordan. During these visits, he sought to convince the other countries of the 
region, that they should think of the war in Dhofar as their own war, as well as urging those 
supporting the rebels to cease their support. Because it is a religious state, the Sultan was able to 
convince Saudi Arabia to support Oman on the grounds that the Dhofar War was also a holy war 
against the anti-Islamic Marxist ideology that had been adopted. He convinced Iran, a more secular 
state at that time, that the rebels would pose a direct threat to Iran if they controlled the Strait of 
Hormuz. He argued that Oman was only the beginning of the communist tide in the region, given 
that the revolution had been renamed “The Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf”. 
This approach enabled the Sultan to gain military support from Iran and Jordan, as well as financial 
support from Saudi Arabia. Iran’s support was especially valuable, as their comprehensive military 
assistance involved the participation of more than 20,000 Iranian combatants, as well as 
sophisticated air and naval forces. Despite their faith in the same religion, Islam, Sultan Qaboos 
recognised the sensitivities of the historical, religious and political relations between the Shah of 
Iran and other Arab nations. Therefore, he asked the Iranians to use the Kuria Muria Islands, near 
the coast of Dhofar, as a base for their troops, keeping them away from the locals and the media. 
The Omani leadership adopted a media policy designed to calm the fears of the Arab peoples and 
governments regarding Iranian support, stressing that this support was to defeat the enemies of 
Islam and their communist servants. Importantly, Qaboos pushed to ensure that the Iranian presence 
was known to be temporary and that it would end once the war was resolved. Overall, it can be 







powers, with Iran's military and Saudi Arabia’s financial support and this support allowed him to 
defeat the Dhofar Liberation Front. His diplomacy was testimony to his sovereign control over 
Oman.  
With regard to the internal procedures carried out by Sultan Qaboos to deal with the rebels, 
probably his most important and successful policy was to invest the funds obtained from oil 
exportation in economic development. Unlike his father, Sultan Qaboos took British government 
advice regarding the necessity of starting a comprehensive development programme in Dhofar as an 
important part of a rebel resistance program. Therefore a programme for “winning hearts and 
minds” was launched in Dhofar, involving several major development projects. This was supported 
by the steep rise in oil prices at that time, as a result of the Arab war with Israel in 1973. Official 
Oman statistics (Oman Economy in Ten years, 1980, p. 20) indicate that, since its inception in 1970, 
the development process had made great strides in many areas, including construction, 
transportation, electricity, water sectors, internal trade, and the banking sector. As a result, there 
was an increase in home construction projects and a sharp rise in employment in the Sultanate. All 
of these contributing factors helped the new government to win the war in Dhofar (Ja'boub, 2010). 
It can be argued that the amnesty decision issued by the government, another internal policy 
brought in by Sultan Qaboos, was an especially important factor in resolving the war in favour of 
the government troops (Al Rayes, 1973; Kally, 1972; Qasem, 2000). These actions had a direct 
impact on the support previously enjoyed by the Front, as locals welcomed the new Sultan and 
found in this his a means to achieve social gains, enabling them to secure a better life for 
themselves and their children (Worrall, 2014).  Sultan Qaboos also used the media effectively in the 
war against the rebels, employing sophisticated tactics to convince sympathisers and revolutionaries 
that their demands had been answered, thereby making continuation of the war unnecessary. He 
utilised effective anti-revolutionary propaganda and strategies of psychological warfare, including 
publishing pictures of leaders who surrendered to the forces of the Sultan in influential regions of 
the rebels, renaming loyalist forces after influential and popular figures like Nasser, and even 
financially rewarding the rebels who joined the government. The aim of this “hearts and minds” 
policy was to remove the justifications for the revolution by treating its main causes, although it 
should also be noted that the new Sultan still invested heavily in the military aspect of his campaign 







The rebels responded negatively to the new political change in Oman, which they portrayed 
as being planned by British policy. The leaders of the revolution did not show any change in their 
goal of overthrowing the government. Instead, in reaction to the coup, they held the third 
conference of the revolution at Ahleesh, in the west of Dhofar. One of the most important decisions 
of the conference was to change the name of the PFLOAG to the PFLO, which pointed to the 
diminished ambitions of the front. This move demonstrated that the rebels were still aiming at the 
overthrow of the new government and that none of their fundamental goals had changed with the 
coming of Sultan Qaboos. The conference also stressed the need to develop rebel foreign relations 
in response to the development of the new government's foreign relations. The portrayal of Sultan 
Qaboos as a puppet of an imperialist British government however began to sound false as he 
constructed a military and regional alliance with Iran, Jordon and Saudi Arabia.  
During this period, nonetheless the British government worked silently and efficiently in 
Dhofar in support of Sultan Qaboos militarily and through the provision of expert consultants. It 
also oversaw the formation of national teams, using defecting rebels to fight against their former 
colleagues in the revolution through their knowledge of key locations and fighting methods. In 
addition, the British armed forces carried out a number of successful military operations, in 
coordination with the Omani and Iranian forces. The US supported the new government in Oman 
indirectly, with perhaps the most prominent support being represented in its blessing for British 
policy of supporting the Omani government against the rebels. The US government also supported 
Iranian intervention on behalf of the Sultanate. It is likely that the US was counting on Iran to 
spread stability in the region, thereby removing the need for direct US military involvement. 
Wahem (1982) claims that Britain and the US were fighting over the opportunity to spread their 
influence in the region, but findings agree with Murad (1982)who argues that America and Britain 
were more diplomatically sharing their influence to a large degree. 
After Sultan Qaboos came to power, he implemented external and internal measures to face 
the rebels in military, political, economical and social terms. In response, Yemen, the most 
important country supporting the rebels, stopped its limited provision of support in 1974. This 
decision has also been attributed to the arrival of Iranian forces in the borders of Yemen (Fayyad, 
1974; Nakhla, 1982). Hensel (1982) argues that Yemen realised that gaining economic assistance 
and ending its political isolation was a safer option than supporting communist revolution, 







League in 1971 may also have been an important factor in curbing Yemeni support for the rebels 
(Fayyad, 1974). The emergence of the Gulf States and Iran as global financial powers because of 
their oil wealth led many regional countries to pursue business relations with them and the 
emerging GCC stipulated that Yemen must stop its support for the rebels in order to receive 
economic aid. It should be noted the headquarters of the Arab League were in Cairo, which was 
highly influential on League decisions. Egypt had blessed the arrival of Sultan Qaboos to power, 
not only cutting off aid for the rebels, but also expelling of all the representatives of the rebels from 
Cairo in 1970. In addition, China changed its policies after the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), 
preferring economic cooperation with Gulf countries, rather than interference in their internal 
affairs. The consequence of these varied factors led Yemen to stop supporting the rebels and 
contributed to the success of Sultan Qaboos and has reassertion of Omani sovereignty over Dhofar.  
 Sultan Qaboos focused on improving relations between the government and the 
tribal leaders, as well as realising the importance of Islamic values in the struggle. The Sultan 
improved his government relations with the royal family of Oman as well as regional countries. 
Sultan Qaboos maintained special diplomatic and military relations with Britain. From analysing 
the events of the war, it becomes clear that the Omani government was far more independent than 
much of the literature argues (e.g. Abdalsatar, 1989, p. 46; Beasant, 2002, pp. 200-201; Fadel, 1995, 
p.212; Halliday, 2008, p. 331; Miles, 1920, pp. 222-230; Omar, 2008, pp. 6-7; Owtram, 2004, p. 16; 
Samah, 2016, p. 273; Sultan & Naqeeb, 2008, p. 26; Wilson, 2012, pp. 331-332). The Omani 
government was not only autonomous, but also exercised independent and sovereign autonomy, 

































This chapter seeks to highlight the main objectives and summarise the findings of this study 
in order to provide a cogent answer to the issue of Omani independence and sovereignty under 
investigation in this study of the Dhofar War. 
Sultan Said (1932-1970) assumed the throne of Oman from his father in 1932. At that time, 
Oman was divided between the Sultanate of Muscat, governed by the Sultan, and Imam of Oman, 
governed by the Imam. As a consequence of the political complexity of the region, the rulers prior 
to Said had been dependent on the support of British experts in operating their governments. 
However, during his rule, Said managed to wrest power from British officials, culminating in the 
removal of many informal supervisors and foreign experts who had been recruited into the country 
since 1889. He placed heavier reliance on local Arabs, many of whom had anti-British feelings 
(Shdad, 1989, p. 122). The policy followed by the Sultan reflected his general desire to preserve his 
legitimate rights and his determination to be independent, with the freedom to act as he wished. The 
reaction of the British in the face of these moves by Sultan Said proves his policies were successful 
in the longer term (Ateeqi, 2007, p. 54). These actions are likely to have been at least partially 
attributable to Said’s realisation that many of the problems facing his predecessors could be 
attributed to high debt and the threat of British subsidies being withheld for non-compliance with 
British interests. In an attempt to free Oman from this onerous situation, the Sultan leveraged the 
resources of the country to repay the national debt. Striving to attain a greater independence than his 
father had enjoyed, Said also confronted the British through the purchase of weapons from other 
countries (Shdad, 1989, p. 123), which reflected his desire to ensure his legitimate rights, 
independence, and freedom to act. In this way, Sultan Said developed and negotiated his 
independence, and that of his country as a whole. 
 
Causes of the Revolution 
The evidence in this thesis indicates that the revolution in Dhofar (1965-1975) against the 
rule of Sultan Said (1932-1970) began as a result of internal factors that were reinforced by external 
circumstances. Some of these internal reasons for the revolution were poverty, limited job 
opportunities, and a general lack of educational and health services in the Sultanate of Muscat and 
Oman, especially in the Dhofar region. In addition, the Sultan adopted a heavy-handed, legalistic 







especially the people of Dhofar, sought work in other Gulf countries, which had grown rich from oil 
exports. When these people experienced the lifestyles in neighbouring countries, they developed a 
strong desire to enact change in Oman (Abdul Redha, 1972, p. 58; Al Khasibi, 1994, p. 157; Al 
Rayes, 2000, p. 2; Al Sa’adi, 1976, pp. 84-85; Al Zaidi, 2000, p. 310; Kechichian, 2013, p. 157; 
Landen, 1983, pp. 480-481; Rabi, 2011, p. 24). This internal realisation of the need for revolt was 
exacerbated by external circumstances, perhaps the most important of which were the conditions 
that dominated the Arab World in the 1950s and 1960s. These were best characterised in the Arab 
Nationalist Movement against western imperialism, which was led by Egyptian President Jamal 
Abdel Nasser. His perspectives were reinforced by the victory of Egypt against Britain, France and 
Israel in the Suez War in 1956. The ideals of Arab nationalism were promoted by Egypt’s most 
popular media (Arab Voice Radio), which exhorted people to take down ‘despotic’ leaders who 
cooperated with imperialist nations (Bahbahani, 1984, pp. 144-145; Barut, 1996, p. 395; Haglawi, 
2003, pp. 310-311; Ja’aboob, 2010, p. 248; Saleem, 1980, p. 45). It is clear that these internal and 
external factors, especially the poor living conditions in comparison with neighbouring countries 
and the spread of Arab nationalism, played an important role in igniting the revolution against 
Sultan Said.  
The findings of this thesis clearly illustrate that one of the most important reasons for the 
war in Dhofar was Sultan Said’s lack of respect for the tribal leaders. This factor has not been 
addressed in the previous literature, yet it distinguished the political relations of the nation, with the 
Sultan’s imprisonment of one of the tribal leaders, Musalim bin Nafal, serving to ignite the war. 
Another important factor was the bad relationship between the government of Oman and the other 
countries in the region, where the support given to bin Nafal by Saudi Arabia, and later Kuwait, Iraq 
and Egypt, played a major role in the inception of the revolution. These sources afforded the 
fighters with the necessary military training and weapons required to challenge the Omani rulers, as 
well as offering safe haven from which the rebel plans could be coordinated. The religious 
orientation of the Dhofar Charitable Association, whose leaders led the revolution during the first 
phase (1965-1967), played a key role in securing the support of Saudi Arabia and the leaders of the 
Imamate, as well as the local people in Dhofar mountains.  
It is also clear from the analysis in this thesis that the policy adopted by Sultan Said policy 
sought to distance Oman from any potential threats to his rule. These included opposing pressure 







nationalism, which incited the peoples of the Gulf to overthrow their ‘autocratic’ rulers; and 
distancing Oman from the influence of the imperialist powers. Ultimately, the Sultan sought to 
ensure that he would have the independence to implement the policies he desired, but his regional 
isolationism aggravated internal problems leading to the Dhofar War.  
 
The Policy of Sultan Said, Sultan Qaboos and the British 
Sultan Said consciously isolated Oman from the rest of the world in an attempt to prevent 
the ideas of Arab nationalism from affecting his citizens. His financial policy neglected the 
development of national infrastructure, because his priority was to repay his father’s debts and 
thereby ensure independence for the Sultanate from the influence of creditors, including Britain. 
Researchers (e.g. Ateeqi, 2007, pp. 211-212; Mansy, 1996, p. 245) have shown that some aspects of 
the policy adopted by Sultan Said were theoretically sound, albeit unsuitable for the critical period 
of the region’s history. Analysis suggests that the Sultan sought to regulate his financial affairs in 
order to fulfil the important aim of limiting the ability of the British to use Omani debt as a lever by 
which to exert diplomatic pressure over the Sultanate. As an independent decision-maker, Sultan 
Said was known to be very sensitive to this issue of British control. This is best exemplified by his 
reluctance to begin national development until the receipt of oil export revenue, in order to limit his 
reliance on foreign powers (UKNA, BC1052/3, 1965), which he believed was necessary to preserve 
the unity and national identity of Oman (UKNA, FCO 8/569, FR: BC1/2, 1966).As part of this 
move to minimise British influence and increase his freedom, the Sultan also transferred the capital 
from Muscat to Dhofar and established a new security force that was independent of the official 
armed forces, which were managed by British officers (Interview Ahmed Al Harthi, 2016; Mansy, 
1996, p. 282). This strategy was partially in response to a failure to use the Americans to limit 
British influence. The Sultan realised that this tactic would not be viable during his visit to the US 
in 1939, where he became aware of an understanding between Britain and the United States 
regarding their interests in the region. Sultan Said’s policy aimed to limit formal or informal British 
restriction of his sovereignty.  
However, the beginning of oil exports quickly offered change of living conditions and 
relations with neighbouring countries in the region, beginning the process of opening the Sultanate 







led by the inspirational character of Nasser, sparked changes and comparisons across the Arab 
world. During this period, communism moreover began a period of aggressive expansion in the 
region, in recognition of the latter’s increased importance due to the discovery of oil. These 
conditions made a volatile, rapidly changing political climate that was ultimately unsuited to Sultan 
Said, given his preference for developing a policy of gradual change and isolationism. Nonetheless 
in this first period of the revolution (1965-1967), the British did not place significant pressure on 
the Sultan to improve the living conditions of his citizens or to address the numerous reasons for the 
outbreak of rebellion. In fact, British officials considered the revolution to be an internal issue. This 
policy changed when the threat of revolutionaries increased against British’s oil interests in Oman. 
The British sought to end the conflict by helping to develop the military forces of the government, 
as well as by offering civil assistance and military intelligence. At this stage, largely as a result of 
the embarrassment suffered during the Suez War in 1965, the British endeavoured to minimise their 
involvement. Instead, they concentrated on oil discoveries and investments, as well as eliminating 
their competitors in Oman and protecting British interests, such as their air bases and the port in 
Dhofar. 
The leaders of the rebellion during the first phase, namely the Dhofar Charitable 
Association, were mature, experienced and Islamic in orientation. They were overturned by 
younger, nationalistic leaders of the Dhofar branch of the Arab National Movement. The new 
leadership radically changed the policy and orientation of the front, as embodied by the decisions of 
the second conference held in Hamrin in September 1968, where communism was adopted as the 
foundation of the revolution. The leaders of the conference also decided to expand the scope of the 
revolution from Dhofar to the entirety of the region. Therefore, the name of the Front was changed 
from the The Dhofar Liberation Front to The Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab 
Gulf. The goal of the new leaders was to get more support of communist countries like China and 
Yemen, after Egypt’s support declined consequent to their defeat by Israel in 1967. The new leaders 
applied communist principles to the people in the areas that they controlled: tribal leaders were 
stripped of their privileges and given equal rank to their communities; women were given the right 
to make their own decisions and made equal to men; and the people were barred from practicing 
religious rites. This resulted in some of the more conservative residents becoming resentful, as in 
the case of the leaders of charitable societies in Oman who could not show their anger in fear that 
this might put their lives at risk. They found the opportunity to express their dissatisfaction in the 







to communism was a significant error by the revolutionary leaders, because these ideas were alien 
to the simple and staunchly tribal environment of Dhofar. The profound difference between the 
communist ideology and the indigenous culture offered the Sultan an excellent opportunity to incite 
internal and regional Muslim opinions against the communist rebels, as well as allowing him to 
market the war as a holy endeavour that enabled the inclusion of foreign Muslims, like Iran and the 
Gulf countries. Sultan Qaboos sought to re-establish his sovereignty over Dhofar by this indigenous 
appeal to Dhofar and the wider region.  
In 1968, when Oman started to export oil to other countries with the assistance of British 
companies and under the supervision of British diplomacy, the government of Oman gained an 
incredibly lucrative revenue stream. As a consequence, the British recommended heavy investment 
the development of Oman, in order to placate the populace. However, regardless of the diplomatic 
pressure that they exerted, Sultan Said declined to follow their advice, as he had no wish to rush the 
distribution of these funds. The Sultan also ignored British advice on improving the infrastructure 
and operation of his government, as well as forging strong relationships with other countries in the 
region. As a consequence of these policies, the British government developed a growing 
dissatisfaction with the rule of Sultan Said. Sultan Said was nonetheless keen to maintain the 
independence of Oman and to make the decisions that he deemed appropriate, even when they were 
contrary to the wishes of the British government. Most notably, he made the decision to refuse to 
commence regional development, despite the availability of the necessary financial resources after 
the beginning of oil exports, which from the perspective of his subject and the British government 
generated growing opposition to his rule. Maintenance of his sovereign against external pressure led 
to domestic decline in his sovereignty in Dhofar.  
Another important and closely related consideration in the analysis of this period, which is 
not present in the literature, is the opposition that Said faced from his family. Initially, this 
opposition was led by the Sultan’s brother, Tariq, who sought to establish a government in exile. 
Tariq incited the British government and tribal leaders, as well as many members of his family, to 
help overthrow the Sultan. It is important to note that Tariq had been one of the most prominent 
aides of Sultan Said in the war of the Al Jabal Al Akhdhar (1957-1959). However, when he was not 
rewarded with an important position, Tariq responded with hostility (see section 2.4.6 for more 








Sultan Said was convinced that the British would intervene in Dhofar, as they had done in the 
earlier Al Jabel Al Akhdhar War (1957-1959). In effect, he expected to have the conflict solved at 
no personal cost. Indeed, due to threats to their strategic assets, particular their air base and port, the 
British were inexorably dragged into the conflict. In response, British diplomats asked the Sultan to 
transfer the British Royal Air Force base to their second air base in Oman, which is located far from 
Dhofar, on Masirah Island. The Sultan refused this request, stating that they could either station 
troops in both bases or neither, as per their formal agreement. In this way, he sought to oblige the 
British to enter the war. This manipulation to ensure their involvement illustrates that Sultan Said 
exerted a profound influence over British actions. Despite the relative weakness of Oman, he 
succeeded in ensuring the involvement of one of the most powerful countries in the world as a 
direct party in the Dhofar conflict to his own advantage, manipulating them to establish to the 
purpose of his own independence and sovereignty.  
On one side, the discussion of the British government about the potential sudden death of 
Sultan Said, acknowledging the power and authority vacuum that this would cause in Oman (Al 
Harthi, pp. 539-540), illustrates that the Sultan was in power and running his, 2007 country On the 
other side, Sultan Said realised that the British government would not allow the revolutionaries to 
overthrow the regime in Oman, because this would end its influence in the area. However, events 
proved the misjudgement of Sultan Said about support for his specific government. In early 1970, 
military operations extended to northern Oman, threatening the oil pipeline connecting the oil fields 
to the port of export in Muscat, which the British and Omani relied on heavily for their financial 
revenues. At this critical time, Sultan Said was displaced by his only son, Sultan Qaboos, who 
ascended to power on 23rd July 1970. This event marked the beginning of the third phase (1970-
1972) of the revolution. Many consider this to be a turning point in the contemporary history of 
Oman. The coup was the direct cause of a radical shift in the internal and external policies of the 
Omani government and the Omani people. British national interests coincided with the national 
interests of the Omani people in replacing Sultan Said, who had not given development momentum 
in line with the aspirations of the people. Sultan Qaboos hastened to devise a plan to contain the 
revolution on both the local and regional levels. In the formulation of this plan, he paid special 
attention to the five distinguishing factors of the political relations in Oman during the Dhofar War, 
which this thesis is unusual in the literature for noting these five factors: the relationships with tribal 







the diplomatic and military relations between Oman and Britain. It was his attention to these factors 
which consolidated his sovereignty over Oman.  
At the local level, he sought to meet the demands of the people through socio-economic 
reforms and shifting the military balance of power especially through a general amnesty and the 
good treatment of all revolutionaries. The amnesty initiative launched by Sultan Qaboos profoundly 
affected the revolution, with rebellions and schisms emerging as a direct consequence of his policy. 
Some of the pro-revolutionary tribes declared that their main objective was to bring about social 
change for a better life, although they alienated many through the administration of death sentences 
carried out on revolutionaries who were accused of being loyal to the new government. However, 
many revolutionaries decided to take advantage of the amnesty offered by Sultan Qaboos, which 
provided an opportunity to compromise and negotiate for some revolutionaries among the 
communist rebels, especially those from the initial stage of the revolution (1965-1968) who had 
split from the rebels and resorted to areas controlled by the government. Since assuming power in 
Oman in 1970, such internal policies implemented by Sultan Qaboos, as well as procedures for 
winning the war in Dhofar, showed that he acted as an independent ruler. In effect, this 
transformation supports the argument that Oman was a fully sovereign state. 
At the regional level, Sultan Qaboos constructed a supportive alliance of states, Britain sided 
with the ruling power in Oman, defending the regime in order to maintain historical ties with the 
Sultanate and ensure the protection of its strategic interests and its market in the region, especially 
after its withdrawal from southern Yemen in 1967. In recognition of Chinese and Soviet 
intervention, the US supported British policy in the Gulf because of its anti-communist policy 
during the Cold War. The Sultan undertook concerted efforts to persuade other regional powers like 
Iran, Jordon and Saudi Arabia to cooperate to halt the spread of communism by opposing the rebels. 
Finally, since its independence from Britain in 1967, South Yemen had been the main supporter of 
the revolutionaries. However, it amended its policy after the Arab League and the United Nations 
recognised the Sultanate in 1971, shifting its attention to development of its economic interests 
through contact with other Gulf countries instead of supporting the revolution. This may also have 
been a reaction to the land losses that occurred after the intervention of Iranian forces along the 
Yemeni border with the Oman. These actions illustrate how Sultan Qaboos negotiated to maintain 








Existing Literature: The Role of the British Government in the Dhofar War 
Many earlier studies and articles discussing the Dhofar War have tended to examine the 
conflict from primarily a military perspective (e.g. Buttenshaw, 2010; Dunsire, 2011; Fiennes, 
1974; Gardner, 2007; Jeapes, 1996; Ladwig, 2008; Medhi, 1995; Peterson, 2007). These western 
authors have focused on the importance of the role of the military in winning the war. However, 
other studies have examined the conflict from different angles. For example, a number of 
investigations have examined the war from regional and international perspectives, as well as from 
countries supporting one of the major parties in the conflict (e.g. Al Amri, 2012; Trabulsy, 2004; 
Haglawi, 2003). Others have focused on local events and aspects, examining the approaches applied 
by Sultan Said and then Sultan Qaboos in treating their people (e.g. Al Hamdani, 2010; Ghobash, 
1997; Ja’boub, 2010; Kechichian, 2013; Landen, 1983; Rabi, 2011). Finally, some books have also 
taken an ideological approach (e.g. Karam, 1971; Philips, 1974); economic perspective (e.g. Lunt, 
1981; Wilkinson, 2006) or models of colonisation and imperialism in the discussion of the war 
(Abdalsatar, 1989; Geraghty, 1982; Lunt, 1981; Murad, 1989; Philips, 2012; Shdad, 1989). Many 
previous books focus on the dominance of the British role. 
This study has identified that the nature of the relationship between the sultans of Oman and 
the British government is only one of a number of factors affecting events in Oman. Another 
particularly important factor affecting the events in Oman was the relationship between the Sultan 
and the tribal leaders, which is intimately connected with the role of Islam in the struggle. This 
study argues that the relationship between the Sultan and the tribal leaders was mirrored by the 
relation between the leaders of the revolution with the tribal leaders. This relationship is important 
in tribal societies, such as in Oman, particularly in more rural areas like Dhofar. Citizens in the 
Dhofari community usually follow the leaders of their tribes, meaning that securing the loyalty of 
tribal leaders typically guarantees the loyalty of its members. In the causes of the Dhofar War, it is 
apparent that Sultan Said ignored tribal leaders and failed to ensure the development of deprived 
tribal areas. In contrast, during the first phase of the war, the commanders of the Front took good 
care of tribal leaders and strengthened the role of the tribe, leading to widespread support for the 
movement, with the tribes serving as popular incubators for the revolutionaries and a source of 
fierce fighters. When the revolutionaries changed to the adoption of communist ideals, calling for 
an end to the role of the tribe and the complete emancipation of women, this angered tribal leaders 







towards Sultan Qaboos, recognising that he respected the tribal system (Agwani, 1978, p. 71). They 
used this as an opportunity to publicise their animosity, fight the revolutionaries, maintain the 
influence of their tribes, and ensure the continuation of tribal customs and traditions. Development 
projects and the policy of winning minds and hearts helped to encourage tribal leaders to choose 
Sultan Qaboos. This was supported by the value that he placed upon Islam, which was influential 
for the tribes who followed and applied its teachings. Sultan Qaboos realised this value and sought 
to confront the communist principles that the revolutionaries adopted at the second (Hamrin) 
conference. He launched a relentless media campaign to focus upon the fact that these principles 
contravened the ideology of Islam, which was deeply rooted in Omani society. His message was 
that facing the revolutionaries was part of a war to protect Islam, which enabled him to secure the 
support of traditionalist tribal groups that had previously fought the government. In addition, this 
approach wider ensured support from a number of Muslim countries in the region.  
The second factor is reflected in the unity of leadership on the side of the Omani 
government and rebels. Again, the relationship between the Sultan and his family is mirrored in the 
relationship between those who led the revolution before the Hamrin Conference and those who had 
assumed leadership afterwards. The findings in this thesis show that Sultan Said took a harsh stance 
in dealing with his family, declining to give them important positions in the government hierarchy, 
and this decision backfired on him. Like other Omanis, many of Said’s family moved abroad. They 
were led by Sayyed Tariq, the younger brother of Sultan Said, who hastened the overthrow of his 
brother by establishing a strong Omani opposition run by the government in exile. When Sultan 
Qaboos came to power, he recognised the importance of rewarding his family and gave many of 
them high positions in the government. On the other hand, while the relationship between the 
leaders of the revolution during the first phase was very good, it later became strained during the 
second and third phases. This is because the later phrases were characterised by the replacement of 
the leaders of the Dhofar branch of the Arab National Movement, excluding the leaders of the 
Dhofar Charitable Association who had dominated the leadership during the first stage. United 
leadership was an important factor in winning the war, a fact that was recognised by Sultan Qaboos, 
who endeavoured to strengthen his ties with his family and especially to obtain the support of his 
influential uncle, Tariq. 
Relations between the Sultans and other countries in the region were an extremely important 







Arabia, Iran, Yemen and Egypt, is mirrored in the relationship of the revolutionaries with these 
countries. Studying the Dhofar War illustrates the importance of the relations between the Sultanate 
and neighbouring countries, with the isolation brought about by Sultan Said serving to worsen 
relations with many influential regional countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, or even severing 
ties with them completely, as in the case of Iran and Yemen. Despite the involvement of the 
communist revolutionaries in the second phase of the war and the opposition of influential countries 
in the region to the tenets of communism, the Sultan Said did not receive any support. This severely 
undermined the position of Sultan Said in the face of the revolutionaries, which hastened his 
removal in response to the gains being made by the revolutionaries in the region. On the other hand, 
the improvement that Sultan Qaboos made to the relationship with influential countries of the 
region enabled him to obtain important support from Iran, Saudi Arabia and Jordon, in addition to 
political support from Egypt. The assistance provided by regional powers was instrumental in 
Qaboos winning the war in Dhofar. In contrast, the revolutionaries strengthened their relations with 
Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states during the first phase. However, the decision by the rebels to 
adopt communism resulted in Saudi Arabia and Egypt severing relations with the revolutionaries, 
making them completely dependent on Yemen to compensate for their loss of regional support.  
An important value, factor not the most important, in understanding the Dhofar conflict and 
the political relations in Oman was nonetheless the diplomatic and military relations between the 
Sultanate and Britain. This study has illustrated how the relationship between Sultan Said and 
Sultan Qaboos with Britain was mirrored by the relationship between the revolutionaries and 
Britain. When relations between Sultan Said and the British were good in the first phase of the 
revolution, the British government offered help to combat the revolution. However, after the Sultan 
rejected their advice about the development of Oman and the relations with other regional powers, 
the British side realised that Said was a deterrent instead of an inability issue for their national 
interests in the region, which inevitably strained their relationship. This ultimately resulted in the 
British government blessing the new government led by Sultan Qaboos, which served their interests 
as the new ruler hastened to develop his country, lift restrictions and develop his government in 
response to their advice.  
These factors can be considered the distinguishing values of political relations in Oman 
during the Dhofar War and perhaps the most important in the recent history of Oman in general. 







British as a key factor, this study suggests that it was not the most important variable in the conflict. 
Instead, this study argues that the values of the tribe, Islam and unity of leadership were of greatest 
importance, as reflected in government policies that secured victory in the conflict and 
demonstrated that the Sultanate of Oman had the sovereignty and independence to focus on its 
national interest, as perceived by the sultans.  
 
Reasons for the Failure of the Revolution: The Importance of Indigenous Factors  
Historians have discussed the reasons for the rebels defeat, typically focusing on one of two 
factors. The first is foreign military support, which is emphasised by academics like Al Nafisi 
(1976), Hensel (1982), Peterson (2007), and Worrall (2014). The second factor is Sultan Qaboos’ 
new regional policy, which led the rebels to lose the support of Yemen, as discussed by Al Hamdani 
(2010), Al Nafisi (1976), Ja'boub (2010), Kechichian (2013), Rabi (2011) and Takrit (2013). The 
findings in this study clearly indicate that there are also two primary indigenous explanations for the 
failure of the revolution in Dhofar. The first reason for the failure of the rebellion is the significant 
contradiction that arose between a secessionist movement that had not yet been able to control the 
territory of Dhofar and its ambition to simultaneously ‘liberate’ the entire Arabian Gulf, rather than 
focusing on Dhofar before expanding the scope to include the other countries in the Gulf. This issue 
arose with the change in the leadership of the revolutionaries and the movement’s adoption of 
communist ideology after the decisions of the Hamrin Conference (second conference) in 1968.  
The ambition of the leadership of the revolution can be recognised as unrealistic, given that 
the Gulf region, as the largest repository of oil in the world, constituted one of the most vital areas 
for the world economy. It meant that Britain was not prepared to leave Oman, to face upheaval 
alone. In simple terms, the overthrow of the regime and the rise of communism in the region would 
inevitably destroy British interests in Oman. Moreover other countries of the Arab Gulf saw that the 
fall of Oman could lead to communist countries gaining influence over the region during the Cold 
War, which would result in other Arab nations quickly falling to communism (Al Harthi, 2007, p. 
374).In consequence, the last three years of the revolution saw a pronounced decline in the military 








The second reason for the failure of the revolution was that the leadership of the revolution 
proved unable to adjust to the great change in political leadership, namely, the end of the reign of 
Sultan Said, who they had sought to dethrone. The leaders of the revolution lost control over key 
factors in Omani political relations during the Dhofar War, which they had previously enjoyed, such 
as: tribal loyalty, respect for Islam, and a strong relationship with other regional powers. Most 
importantly, when the revolutionary leaders lost these values, they were gained by the new Sultan. 
When Sultan Qaboos took power, it stimulated a lack of consensus between the leaders of the 
conservative and nationalist revolution and increased division between supporters of the 
revolutionaries. This difference contributed strongly to the defeat of the rebels. Ordinary citizens in 
Dhofar were simply interested in the removal of Sultan Said, whose authority was linked to 
suffering from hunger, poverty, disease and ignorance. Once those needs were met, they decided 
that Sultan Qaboos differed from his father in important ways and that there was therefore no need 
for further conflict. Instead, they perceived that revolutionaries were seeking power, rather than to 
improve the situation of the common people of Dhofar as they had claimed. There was no interest 
from the leadership of the revolution to marry political action with military action, with the sources 
showing no intention to enter discussions with the new Sultan. In contrast, the policy of Sultan 
Qaboos was clearly to win the hearts of those involved and to convince them to end the conflict. 
This tactic was undertaken with the aim of ensuring their collaboration in the building of the new 
Oman, which he publicised through the media and the distribution of publications in the areas held 
by the revolutionaries. In effect, this policy suggests that Sultan Qaboos realised that many of the 
revolutionaries loved their country and wanted it to flourish, but that they had seen the former 
Sultan as an obstacle to that goal. By cleverly demonstrating his patriotism, Sultan Qaboos 
managed to persuade many of the first phase leaders to abandon the revolution. In general, it can be 
said that the leadership of the revolution failed to distinguish effectively and accurately between the 
value of military action and political negotiation with the ruling authority. Importantly, as noted 
above, the leadership of the revolution was also unable to adapt to the completely new situation that 
rapidly unfurled after the coronation of Sultan Qaboos. It is clear that the new situation could not be 
managed through armed conflict, especially after the overwhelming Iranian military intervention in 
favour of the forces of the British, Jordan, and the Sultan. In other words, the revolution was based 
on armed struggle and showed an inability to respond, despite signs that the armed conflict was no 
longer successful, after the failure of the coup at the end of 1972 and the intervention of Iran in 







reign of Sultan Qaboos in Oman, and they failed due to the inability to negotiate, rather than 
continue to fight. Interestingly, the reasons for the defeat of rebels are extremely similar to those 
that caused the collapse of their enemy, Sultan Said. Essentially, both failed due to an inability to 
adjust to changes in the prevailing conditions. It is clear that the reasons for the victory of Sultan 
Qaboos were not limited to the new policies that he implemented or the foreign support he received, 
as the literature argues. Instead, the reasons are deeper and, based on the Sultan using indigenous 
values and factors required for success in Oman and the Gulf region. 
 
The Nature of the Relationship between the Omani Sultans and the British Government 
This study has also examined the Dhofar war in relation to British diplomatic policy, with 
particular reference to the political interactions during that period. The findings demonstrate that the 
main focus of the British government during this conflict was the suppression of the rebellion and 
halting the spread of communism in Oman at the lowest possible political, human, and material 
cost. In addition, the British sought to minimise any potential embarrassment in the wake of the 
disastrous Suez War in 1956. Britain opposed the independence of Dhofar, as well as demarcating 
the border between Oman and Yemen before its withdrawal in 1967. These actions were undertaken 
to serve far-reaching, British political and economic interests in Oman and across the entirety of the 
Gulf, suggesting that any assistance provided to Oman was self-serving in nature. Britain also 
encouraged the development of Oman and contributed expertise to structure governmental units and 
build the national armed forces, all of which were important contributions in the construction of 
modern Oman to preserve the unity and stability of the country. The British government realised 
that their far-reaching interests in the region depended upon the stability of Oman's status and 
ensuring the continuation of the independent power of the Sultans over the area. In effect, this thesis 
argues that the national interests of both countries have been historically linked and that Oman 
managed to preserve its unity through British support, because the protection of British national 
interests also required the protection of Oman against both internal and external threats.  
In consequence, the British government reacted swiftly and effectively. British interventions 
were limited during the early years of war (1965-1967), due to their perception that the conflict was 
as an internal affair that did not require military intervention or pressure to be placed on the ruler to 







Sultan Said succeeded in involving the British into the Dhofar War through his refusal of their 
request to withdraw their forces from Salalah air base, ensuring that they retained soldiers at Salalah 
and Masirah. The Sultan realised that the British government would ensure the defence of Oman as 
it had done in the Al Jabal Al Akhdher (the Green Mountain) war (1957-1959), thereby maintaining 
his control over the country. The British government therefore became more involved, offering 
military support and exerting pressure for necessary change to be made to policies, especially 
improving living conditions, developing the government, and enhancing relations with other 
countries in the region. However, Sultan Said elected to ignore this advice, maintaining full 
sovereignty in decision-making and therefore deciding to follow the path that he believed 
appropriate, namely to stall the implementation of development plans while creating economic 
independence for the Sultanate. The majority of extant studies conceptualise the British-Omani 
relationship in terms of British imperial control and corresponding Omani subservience, lack of 
autonomy, and formal or informal colonisation (e.g. Abdalsatar, 1989, p. 46; Fadel, 1995, p. 212; 
Halliday, 2008, p. 331; Miles, 1920, pp. 222-230; Omar, 2008, pp. 6-7; Owtram, 2004, p. 16; 
Samah, 2016, p. 273; Sultan & Naqeeb, 2008, p. 26; Wilson, 2012, pp. 331-332;). However, it 
should be noted that other studies have recognised that the Omani government was at times both 
autonomous and sovereign (e.g. Geraghty, 1982, pp. 98-100; Lunt, 1981, p. 32; Murad, 1989, p. 
463; Philips, 2012, pp. 352-353; Shdad, 1989, pp. 220-221). This thesis has demonstrated that both 
Omani governments had a developing and negotiable autonomy, rather than existing as a direct 
colony or an informal colony as commonly argued in the literature. 
This study shows that the Omani sultans limited and controlled British intervention, 
although the manner of this refusal differed from one sultan to another according to the 
circumstances and their specific potential. Their disapproval was sometimes expressed indirectly, 
such as through excuses of illness, travel or abdication, as in the case of Sultan Taimur, Sultan 
Said’s father. Other times, the refusal was more direct, as in the case of Sultan Said, who refused to 
take any British advice in regards to his development policy or in terms of cooperation with other 
countries in the region. Some Arab historians consider the coup that put Sultan Qaboos on the 
throne to be part of Britain's arrangement to ensure their ‘strategic, economic and security’ interests 
before the withdrawal of British forces from the regions east of Suez (e.g. Agwani, 1978, p. 71; Al 
Takriti, 2013, p. 140; Dhiab, 1984, p. 109). This thesis argues with the proposition that the coup 
primarily arose from the desires of an elite group of Omanis, rather than the British, led by Sultan 







Jeapes, 1996, p. 27; Muqaibl, 2002, p.285).Sultan Qaboos did his best to learn from the mistakes 
that his father had made. He strengthened the relationship with the British government, and reaped 
the benefits of its military, economic, and diplomatic expertise in fighting the rebellion (Mowafi, 
1994). The findings of this study suggest that it was clear to Sultan Qaboos that the British were 
operating a primarily self-serving strategy. Nevertheless, Qaboos was able to distance Oman from 
any forms of informal imperialism, domination, or unipolar stances. Instead, he utilised the military 
might of Iran and Jordan, as well as relying on financial support from Saudi Arabia. This bold step 
also demonstrated that he was, the ultimate decision maker in Oman and that Oman was become a 
sovereign country. 
The most important of the allies that the Sultan was able to secure was Iran, which provided 
instrumental support in the military defeat of the rebels through the extensive involvement of 
Iranian forces in Dhofar at the end of 1973. This action was assisted by the ambition of the Shah of 
Iran to limit British influence of the region, as well as to counter the infiltration of communism in 
the Gulf, which could threaten the global shipping corridor in the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranian 
scholar Muhammad Jawad stated that the Iranian who participated in the Dhofar war were the elite 
Iranian troops and therefore the most effective soldiers that could be sent (Jawad,2014). Although 
the Iranian intervention upset many Arab countries, such as Libya and Iraq, their military assistance 
was invaluable due to the relative weakness of the armies of Oman and many other Arab nations, as 
well as the unwillingness of Britain to contribute more troops. Recognising that Iranian influence 
made them nervous, Sultan Qaboos sent messages to the other Arab countries, reassuring them that 
the military intervention would end with the end of the war. The other major player in the region, 
Egypt, also supported Sultan Qaboos after policy changes made after the decline of Arab 
nationalism in the wake of its military defeat by Israel in 1967 and the death of Nasser. These 
changes also precipitated the deterioration in relations between Egypt and the revolution leaders. 
Thus, since the beginning of the era of Sultan Qaboos, Oman has interacted closely with the 
regional states, rather than restricting its relations exclusively to Britain. After 1970, the Dhofar 
War rapidly hastened this interaction. In general, the nature of the relationship which Omani rulers 
and the British was closer to the description provided by some writers (e.g. Geraghty, 1982, pp. 98-
100; Lunt, 1981, p. 32; Murad, 1989, p. 463; p. 46; Philips, 2012, 352-353; Shdad, 1989, pp. 122-
123), namely a relationship of friendship, cooperation, and exchange of interests Omani rulers have 
generally taken advantage of this relationship to meet the long-term needs of an independent. As Sir 







The plain fact is that, even in our own service, only those officers who have actually 
dealt with Arabian peninsula affairs fully realise that the sultanate is independent 
(UKNA, BC 1052/6, 1965). 
Likewise, Sultan Qaboos also answered accusations that the rebels had made about informal 
imperialism from Britain, noting instead that, 
We are getting support from Saudi Arabia and Britain to perform Oman’s internal 
reform project… We do not find difficulties in dealing with the British because they 
are here to work as experts for us and we take advantage of their experiences in 
reforming the country and building the army soldiers (Sultan Qaboos, 1973, p. 1). 
Regardless of whether or not the decisions made by Sultan Said and Sultan Qaboos were 
correct, they insisted on the implementation of policies that they deemed were appropriate, which 
indicates an ability to act independently despite British diplomatic pressure. The relationship with 
the British was an important value in the events of the Dhofar War, in addition to the key role 
played by tribal unity, Islam, the unity of leadership, and the relations between the leadership of the 
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The status of the Sultanate under the leadership of Said 
A British report from J.S.R Duncan, a British diplomat to Sir William Luce,the Political Agent in 
the Arabian Gulf, dated 15th July 1965, shows the status of the Sultanate under the leadership of 
Said (UKNA, F.O., BC 1015/13) 
 
The Sultan’s main problems were: firstly the creation of an administration more suited to the times; 
secondly the consolidation and development of his armed forces; thirdly, improvement of his 
international relations (which must include coming to terms with the rebels abroad); fourthly, a 
measure of constitutional devolution… first the primitive nature of administration in the 
Sultanate… the Sultanate is a large country by Gulf standards; 82,000 square miles in area, with a 
population of about 750,000. The Sultan succeeded his father in 1932 when he was twenty-two 
years old, lived alone at Salalah for the past seven years. He ruled, feared and unloved by means of 
a mass of decrees (covering the smallest matters) inflexibly applied by his personal adviser, military 
secretary (both British), his Minister of Interior and Governor of Muscat (both Omanis). The 
Military Secretariat has an efficient and reasonably well staffed department but the others have only 
a few Pakistani and Indian clerks twice a week, on Mondays and Thursdays. Each of these four 
persons speak with the Sultan from Muscat by means of a radio-telephone, raising any matter which 
has deviated or may deviate, from true doctrine. The Minister of Interior passes on by radio-
telephone or letter, any relevant information to the Walis who control the Interior. The system is 
tight, feudal, very personal and takes little or no account of the outside world. System is adequate, 










Sultan Said’s relationships with international organizations and regional countries 
A confidential report from J.S.R Duncan, a British diplomat to Sir William Luce, the Political 
Agent in the Arabian Gulf, Bahrain, dated 15th July 1965 (BC 1015/13) 
 
“He feels reluctant joining international organizations because he is deeply embittered by his 
experiences with some of the organizations. He applied to join the World Health Organization and 
was black-balled. The issue of his own postage stamps and the taking over of his postal services 
may provide an opportunity for him to join the postal union. If this were successful, other 
organizations could then be joined. … his independent image in the outside world would grow in 
strength. But as long as he declines to come into an accommodation with the four or five key rebels 
presently in Iraq or Egypt or Saudi Arabia, so will there be likelihood of their continued lobbying 
against him; claiming that he is a lackey of Her Majesty’s Government and does not truly represent 
the people of the Sultanate. The fourth problem is that of constitutional development; When the 
Sultan succeeded his father, a form of regency council was in being. This gradually withered away 
through the years and, since 1958 when the sultan repaired to Salalah, it ceased to exist altogether. 
Now there is a straightforward, remote control, dictatorship which is very unlikely to last for long. 
What is needed … a council, advisory if need be at the beginning, … the Sultan’s son might play a 
key part. But I can see neither chance of this being done, … as long as the Sultan (and his well- 
educated but untried son) live their hermit-like, insulated, lives at Salalah. … to persuade the Sultan 
to return to Muscat. … his own mental well- being, to the continuing stability of the Sultanate and 
the rejuvenation of his moribund administration. … the Sultan said … that he will return in the 
coming winter… less positive about this timing and … even though his palace in Muscat is 
presently being redecorated internally. He may delay … if he delays … we may see the 









The reasons for the British government to support Sultan Said’s regime 
A confidential British document From T. F. Brenchley to Foreign Office, dated 1st March 1965, 
entitled “Philosophy” shows reasons that led the British government to support Sultan Said’s 
regime (UKNA, BC1051/10, 1965) 
 
“The philosophy behind the Muscat civil development subsidy has been as follows. A friendly and 
stable regime in Muscat is important to our political position in the Arabian peninsula and affords 
us essential military facilities, we have in the past had to intervene militarily to support the sultan 
against rebellion in the interior; this has caused us considerable international embarrassment; to 
avoid a repetition of this we pay the sultan a substantial military subsidy to maintain armed forces 
to deter future rebellion; at the same time we provide assistance for civil development, which is 
intended to remove the inclination of further rebellion by spreading social benefits among the 
population on a scale which the sultan has not hitherto been able to afford. The sultan has never 
been fully convinced of the efficacy of this policy in comparison to our military assistance, and has 
also been hunted by the fear that we might cut off our aid leaving him unable to support projects 
that begun with our assistance and on our advice. Consequently it has taken constant pressure and 
encouragement to persuade the sultan to allow development… civil development subsidy has so far 
been outweighed in size and priority by military expenditure; and has provided us with useful 
material for rebutting charges that we are interested in the sultanate only for its bases and oil,… 
provided the sultan of impressing upon international opinion that his country is making some 
progress away from the Middle Ages. …provision… minor but thoroughly practical projects, … 
wide an area as possible to increase loyalty to the sultan’s government,…foundation for further 









Arab voice radio support for the revolutionaries 
A British report, “Cairo radio on Indian merchants’ role in Dhofar”, dated 29th December 1967, 
provides valuable insights into how the Egyptian (Arab voice) radio supported the revolutionists in 
Dhofar. This was the most famous and significant radio station in the Arab world at this time 









Declaration of Armed Struggle document 
Reference: DLF (1974, January 12). National Struggle documents, 1965-1974, Statement about 
12th of December division’s movement by resistant forces in the area, popular front to liberate the 
occupied Oman and the Arabian Gulf. 
 
Dhofar Liberation Front, Declaration of Armed Struggle (June 9, 1965) 
Dear Arab people in Dhofar, 
A revolutionary vanguard from among you who believe in Allah have made the freedom of this 
country a principle and to liberate it from Britain and the ruling regime. 
This nation, my brothers, has tasted the bitterness of living for a long period of time, leading it to 
homelessness, unemployment, poverty, ignorance and disease. These deadly weapons were used by 
the pangs of colonialism and carried out by the regime. 
 
Dear Arab people in Dhofar, 
You have seen and understood this particular situation and we all have tasted the bitterness of living 
under this clumsy policy. Allah wants us to live, but they want us to die and the will of God is a 
right that must prevail in this part of the great Arab nation. Dear people of Dhofar who are fighting 
in the name of the brave martyrs who lost their lives in the arena of dignity and honor, and on 
behalf of all the bereaved and those who are emaciated by this abnormal and corrupt situation. In 
the name of the Arab nation, whose sons are fighting in every inch of their land, we agitate the 
authentic Arab spirit in you to stand united against this corrupt situation and demand all of you to 
stand with the men of Dhofar Liberation Front to form a dam against this tyranny. 
The Government of Sultan Sa'id bin Taymour has hired an army of mercenaries to eradicate the 
Arab liberation goals in this country, but the Dhofar Liberation Front will stand against them as a 
raging fire in every inch of this country. This mercenary army was able to hinder the goals of the 
revolution in Oman, but the free will that draws its strength from the will of Allah will triumph over 
this despicable populist army. And we promise you in the name of Allah and this country, to teach 
this army a lesson that will not be forgotten similar to what was inflicted on the colonial armies in 
Egypt, Algeria, Iraq and Yemen. 
Dear Arab people in the south and the Gulf and in every inch of the Arab land, today you are called 
for material and moral support for the armed struggle in Dhofar. This armed revolution derives its 
strength from the goals of Arab nationalism, which the Arab Liberation Army in Dhofar has 
believed on and is now using these principles to achieve the nationalism goals with arm force. The 







British colonization because the colonization and its agents who enslaved and humiliated these 
people by means of force and oppression will not recognize their demands except by arm force. 
Dear Brothers, this corrupt situation has forced the people in Dhofar to live on subsistence, sow 
discord and weakness among them. Such situation was the inevitable reason behind the revolution 
of dignity and freedom. My dear brothers in Dhofar, the front, which now bears the responsibility of 
liberating your country, calls upon you to meet the appeal in these difficult circumstances. 
 
Dear people in the cities, mountains and deserts, you are now requested to take a united stand 
against colonialism and its traitor agents to achieve freedom, unity, social justice and dignity. 
People who are helping this tyrannous regime and the British colonization will receive their fair 
punishment inevitably and the Dhofar Liberation Front will impose this penalty. 
Dear brothers, 
The Dhofar Liberation Front calls upon you in the name of this dear country and Arabism to bear 
your weapon and stand with it against the colonial forces and its mercenaries until the flag of 
freedom rises up in the sky of our dear Dhofar. 
Dear Arab freedom strive, Dhofar Liberation Front, which is leading the struggle against 
colonialism and its agents in Dhofar, firmly believes in the unity of the Arab nation and the unity of 
the struggle for Arabism from the ocean to the Gulf. And this belief must lead it to the fusion with 
Arab revolutionary organizations in the Gulf and the South. Derived from this belief, the Dhofar 
Liberation Front call upon the revolutionary fronts and organizations that are fighting today in this 
arena to stand with it in its fair struggle and to support it with material and moral capabilities in 
order to achieve its objectives and defeat their enemy, the enemies of Arabism. 
Victory will always be for the free fighters, while defeat and shame is for traitors and colonizers. 
Long live a free and proud Dhofar and long live the front of the Arab nation. 









The reaction of Sultan Said at the beginning of the revolution 
A confidential letter from J.S.R Duncan, British diplomat to Major Chauncy, The British Consulate 
General in Muscat, dated 29th May 1965. This letter illustrates the stance and reaction of Sultan 
Said at the beginning of the revolution(UKNA, BC1015/7, 1965) 
 
The sultan ordered Operation Rainbow (increased to two full companies) to try to exercise the threat 
presented by the two rebel groups of Ali Shulfan and Mussalem. They were all sixty persons in 
number. They appear to be well supplied and are presently on the north face of Jabel Qarra. This 
threat is at present the real one to the sultanate. The rebels (trained with the help of the Iraqi 
intelligence) should have decided by now that operations against S.A.F in Oman are unlikely to be 
successful. Operations there will (a) likely cause S.A.F to relax its grip in Oman… and send units to 
deal with them and (b) could well bog down these units in Dhofar in classical guerrilla warfare 
terms in wild country. The position will be serious indeed particularly perhaps in terms of 
serviceability of ageing aircraft. S.A.F’s orders are to destroy the band and to do so within a month 









Sultan said Armed Forces current situation at the beginning of the revolution 
A confidential report from J.S.R Duncan, a British diplomat to Sir William Luce, the Political 
Agent in the Arabian Gulf, Bahrain, shows Sultan said Armed Forces current situation at the 
beginning of the revolution, 15 July 1965 (UKNA, BC1015/13, 1965) 
 
The sultan relied on British financial assistance (1.5 million pounds annually) and on seconded 
officers and equipment. Financial burden on her majesty’s government will cease with the advent of 
oil revenue but providing seconded officers is likely to continue. British officered force (some 33 
seconded and some 25 on contract) with 15 seconded Pakistani officers in the junior ranks. 50% of 
the rank and file are Baluchi mercenaries from Gwandur and Omani representation is relatively 
small, reflecting the sultan’s distrust of his own kind. If British and Pakistani … reduced …the 
force would be most seriously affected. The Ministry of Defence is finding increasing difficulty in 
supplying the necessary number of officers. The Pakistani government might find an unaccepted 
embarrassment. Anti-British sentiment is bound to grow among the young Omanis. … start 









The temporary national constitution 
The temporary national constitution that Tariq the Sultan’s brother broadcasted (Omani 
Kingdom constitution). Reference: A confidential letter sent to British embassy in Muscat from Mr. 


















Hamrin Conference decisions 
The decisions of the Hamrin Conference, September 1968 and the formation of the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of the Arab Gulf, September 1968, issued by the General Command of the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf. Reference: DLF. (1974, January 12). 
National Struggle documents, 1965-1974, Statement about 12th of December division’s movement 
by resistant forces in the area, popular front to liberate the occupied Oman and the Arabian Gulf. 
 
The revolution in Dhofar, through its historic struggle, faced countless difficulties and suffered 
from numerous problems that made the revolution secluded and a captive of its painful reality. In 
addition to the bad conditions of the Arab reality, differences and fuzzy logic that accompanied the 
Arab revolution during its liberation process, and the Bourgeois class which dominated the Arab 
national democratic liberation movements, and what this group represents, by virtue of its 
ideological and class structure, through creating oscillatory policies, which serves primarily its own 
interests, objectives and class distinctions. This bitter reality reflected itself on the revolution in 
Dhofar. Although the revolution in Dhofar carried revolutionary goals and principles, this 
deteriorating reality made the revolution exposed to unhealthy climates and atmosphere. All of 
these factors, difficult conditions and unhealthy atmosphere formed the causes of closure and 
recession for the revolution. In addition to the criminal role played by the colonization, Arab 
reactionary authorities and the traditional political forces of the Imamah in Oman, in desperate 
attempts to strike the revolution and surround it at all levels. It tried its best to obscure the news of 
the armed struggle and to spread rumors and raise doubts about the great revolutionary struggle led 
by the Liberation Front in Dhofar and our dear hardworking people who spared on effort in the 
battle of liberation, the battle of honor and dignity, to eliminate the reactionary feudal colonial 
existence. 
 
The Liberation Front of Dhofar, the leader of the armed struggle and the promoter of the revolution 
of the ninth of June in 1965 from the top of Dhofar lofty mountains, took a brave stand at the 
second conference held from September 1 to September 20, 1968 in the central region of (Hamrin) 
valley to rescue the front from the closure and recession it suffered and to set a strategy at all 
ideological, strategic and organizational levels. The second Front conference took a long and 
serious pause before the stage that the revolution underwent, and provided critical analytical studies 
of the revolution reality and the negative and positive factors affecting it. The conference had 
positive outcomes, the most important of which were: 
1. Election of a new leadership. 







The second conference of the Dhofar Liberation Front had resulted in historic decisions that pushed 
the revolutionary arm struggle progressively to great strides on the external and internal levels as 
well as on the ideological and strategic levels. 
1. On the strategic level: 
A. There was the Commitment to organized revolutionary arm struggle, as the only way to 
defeat imperialism, backward-looking, bourgeois, and feudalism. 
 
B. Changing the name of the Front from Dhofar Liberation Front to the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of the Arab Gulf, and adopting a revolutionary strategy with comprehensive 
dimensions at the level of the occupied Arabian Gulf region to link the struggle of Dhofar 
with the struggle of the masses in the Arabian Gulf in order for the revolution to achieve its 
true meaning. 
 
C. Working to unify the revolutionary popular mass tool in the occupied Arab Gulf being the 
healthy revolutionary entrance for the unity of the organization. 
 
 
2. On the ideological level: 
Scientific socialism was adopted as the historical framework through which the poor masses 
struggled to eradicate colonialism, imperialism, bourgeoisie and feudalism, and as it is considered 
the scientific method of analyzing reality and understanding the contradictions among the people. 
The conference discussed at length all the plans and conferences organized by the global imperialist 
circles to suppress the national liberation movement in the occupied Arab Gulf and the Arab world 
in general. The Conference strongly condemned: 
A. federation of fake emirates of the Gulf (currently the United Arab Emirates). 
B. The Imamah in Oman and all the traditional political forces in the region that manipulate 
with the cause of the masses and raise false revolutionary slogans. 
The Conference firmly supported the struggle of the people in Palestine represented by the armed 
Palestinian resistance. The Conference also supported the fair struggle of the people around the 
world against imperialist, feudalism and bourgeois regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America. 
The Conference strongly condemned: 
A. The racist rule in Rhodesia. 
B. The racism in America. 
The Popular Front for the Liberation of the Arab Gulf calls upon all revolutionary factions in the 
occupied Arab Gulf to bear their historic responsibilities and to abide by the decisions of the Second 







socialist countries to support the fair struggle of their people, and to support it at all material, 
military, media and moral levels. 
Victory will always be for struggling peoples, while defeat and shame for imperialists and 
reactionaries. 
Long live the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf and long live the struggle 










The support for the rebellion given by other less relevant countries (Iraq, Palestine and Syria) 
Reference: Fayyad (1975). People’s war in Oman, the barefoot victory. Beirut: General Union of 
Palestinian Writers and Journalists, p. 139. 
In Iraq, the apathy in relations was caused by the support provided to the Imam Ghalib Al Hinai, 
who had been named as an enemy by the new policy of the Front and had been accused of being a 
traditional political power that trades with public issues. As a consequence of this stance, the 
relationship between the rebels and the Iraqi government was completely severed (Dhiab, 1984, p. 
165). 
PFLOAG sought to establish relations with the governments of those Arab regimes described as 
progressive, such as Syria. The relationship that the Front enjoyed with Syria was limited to holding 
joint meetings between the officials of the two parties. The most important of these took place 
during the visit of the Front’s delegation to Syria on 30th October 1969, under the leadership of 
Majeed Nasser, Chairman of the Front Political Committee (Dhiab, 1984, p. 165). 
The attention given to the Palestinian cause and its inclusion in the statement of the HCD in 1968 
was one of the most important political developments (HCD: Appendix 2). The reason for that was 
to get the front to support the Arab people. This support resulted in a close relationship with the 









Sultan Said’s Speech, January 1968 
Sultan Said reviewed the poor financial situation of the Sultanate when he took power in 1932. This 
outlines his achievements and his plans in organising and developing the country after the oil 
exportation. Reference: Beasant, J. (2002). Oman: The True-life Drama and Intrigue of an Arab 































Sultan Qaboos letter to the British government requesting recognition 









From: Sultan Qaboos Bin Said 
Sultan of Muscat and Oman 
TO: D.G. Crawford Fsqa. 
H.B.M's Consul General, 
Muscat 
Greetings: 
I would be grateful if you convey the following massage to Her Majesty’s Govt: 
I, Qaboos Bin Said, succeeded my father as Muscat and Oman on 24th July, 1970. Following this 
succession, I have received the full support loyalty and recognition of my family. I now seek 
H.M.G'S recognition of as Sultan of Muscat and Oman and assure you that the agreements 
obligations and undertakings entered into between Her Majesty's Government and my predecessors 
will be fully upheld and recognised by me. 
         Sultan Qaboos Bin Said. 









Speech by Sultan Qaboos 23 July 1970 
Speech given to his people on the day of his accession 
Reference: Sultan Qaboos Speech. (1990). Muscat: Ministry of Media. 
 
 
In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful 
I PROMISE you to proceed forthwith in the process of creating a modern government. My first act 
will be the immediate abolition of all the unnecessary restrictions on your lives and activities. 
My people, 
I will proceed as quickly as possible to transform your life into a prosperous one with a bright 
future. Every one of you must play his part towards this goal. Our country in the past was famous 
and strong. If we work in unity and co-operation, we will regenerate that glorious past and we will 
take a respectable place in the world. 
 I call upon you to continue living as usual. I will be arriving in Muscat in the coming few days and 
then I will let you know of my future plans. 
My people, 
I and my new government will work to achieve our general objective. 
My people, my brothers, 
Yesterday it was complete darkness and with the help of God, tomorrow will be a new dawn on 
Muscat, Oman and its people. 









Sultan Qaboos speech in 1973 
Speech given on the occasion of opening the governmental ministries complex on the 3rd National 
Day, 18th November 1973. Reference: Sultan Qaboos Speech. (1990). Muscat: Ministry of Media. 
 
Dear Countrymen 
WE brothers are a nation which emerged three years ago, and which has, during this period, 
achieved gains which have a worthy place in Oman’s history, signs which illuminate the future road 
towards our aims, and we are responsible for maintaining these gains so that our country will reach 
the peak of glory and dignity. 
Your strong determination and genuine drive for the advancement of your country is the incentive 
of our blessed march. 
Countrymen, strange winds are blowing in our region and strange, alien concepts which influence 
those who advocate these factions and parties which separate brothers and the father from his son. 
Those who advocated these alien concepts under misleading slogans have committed the most 
horrid crimes. They have sold themselves to the devil and they were deceived by delusions. 
On this glorious day, our National Day, we express our thanks and gratitudeto those heroes, men of 
our armed services and wish them a happy year. We also salute the men of our national firqats 
which were formed to fight on the side of our heroic forces against the terrorism of the communist 
gangs in the mountains of Dhofar. The struggle we are waging against atheism is a sacred duty 
which our religion imposes upon us. 
Our attitude in relation to the so-called Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian 
Gulf is the same attitude in which we began our new era. We said at the time “let bygones be 
forgotten … return to your country and resume building and construction, for the darkness of the 
past shall be transformed to light and we all shall face an historical responsibility before this 
Country. Those who are loyal to this country have responded, and they have hastened to us from 
every place, to participate in our efforts and to bear the responsibility to have the honor of 
contributing in serving their country and, until this day, we are still receiving individuals and 
groups, who have been misled to begin their life under the shadow of their Government; but those 
who insist on subversion and insurgence or try to threaten security, we shall hit them strongly and 
they shall bear the consequences of their action. 
We stand strongly in the face of subversive operations and Communism thoughts to safeguard the 
honor of our country and do away with all obstacles and challenges. 
In the field of Education, we have this year more than 100 schools and 1,30C teachers of both sexes 
and about 38,000 students. We have ordered the construction of a boarding school to teach the 
children of those who came to Salalah from the mountains of Dhofar and those who saved 
themselves and their children from terrorism and Communist teachings. 
In the field of health, large hospitals, clinics and health centres are being built 
in various parts of the Sultanate to provide health services to the citizens. In addition to the sixteen 







In order to facilitate communications, roads are being constructed. Following 
the completion of the Muscat-Sohar road, work has begun on constructing the Sohar-Khatmet-
Malaha road and the Nizwa-Seeb road. At the same time, the road which links the Southern 
province with the North is being improved and an agreement has been concluded on the Muscat-
Muttrah marine road to facilitate movement between the two towns and it is hoped that this project 
will be completed in 1975. 
The last stage of the construction of Qaboos Port is nearing completion, and work has actively 
begun on Raysut harbour and on the improvement of Sur harbour. 
Seeb International Airport is on a par with other large international airports in receiving aircraft and 
provides the necessary services to the passengers day and night. 
This week the Central Laboratory for the General Committee for Development 
will be opened and the foundation stone for the Qaboos town complex will be laid, an agreement 
has also been reached for the construction of a cement factory which will produce one million tons 
of cement per year. 
On our foreign policy, we have announced the lines of this policy on various occasions. We are part 
of the Arab nation and are linked to the unity of its aim and destiny. Our attitude on Arab issues is 
frank and clear. We have declared our solidarity with our Arab brothers, and the people of Oman 
have showed a genuine spirit in standing against Zionist aggression and in supporting the Arab fight 
in restoring all Arab territories which the enemy has occupied by force, treachery and terrorism. We 
shall always support the Arab fight with blood and money and back ii with all our powers. 
Oman continues in its efforts and heroic activities in the world community and contributes its share 
in resolving international problems and issues to prove its presence as a member of the United 
Nations and to expand its strong desire for maintaining peace and stability between the various 
countries of the world and the establishment of friendly and mutual relations with every country 
which extends a hand of friendship to us on the basis of mutual respect. 
We have paid several visits to our brothers in the Arab countries to strengthen brotherly ties and 
exchange viewpoints with them on the issues which interest us all We also attended the conference 
which was held in Algeria last September and have participated in its debates and 
recommendations. We drew the guidelines of our country’s policy Which is represented in non-
interference in the affairs of others and in the rejection of any interference in the affairs of our 
country, the setting up of relations based on friendship and co-operation with all peace-loving 
countries, and supporting the struggle of our peoples in their endeavours to obtain freedom and 
independence. 










Schedules illustrate the differences in Oman’s economy after the ascension of Sultan Qaboos  
Reference: Oman Ministry of Commence and Industries (1980). Oman economy in ten years, July 
1970- July 1980. Muscat: Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
 
Table 1 
Gross Domestic Product 
(1970 1974)  
R.O. million 
Sector 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 














































































Gross national income 
(1970 1974)  
R.O. million 
In use 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Consumption 33,9 47,4 76,8 103,6 246,8 





























Net exports of goods and 
services 
Exports of goods and services 
Minus 































GDP at market price 104,7 125,1 140,8 169,4 568,5 
Minus the net proceeds of 
factors of production transfers 
_18,2  _20,0  _29,0  _41,0  _86,6  
GNP at market price 86,5 105,1 111,8 128,4 481,9 
Minus net indirect taxes _1,1  _1,1  _1,6  _1,7  _2,3  
GDP at factor cost 
 










Employment in Oman in the years 1970 1975 
  










































































Comparison of the production of the oil sector and GDP 
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Authority hometown of cash Omani Monetary Council of the evolution of foreign assets 




the findings Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
End of March 
1975 
Gold Balances currencies 
Foreign 
Special Drawing Rights 



























































Development of activity of commercial banks 
(The number of bank, branches, regional distribution and the total assets and liabilities) 
 
  
The statement - Year 1970 1973 1975 1977 
June 
1980 
The number of banks (the main offices) 











Total 7 27 55 103 140 
The number of banks and branches in the 
Capital area 
The number of banks and branches 











Total assets and liabilities 
O.R. million 

































































































92,0 88,0 88,6 114,9 419,1 489,2 545,2 547,4 525,1 750,4 












Ahleesh conference decision 
Reference: PFLO, P. S. (1975). PFLO Political Statement of the Second Conference, 9th August 
1974. 9th June magazine, issue 5.PFLO Emergency Conference Decisions (n.d.) The Emergency 
Conference Decisions. Aden, pp. 39-44 
Political statement and the National Action Program issued by the Front in December 1971 
Political statement 
based on the common convictions and positions and in response to all colonial and reactionary 
plans in Oman and the Arabian Gulf, and culmination of all previous meetings and practical steps, 
the leaders of the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Arab Gulf held a unified conference at the 
end of 1971 to mobilize all efforts and energies to escalate the struggle against British colonialism 
and its agents. It is an important step on the road to establishing the Broad People's Front in Oman 
and the Arabian Gulf. 
The Conference had a long pause before the arrangements and amendments created by colonial 
circles in the recent past in light of the so-called British withdrawal and the wide-range of secret 
and public political and military movements of imperialism and reactionaries which aim to obstruct 
the march of the national revolution, falsify their imperialist slogans and objectives, and secure their 
interests and locations in the region. 
Due to the increase in armed popular revolution in Dhofar, the growing popular resentment and 
revolutionary tide throughout the entire region, and the dangerous effect it will have on the complex 
of imperial interests and the vast backward tribal conditions in Oman and the Arabian Gulf, the 
British colonialism raised the issue of its fake withdrawal to be able to arrange the situation and 
conditions in the reign by assistance of American imperialism and its agents in Saudi Arabia and 
Iran to confront the whole revolutionary developments. 
The colonialist and reactionary forces became significantly active. Meetings, delegations and 
suspicious visits by the imperialist agents to the region increased over the past period. The 
imperialists came up with many criminal projects to tighten their grip on our people and prevent 
them from taking control by all means. After the mutual understanding among imperialists powers 
and the distribution of the shares and roles between their agents, they announced the fake 
independence of Bahrain, Qatar and Oman, and continued to patch up the deteriorating situation in 
the northern part of the country. 
The colonial circles not only divided the region and spoiled its resources while continuing the war 
of genocide against our people in Dhofar, but also worked to hand over parts of our land to the 
feudal rule of the Iranian military moments before the announcement of the Confederation of the 
suspicious agents, and before the official announcement of the fraudulent withdrawal of Britain 







Arab and Iranian peoples against one another and falsify the nature of the battle in the region. It also 
aimed to achieve the expansionist ambitions of the Iran Shah rule and to create repressive bases in 
these islands (i.e. the Hallaniyat Islands where the Iranian forces were present) to use against our 
people, and the liberation movement. 
Recent political events and developments have tangibly demonstrated not only the organic link 
between the ruling tribal families, colonialism, and Arab and Iranian reactionary, but also their total 
betrayal and constant willingness to sacrifice national interests and national territory to satisfy their 
imperialist masters and continue to exploit the people and plunder the resources. 
The colonial circles paid great attention to the Sultanate due to its strategic location, the 
intensification of the armed revolution in Dhofar region and the progressive ideological and 
strategic dimensions it gained after the Hamrin Conference. Following the eruption of the armed 
struggle in Oman, the British departments rushed to implement their new plans in the area. They 
replaced Said bin Taymour with his son HM Sultan Qaboos, worked to gather agents and 
collaborators, and launched a wide misleading campaign to strike the revolution from within, and 
withdraw public support. However, the steadfastness of the armed revolution in Dhofar, its ability 
to thwart the divisive plot carried out by colonist agents on 12 September 1970, the victories of the 
People's Liberation Army and the popular militia and the rise of the mass movement throughout the 
Sultanate forced colonial circles to reveal more of their dirty schemes as they started sending 
increasing numbers of British soldiers to fight the revolution. 
The imperialists are well aware of the depth of the political contradiction between them and the 
masses of our hardworking people. They are working in various ways to strengthen their front and 
ease the contradictions among their ranks by increasing the plundering of our wealth, opening the 
region's markets to more capitalist monopolies, and through formal concessions among them, and 
the wide common interests that they share. The whole of these criminal schemes is borne by the 
masses of our people, especially its national groups and hard-working classes which are 
increasingly suffering from national and class oppression. 
The forces of the hardworking people and the national groups must stand together against the 
imperialists and reactionaries unity to confront their fierce schemes in our region, defend the 
national territory, liberate the region from old and modern colonialism and achieve the national 
objectives and democracy for which our masses have sacrificed thousands of martyrs. In face of the 
unity of the imperialists and reactionaries and their united front, the forces of the revolution must 
unite and consolidate to establish one national front against the imperialist and reactionary front and 
thwart their efforts. 
As a result of this scientific and correct understanding of the nature of the contradictions existing in 
Oman and the Arabian Gulf and its primary and secondary forces, the conference was held in one of 
the liberated areas in the Dhofar region. The conference discussed these urgent matters as a whole 







In an atmosphere of positive and revolutionary spirit, the Conference concluded the following 
important decisions and achievements: 
1. Integration of the Popular Front for the Liberation of the occupied Arabian Gulf and the 
National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf in one front 
under the name of (the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf). 
 
2. Discussion and adoption of the National Democratic Action Program and the Internal 
Regulations submitted by the Preparatory Committee. 
 
3. Election of a unified leadership of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the 
Arabian Gulf. 
These decisions and revolutionary steps that have been accomplished are undoubtedly a genuine 
and revolutionary entry point for the integration of all national forces and groups into a broad united 
front, to mobilize the energies and potentials of the masses to confront the colonial and reactionary 
enemy. The establishment of the broad frontline on the battlefield in Oman and the Arabian Gulf, 
extension of the armed struggle as a basic and strategic method, escalation of other mass struggles, 
and the rooting of their slogans are the primary tasks before the revolution at this critical stage. 
The founding conference of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf salutes 
the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and the popular Democratic uprisings of the poor 
peasants and fishermen. It also pays tribute to the heroic steadfast stance of the revolution inside 
and outside with the revolution in Oman and the Arabian Gulf, and declares its absolute stand 
against all imperialist and reactionary schemes aimed at disrupting the revolution and overthrowing 
its progressive regime. The conference also emphasizes the need to develop and strengthen the 
struggle and organizational relations between the two organizations, the National Front and the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf. The conference also salutes the 
struggle of the Yemeni people in the north to overthrow the reactionary feudal system and establish 
a united democratic Yemen. 
The founding conference supports the struggle of the masses and their progressive forces in the 
Arabian Peninsula to overthrow the autocratic rule in the so-called Saudi Arabia and calls for 
consolidating and strengthening relations between the factions of the National Democratic 
Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula. 
The conference also salutes the struggle of the Iranian people against feudal military rule and 
declares its stand alongside with its progressive forces and the necessity of strengthening the 
fighting relations between the Arab and Iranian peoples to bring down all imperialist and 
reactionary plans aimed at destroying them and deepening their chauvinistic tendencies. 
The Founding Conference of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf 
declares its absolute support to the Palestinian armed revolution and its national forces and believes 







mobilization of the Palestinian public's energies is the right way to respond to the total surrendering 
solutions and reactionary conferences aimed at the liquidation of the Palestinian revolution and the 
entrenchment of the Zionist entity. 
 
The interdependence of the revolution in Oman, the Arabian Gulf and Palestine is a strong and 
organic bond which emphasizes the need to coordinate and mobilize efforts against the common 
enemy. The colonial rule in Palestine is a watchtower for the imperialist interests throughout the 
Arab world, including the massive oil revolution in Oman and the Arabian Gulf. The founding 
conference of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf emphasizes the 
need to establish a close relationship between the forces of the Palestinian revolution and the real 
armed revolution in Oman and the Arabian Gulf. 
The Founding Conference affirms the necessity of establishing the Arab Progressive Front to 
mobilize energies and coordinate with the progressive revolutionary forces in the Arab world in 
face of the massive imperialist campaign aimed at liquidating the positions of the Arab revolution, 
establishing reactionary regimes and securing the global imperialism interests in the Arab region. 
The Founding Conference declares its support to the national liberation movements on the three 
continents, and stands by the forces of progress and socialism in their fair struggle against the 
imperialist and global capitalist powers. 
 
Foundational Conference of the Popular Front 










The mountain and the plain: the rebellion in Oman 
Reference: Secret intelligence memorandum, U.S.A Directorate of Intelligence, No. 20 34/72, 
entitled “The mountain and the plain: the Rebellion in Oman”, issued on 19th May, 1972. 
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The mountain and the plain: the rebellion in Oman 
The sultan of Oman, at the south-eastern end of the Arabian Peninsula, has been experiencing 
rebellion since 1963. The rebellion, which threatens to cut off Oman’s western province of Dhofar, 
had its seeds in years of discontent over poor social and economic conditions and the authoritarian 
rule of the Omani sultans. This discontent has been exploited by leftist elements, assisted by the 
radical regime in neighbouring Yemen (Aden). The leftists have organized a political front with a 
guerrilla army that has fought for the last several years for control of Dhofar. Government forces 
have begun to strike back, and since late last year, they have recovered some areas of the province 
from rebel control. They are now engaged in an offensive that the government believes will turn the 
tides in its favour; the monsoon may bring the offensive to a halt before this happens. 











1. Dhofar, which covers an area of approximately 30,000 square miles, has a population 
of about 35,000. It has few towns – the provincial capital of Salalah, Taqah and Mirbat 
being the most important-and a hand full of villages. Most of the other locations 
appearing on maps are water holes or vaguely defined areas associated with the 
nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes which inhabit the mountains. The narrow 250-mile 
coastal plain benefits from the southwest monsoon from late May through September. 
As a result, the coastal plains and the seaward slopes of the 3000 to 4000 foot 
mountains are green and fertile. From the crest of the mountain, many Wadis run 
northward through a barren and arid landscape towards the sands of the Rub al Khali-
the Empty Quarter. The Dhofar rebels have capitalized on both weather and terrain in 
their guerrilla war against the British-led forces of the sultan.     
 
         The beginning 
2. The roots of the insurgency lie in the long-standing demand by the Dhofari 
traditionalists to be separated from Oman. For centuries the sultans of Oman have 
claimed authority in Dhofar, but the province has been troubled by almost constant 
dissidence and unrest as Dhofaris persistently resisted this outside rule. Separated from 
the more populous part of Oman by hundreds of miles of desert, Dhofar has been and 
is more closely linked religiously, tribally, economically and linguistically to the 
Hadhramaut area of Yemen (Aden) than to the rest of Oman. 
3. Dhofaris as well as other Omanis, became increasingly restive in the early 1960s as a 
result of the social and political restrictions imposed upon them by the reactionary and 
authoritarian sultan Said bin Taymur Al Bu Said. The capricious sultan ruled the 
country from 1932 until 1970, when he was deposed by his son, sultan Qabus. The 
discovery of oil in the sultanate in 1963 made small difference to the Dhofaris; most of 
what little economic and social development was started by the government was 
undertaken in Oman itself. A growing number of sultan Said’s Dhofari subjects came 
to recent this neglect, maladministration, and heavy-handed eccentricities. 
4. The current rebellion is usually traced to an uprising in 1963 staged by members of the 
Bait Kathir tribe who had joined the Dhofar Benevolent Society, a religious and social 
welfare organization. This group was composed mostly of Dhofari nationalists 
favouring secession; they were soon joined by the members of the local branch of the 
leftists Arab Nationalist Movement and some Dhofaris returning from service in the 
British-sponsored Trucial Oman scouts (now the defense force of the United Arab 
Emirate). The merger resulted in the creation of the Dhofar Liberation Front, which 
pledged to detach Dhofar from Oman by armed force. By 1964 Iraq might have been 
providing military training for a few rebels; by mid-1965, the front was receiving 
limited financial and military aid from Egypt and Iraq. Its first anti-regime military 







5. The revolt was initially small and limited for the most part to sporadic attacks on traffic 
along the mountain road linking Salalah and Thamarit. The sultan of Oman took a 
complacent view of the rebellion, considering it little more than another expression of 
the tribal and religious enmity that had frequently plagued his regime. He preferred to 
keep his small British-led army near Muscat and ordered local security forces to deal 
with the rebels. 
6. It was not long before the Dhofar Liberation Front began to move to the left. A left-
wing faction – largely from the Qara tribe talked about Arab unity, socialism, anti-
colonialism, and pan-Persian Gulf revolution, but the right wing Bait Kathir tribal 
faction in the front remained primarily concerned with Dhofari separation. The 
eventual triumph of the leftist element was ensured by events in neighbouring Yemen 
(Aden), where the radical national front came to power in late 1967 after the British 
had withdrawn. The new regime in Aden became an active patron of the Dhofar 
Liberation Front, providing arms, money, an outlet for rebel publicity and propaganda, 
and a safe haven for the guerrillas. The Yemen (Aden)port of Hawf and the interior 
town of Habarut became important supply depots for material being passed to the 
insurgents. By mid-1968, the rebels were able to make daylight raids on Salalah and 
Mirbat, and by the end of the year the rebels were fairly well-equipped and organized, 
and more aggressive. 
The popular front 
7. The growing strength of the radical wing was reflected at a 20-day meeting, since 
described as a turning point in the rebellion, which was held in September 1968 at 
Hamrin. The Dhofar Liberation Front was renamed the Popular Front for the liberation 
of the occupied Arab Gulf. A 40-member General command was elected to replace the 
old leaders, and a new statement of goals was promulgated. The new name signified 
the organization was no longer concentrating on Dhofari separatism, but was 
committed to a people’s war throughout the Persian Gulf, which was described as a 
single historical, geographical, and ethnic entity. The Hamrin delegates adopted 
Marxism-Leninism as their ideology. 
8. The popular front is run by a central committee, with sub-units responsible for Dhofar 
political affair, training, finance and supply. Its headquarters are in Aden; other offices 
are located in Cairo, Kuwait, Bagdad and Bahrain. The front has announced the “cult 
of leadership”, and for this reason as well as for security, leaders are rarely mentioned. 
But it is believed that Muhammad Ahmad Salal al-Ghassani, a Chinese trained Dhofari 
of the Qara tribe, is the front’s chief. 
9. The size of the front’s people’s liberation army is a well-shrouded secret; estimates 
have been as high as several thousands. Nearly all the guerrillas in Dhofar are believed 
to be indigenous to that area; in fact, it is estimated that only about 10 percent of the 
People’s Liberation Army is composed of non-Dhofaris, mostly Gulf Arab and Adenis. 
The front also supports the People’s Militia, made up of less committed armed 







permanent military bases in Dhofar, and rebel camps are moved every two weeks or 
so, in part because food and water are scarce in the mountains. The guerrillas operate 
in groups of 20-40 men. These groups have names such as the Ho Chi Minh unit and 
the Che Guevara unit. They avoid pitched battles with the sultan’s armed forces, and as 
a result, losses have been low on both sides. The rebels favor tactics such as the mining 
of roads, the ambushing of patrols and the use of mortars to shell targets. 
10. Basic military training and political education are conducted at Hawf and Jadhib in 
Yemen (Aden). Recruits are reported given heavy doses of lectures on class struggle 
and wars of national liberation, with frequent references to Marx, Lenin and Mao; the 
goal is to prepare both “fighters and politicians”. 
11. Following the Hamrin conference, the front undertook new military initiatives in 
Dhofar, and the number of rebel attacks increased markedly. By mid-1970 the rebels 
controlled the coastline from the Aden border to within a few miles of Salalah and held 
many coastal villages such as Mirbat and Sadh, east of Salalah. They moved at will 
through the mountains and along numerous overland routes. The environs of Salalah 
were sporadically attacked. 
12.  In pressing their drive, the rebels enjoyed certain advantages; a sanctuary across the 
Aden border; admirable guerrilla terrain in the mountains and wadis; and the sympathy 
and cooperation of a substantial proportion of the Dhofaris. It is estimated that at one 
time, about two thirds of the population supported the rebels. The front looked to 
civilians to supply informers, messengers, lookouts and workers. Terrorist tactics have 
been used against Dhofaris who failed to cooperate. 
13. Both for ideological reasons and in an attempt to destroy existing patterns of 
leadership, the front made an effort to reorder the society in the so-called “liberated” 
areas. In particular, it undertook to eliminate the traditional tribal and kingship system 
of Dhofar, which it saw as irrelevant to the needs of the revolution. Front leaders have 
claimed “dazzling success” in replacing tribal relations with “comrade relations”. 
14. Although the front is committed to “liberate” all of the Gulf, the organization has yet to 
get off the ground outside of Dhofar. Most front organizers appear to be primarily 
occupied with raising funds and with political indoctrination rather than with armed 
subversion. The Dhofaris have little interest in fighting for anything but Dhofar. For 
instance, large number of Dhofaris living in Abu Dhabi who had been active in the 
Dhofar Liberation Front lost interest and stopped their financial contributions when the 
leftists took control. 
The New Popular Front 
15. Last January, the popular front announced that it had merged with another left-wing 
organization that had been operating in northern Oman intermittently since early 1970. 
The new organization took as its name “The Popular Front for The Liberation of Oman 
and The Arab Gulf”. The merger probably grew out of a conference held in June 1971 
in Rakhyut. It was decided at this meeting that a second front elsewhere in Oman was 







 Foreign Assistance 
16.  The rebels’ chief foreign baker is the radical government of Yemen (Aden). Aden’s 
financial support has been estimated variously at between $150,000 and $600,000 per 
year.(the lesser figure is probably more nearly correct). The front’s headquarters is in 
Aden, and the Adenis provide arms mostly of Soviet origin-logistic support, medical 
aid, broadcasting facilities and training sites for the guerrillas. Occasional tension has 
marked the relationship; the Adeni government frequently complains, with reasons, of 
being pestered for aid and is critical of the rebels’ failure to gain victory. The Adenis 
also complain that too many front members prefer living in Aden to fighting in the 
mountains of Dhofar. 
17. China has supplied limited quantity of arms ammunition and other equipment to the 
rebels. Thirty front members reportedly were trained in China in 1968, and a Chinese 
training and advisory mission may be based in Hawf. The New China News Agency 
disseminates rebel propaganda. 
18. The Soviet Union has also provided modest amounts of war materiel to the rebels. 
Yemen(Aden)has tried to persuade Moscow, as well as eastern European nations, to 
give the Dhofar rebels more aid, but apparently without much success. North Korea 
sent a small quantity of arms and foodstuffs in 1970 and reportedly has given military 
training in North Korea to 20 Dhofaris. 
19. For its part the front has concluded that, with the exception of Yemen (Aden) no Arab 
state will provide support. In fact, the front bitterly attacks the other Arab states. 
Limited Iraqi and Syrian aid channelled through Aden ended in 1970. The front does 
maintain close ties with Nayif Hawatmah’s Popular Democratic Front for the liberation 
of Palestine, a Fedayeen group not responsive to the direction of any government. 
Sultan’s forces 
 Attacks on several northern Oman towns in June 1970, in the wake of a deteriorating 
situation in Dhofar, probably triggered the … palace coup that ousted sultan Said ibn 
Taimur from office and replaced him with sultan Qabus ibn Said. Initially Sultan 
Qabus believed that the change in leadership and his promises of reform and 
development would encourage Dhofaris and rebellious Omanis to lay down their arms. 
Most rebels at first rejected the sultan’s offer of amnesty. A trick of defectors began, 
and by late 1971 the number had increased to the point where they were being 
organized into small counter-insurgency units, called Firqats. These Firqats know the 
terrain but their enthusiasm is frequently fleeting, and some have redefected. 
20.  When it became obvious that these policies were not working, sultan Qabus and his 
British military advisers resolved to enlarge the army, acquire new weapons, and go on 
the offensive. Qabus increased the armed forces from fewer than 3,000 to over 7,000 







mercenaries, primarily Baluchis. The ground forces are led by 100 to 120 British 
officers; the air force of some 40 to 60 pilots is entirely a British operation.  
Operation Jaguar 
21. When the sultan’s army launched “operation Jaguar” in Dhofar last October, he 
controlled only the Salalah plain, an area of approximately 80 square miles along the 
coast, and had military posts in the towns of Sadh, Taqah, and Mirbat. The sultan 
forces had recaptured Taqah in February 1971 after it had been in rebel hands for about 
a year. Even these military posts, as well as Salalah, were subject to sporadic mortar 
attack and hit-and-run raids by the rebels. 
22. “Operation Jaguar” was post-monsoon offensive designed to drive the rebels from the 
coastal plain and from the mountains that provide cover and sanctuary. The sultan’s 
military advisers are pleased by the results of the offensive and recently expressed 
cautious optimism about their ability to handle the military aspects of the rebellion. 
The coastal area between Mughsayi and the Yemen (Aden) border is now one of the 
most active areas of conflict. Perhaps the main achievement of the offensive has been 
to cut two of the three important rebel supply routes originating in Yemen (Aden). 
More and more tribes men are cooperating with the government as its ability to protect 
them increases. The fighting has been fierce and casualties have been up but, for the 
first time since the rebellion began, the sultan’s forces occupy outposts in the 
mountains. They hope to hold these positions during the coming summer rainy season. 
Although security checks in Salalah and other coastal towns remain tight, the almost 
nightly mortar attacks and mining of roads has been reduced. Areas considered clear 
and secure are still occasionally penetrated by guerrillas, and fighting in the difficult 
mountain terrain is expected to continue. 
23.  The success of “Operation Jaguar” is, in part, a result of increased mobility and the 
effective use of air power. The government prepared small airstrips near some of the 
mountain bases to ease the problems of supply and to accommodate reconnaissance 
planes. From these airstrips and from bases near Salalah, British-piloted Beaver spotter 
planes and helicopters seek out rebel camps and supply dumps. Defectors are used to 
help spot guerrilla hideouts. Airstrikes are then carried out by BAC-167 strike master 
jets. The skyvan transport, with its short take-off and landing capabilities, has been 
used effectively by the government to ferry troops and supplies. 
24.  Oman’s offensive led to a border clash withYemen (Aden) in early May. The four-day 
battle involved attacks by Popular Front insurgents as well as Adeni militia on Omani 
positions near Habarut. The attack, which was probably designed to ease pressure on 
other Popular Front units, was the first reported clash across the ill-defined border. 
When Omani attempts to arrange a cease-fire were successful, Omani fighter aircraft 
strafed the attackers across the border in Aden. Yemen (Aden) seized upon the incident 








25. When the summer monsoon pile thick rain clouds and heavy fog and mist against the 
Dhofar Mountains, helicopters and skyvans will be unable to bring supplies or 
evacuate wounded from the government’s mountain outposts, and the jets will be 
forced to suspend most of their airstrikes. The government’s ability to keep forces in 
the mountains under these circumstances and maintain security of overland routes will, 
in large measure, determine the future of the Dhofar rebellion. If the sultan’s forces are 
compelled to retire to the Salalah plain during the monsoon, the rebels will have the 
opportunity to regroup and to receive new supplies. If on the other hand the 
government can retain its hard-won mountain posts, it will perhaps be able, during the 
dry season beginning in October, to deliver another heavy blow to the rebels in Dhofar. 
Nevertheless, as long as Yemen (Aden) provides a safe haven, Dhofar is likely to be 
subject, at a minimum, to cross-border attacks. 
26.  Should the front be able to prolong the rebellion in Dhofar, Sultan Qabus’ social and 
economic development program will be retarded. Failure in Dhofar could open the 
gates for unrest and subversion elsewhere in Oman and the Persian Gulf. Oman, a 
primitive and very poor country, is spending between 40 to 60 percent of its annual 
$125-million oil income- almost its only budgetary income-for defense. …  the sultan’s 
intentions are good, but expectations of people who have been waiting for reforms for 
generations may outstrip his performance. The sultan cannot afford to get bogged 








The Front emergency fourth conference statement 
Reference: PFLO, P. S. (1975). PFLO Political Statement of the Second Conference, 9th August 
1974. 9th June magazine, issue 5.PFLO Emergency Conference Decisions (n.d.). The Emergency 
Conference Decisions. Aden, pp. 19-21 
 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman, National Program of Action (July 1974) 
1. on the struggles of our people and the current situation 
In its long history, our people have been subjected to many decisions and foreign occupation 
campaigns, but it constantly knew how to fight these invaders and defeat them to free the 
country from their evils. Omani people are known with their love and attachment to freedom, as 
well as their rejection for any foreign intervention. They have constantly confronted the 
invaders and foreign greed, and have made great sacrifices to defeat them and preserve the 
sovereignty and independence of the nation. 
Through the insistence of our people to maintain its independence and sovereignty, they 
managed to preserve vast areas of our country, which was not defiled by the colonizers and 
invaders, making it a starting base to fight against the foreign occupiers and their agents in 
Muscat. The Omani people carried out great campaigns to liberate their country throughout the 
nineteenth century. The 20th century also witnessed an epic for our people in the years 1912 - 
1920, and in the years following the British occupation of Al Jabal Al Akhdher (the Green 
Mountain), where the popular resistance continued for many years. 
The ruling families showed willingness to sign the occupation instruments with the enemies of 
the country and to assist the British in their aggressive campaigns against the Omani people. 
They contributed to all British barbaric military campaigns against the Omani resistance led by 
Qawasim from 1805 to 1820 and proved to be an obedient ride for the invaders and a 
fundamental enemy to the people of Oman and their ambitions in the sovereignty of their land. 
Each time the people rise against them, and use the arms to dislodge them from the country, 
they turn to their British masters to protect them from the people's wrath. British greed met with 
one of the rulers interest to maintain their control over the people in the British-led campaign to 
occupy the Green Mountain in 1955. 
Since the 1798 Treaty, signed by Muscat’s rulers with the British, and since Britain had spread 
its influence over the Gulf region, it enslaved the Omani people and practiced the worst policies 
of oppression, persecution, and exploitation. It had also destroyed Oman's shipping, trade, 
domestic industries and the economy, and has kept Oman in a state of terrible 







Our Omani people have bravely resisted the invasion of the British imperialism, with the same 
valor they used to resist the Portuguese invasion, Dutch colonization, and the Iranian invasion in 
the 18th century. Thousands of martyrs have bravely scarified their lives in this long heroic 
resistance. 
After a long series of militant experiences in resisting foreign occupation, and through the great 
historical lessons gained by the people from these experiences, including the great weaknesses 
and setbacks, our people in Oman have entered the long- term people's war in June 9 1965. 
British colonialism is a fundamental enemy of our people. Oman has been the most dangerous 
ring in the Arabian Gulf region, which Britain sought to control to secure its trade paths to 
India. With the flow of oil in the Arabian Gulf region, British colonialism increased its 
domination over Oman, imposing more political and military agreements that made our country 
a complete British colony. The bases in Masirah, BeitFalaj, Salalah and elsewhere were a 
serious threat to our country and the general public of the Arabian Gulf. 
British colonialism made the rulers a front-end for all its schemes and a local tool to control all 
the country's internal and external affairs and carry out criminal policies against our people. 
With the flow of oil, the ambitions of imperialist countries, led by the United States of America, 
increased. The Americans worked to sweep the British positions one after the other. America set 
plans to control this region and create strong regional repression systems such as Iran to use it to 
hit the national liberation movement and spread imperialists influence on our people. 
Britain did its best to maintain its political, military and economic control over Oman. In view 
of the major developments in the region, the increasing activity of the National Liberation 
Movement and the armed revolution in the southern region of Oman, Britain announced its 
intention to withdraw from the Arabian Gulf region to consolidate and maintain its presence in 
Oman. It reached an agreement with the Americans to maintain the British control over the 
region, develop aggressive common plans to face the revolution of the people in Oman, and 
ensure the common interests of the imperialists. 
Since the coup in 1970 in which Sultan Qaboos came to throne, their circles set a plan after a 
plan to help the British resist the revolution and make certain reforms in the country with the 
aim of pulling the popular support from the revolution and end it justification for continuing. 
Thus, our country under the direct British control and the Qaboos government witnessed more 
foreign interference in the issues of our people, and more violation to exploit and control the 
country. The British forces and mercenary armies rushed to Oman to suppress the armed 
revolution and the mass movement, and impose the peace of the imperialists on the Omani 
people by force. When all these methods and containment and misdirection means of failed to 
achieve its objectives, the Iranian army entered Oman territories on the basis of a plan 
developed by the Cento alliance and supervised by American and British experts to suppress the 







The British colonists are the cause of the tragedies our people are suffering now. They still 
maintain the military bases that carry out their aggressive campaigns against our people in the 
liberated areas. They also retain many advisers on all military, political and economic facilities 
in the country. They secure the interests of all the other imperialists in our country. 
American imperialism, the first and most basic enemy of the people, is now working to increase 
its intervention in Oman. It works under the guise of the British presence and in full 
coordination with it, to develop criminal plans to suppress the armed revolution and control 
Omani territories completely. After it became clear to the American imperialists that Britain was 
unable to confront the armed revolution and put an end to it, and the futility of its methods in 
face of the Omani nationalists, they began to create their foundations in the country to inherit 
the British presence. They fear that the flames of revolution would destroy their interests in the 
Arabian Gulf, and they work to enable Iran to impose its control over the entire Arabian Gulf 
region and to turn Oman into an annex to the Shahnashan Empire. Thus, they provide all 
sophisticated weapons in large quantities to their customers in Tehran to serve as guards in the 
region. 
The Iran reactionary, the American imperialist puppet and its first foundation stone in the 
region, wants to control our homeland, and use our land to protect the interests of its imperial 
masters and implement their plans. Over the past years, Iranian reactionary provided evidence 
of its expansion ambitions in the region. They occupied Omani islands Abu Musa, Greater and 
Lesser Tunbs in 1971. It also occupied other Omani islands at the Gulf entrance. 
They sent many experts, officers and military equipment to the system in Muscat. It now 
invaded the territory of Oman in the open and in large numbers of Iranian forces reinforced by 
the latest weapons in order to hit the revolution in a preparation to control more Arab lands. 
The danger of Iranian expansion threatens not only the identity of our people and Arab nation in 
Oman, but also threatens the entire Gulf region and threatens the future of the Arab national 
liberation movement in both the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq. 
Iran is not playing the police role of the US imperialist interests in the Arabian Gulf region, but 
it wants to achieve its expansionist ambitions and extend its influence over the entire region and 
annex more Arab lands to the Shah Empire. 
At the same time, the regime of the Shah, in its internal policy, oppresses and persecute the 
Iranian people and withdraws its national democratic rights on a daily basis, their foreign policy 
is now occupying the lands of Omani people, killing the Omani patriots, destroying and burning 
the Omani villages and farms in the southern region. This policy will not hesitate to do the same 
and intervene at any time in any part of Oman and the Arabian Gulf or the Arabian Peninsula to 
achieve the expansionist ambitions of the Shahnashahi system or to implement the wishes of its 
imperialist masters in suppressing the Arab national liberation movement and protecting their 







This traitor regime has surrendered entire areas to the Iranian invaders and now offers them all 
privileges and facilities, and hands them more lands and more freedom to tamper with the 
people's capabilities. 
This regime has culminated all its long persecution of our people and its continuous betrayal of 
national issues by its betrayal to the extent of abandoning the homeland, handing over parts of it 
to the Shahnashahi throne, and approving the invasion of Omani territory by Iranian forces. 
 
2. on the necessity to expand the United National Front 
The issue of liberating Oman from the imperialists, the Iranian invaders and their ally regime is 
the responsibility of every Omani who loves his country and fights for the dignity and interest 
of the Omani people. 
All honorable Omani citizens, inside and abroad, elders, men, women are all required today to 
unite more than ever before to face the menace that threatens them all, to save Oman from the 
hands of the occupiers, foreign invaders and their agents. 
The defense of our Omani land and our Omani people against the British colonizers, the Iranian 
invaders and their puppet regime in Muscat is not only a right for all Omanis but also a sacred 
duty. All the Omani people must unite to carry out this holy duty and save their homeland from 
occupation, tearing and destruction, and build an independent, democratic and united Oman. 
In order to expel the British colonists, defeat the Iranian invaders and topple the regime, the 
Omani people must be mobilized and the efforts of all national forces, personalities, national 
classes, and all those who have an interest in overthrowing the rule of the occupiers and their 
agents should stand against the enemies of the people and the country. 
The United National Front, which is required in this stage, is a front of struggle alliance among 
all the national classes, forces, national figures and people. 
The establishment of such a front is now an urgent historical task that lies in the handsof the 
entire people more than ever, and a necessity that must be accomplished in order to defeat the 
enemies of the people and to save the dignity of the nation. 
 
3. On the methods and means of national struggle 
In the face of British imperialism, the Iranian invaders and the regime, the revolution in Oman 
must be a mass popular revolution, using people as main tool, as they are the makers of the 







In the face of such enemies and in order to achieve their defeat to the end and save the country, 
the revolution must be a long-term revolution, thus strategic and military political tactics must 
be adopted on this basis. 
In the face of such enemies, and in order to bring them to an end, Oman must have an armed 
revolution and use the revolutionary violence of the masses to defeat the violence of the 
imperialists, the invaders and their local agents. 
Without such violence and without working to destroy enemy forces and their oppressing tools, 
the people will not be able to wrest the political power from their enemies and save the country. 
The enemies are undoubtedly advanced in the repression tools they use against our backward, 
oppressed and defenseless people, but this superiority is undoubtedly a temporary superiority 
that we will gradually be able to neutralize and dispel thanks to the efforts of the masses and 
their perseverance in the long struggle. 
A long-term popular war is the way by which we can neutralize the power of the enemies and 
transform their temporary strength into a gradual weakness, and our temporary weakness into an 
ever-increasing force. 
Our emphasis on armed struggle as a basic and strategic form of national struggle, and the use 
of violence to neutralize enemy violence and to wrest political power by all means does not 
mean that we should not use other forms of struggles. 
The armed struggle, if not supported by struggles in many other forms, cannot accomplish 
success. The struggle of our Omani masses must take all forms of struggle at the same time to 
enter the course of the armed struggle and achieve national salvation. 
 
 
4. The revolution tasks and objectives: 
Our people struggle for legitimate national goals of self-determination and sovereignty over 
their land and country. They strive for a true democracy that serves the overwhelming majority 
of the Omani people, not the fake democracy of the regime and the British which is the 
democracy of dictatorship, terrorism and persecution of the vast majority of the people.  
Our Omani people have struggled for many years and will continue to struggle, by all means, to 
achieve the following objectives: 
First: To liberate Oman from all forms of occupation and colonial existence and to achieve 
independence: 









2. Remove all British, American and Iranian bases from all occupied territories and islands of 
Oman. 
 
3. Expel all British and Iranian forces, mercenaries, and all foreign advisers and officers from 
Oman. 
 
Second: Establishing a democratic national government by: 
1. Elimination of tribal rule, which is based on the inheritance rule. 
 
2. To establish a democratic and popular republic based on the authority and alliance of the 
national and democratic forces of the Omani people. 
 
3. To establish an elected legislative council of young people on a sound democratic basis. 
This Council shall establish a progressive constitution for the country. 
Third: To provide all political and democratic freedoms to the people by: 
1. Release all political detainees and liquidate the British, American and Iranian 
intelligence services from the country and provide security for citizens. 
 
2. Abolishing martial law imposed on most parts of the country and the city walls system. 
Allowing citizens to move freely between the countryside and cities, and across the 
entire country. 
 
3. To allow all national elements expelled from the country as a result of their anti-
occupation and anti-regime activity to return and exercise all their political rights. 
 
4. Providing the freedom of opinion to all Omani national masses and to the press. 
Fourth: follow a sound economic policy that ensures the people's control over its wealth to 
harness it for national development goals. Therefore, the following must be implemented: 
1. Nationalization of oil companies to achieve full control over them and the abolition of 
all unfair privileges signed by the rulers in this regard. Harness the national wealth to 
build an independent national economy to achieve our people and our nation best 
interest away from the custody and manipulation of oil companies that reap huge profits 
and manipulate prices at the expense of our people. 
 
2. Establish strong national authorities that benefit from all the great national wealth in our 
country without selling it to foreign companies. 
 








4. To pay attention to young people and allow them to establish gatherings and unions, to 
encourage them, invest their interests and harness their enormous potential to serve the 
people and the homeland. 
 
5. Provide free health services to all citizens, and establish hospitals and clinics in all 
Oman areas, including rural and remote areas. 
 
6. Building rural cities and providing facilities for citizens to build decent and healthy 
housing. Abolishing all laws that prohibit citizens from building in some areas of Oman 
and to deliver water and electricity to cities, villages and rural areas. 
 
7. Encouraging social movements and abolishing all arbitrary laws established by the 
colonizers and the regime on clubs and associations and allowing the people to exercise 
their social activities freely. 
 
8. Development of transportation all over the countries including rural, mountainous areas, 
remote areas and valleys. 
 
9. Pay attention to the conditions of herders and fishermen and provide all services and 
facilities for them. 
 
 
Fifth: Combating ignorance and colonial culture and building a national culture. To 
accomplish this, the following must be achieved: 
1. Abolish all the current and backward educational curricula in Oman and develop culture 
for education derived from the history of our people and our glorious Arab nation. 
Development of progressive approaches of education aimed at building a national 
educated generation who are linked to the issues of people, struggles and future 
aspirations. 
 
2. Achieving compulsory education by making it free for everyone in all fields. 
 
3. Establishing schools and industrial institutes to ensure the graduation of technical 
manpower within a comprehensive plan to develop the human and material capacities in 
the country. 
 
4. Work to combat illiteracy, which includes the overwhelming majority of the people of 








5. Allow students to form their student unions to defend their rights and to develop their 
roles in serving the issues of the people and the country. 
 
Sixth: Building a strong national army based on respect and cohesion between soldiers 
and officers, equipped with sophisticated weapons and good training, filled with national 
culture and national spirit and attached to the issues and interests of the masses. 
Seventh: Enable the people to play their actual role in the defense of the country by 
establishing armed popular forces capable of cooperating with the army to defend the 
interests and sovereignty of the country against any conspiracies or expansionist foreign 
ambitions. 
Eighth: Respect all religious beliefs and doctrines, and non-discrimination in treatment 
between different sects and Islamic sects. 
Ninth: Protect and guarantee the rights of all minorities, communities and foreigners that 
respect the independence of Oman and the sovereignty of its people. 
Tenth: work to restore the natural unity of Oman from Dhofar to Abu Dhabi and strive to 
achieve this cherished hope for our people by peaceful means, away from any interference 
or foreign presence. 
Eleventh: Putting all of Oman's potential to contribute to the protection of the Arab Gulf 
region in face of the greedy Shahnashahi ambitions, stand by the national and democratic 
forces in this region and contribute effectively to achieving the unity of Oman and the 
Arabian Gulf as a hope of the Arab people in this region.  
Twelfth: Stand firmly by the Palestinian people and its armed revolution and make all the 
possibilities to support it in restoring their homeland and eliminating the Zionist entity. 
Thirteenth: strengthening the solidarity relations between the Omani people and the 
peoples of the Arab nations, and to contribute effectively to the movement of the Arab 
revolutions to achieve their goals of liberation, progress, socialism and unity. 
Fourteenth: Follow an independent and neutral foreign policy based on the following 
principles: 
1. To refrain from participating in military alliances and not to allow any state to 
establish military bases on Oman territories or to use its territory to attack the 
peoples of other countries. 
 
2. Recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations with all States that respect the 








3. Accept unconditional assistance from all countries that respect the independence of 
Oman and in accordance with the principles of equality and peace in the world. 
 
4. Stand firmly with national liberation movements in Asia, Africa, Latin America and 
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Thanks be to God, and praise be to the Prophet, His Messenger. 
My brother Citizens, The Sons of Our Dear Oman, 
IT is a source of pleasure to be amongst you on this great historic occasion, so as to speak to you on 
this significant event, and glorious historic anniversary of 18th November – our fourth National 
Anniversary. To begin with, I would say many happy returns on this occasion to all of us. 
The commemoration of National Days is a tradition of all peoples to landmark glorious events in 
their history. For events are not counted by the time factor itself, but on the basis of the scope they 
reveal, the ideas they inspire and the aspiration they aim at so as to take a place among the vanguard 
of the marching nation onwards to Progress, Peace and Prosperity. 
On this immortal landmark day, four years ago, a new sun shone in our beloved land to light the 
flame of the national spirit and zeal of our citizens, who plunged into building this renaissance and 
to regain the glories of the ancient past by asserting that it is not the time factor that counts, but the 
achievements themselves on the path of civilized progress, the all-out development of the country, 
the extent of the role it can play in international affairs, and the effect of such events on the course 
of its progress. 
Our people have achieved successful results in all fields of life, under hard and abnormal 
circumstances. It was by the help of Almighty God and His belief in the people that such 
achievements were possible. 
My brother Citizens, 
The power for change, and the stimulus for progress, were inherent in our people, and were just 
waiting for the time to unleash. The enthusiasm was so strong among our people to put things in 
their right order. They have, therefore, spontaneously responded, supported and exerted their utmost 
so as to make possible this fourth and dear anniversary which we celebrate today. 
By the Grace of God and your strong and indomitable have realized many achievements on the soil 
of our land. In spite of the fact that this country has undergone such hardship as was never 
experienced by any people before, we have faced many challenges, but by the Grace of God and 
His help we have achieved glorious triumphs against all these challenges. 
From every battle we emerge stronger, to recontinue our march with greater will and stronger 
belief. 
My Brethren, 
Our people participated in the battle of the Arab nation in its struggle against the common Zionist 
enemy. They did this by the sheer belief in the oneness of the Arab nation to whom we also belong 
and share its destiny and battles and also in the solution of its problems and causes. This was 
unequivocally demonstrated in the war of 6th October (10th Ramadan) when our Arab forces 







Such participation has since materialized into real common action – epitomizing Arab unity in its 
real sense. This caused immense disappointments to sceptics. Victory has been obtained – “If you 
support God, He will support you and strengthen your position”. 
Citizens, 
At the time when we were participating in the Arab battle, we were engaged ina more ferocious 
battle against the enemies of God – the enemy on this front is the same enemy in the other, but our 
enemy is more savage. Here we challenge and face communist infiltration – a more subversive and 
dangerous international movement which works to undermine our religion, our wealth and our 
national prestige. 
On the southern borders of this land, there is a mobilized community of subversive groups, with 
secret organizations scattered in countries of this area working in league with international 
communism. This fact asserts itself, and is undeniable. In spite of this, we stand firm and have 
succeeded in breaking their backbone, as a result of which our brethren in the mountains now enjoy 
protection and security from their terrorism. The terrorists have, however, begun to lose faith in 
their masters, who drove them into launching their terrorism against the innocent people. “They 
resemble fire which burns itself when there is nothing to burn”. 
In these days, new slogans are raised and new names are mentioned. Some look with indifference at 
such tactics. I have warned that the safety of the region is indivisible. Its stability is the 
responsibility of all states and people of the area. Communism has no faith. It recognizes no other 
doctrine. Should it retreat on one front for one or the other reason, it does so just for its interest. It is 
one of their principles to withdraw one step backwards so as to advance two steps forward. I frankly 
declare that any negligence in defending the faith of God will lead to a disastrous result. There is no 
two opinions that communism is dedicated to crush all religion. 
 
  
We are, however, resolved to confront this armed and subversive danger and all that it stands for 
which is in contravention to our Holy Islamic religion, our belief, and the freedom of dignity of our 
Nation. 
Citizens, 
I, for myself, and in your name, – salute our armed forces symbol of sacrifice, heroism and loyalty 
to our cause. They fight to defend the banner of right, the banner of Islam. They stand alert and 
heroically in the face of the enemy of God and the people. 
Our heroes, I share life with you – I strive to make out of you a strong army, loyal to the soil of this 
dear land. A striking force among the armies of our Aral nation, so as to defend the cause of truth 
against the forces of evil. I also salute the young pioneers of the national contingent now engaged in 
the fighting against subversive communist terrorists side by side with our heroic regular armed 
forces. Because “God is the truth, and all that they stand for is evil and false, God is Great”. 
 My Brethren, 
The second challenge, which is no less important, is the challenge of reconstruction and 
development. We have drawn an ambitious plan – the target of which is the Omani citizen. The 







objective is to ensure happiness for the individual and his reformation so as to give the best of his 
talent and production. 
We made a start in this way by providing medical treatment, housing and foodfor the Omani citizen 
– the main capital of our various battles to enhance the cause of our country and its ascension to the 
highest rank among the progressive nations of the world. 
Thanks to Almighty God, we passed through the critical stage successfully. Co-operation between 
the individuals and the Government has led our country to attain a degree of social progress, thus 
enabling us to assimilate and create with the result that we were able to make a positive contribution 
in the building work of our society. 
Citizens, 
Let us make a pause here, and revert to the beginning of July 1970 to find out where we were and 
where we stand today. 
In the field of education: 
In 1970, we started from scratch. All of you know and we can say for sure that we have succeeded 
in this field. The educational plan, both in quality and quantity, has succeeded in all the primary 
stages. 
We have now moved to a higher as well as vocational education. Our object in providing both the 
vocational and higher education is to enable our children to receive their education in its various 
stages in their mother country. We would, however, wish to draw the attention of our students 
studying abroad, to beware of being seduced by foreign ideas. We should make it clear that these 
elements are jealous of our achievements and progress, and they plan to retard the pace of our 
progress. 
Oh my sons, you witness the vast progress which education in our country has achieved, and the 
expansion of the numbers of schools, students, teachers and scholarships. 
It is enough to declare that the education sanctions for this year amount to 
RO 9,458,368 compared to RO 1,031,879 for the year 1970/71. 
This in itself is proof of the extent of our interest in the advancement of the people of our country 
and our insistence to make as rapid a progress as possible. 
 We give all our energy and potential to the welfare of our student’s abroad. For this reason we have 
decided to form a Permanent Committee to look after them and fulfil their needs. This Committee 
will make periodical visits to the countries where they study to examine their problems and make 
solutions for them. We pray God for their success. 
In the health sector: 
The Government gives priority to the health care of our citizens and does all that lies in its power to 
provide medical services for them. Many hospitals have been built, the number of which has now 
risen to 79 hospitals and health units with 1,200 beds as compared with 12 beds in the year 1970. 
In the communications and public services sector: 
A considerable number of large projects have been established in order to meet the ever-increasing 
demand for such projects. A contract has been concluded to extend telephone services and connect 
all villages with the cities with telephone lines. With regard to foreign communications, we have the 







using the most modern technological methods in wireless communications. With the erection of this 
station, our communication with the outside world will rise to the level of the 20th Century. 
In the road sector, the Government is doing its utmost in opening new roads. Some of the newly 
launched projects in this field are the Bidbid-Sur road, Musanah-Rostaq road, and Sohar-Al 
Buraimi road. Electricity is being expanded rapidly and it is expected to extend it to 36 towns in the 
Sultanate in the near future. It is recognized that electricity not only provides light, but it includes 
many other services. 
This is in addition to the water generator required to face the huge development projects, and the 
population growth. The biggest project so far accomplished in the communication and public 
services sector is Qaboos Port, which is being declared open during these days of our national 
celebrations. It is a pioneer project. We have also decided to reduce customs duties on consumer 
commodities in order to meet the rising cost of living in the world as a result of international 
changes. 
We have previously decided to form a committee to make studies of this problem, and as a result of 
this, we decided to abolish customs duties on consumer commodities, the difference in the price 
being borne by the Government. 
We have taken this decision at a time when other governments have beer imposing new taxes and 
new burdens on their peoples. 
We are trying our level best to raise the standard of living of the Omani citizen, who is equal to 
other Omani citizens in rights and obligations. He must take as much as he gives of his efforts, 
sweat, sincerity and loyalty to his dear land. Oman loves her sons equally and the Omanis all are 
sons of their merciful Motherland. She expects them to be loyal and obedient to her cause, but the 
love of country differs from one citizen to another, but Oman loves all her sons, and the principle 
we have declared is to forget the past. We shall adhere to this code. 
Omanis are a nation bound together by the Islamic fundamental ideology, by the friendly social ties 
and loyalty to the country. We are mobilizing all our resources in order to raise the standard of the 
individual and to develop his resources and his conscience economically. Towards this end, we are 
taking into consideration the exploration of all economic resources of our country in the future stage 
of the development plans. We have laid down a very ambitious, balanced, and studied plan based on 
utilizing the various resources of society in order to reach the target of the economic development in 
the light of the society. Also, a thorough study of the mineral and human resources, the making of 
statistical studies on the various economic and social activities of the population, agricultural 
activities, and the cost of living are being made, so as not to leave social and economic progress at 
the mercy of improvised conditions. In order to fulfil this plan of economic growth, to raise the 
living standard of the individual, we have decided to form a higher council of economic 
development under our president ship, and the membership of the concerned ministries such as the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and the Ministries of Agriculture, Fisheries, Oil and Minerals, 
which were recently formed on our orders, so as to play their roles in fulfilling this plan with the co-
ordination of other Ministries. 
Brother citizens, 
The most debated subject of the hour is oil, the main source of energy in the entire world. As far as 







able to develop our country, and fulfil our achievements. As the consumer seeks to buy oil, so do 
we need to install our local oil industry and to sell our oil in the international markets so that we 
may be able to fulfil our development plans. 
It is therefore necessary to follow a sound oil policy in conjunction with a united Arab oil policy 
with strong consciousness which realizes the importance of oil ... makes the best use of it, so this 
national wealth can play its role as a source of energy and as an important economic source. It is our 
hope that consumer countries will realize the real wishes of the producing states and that the world 
may understand that we are not merely seeking profits but that we work for peace and the welfare of 
humanity. 
Information: 
Information is the mirror of reality. Its duty is to reflect the various fields of activities which our 
country is witnessing in its modern age. 
In the information sector Oman has launched many successful projects, and the Information City 
stands as a landmark in the achievements fulfilled. Ii houses the newly expanded broadcasting 
station from which the voice of Oman carries over long distances; and the colour television which 
was inaugurated as a prominent achievement which reflects our keen interest in the truthful word, 
free opinion, true information. 
Our press is also playing its role in serving the cause of the nation. The Omani Museum, also, in 
which the citizen will see the heritage of his forefathers, and the civilization they achieved. 
Our beloved Oman lives today in the dawn of a great and comprehensive renaissance. In our 
foreword march, we have inaugurated the police sports ground, and held our fourth national day 
celebration there. For the present stage, this ground will serve our purpose until the Sports City is 
constructed which will be provided with the most modern sports equipment and playgrounds. 
These are but a few examples of our achievements in the internal sector. However, details of these 
achievements are the responsibilities of the Ministries concerned. 
Insofar as our foreign policy is concerned, we have often made clear in various international 
assemblages, that we are part and parcel of the Arab nation. Our policy emanates from our higher 
interests. The picture is very clear before us. Through the last four years of our progress we have 
known where we stand, and we are directing our energies from the point of our own national 
interest. Our attitude towards every country is decided on the basis of the attitude of such a country 
towards our national causes, and its respect of our sovereignty. We shall not let any country 
interfere in our affairs, or exercise any influence on our policies, irrespective of the source of such 
interference. 
We are exercising our role in international society, and in its various aspects as positively as we can 
in solving the just causes. As an Islamic nation, we take full views of our noble and sublime ideals 
of Islam and adhere to the precepts of our sacred religion, in full realization of our role insofar as 
our region is concerned in particular and the Arab world in general. On this basis, we have 
participated so far in all international activities such as the non-alignment conference in Lahore and 
the “a Arab Summit held last month in Rabat where I took part with my brother Arab Kings and 








All that has so far been achieved in our beloved land is higher and more powerful than any talk; we 
shall continue our march for the sake of our great people, for the sake of dear Oman and by the 
grace of God we will achieve more and more progress. We are continuing our steps in the light of 
the teaching of our Prophet. 
We fully realize that our work is bound by the targets we aim at. The success we see today in the 
sectors of both our local and international policies, is the true reflection of the efforts of our people, 
the sacredness of our soil and the respect and understanding of the world towards our aims and us. 
The values of our society, our relations with the outside world. All these are but one part of our 
progress. 
Thus our view of history is sound and continuous. Our present historical attitude is yielding the 
finest results and rises to the highest peak of success. 
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In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful 
Praise be to God Almighty, Who directs us to the right path. Who said in His Holy Book: “This is 
my right path, ye follow it and do not follow other paths that will dive, you from it.” This is His 
advice for you to heed and follow. Prayers and Peace be on His Prophet. 
Countrymen, 
I WISH you a Happy Year and many happy returns. Every year our dear country continues its 
progress with unfailing confidence and its prosperity with zest, determination and hope, represented 
in your joint efforts, the great achievements, your goodwill and solidarity in standing in our rank 
like a solid edifice in the face of all challenges and difficulties. 
Brothers, 
On this dear occasion in which we celebrate our 5th National Day, the anniversary of a new era on 
our good land to which we are bound, this dear country on whose surface we all have seen the light. 
Brothers, 
Our glorification of our National Days which we honor emerges from a true expression of our 
gratitude to our dear country and its heroic people. As we have always been, still are, and shall 
always remain working for it; we watch over the interests of our country and struggle for its glory 
and die for its sake. We struggle for our faith and Arabism to always remain true Arab Moslems. 
Countrymen, 
We are today celebrating the 5th Anniversary of our National Day amid the joys and splendours the 




We also celebrate constant victories achieved by our heroic Armed Forces and National Firqats 
supported by friendly forces which have achieved real victories for our beloved Oman in the history 
of their battles and recorded with honor and pride true heroism and sacrifice. They are the 
protectors of our noble Islamic faith in which we strongly believe and have the honor to defend. We 
appreciate the results of our will and determination to continue to defend this true and tolerant faith. 
Countrymen, 
You are all aware of the strike which our heroic soldiers have directed against the agents of 
Communism, that strike which made them realize that for every aggression and aggressor there is a 
deterrent. 
We declare to the whole world that we shall never desist from defending the security of this dear 
country against any aggression with all possible means. We put before the whole world a truth 







principle in gratification of our faith, motivated by our patriotism to preserve the sanctity of our soil 
and protect the gains of our people and our eagerness to maintain the independence of our decision 
and our adherence to Arabism and Islam. Our people do not accept that virtue be replaced by evil 
and righteousness by falsehood. 
We are not prepared to put our hand in the hand of a treacherous ally and time 
has shown the deterioration of the situation in the countries where the Communism element exists. 
Those who entered into an alliance with this evil principle have paid the cost dearly in terms of the 
security of their people and the stability of the situation in their country. They have lost control over 
their resources and could not exploit them according to the conditions of their people. Their 
decisions did not emanate from the supreme interest of their country but from complete 
subordination to this subversive principle. 
Communism knows no religion and we do not know those who are unbelievers and we shall not 
adopt a negative attitude towards them. We fight the enemies of God because they deny the 
existence of God and do not recognise His teachings which call for brotherhood, love and peace. 
Countrymen, 
The members of our heroic Armed Forces and National Firqats, supported by friendly forces are 
able to protect the faith because they are protected by its light which illuminates the road in front of 
them and achieve in their battles against the enemies of God, victory, because God promised to help 
those who believe in Him. 
 
The downfall of communist elements and their empty slogans in the many communities which fell 
into their trap is an indication of the failure of their plots Events show that the star of their 
subversive movement has faded in those parts of our Arab and Moslem community which fell under 
its influence. 
The crimes which the communists have committed in the Arab and Moslem area on the internal and 
external levels recently are liable to increase the enmity of the Arab and Moslem nation towards 
them. 
Has not our Arab area seen troubles and disorders in the last years, unprecedented in its modern 
history because of communist presence and subversion of nationalist elements? 
Has not our area itself seen troubles and disorders this year, which we have warned against on such 
an occasion last year? 
The Communists spread hardship among their citizens. They open prisons and detention camps 
while we build schools and hospitals. They lay obstacles, so thorns and choke the freedom of the 
people, while we remove obstacles and make the hardships of life easy, and we encourage public 
freedom provided that they do not impair the security of the State because the security of the State 
means, at the same time, the security of the citizen. 
Their information media is used to launch attacks and fabricate false accusations while our 
information media is used to serve the citizen, educate and entertain him, relying on the true word 
and genuine report. 
That is their policy and they are free to do whatever they wish within. 
The people of the southern district today are enjoying colour television as a sign of development, 







these young potentials in their blessed movement and prosperous era. They are continuing their 
march carrying the torch of knowledge and liberty, the foundations of which they had laid. They 
appreciate the value of their gains and know how to safeguard them, and by doing so they reap the 
fruit of hard work and taste the sweetness of tomorrow and see its brightness. There is nothing 
greater to man than achieving a bright future. 
Our bright future has descended with the Grace of God on every location and appeared on every 
face. A hope which disperses the clouds of darkness to illuminate with its light the road of 
civilisation, progress and prosperity, which we see today on the land of our beloved Oman. 
Welcome to the Enid. We promise to double our efforts and continue the hard work for a new 
tomorrow which shines with every morning in each day of the sixth year in our glorious march 
towards a happy future. 
May God grant you success and bless your steps towards a better future. Concluding, it interests me 
to say: Beware the hypocrites who are in the bottom 
of hell, whom God had described in His Holy Book. “When they met those who believe, they say, 
`We do believe’, but when they retire privately to their devils they say, `we really hold with you and 
only mock at those people”. 
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In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful’ Countrymen 
 
I GREET your ardent gathering here today and congratulate you with pride and dignity on the 
defeat of the agents of Communism who were driven away from the soil of our dear country. It is 
God’s wish that this victory be the crowning achievement of our National Day celebrations, during 
which we have, with the grace of God, launched several development projects. It was also the will 
of God that out victory be a happy start for celebrating two glorious Eids. The Eid of Victory and 
the Eid al Adha (Feast of Immolation). I, therefore, offer you my greetings and best wishes on these 
two occasions. 
Countrymen, 
A blessed greeting which heralds peace and tranquillity on the Eid al Adha accompanied by a 
felicitation crowned with pride and dignity on our glorious victory. Countrymen, 
The Eid al Adha is the commemoration of our father Abraham, peace be or him, when he decided to 
sacrifice Ismail his son in obedience to his Lord, but God redeemed him. 
The Eid of Victory is the result of the sacrifices of our soldiers and National Firqas (irregular 
troops) and every one of the friends who have helped and contributed in achieving this victory. 
They sacrificed their lives in order to save their country and protect their Islam, and redeem peace 
and security from the evils of Communism, the propagator of terror and corruption in the land. We 
thank God for accepting the sacrifice and for granting us victory and driving away the evil 
aggressors. 
0 Heroic Sons of Oman, while I hail your celebrations today and bless your victory over the evil 
gang in a part of our dear country, I bless this victory not only because you have driven away the 
aggressors from our country but also because you have defeated the plots of world communism and 
bowed the heads of those atheists who thought that they would never be defeated. 
Our victory, therefore, is the first to be achieved by an Arab country over world Communism in the 
battlefield in a war which lasted long years, and the second victory by an international state. 
It is for our own good and welfare that our country be purged from communism corruption and is 
probably for the good and welfare of our neighbours also. For we made them perceive the truth and 
liberated them from their delusions in supporting evil people who commit acts of terror, killings and 
destruction in a part of a peaceful country. They kill their brothers, plunder their properties and 
destroy their homes for nothing but simply in order to terrorise, plunder and destroy. 
I wish our neighbours to realise that what we have said is the truth and that we are always true in 
what we say. It is for the good of our neighbours to sacrifice their follies and wrong beliefs, their 







them with peace in their country, a blessing on their crops and good health so that their people will 
no longer suffer from vagrancy, hunger, disease and total ignorance. 
Countrymen, 
The chasing away of communist gangs and their remnants from the mountains 
of Dhofar does not only mean a victory over a few evil gangs, but it is also a clear revelation of an 
established truth that our dear Oman is a pure land that rejects the seeds of the communist 
movement. Our victory is an indication of the failure of the world communist movement in Oman 
and that is a favour from God, whom we thank. 
0 Sons of Oman. Although we have achieved a great victory which has great value and effect in 
political circles, this does not mean that we should rest and lay down our arms. No We now have to 
be more careful because world communism, whose pride has been hit will regard Oman as the axe 
which shattered the rock of communism and the spear which stabbed it in the heart, and will 
harbour feelings of hatred and hostility and will invent new methods and concoct new plots for 
exploiting people who are weak-minded and sick in their hearts, people if you see them like their 
bodies and when they speak, listen to them as if they were blocks of wood. 
Those are the cancer of the nations. God save us from them. So beware of them. 
Countrymen, 
While I bear the great responsibility, I urge every citizen, whether he be a soldier, farmer, or 
worker, student or teacher to keep his eyes open and be always vigilant. I warn in particular the 
responsible officials in the Government, clerks, directors, advisers and Ministers. Each one of these 
has a responsibility to bear and a duty to perform. 
O Sons of Oman, while I am confident of God’s support, I pray God Almighty to guard and protect 
Oman. But we should not ignore God’s orders which call for resoluteness and determination. I 
thank God I am certain of your sincere devotion and proud of your alertness. 
Keep on marching with God’s blessing and be diligent and industrious in order to lead this country 
on the road towards progress and prosperity. 
My hearty greetings to our heroic soldiers and irregular troops and my deep thanks and appreciation 
to our noble friends and everyone who contributed in achieving this great victory. 
I pray God to lend us his help and support. On God I rely for my success and 
I resign myself to His will. 
A Happy Year to you all and peace and the grace and blessings of God be with you. 
 
 
 
